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 1 
 (INTRODUCTION:) 
Tracing the Impact of Technological Change On the Constitution of 
Blackness: Towards Cyborg Black Studies 
 
ǲForecasts of a utopian ȋto someȌ race-free future and pronouncements of the 
dystopian digital divide are the predominant discourses of Blackness and 
technology in the public sphere.ǳ 
(Nelson 1) 
 
Up until the present, considerations of the relationship between technology and race 
have mostly fallen back on the colonialist portrayal of technology as an achievement of 
White1 cultures and the depiction of Black people as technology-illiterates, often openly 
contesting and implicitly confirming these stereotypes at the same time. Rooted in 
traditions historically exemplified by Booker T. Washington and his emphasis on ǲindustrial educationǳ as a way to uplift the Black race (113.ff.), even critical 
considerations of the relation between technology and Blackness have and still largely 
do limit themselves to arguing that people racialized as Black do possess or master 
technology, too, and that there historically were and are today many important Black 
and specifically African-American inventors (Wright). Continuing the both modern and 
colonial grand narrative of Ǯhumanityǯ and its perfection through evolution, these 
considerations approach technology as a both neutral and universal achievement mostly 
understood in terms of a tool-building whose products are considered as both separate 
and independent from its users and their identities. Mostly, these theoriesǯ focus is on 
proving the long-denied humanity and cultural abilities of Black people by disproving ǲthe idea that Afro-diasporic communities are inherently Luddite and therefore situated outside the bound of Western modernity.ǳ ȋWeheliye, Phonographies 2). This, as the 
present book will show, is a misdirected approach, because it both misunderstands the 
existential enmeshment of technology and Blackness and unwillingly permits the 
continuation of an anti-Blackness inherent in modern colonialist technology-narratives 
and the epistemologies, economics and politics they draw from or spawn. It is 
problematic precisely because it is nothing more than an attempt to have Black people 
accepted as part of a historically White construction of Ǯhumanityǯ without analyzing or 
                                                        
1 Both ǮWhitenessǯ/ ǮWhiteǯ and ǮBlacknessǯ/ǯBlackǯ will here be written with capitals when referring to 
racialized identities, and in lowercase when referring to color. 
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offering a critique of the criteria of admission or of that definition of Ǯhumanityǯ and the 
understanding of subjectivity and agency it frames. Ignoring the specific constitution of 
Whiteness and Blackness that modernity and its successors are molded on, this 
approach leaves the general tendency to identify technology with Whiteness just as 
intact as the quiet assumption that the redemption of Black people lies in becoming 
White. The present volume will propose a critique of these underlying identifications 
that are still effective today in the stereotypical dichotomy that opposes White male 
middle class adolescent hacker-geeks or nerds to Black technologically illiterate athletes 
(Eglash); a dichotomy that, far from being a Ǯmereǯ intellectual misperception, shapes the 
way public institutions structure access to the technological infrastructure they offer 
(Banks 13.ff.). It is a dichotomy active not only in socio-political disclaimers ǲconstruct[ing] technology as a site of white male superiorityǳ ȋ(ines, Nelson and Tu ͵Ȍ but also in Black identity politics claiming that ǲ[c]omputers are not part of black cultureǳ ȋRichard A. Goldsby, quoted in Kreuzer ͺͺȌ. )n approaches such as these, 
technology is thought of as located in a superior socio-cultural strata, an advanced tool 
to either master or be mastered by, a machine or technique separate from and subjected 
to its user, a user who is identified as a monadic subject and source of all agency that has 
its fullest incarnation in Whiteness. The following chapters will offer a fundamental 
critique of these approaches. Focusing on the constitution of Blackness within the 
United States of America2, they will argue that the relation of technology to Blackness 
must not be theorized in form of concerns about the emancipating use of technology by 
Black people, but must focus instead on the role of technology in racializing people as 
Black and in constituting the meaning and significance of Blackness in the first place.  
 
The following pages will pursue this project in three sections. Section I., titled The 
Constitution of Blackness, will offer a detailed analysis and critique of 
(post)modern/colonialist racializing patterns in contemporary theories of the subject 
and its formation. It will show how these theories not only deny subjectivity to Black people but rely on the latterǯs abjection in order to be able to constitute White subjects. 
An analysis of the historical continuity and ǲpermutationǳ ȋSexton, ǲThe social lifeǳ ͸Ȍ of 
Black abjection from slavery to the contemporary Prison Industrial Complex will show 
that this abjection, though fundamentally rooted in political economy, first and foremost 
                                                        
2 When speaking of ǮBlacknessǯ, then, the following pages will always and only refer to Blackness in the 
U.S.A. 
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defines a socio-psychological matrix whose purpose it is to (re)produce Whiteness as a 
specific mode of power, domination and exploitation. Section I. will identify the 
structural logic of this matrix as the axiomatic3 of White Supremacy (A[WS]) and, 
drawing from the work of Michel Foucault, trace its mechanics both in terms of micro-
politics and in terms of the enmeshment of knowledge and power in form of a 
dispositive. On the micro-political level, it will show how both subjection and abjection 
describe specific relations between bodies and discourse, or, more specifically, specific 
configurations of inscribing power into White bodies and onto Black flesh. Section I. will 
then show how these configurations are constantly (re)produced on the level of the 
dispositive, that is, how the formation of power determined by A[WS] (re)produces its 
own epistemological foundations and legitimation through both modes of knowing and 
making sense and violence, cruelty and terror. This critique of the dispositive shaped by 
A[WS] will begin by emphasizing that, due to the complex enmeshment of politico-
economical and socio-psychological factors in the constitution of Blackness, approaches 
that are only either materialist (e.g. Marxism) or psychoanalytic (e.g. Lacanianism) are 
not only inadequate to analyze the constitution of Blackness but in fact partake in the 
(re)production of this dispositive. Therefore, it will be argued throughout this book, a 
shift away from simple and separate materialism and psychoanalysis and towards a 
materialist psychiatry or schizo-analysis as proposed by Gilles Deleuze and Félix 
Guattari is necessary for any analysis of the constitution of Blackness aiming not to 
reproduce A[WS]. In theorizing this shift, section I. will move away from both micro-
political notions of soul and ideas of performative social identities and introduce instead 
the concepts of constitutive and constituted Blackness. 
Section II., titled The Racial Glitch and Constitutional Blackness, will apply the 
analytical framework developed in Section I. to cinematic and phonographic 
                                                        
3 The concepts of the axiom and the axiomatic are taken from Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattariǯs two 
volume Capitalisme et Schizophrénie, where – very roughly condensed – they are used to describe a 
general and rigidly fixed system of signification based on a central axiom that overdetermines everything 
within the axiomatic, and is opposed to a less abstract ǲcodeǳ in which signification has yet to be 
established in relation to its location and is open to contamination. Hierarchically speaking, a code can be 
considered a minor piece in an environment determined by an axiomatic. Contrary to the notion of 
episteme, the axiom connotes its contingency, interchangeability and possible – but irreconcilable – 
synchronous coexistence with other axioms, even though totalitarian in its claims. While explicit in its 
foundational and indubitable position, the concept of the axiom avoids the mono-manic reification of a 
single discourse embedded in notions of centrism, such as (e.g.) eurocentrism, and the illusionary politics 
connected to them, which suggest that a decentering could be a political act, while in fact if would only 
amount to nothing more than a reconfiguration of the exact same discourse. A simple re- or de-centering, 
in other words, would be considered a mere re-coding while leaving the axiomatic and its power 
untouched. 
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technologies. It will introduce the notion of the racial glitch as a disruption on the level 
of micro-political inscription of power into bodies and unto flesh made possible by 
technological change, and give examples of the glitch in its analysis of movies such as 
Suture and machine based music such as Detroit Techno. Analyzing examples of racial 
glitch and what it will call constitutional Blackness in cinema and phonography, as well 
as current Black Studies scholarship in these fields, section II. will argue that tracing the 
micro-political effect of the racial glitch shows how much of this existing scholarship 
(re)produces A[WS] and therefore makes a new approach to Black Studies necessary. By 
applying this critique to concepts such as Ǯsoulǯ or ǮBlacknessǯ, section II. will introduce 
concepts such as unBlack Blackness as well as a theorization of racialized bodies as 
cybernetic organisms or cyborgs. 
Section III., titled Cyborg Black Studies will condense the analysis of sections I. and II. 
into a new Black Studies methodology and paradigm beyond A[WS] and serve as 
conclusion. Cyborg Black Studies integrate the problematics indicated by the racial glitch 
and constitutional Blackness and prepare the ground for future analysis of the 
constitution of Blackness in social formations and theories increasingly affected and 
challenged by technological change. In doing so, they will radically interrogate the 
embeddedness of Black Studies within White dispositives and question the axiomatic 
structure of (post)modern/colonial sciences and their epistemologies in terms of what Donna (araway has called the ǲinformatics of dominationǳ ȋͳ͸ͳȌ. 
  
The analytical framework thus drawn up in the following pages will not only indicate 
how writers like Anthony Walton are mislead in theorizing a hostile relationship 
between Black people and technology that considers both as absolute terms and 
independent entities, but it will also emphasize how such an analysis is built on being 
blind to the existential interests of Whiteness in assuring a continued abjection of 
Blackness. Waldonǯs argument that ǲfrom the caravel to cotton gin, technological innovation has made things worse for blacksǳ, and his question, ǳWill the information revolution be any different?ǳ ȋn.pag.Ȍ, direct attention to the wrong problematics. 
Instead of framing the relationship between Blackness and technology solely as one of 
labor exploitation, one must ask how technological change, through making the labor 
exploitation of Black people less necessary, leads to a socio-symbolic revaluation of 
Blackness and what the potential political consequences of that revaluation might be. 
How, one question must be, does the reduced need for an economic exploitation of 
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Blackness (if such a reduction is indeed the case) increasingly reveal and possibly 
modify non-economic factors in the abjection of Blackness? Although the historical 
identification of Blackness with easy to exploit labor (a labor easy to exploit because of 
that identification) is correct, the assumption that, through technological change, that 
labor will merely lose its significance and thus Blackness and its continued abjection 
become unnecessary to society seems wrong, as the continued presence of anti-Black 
violence, both on an individual and an institutional level, show. Walton conflates one 
technology (the cotton mill) that makes Black labor desirable (by Whites) and hyper-
visible and leads to the increase of Black slave labor with other technologies that make 
this labor superfluous and invisible and lead to the decrease in Black employment (for 
example the robot arm or the mechanization of agriculture), when the questions should 
be exactly these: How (if so) does the difference between these technologies correspond, 
relate and/or symptomatize a difference in the constitution of Blackness? How does the 
constitution of Blackness change in order to assure that Whites continue profiting from 
their non-Blackness, either by not being enslaved or by not losing their jobs to 
technology (or at least losing it only after all Black workers have been replaced)? As 
section I. will show, this is not a simple historico-materialist question and in no way can Abdul Alkalimatǯs statement be supported, that: ǲThe entire sweep of Black (istory 
needs to be reexamined on the thesis that technological change creates the main 
structural context for the grand historical narrative of enslavement and the subsequent freedom struggleǳȋn.pag.Ȍ. The constitution of Blackness is about more than just the 
extraction of surplus labor from Black flesh and, as will be shown, no analysis of the 
constitution of Blackness can be reduced to questions of production, nor can the role of 
technology in such an analysis be reduced to a mere secondary factor in the production 
of surplus value. Instead, the following pages will show how and why the constitution of 
Blackness must be read through the lens of White desire and Black social death. 
 
The following chapters, then, will problematize technology in systemic not instrumental 
terms. They will examine how technological change does indeed change the constitution 
of Blackness, as opposed to simply transforming the socio-economic situation of a fixed 
form of Blackness. Throughout this text, the engagement with technological change will 
focus solely on the significance of specific technologies for theoretical models of White 
subjection/Black abjection and the constitution of Blackness, rather than the practical 
use of technologies and their potential for changing real life relations of racial 
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domination. Focusing on meta-theoretical perspectives, the present book will trace 
micro-political changes in the constitution of Blackness and search for possible 
repercussions on the level of the dispositive, and it is precisely the lack of such 
repercussions that will motivate it to propose Cyborg Black Studies.  
 
Not only does this approach based on micro-politics and the dispositive imply that the 
relationship between Blackness and technology is not instrumental, but it will be 
insisted that Blackness itself is a specific symptomatic constellation of the enmeshment 
of knowledge and power and not merely an instrument or technology at the hands of the 
individual. In other words: both essentialist attempts to prove that Black people 
participate in or suffer under technological change and excessively constructivist and 
performative notions of Blackness itself being a technology to use will be considered 
insufficient. Accordingly, approaches such as the following by Beth Coleman will be 
regarded as both dangerously misleading and implicitly apologetic of White supremacy:  ǲ… let us call Ǯrace as technologyǯ a disruptive technology that changes the terms of 
engagement with an all-too-familiar system of representation and power.ǳ(178).  
Although this book would want to embrace Colemanǯs hope, ǲthat technologyǯs 
embedded function of self-extension may be exploited to liberate race from an inherited position of abjection toward greater expression of agencyǳ ȋͳ͹͹Ȍ, a short note on the 
disfunctionality her use of agency introduces into the concept of ǲrace as technologyǳ 
will help to further clarify the deficiencies of her approach and the character of the 
approach developed here. Just like the authors criticized earlier in this introduction, 
Coleman approaches technology as instrumental to the individual, that is, she understands the relationship of the subject to technology as one of ǲtechnological agencyǳ on the side of a free subject and within the hegemonial modes of making sense. 
Coleman understands this ǲtechnological agencyǳ as something that: 
 ǲ … speaks to the ways by which external devices help us navigate the terrain in which we live […] )n this case, agency indicates presence, will and 
movement – the ability to move freely as a being … and it is not restricted to 
individuals but also includes systems: it concerns how beings are subjected in systems of power, ideology and other networksǳ ȋͳ͹͹.f.Ȍ  
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Against this emphasis on agency, the following chapters will show why an analysis of 
existing Blackness cannot be developed along humanistic lines or in terms of hegemony. 
This is especially true of theories concerned with the abjection of Blackness, as both 
Blackness and abjection, it will be argued, mark systemic situations of exclusion from 
society and humanity, not human subject positions on ǲthe terrain in which we liveǳ. 
Rather than a way of negotiating a terrain like humanity, civil society or hegemony, that 
is, rather than a way of shifting oneǯs position on that terrain, the abjection of Blackness 
describes the grid that structures that terrain. It cannot, it will be argued, change on but 
only with the terrain itself. Accordingly, Colemanǯs often repeated point that ǲa notion of 
race as technology, however, moves toward an aesthetic category of human being, 
where mutability of identity, reach of individual agency, and conditions of culture all 
influence each otherǳ ȋͳͺͲȌ and that ǲagency is the operative word in extending race as technologyǳ ȋͳͺ͵Ȍ can not only not be accepted but must be criticized for assuming that 
the relationship between technology and oneǯs racialized identity is always the same, no 
matter if one is racialized as White, or Black or in any other mode. Whatǯs more, it 
completely ignores the significance of location in time and space for the potential use of 
or access to such race-as-technology-agency (e.g. being Black in the Jim Crow South vs. 
being Black in contemporary Liberia). From this perspective, Black People would be 
responsible for suffering from anti-Blackness and its effects simply for not putting the 
potential of their race-as-technology4 into practice. Such approaches – ultimately no 
more than attempts to reduce race to performance – propose an all to innocent 
understanding of racialized identities because they ignore the apparatus of power, 
terror and cruelty that upholds specific systems of representation and knowledge not 
only against agency, but also as fundamental to any understanding of agency. It is 
precisely the force of notions such as the dispositive – and variations on this notion, 
such as the concept of coloniality – to constantly insist on this violence and force any 
analysis of social positions and situations to pass through a combined analysis of 
representation and sheer physical violence. Although the present book suggests that all 
modes of racialization are constitutively enmeshed with technology, it will repeatedly 
                                                        
4 Wendy Hui Kyong Chun defines the differences between Ǯrace and technologyǯ and Ǯrace as technologyǯ as follows: ǲCrucially, race as technology shifts the focus from the what of race to the how of race, from 
knowing race to doing race by emphasizing the similarities between race and technology. Indeed, race as 
technology is a simile that posits a comparative equality or substitutability – but not identity – between the two terms … Race as technology reveals how race functions as the Ǯasǯ, how it facilitates comparisons between entities classed as similar or dissimilar.ǳ ȋͺȌ. This definition is subject to the same critique as the 
definition offered by Coleman. 
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emphasize that these modes are not identical and that no simple analogies between 
them must be made. Race, and particularly Blackness, is not a mere contingent tool 
available to anyone in the same manner, but a structure of social, political, economic, 
psychological and epistemological being and non-being that institutes differences 
between people. Contrary to technology, race is not optional, optimizable or 
transferable, but constitutive. But it is also not simply, as Falguni A. Sheth writes, that ǲ[s]imilarly [to technology], within a juridico-political context, race becomes an 
instrument that produces certain political and social outcomes that are needed to cohere 
societyǳ ȋʹʹȌ. In the United States, as the following chapter will show, Blackness is not an ǲinstrumentǳ and not ǲwithin a juridico-political contextǳ. Rather, civil society in the U.S. 
being based on A[WS], the abjection of Blackness forms the basic structure and gives its 
character to that context. Technology and race must not be reduced to productivity or 
performance, but must be conceptualized in their constitutive impact on society, as well 
as epistemology, economy, politics and psychology. From this perspective, the impact of 
technological change on Blackness is not about the relation between the individual and 
specific technologies, it is not about technology-use, not about an individualǯs access or 
non-access to it.5 The focus here is not on acquiring capacity or dealing with incapacity, 
but on the constitution of the abject as void of any form of capacity (Wilderson, Red 
251), that is, as excluded from any notions of capacity by definition. In order to analyze 
the impact of technology on Blackness one must then not look at their relationship as a 
static one, but analyze instead the correlations between the change in technology and 
the change in the constitution of Blackness. It is for this reason that this book does not 
interrogate the impact of technology as such on the constitution of Whiteness and 
Blackness, but the impact of technological change. The question simply is this: how – if 
so – do ever new technologies force the constitution of Blackness to either adapt or 
disappear; and what forms would such an adaptation or disappearance take? Connected 
to this question, further questions of the following sort then arise: how may technology 
uncover the cruelty constitutive of Blackness but often erased under constituted 
Blackness? How might it enforce such erasure? How can it lead to an abstraction of 
phenotype in social exchange and how might this subversion of face-to-face epidermal 
authority translate into a subversion of structural epidermal authority? What, for 
example, are Whiteness and Blackness in technologically mediated situations that 
                                                        
5 Non-access, such as the one theorized under the rubric of the digital divide, is considered structurally no 
different from more classical (or non-technological) forms of segregation. 
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permit no visual, but only aural interaction? What is the position of White desire in 
technology and how does it affect the constitution of Blackness? Might technology lead 
to the undoing of racialization and thus Blackness, for example by obliterating the 
reasons that inform it? Or will it help to further enforce racialization and its 
consequences? 
 
The answers to these questions have multiple dimensions ranging from mechanisms of 
psychological suture to social suture through, among other things, ideological 
interpellation, physical discipline and surveillance. On the one hand, there are various 
attempts to erase traces of constitutive Blackness, to enforce Black invisibility in and 
through technology, e.g. through a ǲwhitinizing of cyberspaceǳ ȋTalȌ. There are attempts to Ǯrescueǯ or Ǯreconstructǯ racist notions of Blackness using new technologies, such as 
the development of racial profiling into a quasi-social-science that is one of the promises 
of Big Data (Reardon; Whitmarsh & Jones; Roberts). There is the instrumentalization of the (uman Genome Project to reestablish the broken link between the ǲthe somatic and 
the inner self, the phenotype and the genotype, pigment shade and psychological 
sensibilityǳ, between the ǲseen and the unseenǳ through which ǲthe Ǯtruthǯ of race is 
understood as grounded in somatically observable, dependable differencesǳ ȋStoler 
372+371). These approaches rely on claiming Ǯobjectiveǯ and Ǯsignificantǯ medical or 
statistical differences between Ǯracesǯ in order to re-naturalize them, that is, in order to 
re-articulate an ontological grounding of race (Chinn; Hacking; Saul; Fujimura et al.; (artiganȌ. On the other hand, there are notions about ǲthe decline in racial identity … 
reinforced by the tendency of new media to undermine both medium specificity and personal or physical identity, either as a matter of bodies or bloodlinesǳ ȋMitchell ʹͺȌ. 
The present book locates itself close to the latter school of thought and shares its 
attention to media technologies in order to develop a Cyborg Black Studies methodology 
able to enquire into technologyǯs potential to enforce the erasure of constitutive 
Blackness as well as to create a racial lag subverting that erasure. Racial lag mobilizes 
traces of constitutive Blackness, that is, mobilizes moments in which the traditional 
representation and conception of race become dysfunctional and are thus put in crisis 
because an immediate racial identification, a direct reading of a person through a 
specific axiomatic, is disrupted (e.g. the disruption of identification through skin color on 
the phone or in cyberspace). It is through this racial lag that a racial glitch may arise 
between the dispositive and the body/flesh it wants to inscribe itself into/onto. Through 
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tracing this glitch, the following pages will theorize the impact of technological change 
on the constitution of Blackness. They will develop a methodology making possible a 
transfer of Black Studies from colonial and post-colonial to cybernetic spaces, moving 
them from face-to-face to interface situations. Leaving behind both the overemphasis on 
the body that was the mark of phrenology and similar sciences and the overemphasis on 
the symbolic and the performative that was the flaw of much of social constructivism 
and subsequent theories of race as identity, the present book will fuse these two 
extremes by theorizing White subjection/Black abjection and the cybernetic organism 
that will be in the center of Cyborg Black Studies. 
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Section I. The Constitution of Blackness as Abject 
 
 12 
I.1.THE BLOOD-STAINED GATE OF BLACKNESS 
 
 
The beating of aunt Hester is a well-known example of African-American subjection6 and Saidiya (artmanǯs treatment of it  is a key moment in contemporary Black Studies 
debate that will allow us to expose the lines of flight that the considerations on the 
constitution of Blackness7 will follow in this section. Following Frederick Douglass 
depiction, Hartman writes: 
 „The passage through the blood-stained gate is an inaugural moment in the 
formation of the enslaved. In this regard, it is a primal scene. By this I mean that 
the terrible spectacle dramatizes the origin of the subject and demonstrates that 
to be a slave is to be under the brutal power and authority of another.ǳ ȋ3). 
 
Douglass original words were: 
 ǲ[The  beating of aunt Hester] was the blood-stained gate, the entrance to the hell 
of slavery, through which I was about to pass. It was a most terrible spectacle.ǳ 
(3f.)  
 
This constellation is striking in several ways. It is the violence conferred on the body of 
another – the aunt – that seems to create the foundation for the subjection of not only her, but also the ǲ)ǳ, the narrator partaking in the violence only through the mediation of his auntǯs screams. The blood that stains the gate is not that of the narrator but that of 
aunt (esterǯs lashed back. It is through her body that the ǲ)ǳ feels the plantation being 
inscribed into itself, that he is enslaved. In fact, we are not explicitly told about aunt (esterǯs own point of entrance into the hell of slavery. The ǲterrible spectacleǳ relates 
exclusively to the position of the ǲ)ǳ as either witness or spectator/voyeur, a difference 
that Hartman will strongly emphasize (19). Sharing Douglassǯ sense of Black subjection 
                                                        
6 „Subjectionǲ will be used here as proposed by Judith Butler, viz. as equivalent to Michel Foucaultǯs ǲassujettissementǳ, the act of both making someone oneǯs subject in terms of a hierarchy of domination 
and therewith partaking in the formation of a subjectivity (Psychic 2). 
7 As will be elaborated in the following chapters, the term ǲBlacknessǳ will here be used in the sense 
proposed by Fred Moten to designate a situation/position constituted as ǲfactǳ within a specific discourse, as opposed to ȋbut not excludingȌ the ǲlived experience of the blackǳ, and the ǲcase of Blacknessǳ as the 
relation between the fact and the experience ȋǲCaseǳ 179). 
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arising from the ǲspectacular character of black sufferingǳ ȋ͵Ȍ, Hartman argues that such 
spectacles should be avoided when writing about Blackness. What this demand 
delineates is how Black subjection – both during and since slavery – is not a binary 
relationship, but a performance that requires the presence of a third party to transform 
violence and suffering into a socio-normative act creating and re-iterating its own 
foundation, meaning, legitimacy and legibility. In order to analyze the character of Black 
subjection and the constitution of Blackness, then, one must focus on the spectacular, 
not in spite of (artmanǯs critique of such procedures, but as an interrogation of where 
she draws the line between spectator and witness. 
 What is the ǲspectacleǳ? Guy Debord describes it as follows: ǲLe spectacle nǯest pas un ensemble dǯimages, mais un rapport social entre des personnes, médiatisé par des images.ǲ8(§4). This is exactly the „)ǲ situating itself in a social matrix through perceiving 
the spectacular beating of its aunt. The spectacular in this sense is a secondary process, 
as, in order to assume its function – in order to be legible – it needs to connect to a 
preset matrix of power that has always-already defined the meaning of the spectacle and 
which the latter can thus actualize but does not produce. The spectacular ǲmediatesǳ, it 
does not create. The fundamental mechanics at play here are those of identification, both 
in term of identifying with and identifying something. Why does the ǲ)ǳ identify with its 
aunt, and not with Captain Anthony who is doing the beating? Why does it identify at all? 
How does the ǲ)ǳ identify the meaning of aunt (esterǯs screams for its own life? What is 
identification; how does it work? The scene offers several different possible readings. It 
could be read as a moment of Althusserian interpellation, and chapter I.1. and I.3.c. will 
look into the role this concept can play in understanding Black subjection, or more 
precisely Black abjection. )n this sense, aunt (esterǯs screams actualize an always-already present subject within the ǲ)ǳ. The screams launch a preset identity, in which the ǲ)ǳ always-already knows that it is a slave, not a master; a subject which recognizes itself 
in interpellation, because it always-already feels guilty (Althusser 113). Guilt, of course, 
is a feeling that indicates the internalization of an external order as the ground of 
identity. It implies the possibility of experiencing a split and occupying two positions at 
once: that of perpetrator and that of judge. Considering the identification of slavery with 
Blackness, that chapter I.2. will explore in order to demonstrate the continuity of Black 
                                                        
8 „The spectacle is not a collection of images, but a social relation among people, mediaed by images.ǲ 
(S.W.) 
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abjection from the plantation to the penitentiary, from the past to the present, reading 
Blackness through the concept of interpellation and as ǲguiltǳ signals a prior constitution 
of Blackness as pathological and criminal. It thus hints at the importance of thoroughly 
considering the mechanics of internalization of power in the constitution of Blackness 
that will be explored throughout this section and will be considered with a special focus 
on the concept of the dispositive in chapter I.3. and on psychoanalysis and Blackness in 
chapter I.4. Blackness thus will be analyzed as a political concept, central in the 
formation of the subject, the abject, the self and the experience of itself and its worlds, 
impacting what will be defined as a ǲBlack experienceǳ (the split and double 
consciousness, the split and double ontology), but in no way identical with it. Blackness 
will be approached as socio-genetic, as a political construction within a system 
structured along A[WS] and it will solely be considered in relation to this system.  
 
I.1.a. Axiomatics with and without Soul: Spectacular Blackness 
 
Although it might seem strange to equate aunt (esterǯs screams of pain created through 
the violence of Captain Anthony with the interpellating voice of the police constable that 
Louis Althusser describes, this is exactly where the concept of the spectacular develops 
its force. As Douglass notes, Captain Anthony ǲwould whip her to make her scream, and 
whip her to make her hush …ǳ ȋ4). The beating is not a scene of mere violence between 
two bodies (aunt Hester and Captain Anthony), but it is a staging of the relation between 
the locations of these bodies, the situation of aunt Hester and the position of Captain 
Anthony. It is spectacular violence – that is: cruelty – whose aim is not the physical act as 
such, but its mise-en-scène, one form of ǲmaterialization of a regulatory normǳ ȋButler, 
Bodies xii). Cruelty is not directed at its immediate victim alone and not even foremost. 
Instead, it is intended to spread across time and space in the form of impersonal terror 
in order to produce within every individual sharing a determinative communality ȋǲguiltǳȌ with the victim the fear of becoming a victim, too, as well as a certain sense not 
only of the self, but also of the body, in this case: of its body as a Black body. This is exactly what the ǲ)ǳ writes: „) expected it would be my turn nextǲ (Douglass 5). Thus, 
terror can only work through identification, through the act of identifying in the victim 
and as a cause of its ordeal something that makes the ǲ)ǳ interchangeable with it. 
Contrary to violence, cruelty and the terror it aims to produce are abstractions; systemic 
effects due to and only possible because of a certain structure of discourse, a certain 
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axiomatic. In the case of Frederick Douglassǯ narrative, the structural location re-
iterated by this systemic effect is, of course, race, and its product is the identification of 
Blackness with slavery. Through beating aunt Hester, Captain Anthony re-iterates her 
situation as slave and his position as master and he does so in a relation to all other 
slaves and masters. The ǲ)ǳ is not peeping in; it is not an illegal and secret spectator 
tending to its private desires and pleasures and/or subverting the masterǯs powers 
through its witnessing against his will. Captain Anthony makes Aunt Hester scream: he 
wants his power – supposedly put in doubt by misdemeanor – to materialize, become 
tangible, be openly demonstrated. But for this, he does not need to command the ǲ)ǳ to 
be an official witness present by explicit articulation of his will. Rather, the ǲ)ǳ is at once 
the product and the mediated and implied victim of Captain Anthonyǯs cruelty. The guilt 
of being Black is not created but reiterated in the beating. The ǲ)ǳ partakes neither to bear ǲwitnessǳ nor to ǲenjoyǳ the spectacle, but it is forced to participate in the beating through its body that it knows to be the ǲguiltǳ it shares with the actual victim. Not only does the ǲ)ǳ identify in the first place, but it also knows that it is supposed to identify 
with the race of its aunt instead of the gender of the Captain (for one example). The fear 
of being next is not just an empathic identification, but a fully grounded understanding of the ǲ)ǳǯs identity that necessitates a complex self-situating within the community of 
the plantation9. It is a fear that implies a minimum degree of (racial) self-consciousness, 
that is: the integration of race into the self and its body as a determinative factor of the 
self in relation to the community. In this situation, race is a conscious factor, a moment 
configuring subjection through contend rather than form. Here, the ǲ)ǳ is constituted as 
slave through a cruelty it knows it must fear due to its Blackness.  
 As a platform for the spectacle of racial domination, Aunt (esterǯs body serves the 
materialization of the ideology dominant in the society it is situated in (Debord § 212). 
The terrible spectacle in this is not aunt (esterǯs suffering, but Black suffering, that is, 
the reiteration of the ǲfactǳ of the interchangeability of Black bodies projected within a 
constellation of time and space structured along A[WS]. What is being produced is not 
foremost the actual victim, are not actual witnesses or spectators, but virtual victims and 
non-victims as defined by racial ascription. This does not mean, that the actual victim 
should be ignored, nor that there can be no witnesses or spectators, as the non-victim 
                                                        
9 For further consideration of the plantation as a specific field of social relations see chapter I.2. as well as Katherine McKittrickǯs ǲPlantation Futuresǳ. 
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(and to a certain degree also the virtual victim) may of course occupy such a position. 
But it shifts the focus from suffering and the fear of ǲpornotropingǳ ȋSpillers, ǲMamaǳ 67) 
to, on the one hand, socio-genetic morphogenesis and, on the other, fungibility and 
disposability. All of these terms refer to a social acting on the Black body – pornotroping as „the enactment of black suffering for a shocked and titillated audienceǲ ȋWeheliye, ǲPornotropesǳ ͹ͳȌ; ǲfungibilityǳ as ǲthe joy made possible by virtue of the replaceability 
and interchangeability endemic to the commodityǳ ȋ(artman ʹͳȌ; disposability as a 
characteristic of the Black body in its commodification – and are not concerned with the 
interior but only with the social life of Blackness. This will also be the field of enquiry the 
present text will limit itself to. Focusing on the social life and socio-genetic constitution 
of Blackness, the spectacular and the ǲroutine display of the slaveǯs ravaged bodyǳ 
(Hartman 4) cannot be avoided here. However, this is not deemed more ǲobsceneǳ 
(Hartman 4) than (artmanǯs own writing, where she evokes the scene of aunt (esterǯs 
beating in a way that pre-supposes her readersǯ familiarity with the cruelty involved in 
the constitution of Blackness. Hartman can avoid the scene itself only because she 
assumes that it is well known and the fact of cruelty in the constitution has already been 
established. Writing from inside (even if against) A[WS] and its ǲabjectorshipǳ ȋBroeck, ǲEnslavementǳ n.pag.) and ǲenslavismǳ ȋBroeck, ǲBordersǳ 6), the politics of writing in 
the present book not only cannot consider the fact of cruelty to have been established, 
but must pursue the tracing of this cruelty as well as an analysis of how it is being erased 
from perception in order to permit narratives on the Ǯnatureǯ of Blackness that ignore 
the role of violence and cruelty in its constitution. It is assumed here that hinting at 
cruelty without going into detail only serves such erasure and therewith the 
reproduction of A[WS] by avoiding a direct confrontation with its modes of self-
constitution. It avoids the cruelty that constitutes Blackness at the risk of remaining 
within axiomatically coherent representations of Blackness or what will be theorized as 
constituted Blackness below. Hinting at cruelty while wanting to avoid it at the same 
time risks being the first step to agnotology, that is, towards a production of ignorance 
concerning how Blackness is constituted that ultimately makes a detailed analysis 
impossible. Therefore it is necessary, at this point, to give a few examples of cruelty:  
 
 „Before he commenced whipping Aunt (ester, he took her into the kitchen, and 
stripped her from neck to waist, leaving her neck, shoulders and back, entirely 
naked. He then told her to cross her hands, calling her at the same time a d—d 
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b—h. After crossing her hands, he tied them with a strong rope, and led her to a 
stool under a large hook in the joist, put in for the purpose. He made her get upon 
the stool, and tied her hands to the hook. She now stood upon the ends of her toes. (e then said to her, ǮNow, you d—d b—h, )ǯll learn you to disobey my orders!ǯ and after rolling up his sleeves, he commenced to lay on the heavy 
cowskin, and soon the warm, red blood (amid heart-rending shrieks from her, 
and horrid oaths from him) came dripping to the floor.ǲ ȋDouglass 4)  
 „LOWRY ROASTED BY )NC(ES BEFORE W)FE AND C()LDREN ... )nch by )nch the 
negro was fairly cooked to death ... As the flesh began to drop away from his legs 
and they were reduced to bones, once or twice he attempted to pick up hot coals 
and swallow them in order to hasten death.ǲ ȋMemphis Press, quoted in Gussow 
120) 
 „A suspected [black] horse thief, he [a Union officer] said, ǯwas beheaded, skinned 
and nailed to the barn.ǯǲ ȋOshinsky 25) 
 ǲ[…] the particularly ghastly October 1934 murder of Claude Neal, who had been 
accused of rape and murder. With a crowd of some four thousand, including 
many children, bearing witness, Neal was stabbed, burned, and castrated. He was 
forced to eat his own genital before being dragged by an automobile to his death; 
then his body, mutilated and nude, was suspended from a tree in the courthouse square of Marianna, Florida. Photographs were sold for fifty cents. Nealǯs toes and 
fingers were put on display.ǳ ȋKatznelson 167) 
 
These are clearly not acts of mere violence, but spectacular re-iterations of social 
positioning and situating, scenes of materialization of power. The scandal here are not 
the easy to rationalize (even if possibly only feigned) causes of these actions (envy, 
theft), but their form. It is only through their form – their cruelty and terror as the 
production of virtual victimhood – that they reiterate race in the way Michel Foucault 
thought of it, as ǲLa race, le racisme, cǯest la condition dǯacceptabilité de la mise à mort 
dans une société de normalisationǳ10 (Société 228). Cruelty re-iterates the distinction 
                                                        
10 „Race, racism, are the conditions of acceptability of putting to death in a society of normalization.ǳ ȋS.W.Ȍ 
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between those who can be its perpetrators and those who are its victims; a distinction 
that precedes its actual enactment as the foundation of that enactmentǯs possibility. 
Foucault identifies race as the form this distinction takes: it is, in this sense, an axiom 
that is not shaped within a certain society or discourse but shapes that society or 
discourse. Following Foucault, race becomes the norm guiding the instruments of power 
that in his theory are bio-power and discipline. Through setting up the norm, which will 
inform the normal and normalization, bio-power creates a criterion that divides society 
into those who conform to this norm and those who donǯt. The goal of bio-power, then, 
is to (re)produce and preserve the conforming/normal and to eliminate the non-
conforming/pathological. From the perspective of bio-power, race is about life: it does 
not kill in order to kill, but it identifies something to keep alive and kills what it deems to 
threaten that life. The racial other, here, is that which must be killed in order to create a 
homeostatic (healthier/better/ etc.) population (Société 218). It is because it pertains to the creation of a Ǯpeopleǯ and a specific form of society that bio-power means ǲbio-regulation through the Stateǳ (Société 223). In other words: in order to institutionalize a 
specific people in form of a specific nation and a specific civil society, ǲWhitenessǳ and ǲBlacknessǳ are first created as a its determinative concepts and norms and then 
imposed and thus rendered real through violent regularization and policing. The 
multiple and decentralized institutions sufficient for the enactment of discipline – 
focused at the spatial distribution and visibility of bodies in order to extract a maximum 
of surplus value from them (Société 215) – are supplanted (not suppressed) by a central 
normative instance of regularization. This instance is able to transform its norms (of 
what and how the bios should be) into reality. It is able to materialize these norms in and 
through bodies and to create homeostasis because of its power to first name and then 
kill that which is not conform/normal and thus pathological. The power to kill is the 
guarantor of the power to sustain a life defined through homeostasis: the Black body is 
not killed to be dead, but it is first created and then killed in order to produce the White 
body (and White people and society) and give life ex negativo to the White citizen11. This 
is the fungibility of the Black body, but it is also the coloniality of power that chapter 
I.3.a. will elaborate on: a construction of knowledge through power producing a ǳcrookedǳ epistemology violently implemented and thus made ǲrealǳ. 
 
                                                        
11 It is because of this, that, for Foucault, the State as such is deeply enmeshed with racism and that bio-
power is a deeply nationalistic concept (Société 227). 
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Cruelty is one form of materializing the racial axiom, as it is not only legitimate and 
legible only when directed towards Blacks, but marks bodies as Black in its exercise. 
Reading this through Foucaultǯs concept of „châtiment-spectacleǲ12 (Surveiller 17), one 
form in which the bio-political distinction at the base of cruelty finds expression is 
through the absence of a Black soul in a discourse structured according to A[WS]. In 
Surveiller et Punir, Foucault describes how cruel and unusual punishments, whose goal 
was the demonstration of state power, came to be replaced by non-spectacular 
punishments, whose goal was the re-education of the criminal. This ǲsuppliceǳ13 at the heart of the „châtiment-spectacleǲ –ǳ „une production de souffrance, un rituel organisé 
pour le marquage des victimes et la manifestation du pouvoir qui punitǲ14 (Surveiller 44) – moves into the background of punishment because of the discovery of the soul 
(Surveiller 24), which is not to be understood in religious terms: 
 
 „Cette âme réelle, et incorporelle, nǯest point substance; elle est lǯélément o‘ sǯarticulent les effets dǯun certain type de pouvoir et la référence dǯun savoir, lǯengrenage par lequel les relations de pouvoir donnent lieu à un savoir possible, et le savoir reconduit et renforce les effets du pouvoir.ǲ15 (Surveiller 38) 
 
Cruelty towards Black people demonstrated that these were considered to not have a 
soul: because they had no inherent part in power, power had to continue inscribing itself 
onto them through cruelty. Lacking here is not a metaphysical, but a micro-political soul 
(Surveiller 34) and it is in this sense that Frank Wilderson can describe Blackness as a ǲrelation of terror as opposed to a relation of hegemonyǳ ȋǲGramsciǳ 6). Black slaves 
were not conceded a legible and legitimate socio-symbolic existence in terms of a soul 
(humanity; citizenship …Ȍ, but were reduced to bodies and commodities to which 
society related not in terms of discourse but physical violence. It is important to be 
aware of this, as it signals the political character of the constitution of Blackness. 
Although there have been several historical attempts to explain race and racial 
hierarchy (the curse of Ham, social Darwinism, etc.), all of these have considered race as 
                                                        
12 ǲpunishment-spectacleǳ ȋS.W.Ȍ 
13 ǲmartyrdomǳ ȋS.W.Ȍ 
14 ǲthe production of suffering, a ritual organized for marking its victims and manifesting the punishing powerǳ ȋS.W.Ȍ 
15 „This real and incorporeal soul is not substance, it is the element wherein the effects of a certain type of 
power and the reference to a knowledge are articulated, the transmission through which power relations give birth to a possible knowledge, and knowledge redirects and enforces the effects of power.ǳȋS.W.Ȍ 
 20 
a given fact, that is, they have used and admitted a bio-political system structured by 
A[WS] as the basis of their enquiries. They did not consider race a product of White 
supremacist hegemony, but situated it outside that hegemony in the field structuring 
that hegemony. Race, in other words, was and is part of the axiomatic that shapes that 
hegemony, not an aspect within that hegemony. As the self-transparency of Blackness 
and Whiteness are the indubitable cornerstones of truth within A[WS], they cannot be 
changed or eliminated without eliminating this hegemony; they occupy for and within 
this hegemony an ontological status. Thinking from within A[WS] then, White 
supremacy would be considered a system of ontological politics, a polity based on truth 
and thus necessarily constructed as it is and incapable of being otherwise. Race here is 
an onto-genetic political situation. The basic axiom of A[WS] is that the Black person, 
having no soul and thus being ontologically different from the White person, is not a ǲhuman subjectǳ, but just a ǲsentient beingǳ ȋWilderson, ǲVengeanceǳ 3).  
 
Thinking, as this chapter has done, through cruelty as a mode of inscribing racialized 
power into and onto bodies and creating Blackness and Whiteness in the process is a 
method no less founded in axiomatic procedures, even if overtly anti-racist ones. 
However, these procedures do not operate along lines of ontological politics, but aim to 
deconstruct White supremacy in terms of ǲpolitical ontologyǳ ȋWilderson, Red 3). This 
means describing the ontological predications made in A[WS] as not events of truth, but 
results of political processes and thus subject to change. In this case, Blackness is 
understood as socio-genetic. This means analyzing Blackness as ascription and political 
output, as opposed to approaching Blackness as a term describing something that is plain to see to ǲcommon senseǳ and therefore, as indubitable fact, an input to politics 
rather than a political outcome. Both A[WS] and the approach chosen here locate 
Blackness outside the discourse of White civil societies, but whereas ontological politics 
consider this field to be that of non-conflictual and transparent truth, political ontology 
considers this field to be a violent and cruel battlefield whose outcome is contingent and 
impermanent. 
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I.1.b. Theorized in the Zero, declined in the Second Degree: Constitutive and 
Constituted Blackness 
 
As the consideration of cruelty has shown, any analysis of the constitution of Blackness 
must differentiate between the violent inscription of Blackness onto bodies (the level of 
constitutive Blackness) and subsequent intra-axiomatic narrations that may deny this 
cruel formation and consider Blackness to be a fact given prior to and existing outside 
the political (the level of constituted Blackness). The Foucaultian instance of 
regularization that implements race as the organizing principle of the normal posits its 
axiomatic not within but as the basis of its civil society; it is axiomatic precisely because 
it cannot be legitimized within the discourse that is established upon it, viz. after the 
constitution of civil society. Thus situating Blackness outside a social order and describing it as this orderǯs foundational logic is reminiscent of what Giorgio Agamben has described as the ǲ(omo Sacerǳ, the figure of ǲzoeǳ or ǲnaked lifeǳ, of which he writes: ǲDem nackten Leben kommt in der abendländischen Politik das einzigartige Privileg zu, 
das zu sein, auf dessen Ausschließung sich das Gemeinwesen der Menschen 
gründetǳ16(Homo 17)17. More such similitudes can be found, when one considers the 
function of cruelty as suturing discourse and bodies and the absence of a Black micro-political soul within A[WS] in the light of Agambenǯs political perspective on 
metaphysics: 
  „Die Politik erweist sich demnach als im eigentlichen Sinn fundamentale Struktur 
der abendländischen Metaphysik, insofern sie die Schwelle besetzt, auf der sich 
die Verbindung zwischen Lebewesen und Sprache vollzieht.ǲ18 (Homo 18) 
 
The absence of a Black soul in A[WS] means that a Black person is not a person at all (it 
has no part in the socio-symbolic), but is Ǯjustǯ a body on which but not in which 
discourse can materialize, and which thus can be no more than a sentient being and 
silent animal. It is not situated in the realm of the political and thus does not partake in 
the ǲbiosǳ. The Black body cannot be a citizen, as it serves as the ex negativo foundation 
                                                        
16 ǲTo the naked live accrues in occidental politics the singular privilege of being that on whose exclusion 
the community of Man founds itself.ǳ ȋS.W.Ȍ 
17 See chapter I.2.d. for an elaboration on the difference between the situation oft he Black abject and the 
Homo Sacer. 
18 ǲPolitics proves to be the principal founding structure of occidental metaphysics in as far as it occupies the threshold on which the connection between living beings and speech is executed.ǳ ȋS.W.Ȍ 
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for the construction of a homeostatic White citizenry that, precisely because it is not 
Black, cannot be killed, enslaved, exploited (etc.), but is under the protection of the bio-
power that constitutes it. At worst then, the Black body without soul is not even a body, 
but just flesh, in the way Hortense Spillers has theorized these terms: 
 „ȋ...Ȍ ) would make a distinction in this case between the „bodyǲ and the „fleshǲ 
and impose that distinction as the central one between captive and liberated subject positions. )n that sense, before the „bodyǲ, there is the „fleshǲ, that zero 
degree of social conceptualization that does not escape concealment under the 
brush of discourse, or the reflexes of iconography. [...] a theft of the body – a 
willful and violent (and unimaginable from this distance) severing of the captive 
body from its motive will, its active desire. Under these conditions ... the female 
body and the male body become a territory of cultural and political maneuver.ǲ 
(ǲMamaǳ 67) 
 
This interlocked constitution of the White citizen body and the Black commodity flesh 
will be analyzed in this section through the term of abjection. In order to do this, what 
needs to be dissected is the situation of the Black flesh at the ǲzero degree of social conceptualizationǳ ȋwhich will be written as ⧂). This will require a ǲhermeneutics of absence and a pedagogy of traceǳ ȋBroeck, ǲBordersǳ 6.f.) that this chapter will engage in 
in respect to the historical situation of the enslaved, before the following chapter traces 
the continuity of this situation from the plantation to the penitentiary in order to 
prepare the ground for the rest of this section to theorize the abject through a critique of 
contemporary theories of subjection. 
 
* 
 
In his description of the micro-political soul, Foucault points out that this soul was the 
basis for a freedom accorded to a member of society as a property, as „un droit et un bienǲ19 (Surveiller 18) whose confiscation would constitute the core of punishment and 
whose restitution would mark the end of it. Freedom and the sort of punishment 
connected to its confiscation thus relied on a notion of the criminal as a deviant part of a 
                                                        
19 ǲa right and a goodǳ ȋS.W.Ȍ 
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political community that it was already a subject of. This meant that the criminal would 
not have to be set into relation to the punishing power, but that a relation already 
existed and had only to be corrected. The criminal in this sense had a political persona 
before becoming a criminal; he had been a subject before punishment and because of 
this could be re-instated as one without the need for a châtiment-spectacle that would 
first have to integrate him into discourse. Such a sober re-instantiation could not be the 
character of punishment when this was concerned with criminals who did not have and 
were not meant to have a political persona (and because of this were in fact not 
criminals who had broken the law but lawless savages). Being outside discourse, but 
discourse being the dimension of punishment, cruelty was a necessary performance for 
the paradox task of translating extra-discursive violence into punishment without 
making the non-persona a subject. Saidiya Hartman described this complex situation with regard to the slave as follows: „The cleavage or sundering as object of property, 
pained flesh, and unlawful agent situates the enslaved in an indefinite and paradoxical 
relation to the normative category personǲ ȋ56).   
 
That slaves by law were not considered part of the political community of personas was 
famously explained by Supreme Court of the United States Judge Roger B. Taney in the 
Dred Scott verdict: 
 „)n the opinion of the court, the legislation and histories of the times, and the 
language used in the Declaration of Independence, show that neither the class of 
persons who had been imported as slaves nor their descendants, whether they 
had become free or not, were then acknowledged as a part of the people, nor 
intended to be included in the general words used in that memorable instrument. 
[...] They had for more than a century before been regarded as beings of an 
inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white race either in 
social or political relations, and so far inferior that they had no rights which the 
white man was bound to respect, and that the negro might justly and lawfully be 
reduced to slavery for his benefit.ǲ (Scott v. Sandford) 
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But at the same time, slaves were part of the polity of this community, that for one 
defined its people through a legally framed conception of race20, and for another 
allocated and judged the slave as property. Although a zero-degree (⧂) person, the 
slave was situated in a second-degree existence to a non-slave, that is, as the function of 
the right of a non-slave, and the concern of the law with the slave was only in the rights 
and goods of that non-slave: 
 „The unhappy black race were separated from the white by indelible marks, and 
laws long before established, and were never thought of or spoken of except as 
property, and when the claims of the owner or the profit of the trader were supposed to need protection.ǲ ȋScott v. Sandford) 
 „The recognition of the slave as person depended upon the calculation of interest and injuryǲ ȋ(artman 94), and „The protection of property ȋdefined narrowly by 
work capacity and the value of capital), the public good (the maintenance of black 
subordination), and the maintenance and reproduction of the institution of 
slavery determined the restricted scope of [black] personhood and the term of recognition.ǲ ȋ(artman 98).  
 
To kill a slave was not murder, but it did qualify as a legal case of damaged goods that 
had to be refunded to the owner.21 This difference between the not being quantified as humans and put in a situation of ǲsocial deathǳ ȋPatterson 38) and ⧂, while at the same time being declined in the second degree and ǲlegally protectedǳ as property, points to 
                                                        
20 See Neil Gotandaǯs ǲA Critique of ǮOur Constitution is Color-Blindǯǳ for an overview on the legal 
construction of race. 
21See for one example the Slavery Code of the District of Columbia of 1862, Sec. 90.: „)f any slave shall happen to be slain for refusing to surrender him or herself, contrary to law, or in 
unlawful resisting any officer, or other person, who shall apprehend or endeavor to apprehend such slave 
or slaves, and such officer, or other person, so killing such slave as aforesaid making resistance, shall be, 
and he is by this act, indemnified from any prosecution for such killing aforesaid; and that in every such 
case such slave or slaves shall be valued by two reputable persons, not being of kin to the master or owner 
of such slave, upon oath to be administered unto them, and to be appointed by the then nearest magistrate, Ǯwell and truly to value what such slave was worth, to the best of their knowledge, without favor or partiality,ǯ and that the whole value of such slave or slaves shall be certified by such persons to 
such magistrate, and that the same shall be paid to the owner or owners of such slave or slaves, or to his, 
her or their order, by the treasurer of the respective shore of this province on which the same death 
happened, upon a certificate from the said magistrate of the death and value of such slave or slaves, out of 
the public stock of this province in the hands of such treasurer, without fee or rewardǲ  
It is here that the constitution of Blackness is singular even in comparison to the treatment of Native 
Americans or immigrants, who were also not allowed to be citizens until after the Civil War, and thus 
could neither give witness, nor bring suit in courts, but who were not declined in the secondary degree. 
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the difference between constitutive and constituted Blackness. While constitutive 
Blackness is where Black abjection functions as the extra-discursive foundational 
structure for White civil society, constituted Blackness is the ensemble of intra-
discursive forms relied to but not identical with this function. Thus, the forms of 
constituted Blackness can change and give the impression of historical breaks in the 
constitution of Blackness, while on the level of constitutive Blackness an unchanged 
continuity of Black abjection can be observed. This continuity will now be shown 
through an examination of different approaches to the function of constitutive Blackness 
from the plantation to the penitentiary. 
 
 
I.2. DIA-⧂-NOUS BLACKNESS 
 
I.2.a. Profits of Death: the Plantation and the Anti-Citizen  
 
The plantation was not the beginning of cruelty (Childs). The auction block, the slave 
ship, the chains came before. There was the Black Atlantic, water babies ... But the focus 
in this chapter is not on these prior passages, but rests on the plantation as a chronotope 
that must be placed right at the start, as the place of entry into a peculiar institution, a 
machine that makes race and race relations in more than one sense. It was here, as Eric 
Williams famously stated, that: „Slavery was not born of racism: rather racism was the 
consequence of slaveryǲ (7). 
 
Williams argued that the insufficient availability of cheap White labor on the North 
American continent (e.g. in form of British convicts deported to the colonies for forced 
labor) was the reason for the importation of Black labor, which then only after the fact 
lead to the identification of Blackness and slavery.22 It is in the sense of Black slaves 
being integrated into a system constructed around White convict labor, that „[w]hite 
servitude was the historic base upon which Negro slavery was constructedǲ (19). Or, to 
put it the other way around: Black people were not forced into slavery because that 
                                                        
22 A similar argument is made by Karen E. and Barbara J. Fields. Contrary to Eric Williams though, Fields & 
Fields suggest that Black slave labor superseded White convict or indentured labor not because of 
insufficient availability or profitability of White forced labor, but because White people had a history of 
struggle that had established their position as non-slaves within White society as inviolable, a history 
Black people supposedly had not (Fields & Fields 2012: 125). 
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seemed their Ǯnaturalǯ place in society, but slavery came to be regarded as the Ǯnaturalǯ 
place of Blacks because, following the development of certain kinds of economic 
interests and the strategies employed to their satisfaction, Black people had already 
been successfully exploited as slaves and a retro-active and sustainable legitimation and 
explanation for this system of exploitation developed out of custom. The function of 
Blackness here was the legitimation and securing of specific relations of production. 
Pointing to the emergence of capitalism and the system of mass production related to it 
as the reason for the shortage in available labor force, Williams goes on to describe 
capitalism as the axiomatic of these relations of production, of the economic interests 
that shaped the relations between to-be-races and thus the ultimate reason for the 
identification of Blackness with an inferior status in race relations, both socio-
economically and, as a direct correlation, ontologically speaking. The plantation, here, 
makes slavery Black and then marks the Black person as slave. It is the place where race 
connects to the history not just of the United States, but of White supremacist, capitalist 
and colonialist power, which had already invented and implemented the plantation and 
the races it produced in the Spanish Colonies and elsewhere before it came to the North 
American South. The plantation is the chronotope where the identification of Blackness 
with an inferior status establishes itself within the axiomatic of the coloniality of power 
(see chapter I.3.a.) and the globalization of capital in a way that allows Aníbal Quijano to write: „[the] fundamental axes of this model of power [i.e. coloniality S.W.] is the social classification of the worldǯs population around the idea of raceǲ ("Coloniality of Power" 
181). 
 
Reading Williams with Quijano23, we come across a classic Marxist critique of 
globalization and fetishization, as a system of relations produced by men suddenly 
acquires a life of its own and thus seems not within the reach of human power anymore. 
Just as the commodity system slipped through the merchants hands to establish the 
commodity-fetish, the identification of Blackness with slavery stops being perceived as a 
product of the division of labor in a globalized system and becomes a fact seemingly 
independent of and beyond human agency and its motivation and desires. Blackness 
thus transmogrifies from ascription to being, from existence to essence, from narrative 
to revelation, from episteme to ontos; and Black humanity is lost in the torrent of 
                                                        
23 Connecting Quijano to Williams here exceeds Quijanoǯs own work in that Quijano gives more 
importance to the role of race before slavery than Williams does. 
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economic interests that undergird the socio-psycho-epistemo-economic system of White 
civil society. To be sure, race here becomes caste, not class; thus its already theorized 
position outside economic determination in the realm of meta-physics is reaffirmed. 
Because of this, it is exempt from redemption through revolution and the ensuing 
dissolution of the Marxist fundamental contradiction between the worker/producer and 
the capitalist who severs him from the means of production. The slave is not a worker, 
but flesh and/as a commodity; it might be thought of differently after revolution, but it 
will not change in status and remain instrumental, fundamental, constitutive. For 
classical Marxism, the fetish is a problem of knowing, not being. It is concerned only 
with the constituted, as the constitutive in form of historical materialism, cannot be 
acted upon but solely within. Williams is able to correct his perspective on the 
constituted, because he starts from a different epistemological standpoint that posits 
that Black does not equate to non-human. He writes from the other side of that dark veil 
under which, through fetishization, the humanity of the Black person has disappeared 
and become invisible. But he does not move to a consideration of the constitutive and 
because of this cannot solve the fallacies of the Marxist mechanicsǯ inability to think 
what now may be a speaking commodity 24 . Through Williams the Black 
flesh/commodity-fetish may now be capable to speak of the fetishization that 
misportrays its essence, but it still remains a commodity nevertheless, which – unlike 
the worker – will not be affected by a change in the economic structure and the relations 
of production, because it is the constitutive element of economy and production as such 
and cannot be redeemed by a change but only through an end of production (Wilderson, ǲGramsciǳ 6). While the worker can, as a worker, strive for equality and disalienation, 
the commodity must exit and thus end the system that makes it a commodity.  
 
The core assumption in thinking through the plantation as chronotope — that the Ǯneedǯ 
for exploitable labor leads to Black people being stripped of their humanity and 
transformed into commodities — is a condensation of a politico-ontological narrative 
that lost its original content and ended up standing on its head: as ontologico-political 
                                                        
24 I use this expression here in the way Fred Moten has taken it from Marx and then re-formulated it to 
express the paradoxical relationship between Marxism and the situation of the Black body (see chapter 
II.3. and Moten, Break 8ff.). Marx does mention the fantasy of a speaking commodity only to ridicule it and 
point out that the value of the commodity is socio-genetic and not intrinsic to the commodity. This 
approach does not allow the consideration of a real speaking commodity (such as the enslaved) as 
revolutionary agent, whose trade-value is indeed socio-genetic, but who nevertheless does speak and 
claim its intrinsic humanity. 
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revelation. This commutation from politico-ontological to ontologico-political (et vice 
versa) has to be kept in mind to understand the continuity of the abjection of Blackness 
from the past to the present, from the plantation to the penitentiary. )t is the ǲstrippingǳ 
part where constitutive and constituted Blackness connect and anti-Black cruelty 
originates. It is here that the hidden metaphysics of Black abjection feed back with the 
social imperatives for a self-legitimating narrative that represents A[WS] as not based 
on cruelty, terror or other forms of foundational violence, but on an external truth. It is 
here that the constitutive is concealed and, far beyond representation and/or ideology, 
enters into the realms of the psyche and the imaginary, into the dynamics of 
unconscious desire and preconscious interest (see chapter I.4.c.). It is here that a 
colonial difference (see chapter I.3.a.) is first established and then sublimated. It is here 
that the problematics of thinking about the changing constitution of Blackness as abject 
makes the integration of Cultural Studies, psycho-analytics and psychoanalysis into the 
methodology and approach of this thinking indispensable: stripping, as a form of 
defining and constructing of Blackness amounts to the dressing up, yet another form of 
defining and constructing, of Whiteness. The narrative of White humanity and the White 
civil society and economy built on it can only function because of a ǲwhite ignoranceǳ 
(Mills) concerning the foundational discrimination against Black people, the constitutive 
abjection of Blackness. 
 Going back to Foucaultǯs definition of race as the conditions of kill-ability in a regime of 
bio-power, it is possible to paraphrase this dressing through stripping as living through 
killing. The question to be answered is simple: How can I make a profit, how can I 
exploit, enslave and kill others without being killed, enslaved, exploited and made a 
profit from myself? In principle it is society that protects me from this; it is morals, 
ethics, law, the monopoly of power/violence, etc. The goal of modern society is to avoid 
a life that is ǲsolitary, poor, nasty, brutish and shortǳ. This is, of course, Thomas (obbesǯ 
Leviathan; but it is just as much Foucault: ǲCǯest pour pouvoir vivre quǯils constituent un 
souverainǳ25 (Foucault, Société 215). Clearly, the answer to the dilemma of exploitation 
is to find a way to posit oneself within and under the protection of constituted power, 
while at the same time situating the to-be-exploited outside this protection. For 
Foucault, as explained above, this is what race does. ǮWhitenessǯ is the product of this 
                                                        
25 ǲ)t is in order to be able to live, that they constitute a sovereign.ǳ ȋS.W.Ȍ 
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process of excommunication, where the trail of definition followed not what one was, 
but what one was not: not to be exploited, enslaved or killed which through the 
chronotope of the plantation turned out to mean: not Black. But this is an 
understatement which risks obscuring the epic dimensions of tragedy and power it 
contains, so, to be sure, what is implied here must be slowly repeated, over and over 
again, because what is looked at here is: 
 ǲAmericaǯs structuring irrationality: the libidinal economy of White Supremacy, and itǯs hyper-discursive violence which kills the Black Subject so that the 
concept, civil society, may live. In other words, from the incoherence of Black Death, America generates the coherence of White life.ǳ ȋWilderson, ǲGramsciǳ 8) 
 
The precariousness of Black life is the dark side of the profitability, protection and 
enjoyment of White life. Constitutive Blackness is not a contingent position, but a 
structural situation whose constitution can only be changed at a cost of a structural 
change. But this constitution is not tied to a single form of constituted Blackness, such as 
slavery. This is essential for any understanding of the continuity of abjection into the 
present day and the theorizing of this continuity and permutations from the plantation 
to the penitentiary and from social to civic death that will follow bellow. Through the 
lens of bio-power, race is the dividing line between human and non-human, citizen and 
anti-citizen, subject and abject. What remains to be explained is how this constitution of 
constitutive Blackness as abject anti-citizen remains intact, unaffected by the changing 
constitution of constituted Blackness, which moved from the explicit designation of 
Black people as anti-citizen, to their Ǯintegrationǯ as zero citizens. What has to be shown, 
in other words, is how and why the transformation from anti- to zero-citizen is in fact no 
more than – to paraphrase Frank Wilderson – the transformation of Black people from 
anti-citizen to anti-citizen-in-waiting. 
 
I.2.b. From Surplus Labor to Surplus Life: the Penitentiary and the Zero-Citizen 
 
The abolition of slavery and the industrialization of the Southern United States after the 
Civil War are often thought of as having put an end to the dehumanization and abjection 
of Black people. This chapter will show why this assumption is not correct, even though 
the penitentiary did indeed replace the plantation as the chronotope of race and race 
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relations, and although some legal changes did formally end the chattel and commodity 
status of Black people and change their legal situation from anti- to zero-citizen. The 
reason for this is the complex intertwining between social and economic aspects in the 
abjection of Blackness that forbids a reductionist reading of abolition as cathartic 
restructuring of no more than slightly crooked labor relations. In order to fully 
understand this, a short glance at the transformations of the economic situation of Black 
labor from the plantation to the penitentiary is necessary. 
 
Even though the abolition of slavery changed the way Black flesh was traded, it did not 
change the way it was treated. Neither did Black work on the planation end with the 
Civil War, nor were the modernization and industrialization of the U.S. South post-
bellum phenomena whose impact on the structure of the southern economy and the 
relations of production and society entwined with it would necessarily lead to changing 
race relations.26 It therefore has to be emphasized that the plantation and the factory 
belonged to the same capitalist axiomatic of production and race relations. There is 
neither a diachronous (ante- and post-bellum) nor a synchronous (e.g. rural – urban; 
slaves - free White labor, South – North) divide within this axiomatic and it cannot serve 
to describe a change in the constitution of Blackness before and after the abolition of 
slavery. Quite to the contrary: the accelerated industrialization of the South after the 
War does not only not mark a paradigmatic socio-economic shift, but it will deliver the 
impulses for the installment of neo-slavery during the Reconstruction era.  
 
As has often been pointed out, the Thirteenth Amendment, which took effect in 
December 1865, did not abolish slavery, but merely restricted its use: 
 ǲNeither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime 
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.ǳ ȋSection ͳ. of the ͳ͵th 
Amendment. Emphasis added) 
 
                                                        
26 Already before the Civil War, slave labor had been used in industries such as mining, brick making or 
the steel and gunpowder production in Alabama (Blackmon), Georgia, Mississippi (Lichtenstein) and 
other southern states. According to Robert Starobin, around 200.000 slaves (5% of the total slave populationȌ, worked in industry in the ͳͺͷͲǯs. This was not an urban phenomenon: ǲThey [the industrial 
slaves] lived in rural, small-town or plantation settings, where most southern industry was located, not in 
large cities, where only about 20 % of the urban slaves were industrially employedǳ ȋͳ͵ʹȌ. 
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This ǲexcept asǳ-catch was not lost on the contemporaries of the amendment, who had 
not only profited from slave labor before the war, but were also aware of the social and 
political profits of White supremacy. Offered this opportunity to reinstate economic 
constellations similar to slavery and the race relations it produced, law makers 
immediately began adopting Black Codes: sets of laws that would effectively re-define 
race through felony and thus assure the continued anti-citizenship of Black people as 
well as the exploitability of Black flesh: 
 ǲEvery southern state except Arkansas and Tennessee had passed laws by the 
end of 1865 outlawing vagrancy and so vaguely defined it that virtually any freed 
slave not under the protection of a white man could be arrested for the crime. An 
1865 Mississippi statute required African American workers to enter into labor 
contracts with white farmers by January 1. of every year or risk arrest. Four other 
states legislated that African Americans could not legally be hired for work 
without a discharge paper from their previous employer – effectively preventing 
them from leaving the plantation of the white man they worked forǳ ȋBlackmon 
54). 
 
To these, other laws obviously directed at Blacks were added, for example making it a 
felony for a Black man ǲto speak loudly in the presence of white womenǳ ȋBlackmon 67). 
Even laws seemingly designed to protect Black people were subject to racist perversion, 
as in the case of Qualmy Walker, sentenced to 15 years of forced labor under Georgiaǯs 
anti-Ku-Klux-Klan statute for conspiring to assault another Black man, even though he 
was a Black man himself (Lichtenstein 37). Other similar systems, such as debt-peonage, 
sprang from the same source and served the same goals. The central catechism of A[WS] – that Black people, because of a ǲlack of natural reasonǳ and through ǲnatural lawsǳ 
were condemned to be ǲnatural slavesǳ ȋWynter ʹͻ͹Ȍ – did not end with the abolition of 
slavery, but was simply translated from natural into positive law, transforming the 
slavery and abjection identified with Blackness from an ontologico-political position of 
fate into a politico-ontological performance of choice, therewith ensuring the continued 
and complete erasure of socio-genetic factors in the constitution of Blackness. After 
abolition, the representation of the bio-power binary ǲcitizen-anti-citizenǳ underlying the ǲWhiteness = inside the law-Blackness = outside the lawǳ opposition was rewritten 
by fusing it with the ǲgood citizen-bad felonǳ binary. )n this sense, the color-blind 
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constitution the abolition is often romanticized as having given birth to, was not only 
non-existent from the start, but the constitution of Blackness as abject was even 
enforced, as coercive factors in the lives of Black people became less visible. Although 
people of African descent were now legal subjects of the United States, that is technically 
speaking citizens under the constitution and entitled to protection by its laws, these 
same laws made sure to disenfranchise them as fast as possible and turn them into anti-
citizens again, or, to be more precise, zero-citizens at the fringe of the constitution. Black 
people would see their citizen rights hollowed out in the hands of a racist executive and 
a White supremacist jurisdiction that constantly anodized ever bit of emancipatory legislation by introducing such minute legal distinctions as ǳprivate constitutional rightsǳ27 or ǲcivil vs. social rightsǳ28 that made it virtually impossible for Black people to 
sue for their rights (Cho 1607 f.). Abolition did not end anti-citizenship but created zero-
citizenship as another variation of ⧂ that was no more than anti-citizenship-in-waiting. 
This fine-tuning in the legal logic of constituted Blackness lead to a replacement of the 
plantation as chronotope and machine for the (re-)production of race, race relations and 
the relations of production internal to them, by the penitentiary; re-shaping the 
representation of constitutive Blackness while leaving it unchanged. If White supremacy 
and the control of Black flesh and labor necessary for this could only be sustained in a secular form, as punishment for ǲcrimeǳ if not the Curse of (am, then so be it. 
Accordingly, the level of recorded crime skyrocketed in the southern United States after 
the 13th amendment came into effect. At the time this was declared proof of the 
corrupted and pathological character of the Afro-American, now no longer restrained and disciplined by his masterǯs whip; an idea with a substantial impact on how the 
penitentiary system would treat Black people as it precluded once again the idea of a 
rebootable Black subject or body that had informed the shift away from the martyrdom of the ǲchâtiment-spectacleǳ. Not only had Black people never been members of society 
and were firmly believed incapable of being so, but they remained unwelcome to be so 
and as zero-citizens continued to be structurally bared from integrating. Abolition did 
not concede the Black soul on whose absence slavery had been built; although the 
                                                        
27 The rationale of „private constitutional rightsǲ holds that constitutional rights cannot be infringed upon 
in the relationship between individuals (as opposed to the relationship between an individual and an 
institution). It establishes a separation between a private space in which the state must not intervene to 
secure these rights, and a public one in which it must. 
28 See the 1896 Plessy vs. Ferguson ruling, in which „civil rightsǲ are defined as pertaining to „life, liberty and propertyǲ and „social rightsǲ to racial discrimination in the ǲenjoyment of accommodations in inns, public conveyances, and places of amusementǳ ȋCho ͳ͸ͲͺȌ.  
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already constituted constitution of the United States of America was amended, the 
constitutive cruelty it was built upon continued unfettered. 
 
Up until the Reconstruction period, the penal system in the United States had been small 
and concerned almost exclusively with White convicts, the punishment of Blacks being 
left to the plantation owners. After the Civil War, the same industrialists who had 
already used slave labor before the war (and were conscious not only of the advantage 
of a cheap and constant labor force as such, but also of the role forced labor held in the 
control of free labor, keeping wages low and making strikes inefficient), became a thriving force in the exploitation of the ǲexcept asǳ-catch. At first competing with 
plantation owners in the pursuit of convict labor, industrialists soon proved their savvy 
by convincing politicians that the projects deemed essential for the development of the 
South, such as the construction of railroads, could not be realized without the use of 
convicts. In 1886, only 20 % of the convicts leased out in the South were engaged in 
farm labor (Lichtenstein 20). Already in 1871, the Sate of Tennessee had leased all of its 
convicts to the Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad Co. (Blackmon 55). Georgia would follow 
in the next decade and lease its entire penitentiary system to the railroad company 
Grant, Alexander and Company, free of charge (Lichtenstein 58). Although Whites, too, 
could theoretically be subjected to this system of exploitation, they seldom were. In 
1871, 84% of convicts in Georgia were Black. In 1876 it were 90 %, and it stayed that 
way until 1908, when Georgia changed its penal system from convict lease to chain gang 
(Lichtenstein 60).  
 
The official rationale for the convict lease was to end state support of convicts in a 
period of fiscal limitation, when it would have been difficult to explain to White 
constituencies why they should pay taxes to feed and house Black convicts, though there 
was enough work for them to earn their own living.29 This rationale was another 
instantiation of the firm belief in the legitimate exploitation of a Black population that 
had to be disciplined and could not have been so other than trough brute violence and work, the discourse of ǲrehabilitationǳ or ǲintegrationǳ being inapplicable to these sub-
humans. Whites, on the other hand, were usually not sentenced to convict-labor in the 
first place, or were given less straining tasks, such as mechanical work, often portrayed 
                                                        
29 The same rationale would later help re-transform the private convict lease system into a public owned 
and run chain gang system. 
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as to complex for Black convicts. That this logic of dehumanization of Black people had 
not changed since 1783, when the owners of the Zong slave ship were able to win compensation from insurance companies for ͳ͵ʹ slaves which the shipǯs captain, Luke 
Collingwood, had thrown overboard in order – as the owners claimed before the court – to assure the health and therewith trading value of the rest of the ǲcargoǳ (Webster), is 
further emphasized by reports such as this one: 
 
 ǲOne overseer had Ǯwanted to kill [a sick convict]ǯ, since he was Ǯno accountǯ and 
Grant, Alexander & Co.ǳ – the railroad company I mentioned a short moment ago – ǲcould not afford to feed him for nothing.ǳ (Lichtenstein 54).  
 
The fungibility of Black life had not ended with abolition, on the contrary: it had 
increased. Although the slave driver could freely dispose of the slaves, he had to be 
cautious not to overwork them, lest they die. This changed with the shift from the 
plantation to the penitentiary, as the convict lessee had no long-term investment in the 
convicts. If one died, he could just get another (Mancini). The same was true for free 
Black people who, no longer declined in the second degree, could now be killed without 
running the risk of having to reimburse their owner and only little fear of state 
interference and possible punishment. Black flesh had entered a new stage of 
commodification, a little less disposable and a lot more dispensable as lives, if not as 
commodities30, in form of which they were still essential for the political economy of 
White supremacy. 
 
Although the trade value of Black flesh was not entirely lost31, the convicts, technically 
speaking, remained state property throughout the lease and thus disappeared from the 
free market. They could not be leased out to a third party by the lessee, were often 
granted to the lessee for free, and, after the transition to the chain gang system, 
disappeared not only from the free market, but from the market as such altogether. It is 
this disappearance, this slight decrease in disposability of Black flesh, that is often 
                                                        
30 „Dispensable lives are those that become indispensable when they become commodities.ǲ ȋMignolo, ǲDispensableǳ ͹ͷȌ. 
31 Convicts, or rather the lease on them, could be sold under certain circumstances. This was especially true for the beginning of the convict lease system, when Blacks who had committed minor offenses ǲwere arrested and auctioned off to local plantersǳ ȋOshinsky ʹͳȌ. Douglas Blackmon mentions an example of  
convict-leases being auctioned off as part of the selling of the assets of a bankrupt pottery factory in 
Georgia in 1890 (92).  
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mistaken for the end of slavery, thus reducing slavery to the trade-ability of bodies, that 
is to economics and the non-self-possession of the body and the subjection to a masterǯs 
will. But what the post-abolition legislation as well as the Zong/ Grant, Alexander & Co. 
example show, is, that abolition does not introduce a new epistemology of the human, 
nor a new logic of value, but simply a new configuration within a given complex inherent 
to A[WS]. Black people were still considered and treated as quantifiable beings, not 
humans. They still occupied the same socio-economic role, could still be forced to work, 
could still be commanded, humiliated, sold, traded, exploited and killed. But while the 
selling and trading became significantly more difficult and the form of labor extracted 
from Black flesh remained the same, the killing became easier, as individual Black bodies 
became dissociated from Black labor and thus dispensable because replaceable.  
 
Black flesh was still a commodity, but it was now more determined by its use than by its 
trade value. Under slavery, White supremacy had asserted itself in spectacular moments 
of cruelty against Black flesh, but it had been subordinated to economic imperatives they 
served to rationalize and legitimize. The early ontologico-politics of status race was not 
completely detached from the labor relations that had birthed them. After the abolition 
of slavery, White Supremacy needed Black flesh for its assertion in a way that would 
more and more often go against economic reasoning in order to ensure the coherence 
and stability of a society structured along A[WS]. The only thing set free by abolition was 
White Fright and the same blast severed the fetish of Blackness from the economic 
origins Eric Williams has found it to have. The perceived decrease in White security, and 
especially White job security, had pushed for the harnessing of the Black bodies now 
perceived as out of control and roaming free32. The crisis in White Supremacy that the 
Reconstruction period is described as and to which Jim Crow is considered an answer, 
was not a crisis of production or a result of industrialization, but a crisis of sensing, 
being knowing; not a crisis in the commodity economy but in the White psychological 
economy. )n this situation, the Ǯbestǯ way to control a Black body, whose new found 
freedom lay almost exclusively in ǲlocomotionǳ ȋ(artman 151), was to put chains 
around its ankles and put him to work, or hang him/her on the next tree. Convict labor, 
                                                        
32 This is a point, where technically speaking, it would be correct to continue speaking of Black ǲfleshǳ 
from a perspective of A[WS]. But because, after abolition, the borders between Black bodies and Black flesh become fluent and instable, ) will now shift to using ǲbodyǳ except for moments where the reduction 
of Black people to flesh is very clear or requires special emphasis.  
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as has been shown, was not just an economic tool, but most of all an instrument of social 
engineering. 
 
I.2.c. From Social Death to Civic Death, from the Ghetto to the Prison Industrial 
Complex 
 
What becomes clear when considering the trajectory of the constitution of Blackness 
from slavery through emancipation, the convict lease and chain gang system to the 
Prison Industrial Complex that was to follow it, has been aptly summarized by Saidiya 
Hartman, who wrote: ǲthe shifting register of race from a status ascription to a formal 
and purportedly neutral category ineluctably refigured Blackness as an abject categoryǳ 
(Hartman 173). The ǲsocial deathǳ (Patterson 38) of the slave transformed into the civic 
death of the felon; a fractured continuity well captured in the 1871 verdict in Ruffin vs. 
Commonwealth in which the Virginia Supreme Court stated: 
 „For a time, during his service in the penitentiary, he [the convict] is in a state of 
penal servitude to the State. He has, as a consequence of his crime, not only 
forfeited his liberty, but also his personal rights except those which the law in its 
humanity accords to him. He is for the time being a slave of the State. He is 
civiliter mortus, and his estate, if he has any, is administered like that of a dead man.ǳ ȋSupreme Court of Virginia, quoted in Alexander 31; emphasis added.) 
 This concept of a ǲciviliter mortusǳ forfeiting his personal rights is still in effect today: 
 „Unbeknownst to this offender, and perhaps any other actor in the sentencing 
process, as a result of his conviction he may be ineligible for any federally-funded 
health and welfare benefits, food stamps, public housing, and federal education 
assistance. His driverǯs license may be automatically suspended, and he may no 
longer qualify for certain employment and professional licenses. If he is convicted 
of another crime he may be subject to imprisonment as a repeat offender. He will 
not be permitted to enlist in the military, or possess a firearm, or obtain federal 
security clearance. If a citizen, he may lose the right to vote; if not, he becomes immediately deportable.ǳ ȋAmerican Bar Association, quoted in: Alexander 
2012:143) 
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Between the chain gang system, which, with the exception of a short renaissance at the 
turn of the millennium, has been abolished in the U.S. since the 1950s (Browne) and the 
birth of the Prison Industrial Complex, four events have taken place that have to be kept 
in mind when trying to understand the continuity of abjection and of Black zero-
citizenship into the present: the creation of the Ghetto, the transformation of the U.S. 
economy from industrial to post-industrial, the Civil Rights Act and the War on Drugs.  
 
Within this matrix, the penal system transforms from one of forced labor into one of 
forced (mostly Black) non-labor (for the convicts) as the fuel for a state sponsored 
industry of free and (mostly White) labor (for the judicial system). The key point here is 
a double demonstration that A[WS] is essential for the understanding of a constitution 
of Blackness influenced by but not determined in the last instance by economics. No 
revolution of the relations of production or their representation can end the significance 
of race and racism. On the one hand, it becomes obvious, once again, that the function of 
Black abjection is not solely the maintenance of cheap Black labor, that is: the Black 
body is not just a worker (who cannot be exploited as non-labor), but a fetishized 
commodity. The surplus labor of the slave has transformed into Black ǲsurplus lifeǳ 
(Dillon 122). Thus, second, changing economics do have an impact on how Blackness is 
constituted as abject, but it is clearly not the only determinative factor of Blackness as it 
cannot alone explain the changes that can be traced in its constitution. 
 
The socio-economic development in the United States during the first half of the 
twentieth century transforms Black convict labor from the tool for the maintenance of 
White civil society into an instrument with subversive qualities. The overlapping 
interests of White civil society and its economy fall apart when an overabundance in 
cheap Black labor that had been sought after to drive the economy starts creating fear of 
White unemployment and social unrest. This overabundance is, at first, not created through deindustrialization, but through ǲthe decline of cotton agriculture due to floods 
and the boll weevil, and the pressing shortage of labor in Northern factories caused by 
the outbreak of World War )ǳ ȋWacquant, ǲSlaveryǳ 47) which lead to the so called ǮGreat Migrationǯ of Black people from the rural South to urban centers mostly located in the 
North. The number of Black people flooding into the cities exceeded the number of jobs 
available to them in a labor market regulated just as much by protectionist measures of 
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White supremacy (e.g. guilds keeping certain trades closed to Blacks) as by the law of 
supply and demand. This itself was not unwelcome in the North, as the oversupply in 
labor kept the latter cheap, thus fitting smoothly into the succession of preceding 
paradigms underpinning the exploitation of Black labor. But at the same time the rising 
Black presence in the cities increased the need for ethnoracial control of the population, 
ranging beyond the defense of purely White labor sectors to the prevention of racial 
intermingling. The Ghetto provided an answer to this, guaranteeing biological and 
economical separation by physical segregation. As Loïc Wacquant argues, the Ghetto, in its fundamental mechanics, is an ǲethnoracial prisonǳ ȋǲSlaveryǳ 51) that serves to 
enforce the segregation of space, society and labor. It is, after slavery and Jim Crow, „the 
third vehicle to extract black labor while keeping black bodies at a safe distance, to the material and symbolic benefit of white societyǲ (Wacquant, ǲSlaveryǳ 48).  
 
Although historically contemporaneous to the Chain Gang system, the Ghetto is 
technically speaking its successor, as it serves the same aims, but constitutes a new tool-
set adapted to different circumstances. Like prison, it serves the concentration and 
control of Black bodies and the extraction of labor. But it already begins to concentrate 
this labor in a sealed of market, in a parallel economy that does not put White jobs at 
risk. Dispensability increases as Black labor is further excluded from a market at once 
over-saturated and shrinking. ǲFreeǳ labor had mobilized against the use of convict labor 
from the beginning and had often expressed its discontent in form of rebellions and 
raids on convict camps in order to release the prisoners and undermine the lessees 
power to use convicts to control free workers (Lichtenstein 99; Schneider 194.f.). This 
opposition gained considerably in strength during the Great Depression, when social 
unrest regarding the competition created by convict labor on an unstable market lead to 
legislation restricting the market access of convict labor products, e.g. laws prohibiting 
the shipment of goods produced through convict labor33, thus reducing its profitability 
and ultimately initiating its slow demise (Schneider 195). This same mechanism of 
sustaining White social peace by jettisoning dispensable bodies in a tight socio-
economic space informed the Ghetto which served as a sort of security-valve in regulating the balance between ǲlabor extractionǳ and ǳethnoracial closureǳ ȋWacquant, 
                                                        
33 While reducing the profitability of convict labor, theses laws also served to create „Federal Prison )ndustriesǲ, an institutionalized system for the trade of convict labor products between prisons and fellow 
state and federal government agencies (H.A. Thompson 718). 
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ǲSlaveryǳ 48.f.), putting Black bodies on and off the market in measures that would not 
let White fright create social unrest and political dissatisfaction.  
 
This structure functioned until the 1960s, when the Civil Rights Act and the new gained 
Black political power risked demounting the valve at a time where it became of 
increasing importance to control the mounting pressure created by the loss of jobs to 
de-industrialization, outsourcing, and the increase of available labor force due to the 
rising number of immigrants from Latin America. This situation differed from preceding 
historic moments, as a yet again increased dispensability of Black bodies coincided with 
a very real threat to White supremacy and its political and economic hegemony. But this 
time, the solutions to this problem were ready at hand, proved and approved: felon 
disenfranchisement and the development of the Ghetto into a hybrid system of Hyper-
Ghetto34 and mass incarceration that would ultimately lead to the creation of the Prison )ndustrial Complex as a ǲjudicial Ghettoǳ, or a ǲfourth peculiar institution … a system to remold the social meaning and significance of ‚raceǯ in accordance with the dictates of 
the deregulated economy and post-Keynesian stateǲ (Wacquant, ǲSlaveryǳ ͷͳ + 55)35. 
The Prison Industrial Complex would be able to accomplish three things, which the 
Ghetto could not: 1. Control the explosive force of the Black bodies accumulated in the 
Ghettos that at the beginning of the 1960s began to kindle, to come under the influence 
of Black Radicals such as the Black Panther Movement and erupted more and more often 
in the form of race riots increasingly perceived as a threat to White security, 2. 
Neutralize the Black vote created by the Civil Rights Act (and partly eliminated by the 
Prison Industrial Complex through the mechanism of felon-disenfranchisement), 3. 
Create new possibilities of extracting surplus value from Black bodies, whose labor, 
because of the changing character of the economy and the over-supply in cheap work 
force, could no longer be exploited with sufficient profitability (that is: find new Black-
body-businesses after disposability has become almost redundant and dispensability all 
but complete). All of this, of course, without recurring to the concept of race, but through ǲlaw and orderǳ and the ǲWar on Drugsǳ. This, as Michelle Alexander has so convincingly 
shown, was and still is an updated version of the Jim Crow laws aimed at maintaining 
                                                        
34 An analysis of the Hyperghetto is not necessary for the argumentation here. See the work of Loïc 
Wacquant for an elaboration of this concept. 
35 Wacquant himself explicitly prefers the term „carceral-assistential complexǲ to that of Prison )ndustrial 
Complex in order to emphasize the role of the Prison as a part of a general apparatus of discipline and 
surveillance over its economic role ȋǲSymbiosisǳ ͻ͹Ȍ. 
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Black abjection through a redefinition of Blackness qua crime that allowed for color-
blind racism (Carr; Sexton ǲPeopleǳ), a similarity that lead Manning Marable to describe it as the ǲSecond Reconstructionǳ, Angela Davis to write of abolition as merely a transition ǲfrom the prison of slavery, to the slavery of prisonǳ ȋǲFrom the Prisonǳ 75) 
and Frank Wilderson to propose an understanding of Black people in the contemporary U.S. as ǲprison-slave-in-waitingǳ ȋǲPrison Slaveǳ 18)36. 
 
At this point, Black labor disappears form the socio-economic equation and Black bodies 
are not only commodities from a systemic perspective, but they become literally stored. 
Black zero-citizenship had accelerated to full citizenship only for the short amount of 
time it took White civil society to change gears, and only to be throttled even more once 
the law-and-order paradigm latched in. What this amounts to, interestingly, is a sort of 
reversed Myrdal-Dilemma37. To treat this dilemma with the minute attention to 
economic detail it deserves is beyond the scope of this text, which is why it will focus on 
a few aspects considered paradigmatic enough to suffice as an argument here. The 
easiest thing to understand is the one least characteristic of the Post-Civil-Rights A[WS], 
but still important to mention here: (Black) stored bodies do not take jobs away from 
free (White) people, but they create jobs in the Prison Industrial Complex (guards, office 
jobs, catering, etc.). Compared to non-stored bodies, their control function differs in that 
they do not even develop the specter of possibility (she might take my job, he might revolt and burn down my car, he might…Ȍ but are reduced to a social position that is 
absolutely nil. This is the logic of the Ghetto and of White protectionist exclusion of Blacks from certain jobs taken to the extreme. Consider the following statistics: „African 
American youth account for 16 percent of all youth, 28 percent of all juvenile arrests, 35 
percent of the youth waived to adult criminal court, and 58 percent of youth admitted to 
state adult prisonǲ ȋAlexander 118). As Heather Ann Thompson points out, by the 
                                                        
36 It is also in this context that Dylan Rodriguezǯ analysis of Barack Obamaǯs ǲexceptional Blacknessǳ ȋʹ͸Ȍ and his critique of Obamaǯs emphasis ǲthat he is not a descendant of slavesǳ ȋʹͷȌ must be read. 
37 In his book An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy, Gunnar Myrdal, a 
Swedish Nobel Laureate in economics, predicted that at one point, what he saw as the dilemma between 
the American liberal ideology and its ostentatious belief in equality and freedom and the factual treatment 
of African-Americans would have to be solved by fully integrating the latter into society. He claimed that 
this would have to be the solution, because it would for one become an economic necessity and, for 
another, be the only possible choice able to protect the ideological basis of American society against communism. The phrase ǲreversed Myrdal Dilemmaǳ is here intended to refer to a system that considers 
the non-integration of Black people the only solution to the dilemma as well as the only way to secure the 
stability of the economy and the American (White) ideology interlinked with it. Myrdal emphasized that the position of the Black was a ǲwhite manǯs problemǳ ȋli), by which he meant that it was a product of 
White power and the way it was wielded. 
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millennium, ǲa greater number of African Americans had ended up in penal institutions than in institutions of higher learningǳ (703). These youth have interrupted education 
curriculums and are unlikely to acquire the higher skills necessary in the contemporary 
economy. Even if they did not suffer any discrimination or disadvantages on the job 
market due to their incarceration, they would not be able to compete with a better-
educated work force. Add to this the disproportionate total number of Black people in 
jail or prison and thus completely removed from the labor marked, and not even 
available to control the existent labor force through the fear of being replaced: in 2006, 1 
in every 14 Black men was behind bars compared to 1 in every 106 White men 
(Alexander 100). In 2007, 7.3 million people in the United States were under 
correctional control (in jail, prison, on probation or under parole) and 2.3 million of 
those in jail or prison (PEW Center on the States 4.f.), which amounts to a 500 % 
increase over the last 30 years (TheSentencingProject.org). At the same time, these 
prisoners feed an enormous and largely privatized Prison Industrial Complex worth 
about $185 billion and employing almost 2.4 million people in 2003 (Alexander 231). 
 
These numbers indicate why the reversed Myrdal dilemma is important for 
understanding Black zero-citizenship. Considering the recent development in some Detroit or Brooklyn neighborhoods of what are called ǲMillion Dollar Blocksǳ ȋa name 
referring to the amount of tax money spent on people from this block currently in jail or 
prison)(H.A. Thompson 715)) with the history of convict labor in mind, the question 
arises why, especially in times of post-recession budget austerity, these convicts are not 
made to work in order to generate the finances necessary for their incarceration, but are 
instead condemned to non-labor38. Simple historical materialism or political economy 
are not able to explain why a capitalist would pay his employees more rather than scare 
them into the lowest possible wage and longest possible working hours, while at the 
same time paying taxes to have Black people spend some ǲlazyǳ time in jail. The reasons 
for this are as follows: first, as mentioned above, due to the socio-economic change in 
the twentieth century and the overaccumulation crisis of the contemporary economy, an 
army of Black unemployed would not have an additional positive impact on the 
economy and its processes, while stored Black bodies create millions of jobs. The role of 
                                                        
38 „Non-laborǲ does not mean that there is absolutely no convict labor in U.S. Prisons. In 2003, about 7% of 
prisoners worked in prison industries (Atkinson & Rostad 2003:2). The intention of this formulation is to 
point out a general paradigm shift within A[WS]. It does not want to deny the existence of any convict 
labor but aims to underline its shifting function within capitalist White civil society. 
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A[WS] here is to determine why these jobs are created this and not any other way. It 
explains why the State funding used here went into imprisonment instead of (e.g.) 
market expansion through education and research. What remains to be explained is why 
these jobs in the prison industry were State funded in the first place, instead of being 
financed through revenues generated through convict labor. The answer has been given 
already in the short look at the role of the Great Depression in the ending of convict 
labor: unionists, workers and employees as well as employers afraid of cheap 
competition, politicians and residents do not wish to see jobs outsourced to the 
prisoners, even if such an outsourcing would mean reduced taxation, and this is 
especially true in times of economic crisis. This is essential for understanding the 
continued existence of the Prison Industrial Complex in times of a Great Recession that 
has made this Complex, in the words of Attorney General Eric (older, ǲunsustainable economicallyǳ ȋquoted in: Gottschalk ͸ʹȌ. This development is thus not merely tied to 
economic aspects, but also to questions of how to regulate White Fright. 
 
At first, solving the financial issues posed by the Prison Industrial Complex may seem 
simple: reduce costs by reducing convictions by changing those drug laws that were the 
cause for most of the convictions fueling the prison population. This direction was partly 
chosen and culminated in the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010. According to a report released 
in December 2012, six states were closing 10 prisons (that is a capacity of 14,100 beds) 
in 2012, following 13 states closing prisons with a capacity of 15,500 beds in 2011, 
followed by further closings in 2013 (Porter, Chopping Block 2012: 1. + 3. and Chopping 
Block 2013 1f.). A second answer, also implemented, was to change punishment 
methods, thus not taking people out of the prison industrial complex per se, but shifting 
them to less cost intensive post such as work-release programs. But as further prison 
closings were announced and explicitly referred to as putting an end to prisons as ǲemployment programsǳ, political and interest group opposition began to consolidate 
and prevented some of these closings on the basis of economic and security 
argumentation (N.Y. Times). This argumentation is shockingly direct in its 
rationalization of using inmates as fuel to secure jobs and thus votes, in spite not only of 
the commodification of Black bodies this means, but also in spite of the consequences for 
the economy in general. And although expressed in mostly color-blind terms, it is 
constitutively tied to the a priori stereotyping of Blacks as felons or thugs and zero-
citizens and the ensuing dispensability of Black bodies. Nevertheless this is not just a 
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political strategy that considers crime and criminals exploitable socio-legal 
constructions, but some of the groups opposed to the shrinking of the Prison Industrial 
Complex seem to really believe that any crime is as such an objective fact independent of 
legislation. These groups warn of a reduction of criminal persecution and punishment as 
opening the gates to floods of violence. It is the logic of an always-already presumed 
Black pathology (or the afore mentioned Black guilt) (Marshall); yet another mechanism 
undergirding the precariousness of Black life in and outside the prison, coming to the 
surface over and over again in form of verbal attacks on Black ǲwelfare cheatsǳ or in the 
killing of young Black kids like Trayvon Martin, Jordan Rusell Davis or Michael Brown. 
But this mechanism is historically so deeply rooted and so constantly re-iterated 
through the media that, as Angela Davis points out, even Black people themselves tend 
to believe in it (ǲPrison Abolitionǳ 202). Here coloniality outdoes itself and the 
problematics of de-fetishization become critically complicated. The mechanics of 
ethnoracial closure and Black dispensability reappear inside Black perception as the 
ultimate triumph of Black abjection.  
 
Thus, although paying taxes for the maintenance of the Prison Industrial Complex may 
seem sub-optimal compared to the prisoners being released or paying for their 
imprisonment by their own labor, the profits Whiteness – as a political system 
producing and discriminating between White citizens and Black zero-citizens – reaps 
from the Prison Industrial Complex in terms of securing its psycho-materialist structure, 
outweigh potential economic losses. Once again, Frank Wildersonǯs dictum that the 
Black subject (and the Black abject) cannot solely be understood through class but must 
at the same time be considered trough the matrix of White supremacy (ǲGramsciǳ 1) 
forcefully asserts itself. 
 
I.2.d. The Plantation/Penitentiary is not a Camp; or: Contre Agamben I. 
 
The transformation of constituted Blackness from status-race into felony does not only 
uncover the fallacies of Marxism that Wilderson underlines, but it also shows why the ǮBlack flesh – Home Sacerǯ analogy mentioned earlier (see chapter I.1.b.) is mislead 
precisely because, from the plantation to the penitentiary, Blackness is at the same time 
constitutive of and constituted in A[WS] while the Homo Sacer in the figure of the camp-
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inmate, is merely constituted in A[WS] but not necessary to (constitutive of) that axiomaticǯs existence.  
 
Agamben himself acknowledges this difference between the penitentiary and the camp 
in reverse when he writes: 
 ǲDas Lager, und nicht das Gefängnis, ist der Raum, der dieser originären Struktur 
des Nomos [der Erde] entspricht. Das zeigt unter anderem die Tatsache, dass das 
Strafvollzugsrecht nicht außerhalb der normalen Rechtsordnung liegt, sondern 
bloß einen besonderen Bereich des Strafrechts bildet, während die juristische 
Konstellation, unter der das Lager steht, das Kriegsrecht und der 
Belagerungszustand ist ȋ…Ȍǳ39 (Homo 30). 
 
Here, Agamben points out that the prison is part of constituted law (within the existing 
State), while the camp is a state of exception, which, qua Carl Schmittǯs concept of the 
nomos of the earth, is intended to suggest that the camp is located in the realm of the 
constitutive (founding the State). But to Agamben, the norm instituted in the 
constitutive and reiterated through the penitentiary and the plantation as the normal is 
illegible and he therefore misreads the camp. Barely does he manage to theorize an 
exceptional racism fixed on Whites, a Ǯperversionǯ, that is, that is legible as scandal 
within A[WS] precisely because it is not normal, precisely because it is not the norm 
instituted in the realm of the constitutive as the foundation of the constituted. Agamben 
thus reiterates a White-centered logic that Aimé Césaire had already criticized half a 
century earlier: the outrage created by the concentration camps is not outrage at crimes 
against humanity, but outrage at crimes against Whiteness; it had not been expressed 
towards any of the atrocities of colonization and slavery (Césaire 14.f.). Although 
Agamben believes himself to be working in the realm of the constitutive from where he 
deems himself capable of offering a radical critique of the political as such, he remains 
safely within the constituted discourse of A[WS] and thus a very specific form of the 
political. Within A[WS], the camp inmate, once liberated, can return to civil society and 
become human again, whereas the Black body has no place in society except as 
                                                        
39 ǲThe camp, not the prison, is the space corresponding to this original structure of the Nomos [of the 
earth]. This is proved among other things by the fact that the prison law constitutes a particular sphere of 
penal law and is not outside the normal order, while the juridical constellation that guides the camp is martial law and the state of siege ȋ…Ȍǳ ȋS.W.Ȍ. 
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commodity. The fact that, within A[WS] and Agambenǯs writing as one of its expressions, 
the Black mass incarceration in prisons is considered normal while concentrating 
Whites in camps is considered exceptional, is a direct expression of the regulatory norm 
at the core of A[WS]. It indicates how the camp inmate must be freed for normalcy to 
reign, while the Black body must be maintained in its abjection if White civil society and 
its economies (financial, libidinal, etc.) are to continue normally. Claims such as the 
following: 
 „)f we take into account the racial dimensions of the US penal system, imprisonment, and torture in their full juridical and cultural ‚normalnessǯ, it 
would seem that racial violence and Blackness are always already beyond the law 
under a constant state of siege. In this way, Blackness and racism figure as major 
zones of indistinction: Blackness is the state of exception.ǲ ȋWeheliye, ǲPornotropesǳ 69) 
 
not only misread Agamben and misunderstand the quintessential (Foucaultian) 
normality of Black abjection, but they also misanalyse the Prison Industrial Complex. 
Interestingly, some authors are well aware of this, but still insist on connecting the 
figure of the Black prisoner to that of the camp inmate (Childs 286f.) in what amounts to 
a contra-factual normative claim conflating White and Black political ontologies, thus 
permitting to describe Black incarceration as both a ǲconditio inhumana…state of exceptionǳ ȋChilds ʹͺ͸Ȍ and ǲnormal lifeǳ ȋChilds 289) at the same time. This is an easy 
slip to make, as (and therein lies the conflation) a White subject in a state of abjection 
within A[WS] would be in a state of exception, as the regulatory norm installed by A[WS] 
is precisely that only Blackness must be abject. Within A[WS], in other words, the 
abjection of Blackness is no exception but both normative and normal.40 It is because of 
this that the plantation and the penitentiary, as chronotopes of and machines for 
constituting race, are not twins to the concentration camp. It has to be repeated that in 
and according to A[WS] the Black person has a different ontological status than the 
White person, that he has no soul that is, that his Ǯnormalǯ state is to be considered 
constitutionally flawed. S/he enters the penal system and the penitentiary in order to be 
                                                        
40 It must be mentioned here that Childs and Weheliye both explicitly take note of the Agamben passage 
on the difference between the prison and the camp quoted above, but do not accept the argument he proposes therein. Especially Weheliyeǯs work can be read as ambivalent concerning the conflation 
mentioned. 
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processed into civil death and anti-citizenship and the reason s/he does/is done so is 
because of her pre-established abjection in a White supremacist epistemology. Her 
fungibility, disposability and dispensability are essential to the formation of Whiteness, 
the capitalist system, the epistemology interwoven with and all the normalcy built on it. 
Thus, Black flesh and Black death are a way of sensing, knowing, being normal in a 
White supremacist system, while they would and would be a state of exception in other 
systems. Agambenǯs bare life on the contrary marks a life that can only be exceptional 
and stripped of humanity because it was able to and did possess these within the axiom 
in which it became bare. No such stripping is possible for the always–already socially 
dead Black body: the slave or Black prisoner is not the Homo Sacer or the Muselman, 
because it cannot be dehumanized but is, in A[WS], by definition inhuman chattel. The 
Muselman or Homo Sacer, on the other hand, are always-already more than the Black 
abject sentient being. The Black flesh is reduced to zoe from the outset; already socially 
and civically death, it is no bios to be stripped naked and transformed into bare life. 
Frank Wilderson refers his reader to the work of Frantz Fanon to point out that, as 
opposed to the Black person, the position of Agambenǯs camp inmate is still within civil 
society, which means that he, as a victim of ǲsocial oppressionǳ, not ǲstructural sufferingǳ 
(Wilderson, Red 36), belongs to a completely different ontology than the Black person.  
 
To clarify and solve the problematics described here, it is necessary to disentangle this 
conflation of Black and White ontologies created through the disappearance of 
constitutive Blackness under constituted Blackness and necessary for Agamben to have 
the possibility to even think of the Nazi concentration camp as unprecedented and 
unparalleled. In order to do this, the following chapters will formulate a more detailed 
theory of constitutive Blackness, before section II. further engages the relationship 
between constitutive and constituted Blackness in relation to technology. Through an 
analysis of the erasure of constitutive Blackness in theories proposed by Agamben and 
others, the concept of Black abjection will be proposed to describe its construction 
within a system structured according to A[WS]. 
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I.3. ABJECT T/RACES OF DESIRE: CONSTITUTIVE BLACKNESS 
 
I.3.a. Ma(r)king a Difference: (Self-)Overrepresentation and Coloniality  
 
The disappearance of constitutive Blackness is no more than its erasure through the 
reification of constituted into a simulated constitutive Blackness. So far, this mechanism 
has been analyzed in the form of the capitalist fetishization of Blackness into a speaking 
commodity and it has been traced in the development of the Black legal persona from 
commodified anti- to pathologized zero-citizen.  
 
This mechanism is located in the realm of a representation defined as the imaginary 
linking or delinking of a constituted with a constitutive according to an axiomatic such 
as A[WS]. This de-/linking must not be understood as a consciously productive act of 
dis-/connection. Quite to the contrary, representation here is predicated on the belief of 
a necessary and pre-established relation between the represented and that representing 
it. Representation is intra-discursive; its logic is that of the axiom informing it. It is 
unable to reflect its own conditions of possibility and legibility, because, if it did, it 
would not be representative, but productive. It is this belief in an externally guaranteed 
connection between the represented and the representative that predetermines the 
erasure of the constitutive through a reification of the constituted, just as it is capable of 
performing the reverse erasure of the constituted through the constitutive. At the same 
time, it performs the materialization of power in and on the body as body, that is, it 
presents power as deductive of qualities contained in the body independently of the 
effects of power (viz. it portrays White Supremacy as due to Black abjection, rather than 
explaining how White Supremacy creates Black abjection to legitimize itself). 
 
In the ontological politics of A[WS], the constitutive can be an external truth known 
through revelation (God) or discovery (History and Science) and can be narrated, among 
other things, in the form of a Manifest Destiny, a White Manǯs Burden or a Mission 
Civilisatrice. In the political ontology of A[WS], such an openly meta-physical 
explanation is shunned and narratives usually center around supposedly non-
metaphysical constitutives, such as a ǲrespublicaǳ built on a set of ǲethical-political 
valuesǳ ȋMouffe 66.ff) produced through enlightened debate and decision making. The 
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constitutive in the case of ontological politics is how things are in ǲtruthǳ, that is: how 
they should or could be in reality. In this case, conditions in which the constitutive and 
the constituted coincide are ǲgoodǳ ȋeverything is as it ought to be, the normative and the descriptive are identicalȌ, conditions in which they oppose each other are ǲevilǳ 
(everything ought to be different). Accordingly, the axiom governing representation of 
the constitutive will determine the action produced through it and any representation 
keen on keeping things as they are will seek to picture a Ǯgoodǯ situation in which the 
constituted and constitutive coincide, or, in the case of a perfectly conservative 
narrative, become one. This becoming one is considered erasure from a politico-
ontological point of view. It is a totalitarian move of total representation within which all 
alternatives are condemned as either stupid (accidentally wrong), evil (consciously and 
willingly wrong) or superstitious (consciously but not willingly wrong), but always 
nonsensical. Representation, then, is nothing else but the narrating of the world 
according to a specific axiomatic, a narrating which is never an act of pure and 
disinterested judgment, but, due to its moral and ethical character, a rationale for action 
that translates knowledge into action and thus power, or: epistemology into politics. 
 
In the examples enumerated above, this nexus between power and knowledge made it 
possible to colonize continents and slaughter millions while not only allowing its agents 
to represent themselves as doing Ǯgoodǯ, but also forcing them to convince their victims 
of this same truth. The axiom in this case is that of a ǲcolonial differenceǳ, 
 „[a] difference that hegemonic discourse endowed to Ǯotherǯ people, classifying 
them as inferior and at the same time asserting its geo-historical and body-social 
configurations as superior and the models to be followed.ǲ  
(Mignolo & Tlostanova 208) 
 The ǲcolonial differenceǳ is a functional twin to ǲraceǳ. In analogy, the role of A[WS] in 
the erasure of the difference between constitutive and constituted Blackness is one but 
double: the erasure of the difference within the mind of the Black/colonized through ǲsoftǳ colonization and the erasure of the difference within the mind of the 
White/colonizer through the act of (self-) overrepresentation. 
The latter is a comparatively simple process in which a particular position identifies 
itself as universal and erases the self-representation and claims of everyone else 
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through this auto-self-universalization (mostly not perceived as an active rendering 
universal but as asserting a universality always-already given). This would be the case of 
one school of thought identifying itself with Ǯtruthǯ (such as religion), or, as in the case of 
A[WS], a specific ǲethno-classǳ identifying itself as ǲhumanitasǳ while at the same time 
disqualifying all non class-members as an indistinct ǲanthroposǳ that has to be ruled by 
the humans ǲfor his benefitǳ ȋWynter 260). This is a simple process on the side of the 
self-overrepresenting part, as this part does not change its knowledge or modes of 
making sense, but only expands its reach.  
 ǲSoftǳ colonization on the other hand, the underbelly of (self-)overrepresentation, 
having not only to erase and restructure axiomatics and representations preceding, as 
well as experiences contradicting the self-overrepresenting partǯs claims, but also 
having to reconfigure the relation of the colonized/racialized to her or his own body 
(which is now what betrays, what makes one the target of terror, becomes oneǯs ǲguiltǳ, 
etc.), is a lot more complex. Aníbal Quijano has theorized this as ǲcolonialityǳ, a process 
consisting of three main steps: 
 „)n the first place, they [the European colonizers S.W.] expropriated those 
cultural discoveries of the colonized people that were most apt for developing 
capitalism to the profit of the European center. Second, they repressed as much 
as possible the colonized forms of knowledge production, models of the 
production of meaning, symbolic universe, and models of expression and of objectification and subjectivity. […] Third, in different ways in each case, the 
Europeans forced the colonized to learn the dominant culture in any way that 
would be useful to the reproduction of domination […].ǳ ȋǲColoniality of Powerǳ 
189) 
 
Although drawing its force from the arsenal of hard colonization, the role of coloniality 
is to make the use of this hard force unnecessary by assuring reproduction of 
domination through creating in the colonized/Black person the guilt and identification that was already considered in the example of aunt (esterǯs beating. The role of 
coloniality then is to translate extra-discursive constitutive violence into the discursive 
constituted power. Its goal is to prevent opposition to the constituted by erasing the 
 50 
gratuity of the constitutive through a legitimizing narrative which will represent it as 
well and right and transform cruelty into justice. 
 
That coloniality has seldom lived up to this goal has been and is being proven 
throughout history. W.E.B. DuBois has best described its actual effects concerning the 
implantation of Blackness in the minds of those racialized as Black within the United 
States: 
 ǳThe Negro is a sort of seventh son, born with a veil, and gifted with second sight 
in this American World, – a world which yields him no true self-consciousness, 
but only lets him see himself through the revelation of the other world. It is a 
peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of always looking at oneǯs self through the eyes of others, of measuring oneǯs soul by the tape of a 
world that looks on in amused contempt and pity.ǳ ȋ2) 
 ǲThe tape of a world…ǳ is the axiom implanted through not only the coloniality, but also 
the cruelty of power based on A[WS]. It is with this tape that the zero degree of ⧂ is 
measured, that there is no soul. But this tape comes up against a different tape, another 
consciousness in the to-be-colonized/to-be-racialized, based on both pre-existing 
cultural traditions as well as experiences that are incompatible with the axiomatic. This 
double consciousness hollows coloniality out, limits its power and makes necessary the 
constant reiteration of cruelty as the form that the implantation of the axiomatic into 
and onto bodies and flesh takes. Instead of a single subjected mind, coloniality creates a 
double consciousness in the bodies colonized or racialized as Black. The colonial 
politico-ontological epistemology meets a resistance rooted in the body and its 
experience. But this is not the body as sheer materiality or source of a supposedly pure 
affect. Rather, it relates to the stigmatized situation, to the becoming Black through 
terror and cruelty as specific forms of materialization of power that create a different 
experience in the Black abject than they do in the White subject (which does not have to 
suffer cruelty to become White) and thus potentially creates situations that the 
axiomatic, because of its White blindness, cannot anticipate and does not cover. This 
experience of being Black under A[WS], then, creates a cognitive dissonance between 
being and axiomatic that produces a fissure in the coloniality of power. This double 
consciousness is not free from coloniality, but it is also not completely contained within 
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it. The double Black consciousness is the opposite of the unitary White (self-
)overrepresenting consciousness: to a Black perception of two dissonant instances 
(White axiom and Black being) corresponds a White blindness that does not see 
anything outside its own self-overrepresentation in which being and axiom coincide. As 
will be shown now, this blindness relates to the constitutive Blackness whose exclusion 
founds the White subject and to which the latter must be blind in order not to face its 
own cruelty. This is the White blind spot that makes the totalitarian discourse of A[WS] 
possible, because it hides the contradictions between the constitutive and the 
constituted of White civil society and makes them seem one. 
 
I.3.b. Dispositivism:  Contre Agamben II. / Racializing the Subject I. 
 
Constituted discourse aims to hide the constitutive violence it is founded on in order to 
monopolize violence and consolidate itself and its power. Rationality, coloniality, 
modernity (Quijano, ǲColonialityǳ), Whiteness: all of these are knowledge formations 
that legitimize their force as not conquered but given by an extra-discursive higher 
order such as Ǯtruthǯ. This narrative portrays a specific social formation as uncontestable 
and denies the contingent and thus changeable nature of the axiomatic and regularizing 
norms that order it. This is what Michel Foucault has described as the dispositive41: 
 ǲJǯai dit que le dispositif était de nature essentiellement stratégique, ce qui suppose quǯil sǯagit là dǯune certaine manipulation de rapports de forces, dǯune 
intervention rationnelle et concertée dans ces rapports de forces, soit pour les 
développer dans telle direction, soit pour les bloquer, ou pour les stabiliser, les 
utiliser. Le dispositif est donc toujours inscrit dans un jeu de pouvoir, mais 
toujours lié aussi à une ou à des bornes de savoir qui en naissent mais, tout autant, le conditionnent. Cǯest ça le dispositif : des stratégies de rapports de 
forces supportant des types de savoir, et supportés par eux.ǲ42 (ǲJeuǲ 300). 
 
                                                        
41 Although ǲdispositifǳ is often translated as ǲapparatusǳ in English, it will be written as dispositive here in order to avoid confusion with the Althusserian concept of ǲ)deological State Apparatusǳ used below. 
42 „) said that the dispositive is of an essentially strategic nature, which supposes that we have here a 
certain manipulation of relations of power, a rational and concerted intervention into these relations of 
power, either in order to develop them in a certain direction, or to block them, to stabilize them, to use 
them. Hence, the dispositive is always inscribed into a game of power, but also connected to one or several 
limits of knowledge arising from it while, just as much, conditioning it. This is what the dispositive is: 
strategies of power relations that support specific kinds of knowledge and are supported by them.ǳ ȋS.W.Ȍ 
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As a dispositive, coloniality implies for the colonized43a situation in the colonial matrix 
of knowledge and its social classifications that is at add odds with their own tradition, 
experience, etc. This dissonance prevents the colonized from total identification with the 
colonial matrix. The colonizer on the other hand, in order to accept the colonizing 
narrative that guides his actions, can be assumed comfortably identical with his own 
colonizing matrix. Not feeling the whip that gives his knowledge its power (a constantly 
reiterated reminder of the roots of power), it is easy for him to ignore the nature of the 
colonial difference that informs his representation of society. The colonial dispositive 
then creates two distinct kinds of subjects (the double consciousness and the single 
consciousness subject), which are determined by their respective situation or position 
within the colonizing power/knowledge matrix. )n this respect, Giorgio Agambenǯs 
statement, that „Das Dispositiv ist also zunächst eine Maschine, die Subjektivierungen 
produziert, und nur als solche ist es auch eine Regierungsmaschine.ǲ44(Agamben, 
Dispositiv 35) seems at first glance no more than a description of the function of 
coloniality as creating discursive power through acquiescence. If the dispositive is a 
process that manipulates power relations according to a certain axiomatic45, then it is 
automatically a governing machine. 
  
But, as has been shown, within the colonizing dispositive, the colonized is not thought of 
as a subject, but merely as a sentient being, a body or flesh. It is not a citizen, but an anti-
citizen, a zero-citizen, a speaking commodity: 
 „)n short, the colonized subject is embodiment. In the colonial principle of 
rationality, however, there is a clear difference between being and existing. Only 
the human exists, since the human alone can represent the self as existent, and 
have a consciousness of what is so represented. From the standpoint of 
colonialism, the colonized does not truly exist, as a person or subject.ǳ ȋMbembe, 
Postcolony 187) 
 
                                                        
43 The term „colonizedǲ will be used to refer to those subjected to coloniality as soft colonization. As such, 
it will also be applied to African Americans in the course of this text.  
44 ǲThe dispositive is foremost a machine producing subjection, and only as such is it also a governing machine.ǳ ȋS.W.Ȍ 
45 ǮAxiomaticǯ refers to a specific knowledge formation without any consideration of power, Ǯdispositiveǯ 
refers to that knowledge formation with an emphasis on the enmeshment of knowledge and power. Thus, 
an axiomatic can be considered as a part of a dispositive. 
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How does the dispositive account for the different forms of subjection regarding the colonizer and the colonized? Significantly, it doesnǯt. In fact, from the perspective of 
ontologically founded axiomatics such as A[WS] it canǯt, because these are by nature 
totalitarian and can as such not admit that they or their power are limited. Accounting 
for different forms of subjection would amount to admitting that the colonized is not 
what the colonizing axiomatic represents it as being, or, in other words, that the 
axiomatic is wrong or insufficient, thus not identical to truth, and not equipped with its 
moral and ethic power to command a very certain kind of action. The driving belief of a 
colonial axiomatic is that it does not produce the colonizedǯs situation, but merely 
reveals it to him or her. It does not see itself as transforming but as revealing and could 
never think of itself in terms of coloniality. In other words, the dispositive is structurally 
blind to that which is beyond it and it has to be so in order to be what it is. This is the 
location of erasure, where the constituted is reified into the constitutive. This is also the 
reason why a hermeneutics of absence and a pedagogy of the trace is necessary. 
 
What does this erasure mean for constitutive Blackness? What does it mean for 
constitutive Blackness, when it can only survive in the blind spots of colonialist 
representation, through syncretism or going underground? It means social death and ⧂, it means invisibility: 
 „) am invisible, understand, because people refuse to see me ... When they 
approach me they see only my surroundings, themselves, or figments of their 
imagination – indeed, everything and anything except me ... That invisibility to 
which I refer occurs because of a peculiar disposition of the eyes of those with 
whom I come in contact. A matter of the construction of their inner eyes, those which they look through their physical eyes upon reality.ǲ ȋEllison 3). 
 
Invisibility is not disappearance as such but erasure; it is refused existence and absence 
within the colonialist representation but not deletion. What is produced through this 
colonialist refusal and the attempt to assimilate the world to its knowledge, instead of 
the other way round, is a repressed unconscious (perceptible but not representable), a ǲcolonial uncannyǳ (Low 113 f.), which for the axiomatic is an ǲunconceptǳ 
(Masschelein). In order to fully understand this erasure and its role for the constitution 
of Blackness, a closer look at the totalitarian subject is necessary, a second look that will 
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produce a description of the structural erasure of constitutive Blackness as abjection. 
 
* 
 
How does the dispositive of coloniality operate within the mind; how does it create 
subjects? Quijano describes it as follows: 
 „This relationship [of coloniality] consists, in the first place, of a colonization of 
the imagination of the dominated; that is, it acts in the interior of that imagination, in a sense, it is a part of it. […] The [systematic colonial] repression 
fell, above all, over the modes of knowing, of producing knowledge, of producing 
perspectives, images and systems of images, symbols, modes of signification, over 
the resources, patterns and instruments of formalized and objectivized 
expression, intellectual or visual. It was followed by the imposition of the use of the rulersǯ own patterns of expression, and of their beliefs and images with 
reference to the supernatural. These beliefs and images served not only to 
impede the cultural production of the dominated, but also as a very efficient 
means of social and cultural control, when the immediate repression ceased to be 
constant and systematic.ǳ ȋǲColonialityǳ 169) 
 
The subject in this sense would be something that not only internalizes the axiomatic of 
colonial culture (and the narrative determined by it) into itself as itself (in the perfect 
colonial world) or as a part of itself (in this imperfect but still colonial world), but which 
literally incorporates the axiomatic, materializes it in its own body (that is: as its own 
experience, perception, relation to its body, its morphology and as the body of the axiom 
(Butler, Bodies 35f.)). A total identification would in this sense imply an erasure of the 
implementation and a representation of the identified colonial psychological and 
corporeal identity as natural; viz. an erasure of the constitutive terror under the 
constituted discourse that would make cruelty unnecessary: 
 
 „Der Terminus Dispositiv bezeichnet also etwas, in dem und durch das ein reines 
Regierungshandeln ohne jegliche Begründung im Sein realisiert wird. Deshalb 
schließen die Dispositive immer einen Subjektivierungsprozess ein, da sie ihr 
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Subjekt selbst hervorbringen müssen.ǲ46 (Agamben, Dispositiv 24). 
 
At this point, important questions reemerge. First: What role does the to-be-
subjectivated play in the act of subjection? Agamben suggests that it is passive and 
powerless. Second: how is political change even thinkable in such a situation of passive 
powerlessness? If the dispositive meets no resistance, why and how should it change? 
Third: What is the significance of all of this for the constitution of Blackness, if it is 
premised that „eine rassistische Unbedingtheit und Logik in der Schaffung und 
Durchsetzung des Subjektbegriffes selbst [liegt], die eine Partizipation nicht–weißer 
menschlicher Handlungsfähigkeit im Orbit der Subjektivität nach wie vor ausschließtǲ47 
(Broeck, ǲSubjektǳ 153)? These questions shall be used to formulate a critique of Agambenǯs elaboration of the dispositive first, and then serve to introduce a different 
approach to this concept proposed by Gilles Deleuze.  
 
Agamben emphasizes that dispositives rely on an ǲoikonomiaǳ, that is an ensemble of 
practices, knowledges, procedures and institutions, whose goal it is to manage, govern, 
control and redirect the conduct, gestures and thought of people into supposedly useful 
channels (Agamben, Dispositiv 23.f.). At the same time, Agamben laments the pullulating 
of dispositives into oikonomias, into different apparatuses of control that unilaterally 
create subjects through edict and without exchange with the subjectivated; a process 
which he describes as ǲNiedergang der Politikǳ48 (Dispositiv 39). In these sentences, 
Agamben just as categorically excludes any interaction between dispositive/s and 
subject/s as he precludes any multiple determination of the to-be-subjected through 
different synchronous dispositives. For Agamben, in other words, no double 
consciousness is thinkable. He explicitly proposes a top-down model of subjection, 
which one can neither escape nor exact any influence on: subjection is always-already 
determined and inevitable. Though the content of subjection remains unspecified and 
thus possibly contingent, subjection as a form and function is given for Agamben, that is, 
it possesses the force of ontological politics. For Agamben, there is only one model of the 
subject, and given this assumption, the subject can be completely enveloped in the 
                                                        
46 ǲThe term dispositive thus designates something in an through which a pure action of governance is 
realized without any foundation in Being. Because of this, dispositives always include processes of subjection, because they have to produce their own subject.ǳ ȋS.W.Ȍ 
47 ǲthere lies within the creation and implementation of the concept of the subject a racist unconditionality 
and logic, which still excludes non-white human agency from the orbit of subjectivityǳ ȋS.W.Ȍ 
48 ǲdemise of politicsǳ ȋS.W.Ȍ 
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dispositive and merge into the totalitarianism of its mode of representation. Thus, in a 
White civil society, this can only be a White or colonizing subject, because it does not 
experience the cognitive dissonance between power and knowledge, between the 
constitutive and the constituted. Agambenǯs work has been successfully colonized by 
Whiteness; it is an example of what must be called dispositivism (viz. a positivist 
acceptance of the dispositive in force). In White civil society, this dispositivism asserts 
White (self-)overrepresentation and it is because of this that Agamben is blind to the 
problematics of double consciousness, Blackness or colonization and can speak of the 
Nazi camps as being without precedent.  
 
While Agamben seems to indicate an awareness of the problematic of a totalitarian 
theory of the dispositive by posing the question of possible ǲprofanationǳ ȋa word whose 
religious connotations are indicative of Agambenǯs erasing of the political under the 
ontological) of the dispositive, he undermines this by reducing profanation to the action 
of a ǲGegendispositivǳ49 (Dispositiv 34). Although a counter-dispositive might counter-
act the influence of a first dispositive on the subject and its formation, this will not result 
in a double determination by both dispositives at once, nor produce any space for 
agency on the side of the to-be-subjected, but merely signals the replacement of one 
dispositive by another, thus leaving the fundamental mechanics of subjection intact. 
Agamben emphasizes that the counter-dispositive stands in a relation of ǲeither-orǳ to the ǲprimaryǳ dispositive. For him, profanation cannot „[auf die S.W.] 
Wiederzusammensetzung eines neuen Subjektes hinauslaufen, es sei denn in verhüllter 
gleichsam gespenstischer Formǲ 50  (Dispositiv 36), because the subject is so 
fundamentally limited to internalizing only a single and total dispositive that it cannot 
constitute itself in the blanks between more than one dispositive. On the contrary, 
Agamben argues that the to-be-subjected would not develop agency but would be lost in 
such an in-between-space and that such a space would therefore ultimately have to 
remain empty. Accordingly, he describes this space as one of ǲdesubjectionǳ, a process 
whose result is exactly ⧂, but which still counts as subjection nevertheless, because, 
due to the multitude of different dispositives present in the contemporary world, ǲSubjektivierungsprozesse und Desubjektivierungsprozesse [werden (S.W.)] 
                                                        
49 ͞ĐouŶter-dispositive͟ ;“.W.Ϳ 
50 ͞lead to a re-assembling of a new subject, except in a veiled and quasi spectral forŵ͟ ;“.W.Ϳ 
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wechselseitig indifferentǳ 51  (Dispositiv 37): where one dispositive fails, another 
succeeds. The ⧂ remains opaque and the gaze is again diverted from the constitutive to 
the spectacular, its constituted double feigning totalitarian transparency. It is no 
coincidence that Agamben draws on pornography to exemplify instances of profanation 
and to think a body invested by capitalist commodification. Here profanation is thought 
of in terms of stripping a thing of its function in the dispositive by voiding it of 
signification and turning it into a pure signified, or pure means, detached from a 
vanished foundation that will then seem to never have been. Only in pornography, this 
argument goes, is a body reduced to flesh and pornography, therefore, is a ǲre-appropriation of nihilismǳ (Prozorov 72 ff.). This nihilism, though, is just the embrace of 
a merely perceived nothingness or absence that is not so, but is the result of an erasure. 
The profane remains trapped within A[WS]. Its nothingness/absence is understood as a 
disruptive emptiness that brings to surface the ǲtruth contentǳ under the ǲsubject matterǳ of capitalist spectacle (Prozorov 79): pornography as an act for show, not for its ǲauthenticǳ goal ȋprocreationȌ, but merely for the consumption of the viewer. But, as 
argued above, the spectacle is not the flat surface Agamben takes it for. Rather, it is the 
translation of the constitutive into the constituted, the conservation of constitutive 
violence in discourse through cruelty, the administration of experience as narrative 
through an axiomatic, the transmogrification of ascription to description, the formation 
of subjects by writing an axiomatic into and onto bodies. The spectacle is not mere 
surface; it is not just a product that can be consumed, but first of all a medium in which 
an axiomatic transmits itself, an act of normalization that not only invests a subject, but also is ǲa regulatory ideal … whose regulatory force is made clear as a kind of productive 
power, the power to produce – demarcate, circulate, differentiate – the bodies it controlsǳ ȋButler, Bodies XII). The ǲtruth contentǳ of its ǲsubject matterǳ then is not 
emptiness, but power, and the bodies present in pornography are never mere surface or 
simple materiality. Ignoring this and embracing a supposed nothingness not only 
amounts to an intra-discursive act that is a far shot from disrupting the spectacle, but 
also embracing the power and terror hidden underneath it. The fact that Agamben does 
mistake erasure for absence is further proof of the dispositivism that forces him to refer 
to pornography and the Nazi camps to be able to think dehumanization, that makes him 
unable to think the abjection constituted through the commodification of Black bodies 
                                                        
51 ͞suďjeĐtioŶ aŶd desuďjeĐtioŶ are ďeĐoŵiŶg ŵutually iŶdiffereŶt͟ ;“.W.Ϳ 
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and the reduction of these bodies to flesh in slavery and from the plantation to the 
penitentiary. 
 
The Black desubjection that double consciousness would be from Agambenǯs 
perspective is in this sense constitutive of the Ǯinnocenceǯ (the constitutive blindness to 
cruelty and its role in it) that White subjection is made of, the Ǯinnocenceǯ that allows 
Whiteness to think of itself as having no responsibility for the world it has made, 
because it does not know that it has made this world. Because of this, desubjection and 
subjection can never be mutually indifferent: the one exists only because of and through 
the other. The absence of this Black desubject in Agamben has been shown in the 
paragraph above, but the trace from which to theorize this desubject as abject has also 
already been mentioned: the veiled and spectral form of that which is between 
dispositives. This abject is the uncanny colonial doppelgänger of the subject. Its haunting 
of the spectacular will offer clues to its understanding. But before this, a splitting up of 
the concept of the dispositive is necessary in order to recuperate it from Giorgio Agambenǯs flawed dispositivism. 
 
I.3.c. Re-t/racing the Potential of the Dispositive in the Psyche 
 
Required for recuperating the concept of the dispositive is adapting it to the realm of the 
psyche, where coloniality and subject theory converge, without conflating it with 
theories of ideology or repression. At first glance, both these terms seem to be perfectly 
adequate to explain the interior process that underpins subjection. In Louis Althusserǯs 
theory, it is ideology that implants in the subject the structures that will make the self-
recognizance of the subject as subject in the act of interpellation possible: For him, 
ideology is: 
 „ … profondément inconsciente […] Lǯidéologie est bien un système de 
représentations, mais ses représentations nǯont la plupart du temps rien à voir avec la Ǯconscienceǯ: elles sont la plupart du temps des images, parfois des concepts, mais cǯest avant tout comme structures quǯelles sǯimposent à lǯimmense 
majorité des hommes, sans passer par leur Ǯconscienceǯ.ǲ52 (Pour Marx 239) 
                                                        
52 ǲ… profoundly unconscious […] )deology is indeed a system of representations, but most of the time 
theses representations have nothing to do with Ǯconsciousnessǯ: most of the time they are images, 
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Ideology works through representation. Its role in representation is similar to that of the 
axiomatic, with one fundamental difference. As Foucault has pointed out in his critique 
of the concept of ideology, theories of ideology are generally built on notions of a truth 
that would be veiled by ideology and could be revealed by tearing up ideology, and they 
necessarily rely on an a subject preceding ideology and posited „in untergeordneter 
Position in Bezug auf etwas, das ihr gegenüber als ökonomische, materielle usw. 
Struktur oder Determinierung wirksam istǲ53 (Dispositive 34f.). The concept of ideology, 
in this sense, is very similar to the Agambian version of the dispositive and it runs the 
same risks of totalisation. Although ideology seems to be a critique of totalitarian 
representation, it is so only by recurring to ontological politics of truth. Theories of 
ideology therefore do not consider the constitution of the subject or abject, but take 
these as given. Instead, they focus on the manipulation of the latter through 
representation, that is, they are concerned only with the level of the constituted, not the 
constitutive. This why Foucault combines his critique of the concept of ideology with a 
critique of using the notion of psychic repression in the analysis of power. Although 
psychic repression „scheint so gut zu einer ganzen Reihe von Erscheinungen zu passen, 
die von Machtwirkungen abhängenǲ, it is a „völlig inadäquatǲ concept, because it implies 
not only theorizing a true or Ǯcoreǯ subject that exists prior to power and the repression 
it assert, but also amounts to a ǲvöllig negative, beschränkte, zu kurz gefasste Auffassung 
der Macht ist, die seltsamer Weise ein wenig von allen Seiten geteilt wurdeǲ54 (ibid.). 
Gilles Deleuze elaborates this in his book on Foucualt: „la répression et lǯidéologie nǯexpliquent rien, mais supposent toujours un agencement ou Ǯdispositifǯ dans lequel 
elles opèrent, et non lǯinverseǲ55 (Dispositive 36). 
 
Both Foucault and Deleuze consider the dispositive to be more fundamental and 
foundational than Agamben does. They insist on its creative and constitutive power and 
refuse to see it as a merely deceptive or negative instance operating within the realm of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
sometimes concepts, but most of all they impose themselves as structures on the immense majority of 
Men, without passing through their Ǯconsciousnessǯǳ. ȋS.W.Ȍ 
53 ǲ… in a subordinated position in relation to something acting on it in form of an economic, material, etc. structureǳ ȋS.W.Ȍ 
54 ǲ[seems to ȋS.W.Ȍ] fit well to a whole series of phenomena depending on power effects ǲ… „completly inadequateǲ … „completely negative, limited and insufficient conception of power, which strangely seems to be shared a bit on all sidesǲ ȋS.W.Ȍ 
55 „repression and ideology donǯt explain anything, but always suppose an agency or ‚dispositiveǯ within which they operate, and not the other way aroundǲ ȋS.W.Ȍ 
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the constituted: 
 
 „Wenn sie [Macht] nur repressiv wäre, wenn sie niemals etwas anderes tun 
würde als nein sagen, ja glauben Sie dann wirklich, dass man ihr gehorchen 
würde? Der Grund dafür, dass die Macht herrscht, dass man sie akzeptiert, liegt 
ganz einfach darin, dass sie nicht nur als nein-sagende Gewalt auf uns lastet, 
sondern in Wirklichkeit den Körper durchdringt, Dinge produziert, Lust 
verursacht, Wissen hervorbringt, Diskurse produziert […]ǲ 56  (Foucault, 
Dispositive 35) 
 
The dispositive is neither absolute nor embedded in a prior discourse that assures its 
demands for identification and subjection are met. It must motivate obedience and 
create the basis for identification and subjection. This means that the dispositive must 
deal with the possibility of resistance on the side of the to-be-subjected. Why; and what 
does this possibility look like? It is the trace of something that could be called truth, 
though not in the form of an ontologico-political self-transparent and self-identical 
truth-kernel (as in theories of ideology and psychic repression), but as a politico-
ontological truth: the presence of the constitutive in the constituted. In the case of the constitution of Blackness, this presence is Ǯtraceǯ: the presence of the constitutive as the 
presence of the (politico-ontological) truth of race, that is, as t/race. In order to 
constitute White Subjects and Black abjects, the dispositive needs to eliminate that 
t/race, which implies erasing the perception of the violence that founds its knowledge 
and representing its axiomatic as self-sustaining, translating hard into soft colonization. 
But the t/race signals that this translation can never be total, that there can be no 
discursive closure, due, among other things, to the cognitive dissonance present in 
double consciousness and to the colonial uncanny this double consciousness upholds 
into the dispositive. 
 
This is the point where the analysis of the constitution of Blackness reveals itself to be 
the analysis of the desire contained in the commodity-fetish of race. What motivates the 
                                                        
56 ǲ)f it [power] were only repressive, if it would never do anything else then say no, do you really believe 
that it would be obeyed? The reason for the rule of power is that it is accepted, it is simply this, that it is 
not merely weighting on us as a prohibitive power, but in reality permeates the body, produces things, 
causes desire, generates knowledge, produces discourse […]ǲ ȋS.W.Ȍ 
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subject to at least acquiesce and internalize the de jure ontologico-political narrative 
that erases the de facto political ontology of the constitution of Blackness? How is this 
motivation a desire contained within ǮBlacknessǯ (but not of it), and what is the radical 
political potential possibly contained in a deconstruction of this fetish that may bar the 
desire this fetish structures or even generates? What does this tell us about desire itself? 
Is this analysis concerned with a socio-genetic or onto-genetic desire? Is this desire 
identical or intrinsic to the subject, or does it precede or succeed it? Is this desire 
constitutive or constituted? How does it operate? In the case of repression or of Althusserǯs ǲscreenǳ of ideology ȋIdeology ͺͻȌ and Agambenǯs oikonomia of the 
spectacle, this – even if not theorized as such by these authors themselves – is an onto-
genetic but mislead and misused desire. Both Althusser and Agamben propose a notion 
of a return to and liberation by truth, but they do not explain where the impulse for such 
a return could possibly originate. For Foucault, the question of how obeisance is 
motivated reveals the subject as a mixture of unfettered, as well as mislead onto-genetic 
and freshly created socio-genetic desire. While it are mislead onto-genetic and socio-
genetic desires that drive the motivation for acquiescence and internalization, onto-
genetic desire is the potential constitutive force which always risks disrupting the 
constituted power, be it in its sheer being (for example as homosexual/non-normal love 
or friendship (Foucault, Ästhetik 70.f.)), or as impulse for an askesis as a ǲtechniqueǳ or ǲcareǳ of the self, a form self-purgatory discipline of desire57. 
 
If a desire for material profit, this desire is at a minimum adapted to the parameters of a 
very specific axiomatic, necessarily secondary to the power that makes profit a possible 
and legible concept in the first place. But because knowledge of this secondary nature 
implies not only the possibility of opting (dropping) out, but signals the non-imperative 
nature of the axiomatic claims altogether, power weaves a narrative that erases within 
constituted discourse its constitutive violence and reifies the constituted into the natural 
(and thus only possible) state of things. Accordingly, subjects must be convinced that 
they themselves could not be and act any different from what they are and do within the 
system. This, as has been explained above, is attempted through fusing the constitutive 
and the constituted through (self-)overrepresentation and coloniality. As this chapter 
                                                        
57 Other approaches to the role of desire in subjection will be discussed in chapter I.4. The how, why and 
when (etc.) of possibilities of resistance connected to desire will be discussed in more detail when 
constitutional Blackness, the glitch and the semiosis of the abject are considered in later chapters. 
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has shown, in order to assure this function efficiently, the narrative must not only inscribe itself into the subjectǯs representations, but also into its body and its libidinal 
economy. It must create an incentive to identify with the narrative, it must create in the 
subject the impression to have stakes (possibilities of enjoyment) in the maintenance of 
power, in short: it must create a desire. 
 
It is exactly the role of A[WS] to define this subject as Ǯnon-Blackǯ which is then called ǮWhiteǯ58 and blessed with White innocence as to the (politico-ontological) truth of this 
desire. The politico-libidinal economy of A[WS] demands that the subject enjoy its 
Whiteness, and this is only possible if all it does is good and true. The price for this to be 
possible is a certain blindness of Whiteness, a ǮWhite ignoranceǯ reducing Blackness to ⧂. The White subject is built on a Black desubject, which according to A[WS] is neither 
possible nor real and which cannot have a desire of its own. This situation is that of 
Black abjection, which may be tinged with desire but always harks back to that cruelty 
which only a White subject in a White civil society can ignore. 
 
I.3.d. Supermax Erasure: Why the Black Desubject is Abject 
 
The colonial uncanny is not a repressed desire, but the haunting intuition of the 
(politico-ontological) truth of colonialist desire and White innocence. It is the shadow of 
that which lies underneath ⧂, the foundation of the White subject, and leads to the 
Black abjection that this chapter will now theorize.  
 
The Black abject is the impossible Black desubject. As has been shown, it is not only 
axiomatically excluded from being a subject, but it serves the constitution of the White 
subject and has to be necessarily erased from the discourse of the constituted White 
subject in order to make its existence possible. This is an abject situation very similar to 
that sketched by Judith Butler in order to conceptualize gender relations: 
 ǲAbjection ȋin latin, ab-jicere) literally means to cast off, away, or out and, hence, 
presupposes and produces a domain of agency from which it is differentiated. 
Here the casting away resonates with the psychoanalytic notion of Verwerfung, 
                                                        
58 Thus the wish to Ǯbecome Whiteǯ in a White supremacist society, as for example described by Frantz 
Fanon. See chapter I.4.a. for an analysis of this proposal. 
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implying a foreclosure which founds the subject and which, accordingly, 
establishes that foundation as tenuous. Whereas the psychoanalytic notion of 
Verwerfung, translated as Ǯforeclosureǯ, produces sociality through a repudiation of a primary signifier which produces an unconscious  or, in Lacanǯs theory, the 
register of the real, the notion of abjection designates a degraded or cast out 
status within the terms of sociality. Indeed, what is foreclosed or repudiated 
within psychoanalytic terms is precisely what may not reenter the field of the 
social without threatening psychosis, that is the dissolution of the subject itself. I 
want to propose that certain abject zones within sociality also deliver this threat, 
constituting zones of uninhabitability which a subject fantasizes as threatening its own integrity with the prospect of psychotic dissolution ȋǮ) would rather die than do or be that!ǯȌ.ǳ ȋButler, Bodies 186, note 1.) 
 
In the development of her concept of abjection, Butler remains on track with A[WS], 
which is why her approach needs to be differentiated from the understanding of 
abjection proposed here. At once very close and fundamentally different, the Butlerian 
abject will therefore be scrutinized in a separate sub-chapter bellow. It will suffice, at 
this point, to signal two important readings of the desubject as abject. 
 
First, reading the Black desubject as something whose humanity is invisible to A[WS], 
while it is hypervisible as Black flesh, as a commodity or a pathological criminal, as 
prisoner, anti- and zero-citizen. This Black desubject can be acted upon within the 
constituted dimension, it can be described as dangerous or lazy, but itǯs exclusion from 
the realm of White civil society, itǯs absent soul, viz. itǯs desubjection/ abjection are set in 
the realm of the constitutive and unchangeable. Hence, the necessity of cruelty as the 
form social reproduction takes in the realm of the constitutive, as opposed to (e.g.) the 
legal discourse of rehabilitation that is set in the realm of the constituted. Hence, the 
scenes of subjection in which Saidiya Hartman describes how the narrative of A[WS] 
attempts to conceal cruelty under a veneer of constituted discourse by making the slave 
sing or dance or express other signs of libidinal investment in and acquiescence to White 
civil society. This narrative is conceived to erase from White civil societyǯs self-narration 
the possibility of a Black body not invested, that is, not inscribed with power and 
therefore not under the control of discourse and thus constantly summoning violence. 
This first reading of abjection, then, is that of Saidiya Hartman: the total erasure of 
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cruelty and its replacement through narratives of enjoyment; a situation in which „Blackness marks a social relationship of dominance and abjectionǲ ȋͷ͹Ȍ. 
 
Second, a reading of abjection to describe the function of Blackness for and in the psyche 
and self-consciousness created through subjection within a dispositive structured by 
A[WS]59. This is the abject described by Julia Kristeva as a „objet chu, [qui] est 
radicalement un exclu et me tire vers là o‘ le sens sǮeffondreǲ60 (9). For Kristeva, the abject is the impure, repulsive, disgusting and detestable that the ǲ)ǳ rejects in its self-
constitution and represses to the degree of invisibility, because it feels threatened by 
it.61 Kristeva here, of course, participates in the discourse of psychic repression tied to 
the conservative notion of the subject critiqued by Foucault and Deleuze above. Her 
notion of the abject is and can only be articulated in reference to Blackness if located 
firmly within A[WS]. There it describes the Black abject in accord with ⧂ as „à la lisière de lǯinexistence et de lǯhallucination, dǯune réalité qui, si je la reconnais, mǯannihileǲ62 
(Kristeva 10).  
 
The haunting of the axiomatic by the colonial uncanny is just such a threat of 
annihilation or end of the world (see chapter I.4.a.). It is uncanny, because it can be 
present to experience, but is not representable in the narrative that is constituted on its 
exclusion. It is a gut feeling. It can be anxiety, a fleeting sense of the always possible 
collapse of the self. The colonial uncanny is uncanny not in a Freudian sense of a return 
of the repressed, but first of all in an almost Heideggerian manner: the sensing of the 
absence of (that which functions as) the ontological foundation of oneǯs being, the t/race 
of cruelty within the constituted. As such, the colonial uncanny also indicates the fear of 
having to face the truth of oneǯs desire.  
 
                                                        
59 ǲ)ch werde Subjektivierung den Prozess nennen, durch den man die Konstitution eines Subjektes, 
genauer, einer Subjektivität erwirkt, die offensichtlich nur eine der gegebenen Möglichkeiten zur Organisation eines Selbstbewusstseins ist.ǳ [„) shall call subjection the process through which the 
constitution of a subject, more precisely, a subjectivity, is produced, which obviously is only one of the 
possibilities for the organization of a self-consciousness.ǳ ȋS.W.Ȍ] ȋFoucault, Ästhetik 251). 
60 ǲfallen object, radically excluded and pulling me towards the point where sense breaks downǳ ȋS.W.Ȍ 
61 This is also the difference between the abject and the object, which does not threaten but stabilizes the 
subject (Kristeva 9f.). In general, the object has to be considered as intra-discursive or belonging to the 
realm of the constituted. Fred Moten in this sense differentiates between the object and the thing, with the latter ǲsustain[ing] itself in that absence or eclipse of meaning that withholds from the thing the horrific honorific of Ǯobjectǯ.ǳ ȋMoten ʹͲͲͺ: ͳͺͳȌ. 
62 ǲon the edge of inexistence and hallucination, of a reality that, if ) recognize it, annihilates meǳ ȋS.W.Ȍ 
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The threat of the abject for the subject in A[WS] then is double: the end of 
innocence/ignorance on one side, and possibly the end of the subject and the world it 
senses, knows, is, on the other side. To repeat, yet again, a variation of the by now 
familiar theme: the subject can not be the subject that it is and recognize the abject at 
the same time: „Lǯabjet sollicite et pulvérise tout à la fois le sujetǲ63 (Kristeva 12). The 
entrance of the constitutive abjection of Blackness into constituted discourse (its 
semiosis) would amount to an ontological jump; it would be and require a re-foundation 
of power and the subject. Sections II. and III. will analyze this as the concept of 
constitutional Blackness and in relation to the racial glitch. At this point, however, it is 
necessary to remain with the anxiety and its role for abjection. As has become obvious, 
this is a well-founded anxiety, because: 
 „Eradication of the generative mechanisms of Black suffering would mean the end 
of the world and they would find themselves peering into an abyss (or 
incomprehensible transition) between epistemes ...ǲ ȋWilderson, ǲVengeanceǳ 33) 
 
Speaking in these terms, the motivation of the White subject to sustain the abjection of 
Blackness is to secure the continuity of its self or ego in the form it was able to take and 
can only sustain because of this abjection, an abjection acquiesced in exactly because of 
the joy it brings. From a perspective emic to A[WS], the fetish of Blackness marks a 
taboo that can only be touched at the prize of the end of the world and whose 
uncannyness will be rationalized by the axiomatic narrative in order to sublimate the 
anxiety it generates. The White subject posits itself against the abject, defines itself as 
rational contra the irrational abject, whose supposed libidinal being is uncanny to 
rationality, because it can not be grasped by it, but which is contained through these 
terms nevertheless. Blackness becomes a shapeless something, noise or chaos, a jungle 
of drives, becomes perceived as barbaric, un-cultured savage, primitive or pathological, 
something which can be neither represented nor understood by a Ǯnormalǯ mind: „a vast 
tumultuous world of drives and sensations, so tumultuous and opaque as to be 
practically impossible to represent, but which words must nevertheless grasp and 
anchor in pre-set certaintyǲ ȋMbembe, Postcolony 176). Rationality acts like faith, culture 
or civilization as a basic axiom, a colonial difference under which to erase not only the 
                                                        
63 ǲThe abject at the same time solicits and smashes the subject.ǳ ȋS.W.Ȍ 
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constitutive nature of race but also its capacity for haunting. In its function as 
mechanism of delimitation it marks not only its own borders, but also transcends these 
borders by defining everything beyond them as the class of the ungraspable and then 
treating and dominating it through this class. The axiomatic representation asserts its 
totalitarianism through ǲempty signifiersǳ 64, tools of reintegration and containment 
complementing the mechanism of erasure in moments where the constitutive risks 
gaining sufficient force to disrupt the constituted. The insufficiency and faultiness of not 
understanding or being unable to narrate are transferred from the necessarily perfect 
because true discourse to the not understandable itself. There is not a lack of 
explanatory capacity, but simply nothing to be explained, nothing beyond 
representation, its narrative, its imperative. As Achille Mbembe writes in an analysis of 
the colonial axiomatic that is also valid for A[WS], ǲit can be defined as a series of 
hollowsǳ (Postcolony 179), a series of representations protecting the subject from the 
abject: 
 „)n desperation to endow the colonized with an essence and enshrine them in a fossil, the colonizer can confine them in a name […] Thanks to this name given by 
the settler, the native will become a fragment of the real, an objective thing, 
matter. The world of things and the world of names will then be a single reality and the settler able to make a representation of the colonized. […]  the native is 
only in so far as he/she is a thing denied, is only as something deniable. In short, from the standpoint of a Ǯselfǯ of oneǯs own, he/she is nothing. In the colonial 
principle of rationality, the native is thus that thing that is, but only insofar as it is 
nothing. And it is at the point where the thingness and its nothingness meet that the nativeǯs identity lies. The work of the colonizer will henceforth consist in self-representing that thingness and nothingness, what they are and how they are. […] 
The native – and here lies the paradox – is also what makes possible the constitution of the colonizer as subject par excellence. […] The subject that the 
colonizer is, is a subject stiffened by the successive images he or she makes of the 
                                                        
64 „An empty signifier can, consequently, only emerge if there is a structural impossibility in signification 
as such, and only if this impossibility can signify itself as an interruption (subversion, distortion, etcetera) 
of the structure of the signǲ ȋLaclau ͵͹Ȍ. The empty signifier can be characterized by Albert Memmiǯs description of the colonized: „Er besteht zunächst aus einer Reihe von Negationen. Der Kolonisierte ist 
dies nicht und ist das nicht. Er wird niemals positiv beurteilt; falls dies doch geschieht, so verdankt sich die 
konzedierte Eigenschaft einem psychologischen oder ethischen Mangel.ǲ [ǲ(e consists primarily of a 
series of negations. The colonized isnǯt this and he isnǯt that. He is never judged in a positive manner; if this 
does happen, the conceded quality is due to a psychological or ethical lackǳ ȋS.W.Ȍ] ȋͺͶȌ.  
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native.ǳ ȋPostcolony 186) 
 
After defining Whiteness as not-Black on the constitutive level, Blackness is presented as 
lack and not-White on the constituted level. The causality is reversed and suddenly 
Blackness is fungible and exploitable because not possessing speech, nor history, nor 
civilization, nor humanity instead of the other way around. Supermax subject stability is 
secured and erasure perfect: supermax erasure. 
 
I.3.e. Dancing in the Dispo(sitive) Prohibited; or no Body, no Soul, no Black Desire 
 
In order to even think the possibility of subverting the supermax erasure of abjection, it 
is necessary to propose another subject model, another approach to the subject that will 
allow us to understand abjection in terms etic to A[WS]. This will be the subject model of 
Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze, which in the preceding pages has already served as 
default position for a critique of A[WS] multiple times, and which will now be sketched 
in more detail through Deleuzeǯs understanding of the dispositive in his reading of 
Foucault. 
 
Contrary to Agamben, Deleuze centers his analysis of the dispositive on the question: „ … 
ob die Subjektivierungslinien nicht der äußerste Rand eines Dispositivs sind, und ob sie 
nicht den Übergang eines Dispositivs zu einem anderen umreißen: In diesem Sinne w“rden sie ǮBruchlinienǯ präparierenǲ65 ȋǲDispositivǳ 156). According to this, the subject 
is not defined through a delimitation of its contours, but it is itself a delimitation of the 
dispositive. The subject then is imposed on a self with which it fuses, but not to the 
extent of total identity and not without being contaminated by the self: „Das Selbst ist 
weder ein Wissen noch eine Macht. Es ist ein Individuierungsprozess, der sich auf 
Gruppen und Personen bezieht und sich den etablierten Kräfteverhältnissen sowie den 
konstituierten Wissensarten entzieht: eine Art Mehrwertǲ66  (Deleuze, ǲDispositivǳ 
155f.). 
 
                                                        
65 ǲ… if the lines of subjection are not the outermost edge of a dispositive, and if they do not outline the 
transition from one dispositive to another: in this sense, they would prepare Ǯfault linesǯ.ǳ ȋS.W.Ȍ 
66 ǲThe self is neither a knowledge nor a power. )t is a process of individualization that relates to groups 
and people and eludes the established relations of power as well as the constituted types of knowledge: a sort of surplus value.ǳȋS.W.Ȍ 
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Although the subject is constituted, the self is not. It is located below the constitutive and 
relates to the constituted through the subject-form, but it remains a space of resistance 
to the constitutive force and cruelty of discourse. The dispositive cannot take totalitarian 
control of the self and its subject, it cannot position subjects that reproduce the truth of 
the axiomatic informing the dispositive, it cannot completely incorporate itself into the 
body. Read in reverse: the dispositive cannot take totalitarian control of the self and its 
abject, it cannot situate abjects that have never been in the truth of the axiomatic 
informing the dispositive. There are neither positions nor situations, but a self dancing67 
in the dispo(sitiv) as the delimitations of power are not the delimitations of the 
subject/abject, but the self extends and dances below, above, beside and beyond these 
delimitations into a space that the subject/abject may serve to integrate into and speak 
in the discourse of power, but which by definition is never totally colonized. In this 
model, the colonial uncanny is not deleted by supermax erasure, but it is a productive 
force of subversion and resistance. Asking „Wie ist in der Welt die Produktion von etwas Neuem möglich?ǲ, Deleuze responds: something new is to be understood as the „Neuartigkeit der Ordnung und nicht die Originalität der Aussageǲ68 (ǲDispositivǳ 159). 
This new order is what is created through the fault lines that delineate the subject 
without containing the self, as the dispositives react to the contamination with and 
subversion by the dancing self that establishes itself on these contested fault lines and 
transforms the dispositive. This is the essential difference between a 
Deleuzian/Foucaultian approach to the dispositive and that of Agamben: while the latter 
asserts that there can be no subject between dispositives, the former insist that it can be 
only there. While Deleuze understands the subject to be only the tiny part of the 
dispositive where the (from the perspective of the dispositive) insufficiently 
subjectivated self interacts and partly merges with it, Agamben identifies the subject 
with the complete self and not only ignores the self that exceeds the subject and the 
dispositive, but erases that surplus self completely from representation. The important 
impulse here is to think the subject as only a part of a self that eludes total 
subjection/abjection as a closed, definable, classifiable and containable entity that has a 
given and transparent identity and place and is incapable of changing its position and all 
                                                        
67 Though not directly inspired by it, the use of the term „danceǲ her is also connected to Deleuze and Guattariǯs consideration of Man Rayǯs „Dancer-Dangerǲ ȋDeleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipe 464). See 
chapter I.4. for further analysis of the constitution of the subject in Deleuze and Guattari. 
68 ǲ(ow is the production of something new possible in this world?ǳ … ǲthe newness of an order and not the originality of an assertionǲ ȋS.W.Ȍ 
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positions relational to it. There is no supermax stability here and the modality of the 
subject is thus propelled from passive-descriptive to ascriptive-aggressive. This is why 
power must motivate obeisance. It is also why a motivated conservative subject has an 
(ascriptive-aggressive) interest in maintaining other positions, to which it is relational, 
in their situation and why a system of supermax erasure has to be implemented in the 
first place. Again, desire asserts its force and asks the rhetorical question: who has a 
desire invested in White supremacy? Who enjoys it, when dancing in the dispo(sitive) is 
prohibited?  
 
A[WS] is a system that creates Whiteness and White desire and seeks to guarantee their 
enjoyment in order to sustain itself. It was argued above that the identification of 
Blackness with slavery was a post-facto legitimization of certain relations of production 
intended to secure their reproduction and sustained profitability for a certain ethno-
class. This implied that race as a concept pre-existed the fetishization of Blackness, but 
did only after this become the political axiomatic that structured the White civil society 
still in effect in the United States today. Blackness, then, is the product of the 
transformation of one dispositive into another, the transformation of a proto-capitalist 
class society into a White capitalist caste/ethno-class society. As it was only through this 
transformation that the desire undergirding it became White, this desire is a 
manipulated desire. It cannot be ontogenetically White, because there is no ontological 
Whiteness, but is has become White and reproduced itself as such through the political 
ontology of the fetishization of Blackness in which it is contained as its truth. 
Structurally speaking then, it is not possible to pose the question of Black desire within 
A[WS], because within A[WS] Black people were not subjectivated but abjected in the 
creation of Whiteness/Blackness. As the consideration of cruelty has shown, A[WS] pre-
posits that its discourse neither can nor wants to enter Black flesh but only inscribes 
itself on it. Black people were not only not integrated (as humans), but constitutively 
excluded from the dispositive of A[WS]: they had no body, no soul and thus no desire. 
Black desire within A[WS] could only exist either as the potentially subversive explosion 
of a desire suspended (and contained) in the empty signifier of race, or as the abject 
acquiescence Saidiya Hartman traces. This latter desire, though, had nothing to do with 
White desire, because  – even if it had been genuine – its structural functionality would 
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have meant a completely different kind of social suture69 that can not be theorized in 
terms of desire qua enjoyment. Thus, as mentioned, in A[WS] Blackness is not 
constituted through hegemony, but through terror; Black people are not only 
constituted but also disciplined through violence (Wilderson 2011:4). Desire as 
motivation for subjection is specific to the axiomatic of the dispositive that generates 
this desire (be it from nothing, socio-genetically, or as a form of manipulation of another, 
onto-genetic desire). As such its universalization (its self-portrayal as being outside and 
above specific axiomatics and including all possible axiomatics) is an act of (self)-
overrepresentation and coloniality that is by definition erasive of that which exists 
outside it (e.g. alternative desires).70  
 
I.3.f. Black Bodies matter Differently: Contre Butler / Racializing the Subject II. 
 
Given the axiom-specificity of discourse, what does it mean to ask what desire or 
enjoyment motivates the Black plantation or prison slave to approve of and internalize 
A[WS], that is: to ask for the impossible Black desire? Is such asking for Black enjoyment 
in White civil society not a tautological question that rests within A[WS] and is no more 
than a reiteration of abject acquiescence, no more then an act giving supermax stability 
to a colonialist subject and the system reproduced through it? It is, if asked on the 
assumption of a unitary colorblind desire. This, to give an example, is what Judith Butler 
does when she writes of the ǲlonging for subjection, based on a longing for social existenceǳ ȋPsychic 20). Given her awareness of gender-related abjection as a process of 
normative erasure of specific bodies from discourse and ontology in order to define the 
normal body, this is of special significance here, because it highlights the difference 
between gender and race and the consequences of this difference for Butlerǯs work. 
 
Judith Butler emphasizes the ǲproduction of the abjectǳ ȋBodies xii), a production that is 
a discursive process of making invisible, of producing for the non-normative bodies an ǲinadmissibility to codes of intelligibilityǳ, denying them any claim to partake in the 
human and forcing them to ǲlive in the shadowy regions of ontologyǳ (Costera Meijer & 
Prins 277). But in spite of her acknowledgment of abjection and its potentially 
                                                        
69 Suture and the interaction between constitutive and constituted Blackness will be analyzed in detail in 
section II. 
70 See also the discussion of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattariǯs common work in the next chapter, which 
contains similar propositions that have inspired the development of this one. 
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subversive power, as well as her claim to want to ǲrefuse the ontological dualism that posits the separation of the political and the psychicǳ ȋPsychic 19) – which is the deep 
structure of the production of abjection as foundation for the subject-as-self-
consciousness – Butlerǯs belief in a longing for subjection prevents her own theorizing 
from living up to her claims.  
 
The claim that subjection should be the only possible way to gain a social existence is a 
Hegelian and Lacanian one71 and is based not only on the assumption that there is only 
one instance from which this existence can be won, but also on the hypothetical 
existence of a universal core subject and a universal desire. This theory of a universal 
core-desire and its dependency on the single – and thus totalitarian – instance of 
recognition not only creates the motivation to internalize it, participate in its axiomatic 
and thus become a subject, but it assumes that the subject is forced to do so: 
 ǲBound to seek recognition of its own existence in categories, terms, and names 
that are not of its own making, the subject seeks the sign of its own existence 
outside itself, in a discourse that is at once dominant and indifferent. Social 
categories signify subordination and existence at once. In other words, within subjection the price of existence is subordination.ǳ ȋPsychic 20)  
 
Where is the non-discursive abject in this? Is it not implied that those abjected should 
also seek recognition from the totalitarian power (that abjected them in the first place), 
as this desire for social existence is presented as non-axiomatic and universally valid? 
But this would not only radically undermine the disruptive potential of abjection and 
risk reducing it to abject acquiescence, but it also posits erasure as given (Butler, Bodies 
24f.). Yet, what indeed does Butlerǯs proposition imply, if we consider for example Orlando Pattersonǯs question: „)f the slave no longer belonged to a community, if he had 
no social existence outside of his master, then what was he?ǳ, and his answer: „The 
initial response in almost all slaveholding societies was to define the slave as a socially dead personǲ (38). Or to phrase this with Fred Moten ǲ… if the black can only be an other 
for the white, then is there ever anything called black social life?ǳ ȋǲCaseǳ 178). Does not 
                                                        
71 The next chapter will consider this in more detail. Note here that the ǲlonging for subjectionǳ Butler speaks of is taken from Jacques Lacanǯs model of the Oedipal stage in the formation of the subject and itǯs entry into the symbolic order that will be criticized in the context of Frantz Fanonǯs work in chapter ).Ͷ.a. 
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Butler, fixed on a totalitarian because over-determining power, propose exactly such a 
Black social death and absence of Black social life as the only possible constitution of 
Blackness? Her concept of melancholia suggests as much and this is due to the fact that 
the difference between gender and race lies exactly in their im/possible relation to the 
desire of discourse. Although Butler masterfully analyses this problematic on the level of 
gender, her already highlighted use of a supposedly non-axiomatic model of core-desire, 
a supposedly non-erasure based and non-concealing psychoanalytic core subject/core 
self – which is in fact a secret supermax erasure in her otherwise explicitly contra-
erasure system – forces her to repeat „the introduction of the slave into the community 
of his master, [which] involves the paradox of introducing him as a non-beingǳ ȋidem.).  
 
The concept of melancholia is Butlerǯs attempt to grapple with the colonial uncanny she 
seems to acknowledge but in fact reproduces in her thought of the subject. Even if the 
abject would acquiesce to the discursive power in order to gain a social existence, it 
would still not be contained in this discourse, as it can only assume as its identity within 
discourse the narrow corset of constituted abjection. Constitutive abjection cannot 
appear in the constituted abject without exploding it. As perfect coloniality, to attempt 
such an integration of the abject would only solidify the totalitarian narrative of an 
identity of the constituted with the constitutive, but it would not stop the haunting of the 
abject emanating from the erased constitutive abjection. Interestingly, Butler herself 
introduces melancholia in these same terms as the haunting of the subject by a rest that 
could not be integrated in the moment of subjection and thus marks its borders (Psychic 
29) and describes the ǲunthinkable, abject, unlivable bodiesǳ as ǲthe excluded and 
illegible domain that haunts the former domain [of intelligible bodies] as the specter of its own impossibility, the very limit to intelligibility, its constitutive outsideǳ ȋBodies x). 
But instead of seeing in the abject the possibility of a subversive truth (in terms of the 
presence of the constitutive in the constituted) of that which is lost, Butler uses the term 
melancholia to theorize an irreversible supermax erasure as the loss of that which is 
lost. But even if this at least acknowledges the politics of erasure in subject-formation ȋǲ)s there a loss that cannot be thought, cannot be owned or grieved, which forms the 
condition of possibility for the subject? (Psychic 24)) and hints at the socio-genetic 
constitution of political ontology, it also affirms the subject in a conservative positivism 
or entrism that is due to her theorization of the performative as a process parasitical to a 
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discourse preceding and engulfed by it72as its certainly productive self-subversion but in 
now way its radical nemesis. As Butler writes herself of citing (which together with 
reiteration forms the core method of performativityȌ, it: ǲestablishes an originary 
complicity with power in the formation of the Ǯ)ǯǳ, and thus, ǲ[a]lthough this constitutive 
constraint does not foreclose the possibility of agency, it does locate agency as a 
reiterative or rearticulatory practice, immanent to power, and not a relation of external opposition to powerǳ ȋBodies xxiii). 
 
Though pointing with important accuracy to supermax erasure as something similar to ǲa foreclosure that constitutes an unknowability without which the subject cannot endureǳ ȋPsychic 24), she does not seize this moment for a politics of liberation based on 
the rupture of the subject, but merely theorizes a slow shift in power through micro-
differences produced in the reiteration and citations of discourse by those always-
already constituted within discourse but not constitutive of it. It is in this sense that 
Black bodies matter differently. Their discursive limits are not identical to those of 
gendered bodies, because they have no soul and discourse only marks on the Black flesh, 
what it would write in the gendered body. Because of this, there persists in Butlerǯs 
theorization an abjection through the notion of a seeming non-axiomatically but in fact 
very discursively desiring subject, the risk of inheriting a White supremacist/colonialist 
hidden agenda powerful enough to not only undermine but turn oneǯs attempt to 
understand the constitution of Blackness against itself. Just how powerful, will now be 
shown through an analysis of its effect in Frantz Fanonǯs Peau noire, masques blancs. 
This will allow a paradigmatic critique of large sections of psychoanalysis as a colonialist 
science of White self-overrepresentation that will be combined with the aforementioned 
critique of materialist approaches and the work of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari in 
order to terminate this first section by proposing a psycho-materialist approach to the 
analysis of the constitution of Blackness. 
 
 
                                                        
72 Consider Judith Butlerǯs definition of performativity ǲas the reiterative and citational practice by which discourse produces the effects it namesǳ ȋBodies xiiȌ and which is thus ǲnot a singular Ǯactǯ, for it is always a reiteration of a norm or set of normsǳ ȋBodies xxi). 
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I.4. JUST WHAT IS IT THAT MAKES TODAYǯS WHITENESS SO DIFFERENT, SO APPEALING?73 : 
T/RACING PSYCHOANALYSIS 
 
Psychoanalytic approaches based on the assumption of a universal structure of desire 
overrepresent the axiomatic that narrates this universal desire as the motivation of the 
subject to internalize this axiomatic and thus assure the power and reproduction of its 
dispositive. These approaches reify the politico-ontological constitutive processes into 
the ontology of nature or the human per se, thus erasing its axiomatic character and 
stabilizing the polities, policies and politics deduced from it.  There is therefore the 
necessity to deconstruct these approaches, and this chapter will do so by focusing on the 
coloniality of the Oedipus complex as fundamental axiom of most psychoanalytic 
theories of desire used in cultural analysis.  
 
Before doing this, a short emphasizing of the obvious is necessary: stating – as has been 
done in the previous chapter – that desire as motivation for subjection is specific to the 
axiomatic of the dispositive that generates it, is in itself a counter-axiomatic to the Freudian theory of culture ȋunderlying Judith Butlerǯs work among othersȌ according to 
which the dispositive ǲKultur-Über-)chǳ74 (Freud 104) saves society and the subject 
from a self-destroying abandonment to its desires (e.g. to its Thanatos). This latter claim 
is nothing less than the reification of a specific idea of humans as being constitutionally 
aggressive against each other, an aggression that has to be eliminated through the 
Super-Ego (Freud 105). Starting from this assumption, proclaiming that subjection is the 
only possible means to establish and maintain a functioning society becomes a fact of 
ontological politics. Power, in other words, becomes socially naturalized as the need to 
foreclose a part of the self in order to create the subject and society in a mutually 
constitutive interpellation. A short glance at history and the shifting definitions of that 
which is to be kept at bay in order to guarantee the maintenance of society (paganism, 
homosexuality, communism … or Blackness) suffices to show how deeply entwined with 
abjection this model is. Thus, in order to even start an analysis of the A[WS] quality of 
psychoanalysis, desire has to be posited as given, but unknown as to its ultimate 
character. It might be onto-genetic desire or socio-genetic desire, or both, and its quality 
                                                        
73 The title is inspired by Richard (amiltonǯs ͳͻͷ͸ Pop-Art collage and comment on consumer culture „Just what is it that makes todayǯs homes so different, so appealing?ǲ 
74 ǲCulture-Super-Egoǳ ȋS.W.Ȍ 
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might be that of aggression, that of an abstract force or drive, or something completely 
different. Certainly though, positing a specific ontological desire risks doubling the 
coloniality of rationality in as far as it overrepresents a certain motive for and logic of 
action as universally valid. This is a basic hypothesis: liberal, Marxist and most other 
north-western social meta-narratives agree in modeling their theorization on a rational-
choice-agent, their differences springing not from how the subject wants, but what s/he 
wants. This chapter will contend that separating Ǯhowǯ from Ǯwhatǯ is a fatal flaw, though 
by no means an accident, but a very consistent and essential paradigm in A[WS]. 
According to this logic, there can only be ideological and intra-axiomatic differences 
between meta-narratives: the subject is given, and it is either good and true and values 
the well-being of the community above its own well-being or it is an individualistic, 
selfish and self-centered wolf only looking for his own good. All differences in action do 
not spring from a different logic of action, but from different parameters feeding into the 
logic. In impressive unanimity, desire is always posited as given and civilization is the 
means to channelize it in the realm of the possible defined by the nature of desire. The 
question is, if this desire is as Freud conceived it, or if this desire is as such Ǯgoodǯ and 
only turns aggressive and anti-social through the repressive structures of culture and 
authority, as for example Wilhelm Reich would content. Thus the binary logic of north-
western social meta-narratives: if Manǯs Desire is anti-social, this deontologically 
legitimates the Police State; if not, let the State wither away so that a hundred flowers 
can blossom. Not denying that there is Evil in the World, these meta-narratives inquire 
into its roots, assuming those can only be either in the self or in the other, either the 
individual or the alien, and propose remedies according to their analysisǯ results. 
 
But here the precincts of the Chinese Cultural Revolution and its 100 Flowers campaign 
are not crossed by coincidence. Indeed, the question of the nature of desire in political 
struggle seems to have been nowhere more imminent than in the context of colonialism 
and imperialism, where the colonized not only had to fight and liberate themselves from 
relations of force and exploitation, but also from soft power, from the coloniality of 
culture. Anti-colonial thinkers such as Liang Qichao, Rabindranath Tagore, Jamal-al-Din 
al Afghani or Léopold Senghor (to name but a few) not only criticized colonialism on the 
basis of economic exploitation, but also developed ideas of (Pan-)Asianism, (Pan-
)Islamism and (Pan-)Africanism in order to pit certain modes of thinking, knowing and 
being against a western culture often felt to be spiritually corrupting. Without using the 
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concept of desire, these authors pointed to the psychological effects that lead certain 
people to cooperate in their own oppression, while driving others to apathy or 
psychological instability.  
 
Before entering this problematic with maybe its most famous analyst, Frantz Fanon, the 
basic lines of flight of this chapter should be named in order to make its argumentation 
easier to follow. The goal of this chapter is to expose how the concept of desire functions 
within A[WS], while at the same time demonstrating that the politics of t/race and 
im/possible desire in White civil society are the points of departure for any retrieval of 
the political beyond the reproduction of race, racism and power within the subject. Any 
political programmatic must start from here, asking: Just what is it that makes todayǯs 
Whiteness so different, so appealing? 
 
I.4.a. T/racing Fanonǯs End of the World 
 
In order to understand Frantz Fanonǯs contribution to the critique of desire in A[WS], 
one has to read Les damnées de la terre as a critique of Peau Noire, Masques Blancs. In the latter, Fanon famously ȋand explicitlyȌ complements Freudǯs approach to the subject as ontogenetic through a ǲsociodiagnosticǳ which attempts to analyze the socio-genesis of 
the Black person (Peau 8). In this, he goes as far as declaring the Black soul a construct 
of the White man (Peau 11). Although, at first glance, this seems to be the same politico-
ontological approach so far described with Foucault and Wilderson, it is not (yet) so, and 
that is the central flaw of Peau Noire, Masques Blanc that Les Damnées de la terre will 
correct through the elaboration of a concept of (de)colonial violence.  
 
All throughout Peau Noire, Fanon seems to become entangled in contradictions arising 
from his attempt to combine classical dialectics and psychoanalysis75 with his political 
agenda; putting into doubt not the force of his argumentation but the capacity of 
psychoanalytic discourse to articulate this argumentation. What indeed to make of the 
subtext of a self-declared Freudian stating that the Negro is far from developing an 
Oedipus complex (Peau 123), given that Freud himself has described the development of 
                                                        
75 In spite of his critique of psychoanalysis (Peau 123), Fanon explicitly places himself in the tradition of 
Hegel, Alder and Freud (Peau 49) and connects his analysis to Lacanǯs theory of the mirror stage (Peau 
131, footnote 25.). 
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this complex as the process of development of culture (Freud 95f.), viz. the point that 
marks the difference between the civilized and the savage? Might this have to be read as 
subversion or transgression? Or does Fanon play with the idea of the Noble Savage; do 
we find the naturally good man corrupted by society; does Fanon unwillingly connect 
with the négritude he tries to reject (Peau 183)? Is it a slip, an intellectual inconsistency 
or a strategic lie, given that the logic of his argumentation does not follow its enunciated 
program and continues to reason through the Oedipus complex? 
 
Fanon emphasizes that the processes of subjection are different for White and Black 
people. While the White family prepares its offspring for life in a nation and society built 
in its image (et vice versa), the Black family cannot do this, and because of this the Black 
child ǲsǯanormaliseraǳ76 with the first contact with the White world (Peau 117). Even when ignoring the fact that Black here means Ǯcolonized Blackǯ ȋviz. Black in a society 
where the number of White people forms a quantitative minority), as well as the 
impossibility of drawing such a clean division between the colonized family and the 
colonized/colonizing society that it is located in, and the ambivalence of politicizing the 
private of the psyche while at the same time de-politicizing the private of the home, the 
mechanics and vocabulary of this pathologization are quite problematic. For one, if, with 
Foucault, we consider race as an instrument of normalization, calling Black psychic 
processes anormal fits neatly into a White supremacist perspective, begging the 
question once more of what role psychoanalysis plays in the dispositive of White civil 
society. This is underlined by the fact that, in order to be able to even say this, Fanon 
accepts the psychoanalytic axiomatic of positing the north-western nuclear family as the 
place where the subject and its ǲmorbiditéǳ77 (Peau 116) develops, thereby making it 
hard to read his formulation of anormalization as a cynical critique of a contagiously 
perverse White society. What, then, is this moment of anormalization? How does it come 
about, what does it consist in, and what are its consequences? 
 
The moment of anormalization is one of the most famous passages in Fanons oeuvre. 
Faced with a little child pointing its finger at him and saying: ǲMaman, regarde le nègre, jǯai peurǳ78 (Peau 90) and other exclamations of the kind, Fanon becomes conscious of 
                                                        
76 ǲwill anormalizeǳ ȋS.W.Ȍ 
77 „morbidityǲ ȋS.W.Ȍ 
78 ǲMother, look at that Negro, )ǯm afraid!ǳ ȋS.W.Ȍ 
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his Blackness: „au premier regard blanc, il [le nègre] resent le poids de sa mélanineǲ79 
(Peau 122). The result of this is the „écroulement du moiǲ80 (Peau 125).  
 
What happens in this moment of anormalization? At first glance, this seems to be a 
situation of Althusserian interpellation in which an always-already present subject 
becomes actualized as the self recognizes itself as interpellated, thus assuming its 
always-already given identity. The problem with Althusserǯs model is that it cannot 
explain why the self should recognize itself as the interpellated subject at all and why, if 
it does so, it should chose to recognize itself in this specific form. This is correlative to 
one of the points of critique proposed against Butler above and also valid for Fanon, and 
which I will now repeat in a more extended form: ǲAnd if, as Frantz Fanon suggests, the 
black cannot be an other for another black, if the black can only be an other for the white, then is there ever anything called black social life?ǳ ȋMoten, ǲCaseǳ 178). 
Significantly, Fanon proposes a situation in which power inscribes itself not just on the 
Black flesh, but within the Black body; in other words: he theorizes a Black desire and 
longing for recognition within A[WS] that ultimately describes Blackness in a quasi 
dispositivistic form. The ǲNegroǳ cannot become Black at the moment of interpellation, but he has to have 
been inserted into the system producing his Blackness ȋhis ǲguiltǳȌ before in order to 
even understand, to make sense of and to identify with this interpellation and the 
Blackness it situates him in. This is exactly the predicament Fanon has placed himself in 
by positing a clean cut between the Black family and the White society. If the cut were as 
clean as portrayed, neither could the interpellation work, nor would there be the 
problematics of a Black desire dependent on White supremacy, the problematics of 
thinking Black life as what David Marriott has described as ǲhauntedǳ by ǲthe gaps left 
within us by the desires of othersǳ ȋHaunted 53). Fanonǯs argumentation though, will 
move exactly in this direction. Anticipating Althusserǯs Ideological State Apparatuses, 
Fanon argues that through institutions such as the school, subjection is performed in the 
same mode for White and Black children. Both are taught to consider the Gauls their 
ancestors, both learn the same logic of knowledge through the same textbooks and the 
same culture, the same adventure novels (Peau 118f.). Because of this, Fanon argues, 
Black children think of themselves as White and consider Blackness to be evil. Explicitly 
                                                        
79 ǲwith the first white gaze, he [the negro] feels the weight of his melanineǳ ȋS.W.Ȍ 
80 ǲcollapse of the selfǳ ȋS.W.Ȍ 
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connecting, just as Althusser will do after him, his theory of the subject to Lacanǯs theory 
of the mirror stage (Peau 131), Fanon goes on to explain that what happens is that the 
Black child constructs a self-representation, an imago of itself that is different from its 
real self; a process that is not interrupted within the Black family as the family itself 
strives to be as White as possible within White civil society. Thus, through a „imposition culturelleǲ81 (Fanon, Peau 156) – coloniality! – a Black collective unconscious is 
constructed in which Black people think of themselves not as lily-White, but as whiter 
than other Black people, e.g. whiter as the Senegalese (Peau 20): „Un Antillais est blanc par lǯinconscient collectif, par une grande partie de lǯinconscient personnel et par la 
presque totalité de son processus dǯindividuationǲ82 (Peau 152).  
 
It is this imago that is shattered by the White gaze, thus leading to the collapse of the 
self. The anormality and pathology created in the Black person in his contact with the 
White world is to be read very narrowly: as a factual and painful state of disruption and 
abjection, not merely a violent ascription in the Foucaultian sense. It is important to note 
that this shattering is not a moment of disillusionment or tearing apart of the 
misrepresentation of the self, but a moment in which the coloniality of power Ǯclicksǯ in 
the Black psyche in order to regulate its behavior towards the White (looking) master, 
viz. a moment in which power is not disrupted but affirmed. The dispositive produces in 
the racialized subject a White desire: to be White and enjoy the privileges of Whiteness. 
The gaze breaks this enjoyment and reveals the nature of its desire, the constitutive 
tears apart the constituted. Thus, Black desire in A[WS] is in fact White desire, thus 
Black life in A[WS] is haunted rather than haunting life and the destitution of its desire 
might inspire the conceptualization of the destitution of the Ǯrealǯ thing, the Whiter than 
White desire. But in Peau Noire the trauma of collapse is in no way a revolutionary 
catharsis, but a humiliation. The desire to be White is not dispelled but enforced, as the 
Black psyche remains inside the discourse of its cultural imposition and understands 
Whiteness as the only way out of the state of humiliation. Not only does the White gaze 
not automatically lead the traumatized psyche to its Ǯtrueǯ or Ǯauthenticǯ self, but it most 
often induces compensatory behavior seeking to rebuilt the collapsed self (which is 
                                                        
81 ǲcultural impositionǳ ȋS.W.Ȍ 
82 ǲAn Antillean is white through the collective unconscious, through a big part of the personal unconscious and through almost the totality of his process of individuation.ǳ ȋS.W.Ȍ 
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indeed collapsed, but not totally erased) in accordance with the imago that lead to its 
collapse.83  
 
At this point, two essential aspects of Fanons argumentation in Peau noire come into 
focus. First, although as a classical psychoanalyst Fanon posits the existence of 
ontological desire (e.g. in the drives), he also theorizes socio-genetic desire, such as the 
Black-White desire to be White. This desire is the result of the coloniality of White civil 
society and nothing else and in accordance with this, Fanon urges Black people to gain 
hold of their means of self-representation and start writing Black childrenǯs books, 
songs, history books and so on (Peau 121). As long as these are not created, Fanon 
contends, people with Black skins will wear White masks. But Fanon does not stop with 
the mere intra-discursive advocacy of creating Black imagos invulnerable to the White 
gaze. In a Hegelian twist on desire84, Fanon demands that Black people be recognized 
and considered from their own desire (Peau 177). This is still a call for both sides to 
transcend their differences towards a common humanity and in Peau noire it is still 
considered a problem of the White subject most of all. Blackness is consolidated through 
White obstruction, trough the refusal of White civil society to accept Black humanity; a 
refusal condensed in the White gaze that refuses the Black person access to Whiteness 
and lets it become aware of its positionality within White civil society. In this situation, 
the Black person can understand the dynamics of subjection/abjection because of an 
immediate Black experience of t/race, a double consciousness created through the 
machinations of coloniality that not only makes him or her aware of, but urgently forces 
him or her to act in two systems of reference at the same time (Fanon, Peau 89). As 
mentioned before, this being-in-two-systems at the same time is not given in the White 
experience which can remain within White self-overrepresentation constantly and 
comfortably without risking moments of cognitive dissonance. In order to be recognized 
as human, the Black person must force an awareness of double consciousness on the 
White subject, viz. it must break Whitenessǯ centrifugal power projection in which the 
White individual identifies itself with humanity and thus prohibits and prevents the 
humanity of everything non-White from being legible and legitmate. Fanon says that this 
breaking of White coloniality will require a struggle, but still shies away from 
                                                        
83 Fanon describes this extensively, analyzing acts such as interracial marriage, education or relocation to 
the metropolis (Peau chapters 2 and 3). 
84 For a more detailed take on Fanonǯs contradictory use of Hegelian dialectics, see David Marriottǯs 
Haunted Life. 
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acknowledging – as he will in Les damnées (37f.) – the necessarily violent nature of this 
struggle. Only such a struggle will permit Black and White people alike to ultimately 
break with White desire in order to develop a new community. But although he does call 
for an end of the world in Peau noire – ǲla fin du monde, parbleu!ǳ ȋͳ͹ͷȌ – he does not 
explain how it should come about. Instead, he explicitly rejects the political potential of 
history (viz. historical materialism) and posits a universal humanity in form of a 
psychoanalytic core-subject/core-self from which the foundation for the future 
recognition of that humanityǯs true nature will spring (Peau 187). With this, he still 
summons the power of rationality rather than violence to combat coloniality and racial 
conflict. But how should an awareness of the double system dynamics of 
subjection/abjection be imposed on White civil society and White resistance to Black 
humanity broken, how the end of the world induced, if one remains within the axiomatic 
of this world by appealing to an intra-systemic logic of rationality instead of demanding 
a new constitutive moment (often perceived as violent because not contained within the 
known modes of making sense)? How can the psyche be purged of its humiliation, how 
the body be purged from power and the desire to either be White or to kill Whiteness be 
dissipated? How are Black and White psyches constructed from scratch, what is their 
content, what their form? These questions underline the conspicuous absence of double 
consciousness in Fanonǯs writing and lead to the second essential aspect of his work 
highlighted here. Fanonǯs study of the collapsed self is in fact founded on a psychological 
structure based on the Oedipus complex. It is because of this that he formulates an intra-
discursive/unitary psychological system that references an always-already White 
humanity and thus ends up rolling the revolutionary potential of Peau Noire back into 
the processes that reproduce race and power within the subject. 
 )n ǲLe stade du mirroir comme formateur de la function du Jeǳ, Jacques Lacan explicitly 
describes the concept of the imago as interwoven with the Oedipus complex (Écrits I. 
92.ff.). The mechanism here is basically the same Fanon uses to describe the production 
of the White imago in the Black child. Due to a ǲméconnaissanceǳ85 (Lacan, Écrits I. 93), 
the child identifies with a picture of itself ȋǲjeǳȌ that does not correspond to its real self, 
thus entering the realm of the symbolic. The ǲjeǳ is, in form of the ǲje-idéalǳ, a symbol 
standing in for and producing a fictive unity of the non-unitary ǲmoiǳ. Nevertheless, it 
                                                        
85 „misrecognitionǲ ȋS.W.Ȍ 
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does have social validity and power in spite of its fictive character, as it is recognized 
(mirrored) by the social context of the child, such as the family. As such, the ǲjeǳ is the 
precursor of the not-yet full-fledged subject (which will only emerge after the Oedipus Complex has been passed through, viz. slightly Ǯafterǯ the formation and transformation 
of the imago). Most importantly, the imago is the point where social construction and 
auto-perception of the self become interlinked with the desire of the Other on whose 
recognition it not only depends, but by which it is constituted (as any recognition diverging from the ǲjeǳ will induce change in the ǲjeǳ). This is not only the core matrix of 
the Oedipus complex (Lacan, Écrits I. 97), but also the exact same constellation Fanon 
uses in his description of the White gazeǯs role for the self-perception of the Black 
psyche which cannot sustain its imago against this gaze. In order to further trace the 
enmeshment of this with Lacanǯs theory of the Oedipus complex, a short reference to some of Lacanǯs works published after ͳͻͷʹ (the publication date of Peau noire) is 
necessary86. 
 
According to Lacan, the Oedipus complex consists in the interruption of the childǯs 
imaginary identification with the mother through the interruption of that identification 
by the name-of-the-father87 and the childǯs subsequent attempts to reinstate this 
identification. Through this interruption, the child completes its entry into the realm of the symbolic, as the ǲjeǳ it identifies with is now completely detached from anything real 
(such as the mother) and purely symbolic. Searching for the reason of its interrupted 
identification with the mother, the always-already rational-choice-analytic child now 
asks itself: What does the father have that ) donǯt? What in the father attracts the motherǯs desire and love and enables the father to interrupt my bond/ identification 
with the mother? The name-of-the-father, in other words, creates a split in the childǯs 
psyche. Through its prohibitive force, the child exits a holistic world of experienced 
mere being (even if this holism and mere being are just a misrepresentation, an illusion 
in the realm of the symbolic) and enters a world of insufficiency and lack, split into what 
is there and what is missing to be complete. In its attempt to identify the lack that leads 
                                                        
86 For a summary of the development of the Oedipus concept in Lacanǯs work and its differences to Freud, 
see Borch-Jacobsen & Brick. For the explanations given here, see also Lacanǯs Des Noms-du-Pére and Sean 
Homer (Lacan 51.f.). 
87 The expression „name-of-the-fatherǲ ȋnom-du-père) intends to highlight that the function by that name 
in the Oedipus Complex is performative and can also be assumed by someone else than the biological 
father. It also hints at the ǲno-of-the-fatherǳ (non-du-père) on which the phallic law and the realm of the 
symbolic are founded. 
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to the disruption of the unity and the diversion of the motherǯs love from the child 
towards the name-of-the-father, the child discovers the phallus as answer and it will 
now attempt to become that phallus (that is: the child attempts to be that which – 
according to the theory of the Oedipus Complex – is missing in the mother and makes 
her love the father as the one where that is not missing) to re-become the object of the motherǯs desire, re-conquer her love and re-instate the unity with her, while at the same 
time ending (castrating) the disruptive force of the name-of-the-father. The phallus thus is at once the signifier of the m/Otherǯs desire ȋLacan, Écrits II 172) and at the same time the signifier of lack in the ȋchildǯsȌ split self or the childǯs desire for the m/Other. This is 
exactly the Ǯincestuousǯ matrix of desire that the child will have to leave behind in its 
passage through the Oedipus complex in order to become a subject. It will do so by 
identifying with and thus integrating the name-of-the-father into itǯs self in form of the 
law-of-the father. This integration is the conclusion of the entrance into the realm of the 
symbolic, the development of a signifier of the self determined by three different poles: a 
signifier, a signified and an Other/law-of-the-father both sustaining the connection 
between them and preventing the two from (incestuous) union (and therewith from 
regressing into the realm of the imago: the imaginary). The child recognizes the 
impossibility of re-entering the imaginary and sublimates its incestuous desire for being 
the phallus of the name-of-the-father into the desire for becoming a different symbolic 
phallus that can be reconciled with and recognized by the law-of-the-father, thus 
starting the act of transference that initiates the chain of signification in which the 
signification of the signifier slides from signified to signified in search for the phallic 
signifier with which and through which the split between signifier and signified will be 
transcended and unity reinstalled. The desire to transcend the split self will continue in 
its quest for the missing object and the recognition of the Other. Lacan condenses this by saying, that desire is always the desire for the recognition of oneǯs desire ȋÉcrits 342), 
which is exactly the conclusion to Peau Noire: ǲJe demande quǯon me considère à partir de mon Désir.ǳ88 (177). 
 
Although Fanon dismisses the significance of the Oedipus complex for the Black psyche, 
his analysis is profoundly Oedipal. What else indeed is the collapse of the self under the 
White gaze than the interruption of the imaginary identification and the destruction of 
                                                        
88 ǲ) demand to be considered on the basis of my desire.ǳ ȋS.W.Ȍ 
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the imago through the name-of-the-father? Seeing this, the role of psychoanalysis in the 
maintenance of White civil society suddenly loses all obscureness, as it becomes obvious 
that the Oedipal structure of White civil society posits a very specific phallus: Whiteness. 
It is the lack of Whiteness that leads to the collapse under the gaze and it is this the 
phallus that the law-of-the-father, the law of White civil society will forever refuse the 
Black psyche. In White civil society, Blackness means castration. It means forever remaining a Ǯboyǯ, never becoming a man. This is the anormalization of the Black psyche, 
which cannot solve the Oedipus complex created through the dispositive A[WS]. Being 
forced into this situation, the Black psyche begins the compensatory behavior already 
mentioned. The White mistress (partner), the White mind (education), the White 
metropolis: the quest for surrogate Whiteness is the very reality of White coloniality and 
White civil society, but it is also the beginning of its undoing, because it creates in the 
Black mind a White desire that cannot contain the Black body excluded from this same 
White desire. If, as Judith Butler contents in relation to symbolic sexual identities, Ǯǳwithout symbolic inscription, that body [which refuses the inscription] will be negatedǳ ȋBodies 65), what we encounter in the quest for Whiteness described by Fanon 
is exactly desire as the dispositivistic drive for subjection proposed by Butler and 
Agamben. The Black person must become White in order to avoid castration. But 
because it canǯt, it will ultimately disappear within the Oedipal model. Unable to solve 
the Oedipus complex, the Black person cannot become subject, but only abject. Black 
desire thus can only lead to psychosis or pathology, and into what is exactly an abject 
invisibility and social death created under the law-of-the-father that as such neither will 
nor can recognize Black desire. In this dispositivistic situation, Black desire remains 
stuck in the pre-subject relation between the law and the body from which the subject is 
supposed to ascend as a product of the lawǯs terror and cruelty: 
 ǲThere must be a body trembling before the law, a body whose fear can be 
compelled by the law, a law that produces the trembling body prepared for its 
inscription, a law that marks the body first with fear only then to mark it again 
with the symbolic stamp of sex.ǳ ȋidem; emphasis: SW.)  
 
This stamp of sex can be paralleled to the stamp of race. Power implants itself in the 
very desire of the self and the body produced through and within this desire, and the 
complicity of Oedipal psychoanalysis in White civil society lies exactly in not pointing to 
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the socio-genesis of this desire, because this would mean its mutability and signal the 
possibility of a revolution. Pointing to socio-genesis here would be to indicate the 
necessity to change the socius creating and sustaining a lack in order to transcend that 
lack, as opposed to narrating that lack as a deficiency in the Ǯpatientǯ. )t would mean 
proposing the literal end of the socius, the end of the world, the end of the gaze. Instead, 
Oedipal psychoanalysis diagnoses a Black pathology, a Black incapacity to deal with the 
supposedly onto-genetic problematic of desire common to all humans and suggests that the Ǯpatientǯ needs to adapt to a social order that is given and unchangeable. This 
simultaneous creation and pathologization of racialized identities is the colonial 
difference that is at the core of Oedipal psychoanalysis. While the argument in Peau 
noire seems not yet to engage this and remains within the confines of Oedipal 
psychoanalysis, Les damnées picks up on this point, refuses psychoanalytic solutions to 
colonial problematics and argues for a new constitutive violence and the creation of a 
new society as the necessary paths not to healing but to re-founding the psyche, to 
working on the psyche through working on its socio-genetic determinants. Here, Fanon 
points out that the supposedly universally human Oedipal crisis is not so for every 
colonized Black psyche, but only one for the non-revolutionary intellectual and the 
bourgeois, and, sometimes, the urban worker. It is a problem of those inside White civil 
society, that is, supposedly partaking (at least in parts) in the phallus and its power. This is why, ǲ… la decolonisation est très simplement le remplacement dǯune Ǯespèceǯ dǯhommes par une autre Ǯespèceǯ dǯhommesǳ (Fanon, Damnés 39), why tabula rasa is 
necessary (idem.Ȍ, why decolonisation will create ǲdes nouveaux hommes, un nouveau langage, une nouvelle humanitéǳ 89 (Fanon, Damnés 40). This is why, in Les damnées, the 
White gaze does not smash the colonized any longer ȋǲson regard ne me foudroie plusǳ 
(48)). But it is also the reason why a White subject can ǲse faire nègreǳ by giving up its 
privileges, by accepting that its enjoyment of the phallus be barred, by becoming a 
treacher to his own race and accepting the constitutive violence and terror of the 
revolutionary struggle, by accepting ǲles souffrances, la torture, la mortǳ90 (Damnés 
139).  
 
                                                        
89 ǲ… decolonisation very simply means the replacement of one Ǯspeciesǯ of Men with another Ǯspeciesǯ of Menǳ … ǲnew Men, a new language, a new humanityǳ (S.W.) 
90 „become a negro ǲ … ǲthe suffering, the torture, the deathǳ ȋS.W.Ȍ 
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At this point, a first tentative answer to the initial question of this chapter (What is the 
role of desire in White civil society?) can be given: it is a very specific instrument of 
control that implants the dispositive of White civil society in the self and its body by 
connecting its libidinal economy to A[WS]. In this sense, the following is true both for 
the Black-White desire and the Whiter-than-White desire: 
 ǳŒdipe, cǯest toujours la colonisation poursuivie par dǯautres moyens, cǯest la colonie intérieure, et nous verrons que, même chez nous, Européens, cǯest notre 
formation coloniale intime.ǳ91 (Deleuze & Guattari, Anti-Oedipe 200)92 
 
But there is one fundamental difference between Black-White and Whiter-than-White. 
Although in White civil society the White psyche is impregnated with the same desire for 
the phallus of Whiteness, it is not confronted with the gaze of race, which informs it of a 
difference in kind (human – non-human), of its not having the phallus, but only with the 
gaze of class and gender, which informs it of a difference in degree (human – less 
human). To be White means not to carry colonial difference as a split in the self or 
between body and desire, but only as a social split between the self and the Other. 
Whiteness is a single determinacy system without the experience of double 
consciousness and colonial castration. According to this logic, it is exactly this White 
self-image that White civil society and its political economy will seek to uphold against 
economic reasoning, because profit in this instance is an intra-systemic variation while 
A[WS] is constitutive of the system itself. It is also exactly this logic that Fanonǯs violence 
will seek to break. 
 
Thus, as this chapter will contend in its consideration of some concepts of Gilles Deleuze 
and Félix Guattari below, Oedipal psychoanalysis is constitutively entwined with White 
civil society and it cannot be used to transcend the reproduction of race and power 
within the subject. A successful passing of the Black psyche through the colonial Oedipal 
stage would mean nothing short of recognizing everyone White as the all powerful 
name-of-the-father to whose authority the castrated Black boy cannot resist and must 
                                                        
91 ǲOedipus is always colonization pursued with other means, it is the interior colony, and we will see that 
even with us, Europeans, it is our intimate colonial formation.ǳ ȋS.W.Ȍ. 
92 Amber Jamilla Musser has written a text connecting the work of Fanon to that of Deleuze and Guattari 
via the concept of the Oedipus complex. But because she uncritically accepts Fanonǯs dictum that there is 
no Oedipus complex in the Black psyche, her textǯs conclusions have only superficial consistency. 
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bow and which it has to make a part of itself through integrating the White law-of the-
father. Oedipal psychoanalysis incarnates the micro-politics of White desire as 
formulated in the development of the notion of the abject. Nevertheless, a short 
consideration of Hortense Spillersǯ appropriation of Michel Foucaultǯs concept of askesis 
and her engagement with psychoanalysis as a method of healing for African-Americans 
is necessary at this point, because the difference between her approach and that of 
Fanon will allow for a precise dissection of the hidden programmatic of Oedipal 
psychoanalysis and will initiate the theorizing of a politics of t/race and constitutional 
Blackness in sections II. and III. 
 
I.4.b. T/racing Hortense Spillersǯ Askesis 
 )n ǲAll the things you could be by now, if Sigmund Freudǯs wife was your motherǳ (a title 
taken from a Charles Mingus composition), Spillers reflects on the fetishization of 
Blackness through the lens of the relationship between race and psychoanalysis. Like 
Eric Williams, she relates race, racism and the racialized subject to socio-economics, implicitly following Althusserǯs ȋto whom, along with Lacan and Fanon, she refers repeatedly in the textȌ dictum that „no theory of psychoanalysis can be produced 
without basing it on historical materialismǲ ȋAlthusser, Ideology 142). Spillers insists on 
pointing out the reality of race as a lived experience as well as its impact on the psyche. 
Although race does not have an ontological foundation as such, it does have a very 
tangible politico-ontological existence in a way that makes it possible for Spillers to describe race as ǲdestiny in the world we have madeǳ ȋǲAllǳ ͹ͺȌ. )t is her concern in ǲAll the things you could be …ǳ to create a possibly emancipating consciousness of the 
artificiality of race and racialized desires while at the same time acknowledging race as 
not only a very powerful factor in real life but also as a possible cure (for example in the 
form of Black culture) for the evils of racism. In order to accomplish this, she does two 
things.  
 
First, she proposes the concept of the ǲsocionomǳ, which she defines as ǲthe speaking subjectǯs involvement with ideological apparatusesǳ ȋǲAllǳ 88) and as an addition to 
Lacanian psychoanalysis ȋǲAllǳ 81) that will permit her to think of race as ǲan outcome of politicsǳ and an ǲinterior intersubjectivityǳ at the same time ȋǲAllǳ ͺͲȌ. The Fanon-
inspired goal of the socionom is to reveal the subject as the socio-genetic effect of 
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several intersecting lines of flight, instead of representing it as an onto-genetic entity 
independent of its context. Thus, the self is intrinsically interwoven with its community, 
culture, society, economic system (etc). Understanding – becoming aware of – this, 
Spillers argues, is essential for gaining the possibility of agency and thus emancipation. 
In a second step, she therefore introduces askesis as the method to develop this 
awareness. Askesis93 is a ǲdisciplineǳ, a process of ǲself-interrogationǳ intended no to 
produce solutions as to how to change constitutive Blackness, but to throw into doubt, 
subvert and destabilize the power of the discourse built on it ȋǲAllǳ 85). It does so by 
exploiting the inconsistencies between the self-legitimating narratives of discourse, and 
the lived experience of the racialized subject. Askesis works on double consciousness, it 
collapses the erasive power of discourse by putting into relief traces of constitutive race – t/races – within discourse, by laying open its constitutive violence and terror. In this 
sense, it is always-already public, political and emancipatory94: the work on the subject 
is not an intra-monadic exercise but a very nomadic deconstruction of the public and the 
political that undergird the constitution of the subject/abject.  
 
This deconstructive and analytic focus on the self marks the difference between 
Hortense Spillers approach, and earlier, less psychoanalytic, more performative and 
community work oriented approaches to Black consciousness, such as for example that 
of Steve Biko (38; 48ff.) or of many African American Political Movements in the 1960s 
(think of Rev. Jesse Jacksonǯs ǲ) am somebodyǳȌ. )t is also the point, where her 
conceptualization differs significantly from classic Marxist notions of false 
consciousness in 2 ways: 
 
                                                        
93 Although Spillers does not explicitly connect her use of askesis to its presence in Michel Foucaultǯs 
work, her otherwise significant engagement with his thought as well as the similarity between her and his 
theorization of the term suggest making an analogy here. Foucault wrote about askesis as a ǲtechnic ofǳ 
and ǲcare forǳ the self in his late works, presenting askesis as a work on the self capable of flowing into 
social change (Foucault, Ästhetik 68ff+74). Especially interesting here is the connecting of askesis and 
epimeleia as a ǲ(ermeneutik des Subjektsǳ [ǲhermeneutic of the subjectǳ (S.W.)], which has to go together 
with an un-learning (ǲde-discereǳ) of all „schlechten Gewohnheiten, aller falschen Ansichten, die man von 
der Menge, von schlechten Lehrmeistern, aber auch von den Eltern und der engeren Umgebung 
übernehmen kannǲ [ǲbad habits, all erroneous views that one can adopt from the mass, from bad teachers, but also from parents and oneǯs close entourageǳ (S.W.)] (Ästhetik 127). It is important, though, to 
emphasize the difference between askesis as a purifying work on the self, bringing it closer to the Ǯgoodǯ 
through moving it nearer to its Ǯtrueǯ self on the one hand, and an aesthetic of existence or the self, on the 
other hand, which points to a work on the self moving it closer to an ideal completely independent of any 
notions of Ǯgood and trueǯ and which is honorable exactly because of its strenuous and disciplined work of 
moving the self away from a socially inherited pattern to something different (Ästhetik 112). 
94 Spillers describes it as ǲsocio-political engagementǳȋǲAllǳ ͺͶȌ. 
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1. As Fanon pointed out before her, Spillers assumes that the subject is not completely determined by the economic infrastructure. Spillers emphasizes that, although race ǲis found in economyǳ, it ,ǲis not exhausted by itǳ ȋǲAllǳ 84). The lifting of the ideological veil 
of race and racism will not occur through the escalation of economic contradictions 
between capital and the worker, but the subject will become aware (or more aware) of 
the contradictions of its existence and emancipate herself through askesis. Emancipation 
here is not yet revolution, and the notion of the avant-garde is not abolished, as self-
interrogation might just as well be induced by the functionary, the teacher, the psychoanalyst. Nevertheless, and in spite of the Althusserism undergirding ǲAll the 
things you could be…ǳ, a quintessential anti-Marxist event has occurred here, with 
individual (but not individualist) agency producing history instead of the other way 
around. The implications of this become obvious once it is asked where and how askesis 
becomes possible. Here, the second significant difference between Spillers analysis and 
that of Marxism can be found. 
 
2. The individual agency contained in askesis must not be confused with the ideal of 
bourgeois individualism disconnected from and disinterested in the masses, its culture, 
its context. Rather, it is the action of what Spillers calls ǲthe Oneǳ ȋǲAllǳ 100), an inter-
subjective moment that condensates the mass in herself/ her selves. In contrast to the 
seemingly self-contained nature of the individual, the One exists as a sort of thickened 
perception of shared identity and shared self among the members of the masses and 
draws her self-interrogatory potential from this. In other words: false consciousness is 
subverted through community and experience. Unlike the White worker, the Black One 
does not have an artificially unified and homogenized false consciousness that needs an 
external or traumatic event to be fractured. No lightning strike is necessary to be 
politically charged: due to its race and the commodification and fungibility embedded 
therein, the Black One always-already has a double consciousness (ǲAllǳ 104), an 
awareness of interior exteriority that can be developed into a consciousness of internal 
intersubjectivity. Askesis does not create or find inconsistencies. Rather, it is a method 
of grasping, a method of articulation and making sense, of politically mobilizing these 
contradictions and of purging the selves of their pre- and sub-conscious dispositivistic determination. Askesis piggybacks on ǮThe Black Experienceǯ; it is the discipline that 
transforms this experience into event.  
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But there is a fundamental flaw in this approach, contained in Spillersǯ statement that 
askesis is merely a form of speech. Even though she emphasizes that this is speech as a ǲsocial positioning vis-à-vis discourseǳ ȋǲAllǳ 106), her approach ends up along the lines of Judith Butlerǯs warning that it is the fate of performativity that it may change the logic 
of exclusion and erasure, but not abolish it (Butler, Bodies 24f.), that is: that it always 
remains ensnared in discourse. )t is, in Spillersǯ own words, about the ǲstigmatized 
subject[ǯs] … access to discourseǳ ȋǲAllǳ 139) and not about revolutionizing discourse 
itself. But neither Butler nor Spillers seem to be aware of the implications this has as to 
the production of a racialized subject. Just like Fanon before them, both authors do not 
just replace one form of erasure by another, but by assuming a meta-formation and 
functioning of a supposedly not-yet-racialized psychoanalytic core-subject/core-self, 
they re-introduce a subject that is far from being free of the mechanics of erasure of 
A[WS]. It is in this sense of accepting a presumably non-erasure based and non-concealing ȋǮtrueǯ) core subject or self, that performativity is entangled in discourse and 
not just theoretically, but methodologically blind to constitutive race.  
 
But although the t/races in Hortense Spillers work are based on such a misreading of the 
constitutive, they form an important impulse that proves very fruitful in the search for 
retrieving the political beyond the reproduction of race and power within the subject. In 
order to mobilize this impulse, the critique must continue where it has begun with 
Fanon: with the Oedipal, whose role in the Black psyche Spillers attempts to prove (ǲAllǳ 
119ff.+140).  
 
I.4.c. T/racing Deleuze and Guattariǯs Schizo-Analysis: Constitutional Blackness 
 
At first glance, the work of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (written ǮD&Gǯ from here 
on), specifically their critique of the Oedipus complex and their development of schizo-
analysis, could be mistaken as a form of t/racing itself. Not only do they explicitly write 
against erasure in different forms (two of which will be considered below), but they also 
explicitly tie its varying mechanics to those of race. Still, they consider race just one 
particular and exchangeable factor in a more general psycho-materialist system, 
seemingly approaching a making visible of constitutive race, but failing in the process. It 
is because of this that their theory and methodology cannot be approached here without 
t/racing their work itself, even though it is precisely their fusing of a psychoanalytic 
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with a materialist approach that not only makes them relevant at this point of the 
argument, but will guide the argument from here on. 
It is not within the scope of the present book to go into every intricate detail of 
the two tomes of Capitalisme et Schizophrènie, to which this chapter will restrict itself in 
its t/racing of D&G. Though a closer dissection might add further nuance to the analysis 
proposed here, it would not only not be necessary for the development of its argument, 
but even risk fraying it out and detracting from the goal pursued here, that is, from an 
understanding of the political constitution of Blackness. Instead, this chapter will 
portray in broad strokes central concepts of schizo-analysis and its development by D&G 
in relation to race that it considers to be already present in the analysis presented so far. 
The goal then is to use the work of D&G to end this first section by synthesizing its main 
lines of flight into a platform on which the following sections will rest. 
 
To portend to begin this chapter with two cases of erasure is already an adaption of 
D&Gs work to the present purposes. The first case, developed in Anti-Oedipe, is not 
exactly one of erasure, but rather a ǲrefoulementǳ in two steps: first, the repression of the ǲreprésentant du désirǳ under a ǳreprésentation refoulanteǳ, then the suppression of 
the représentation under a ǲrepresénté déplacéǳ95, that is, under a substitute that 
assumes the role of the repressed in order to doubly erase the representative (Anti 136). 
In other words: not only is there repression, but that repression is acknowledged in 
order to pretend that that which is being repressed in in effect something different from 
that which is in fact repressed. Obviously, this double erasure is reminiscent of Judith Butlerǯs description of homosexual melancholia as the loss of loss, as a loss hidden 
within repression that founds the subject and threatens it with dissolution (Butler, 
Psychic 23.f.). And indeed this first form of erasure is closely linked to D&Gǯs critique of 
the Oedipus complex and the role this critique will assume in their conceptualization of 
the subject and the role of race and racism in the formation of the subject. But there is 
one fundamental difference, in as far as this loss is neither real nor irretrievable, even 
though the belief in the permanence of loss is exactly what this process aims to achieve. 
Butler, D&G would content, has been fooled, trapped not only within the Oedipus 
complex she embraces in her writing, but also in the A[WS] whose instrument the 
complex is. There are several reasons for this. 
                                                        
95 „repression/suppressionǳ … ǲrepresentative of desireǳ … ǲrepressing representationǳ … ǲdisplaced representedǳ ȋS.W.Ȍ 
 92 
 
First, refoulement is a process through which power structures discourse in order to 
assert itself. For D&G, desire is not the attempt to retrieve something that is missing (viz. 
the phallus). It is not connected to lack or representation of lack, but it is itself an 
unstoppable productive force. Accordingly, refoulement cannot repress and suppress 
desire, but only its representative. In other words: unable to eliminate desire, it 
attempts to make it invisible or even unthinkable within a discourse that would be 
disrupted by its presence (such as the presence of Black desire would be within a 
discourse structured according to A[WS]). Thus, to assume, as Butler does, that 
something is irretrievably lost is exactly to fall prey to that power which uses 
refoulement, whereas D&G emphasize that it is understanding that nothing is really lost 
or lacking in the subject/abject that marks the first necessary step in contesting power. 
 It is precisely the impossibility of real erasure that makes it necessary to supplant 
the repression of the representative of desire by its suppression under a displaced 
represented. Unable to delete desire, itǯ perception will be distorted through the 
introduction of the Oedipus complex. Oedipus, and its portrayal of desire as incest, is an ǲimage truquéeǳ96 (Anti 136) of real desire; defining it as a relation between a child and 
its parents, it introduces filiation as its ǲnaturalǳ principle and thus reifies power based 
on the ontological politics of race and nation. Thus, a system of interpretation is created, 
a system of ordering a world according to a specific axiomatic, whose goal it is to a priori 
capture all not-yet-named/colonized – controlled! – productivity of desire by fitting it 
into a totalitarian discourse of power. Power then, is a rigid system of signification 
striving for but unable to achieve closure. It has the force to name and explain, and it is 
through this power of signification that it creates its subjects.  
D&G do not assume that desire thrives to fill a lack and produces a subject within 
this process. Rather, the fixed subject is a product of the repression of a desire always in 
possession of its object and producing the real (Anti 34). It is exactly the aim of the 
Oedipus complex and all other systems of signification to fix the subject, to arrest the ǲnomade et vagabondǳ ȋAnti 34) subject by locating, positioning or identifying it within 
its discourse. And it is exactly because of the productive nature of desire that this fixing, 
locating, positing, identifying must be constantly reiterated, that the names already 
given must be extended and adapted in the form of interpretation, and erasure befall 
                                                        
96 ǲfaked imageǳ ȋS.W.Ȍ 
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that which cannot be integrated. Because desire is constantly productive, names and 
explanations and the relations they establish are permanently unstable. It is because of this, that power needs to gain control over desire: ǲSi le désir est refoulé, cǯest parce que 
toute position de désir, si petite soit-elle, a de quoi mettre en question lǯordre établi dǯune société [...]ǲ97 (D&G Anti 138). 
 
The Oedipus complex then is internal to a specific axiomatic, it is nothing else than a 
particular logic of implantation of that axiomatic by arresting the dynamics of a matrix 
of interwoven signification/subjection, that is, of imposing a way of making sense 
internal to a specific system of power, which, in the case of the Oedipus complex, is that 
of White civil society. The Oedipus complex is ǲimpérialisteǳ98 (Anti 30): it seeks to 
determine the totality of possible subjectivities, identities and events by enforcing what 
counts as what, what is representable or not and thus thinkable or unthinkable. This is 
the imperialism of a certain semiotic, defined as imperialism through its pretention ǲà écraser toutes les autres sémiotiquesǳ99 (Mille 223); it is coloniality. Accordingly, to 
think the subject within the parameters of the Oedipus complex is to think the subject 
within the semiotic of that power which Oedipus sustains. The claim to a universal 
validity of the Oedipus is dispositivism at its best.  
 
As mentioned above, and because of its reliance on the notion of filiation, D&G explicitly 
link the Oedipus complex to Whiteness, to White supremacism, to White capitalism and 
to what has been called White civil society here. The Oedipus complex is portrayed as 
breaking representation along color lines, as structuring signification through race100 
until, in Mille Plateaux, the semiotic of the modern White man and that of capitalism 
become one (223). At this point, it is not the head of a Chinese, an Arab or a Black that 
puncture and threaten to undo signification through the threat they pose to the White 
subject (the threat to become Chinese, Arab, Black that within Oedipus fuse with the 
threat of castration, the threat of abjection), but it is the face of the White man, the face 
of Jesus, that arranges signification in its image. At this point, D&G explicitly connect 
                                                        
97 „If desire is repressed, it is so because every position of desire, as small as it might be, has the potential to put the established order of a society in question [...]ǲ ȋS.W.Ȍ 
98 „)mperialisticǲ ȋS.W.Ȍ 
99 ǲto crush all other semioticsǳ ȋS.W.Ȍ 
100 „Pas de chaîne signifiante sans un Chinois, un Arabe, un Noir qui passent la tête et viennent troubler la nuit dǯun Blanc paranoïaque.ǲ [No signfiying chain without a Chinese, an Arab, a Black showing their head 
and troubling the night of a paranoid White.ǲ ȋS.W.Ȍ] ȋAnti 117). 
 94 
their writing with Foucaultǯs definition of race within his theory of biopolitics101. Just 
how is a process of signification/subjection racialized, how can D&G write: ǲTout délire 
est racial, et cela ne veut pas dire nécessairement racisteǳ102 (Anti 101)? It is because 
imperialist semiotics are normalizing powers. In the case of the oedipal-White-capitalist semiotic the norm governing its system of signification is the ǲ(omme-blanc-mâle-
adulte-habitant des villes-parlant une langue standard-européen-hétérosexuelǳ103 (Mille 
133)104. This norm is subsumed in the term ǲvisageǳ whose imperialist process D&G term ǲvisagéitéǳ105 (Mille chapters 5+7). Technically speaking, the face is that in whose 
image interpretation structures the world, which means it is not necessarily White, but 
de facto so. In terms of politics, the face is the product of the inscription of power into a 
body and its desire106, and it can be thought of as subject-as-mask in the Greek sense of ǲpersonaǳ107 that determines the social position and/or situation of the inscribed body 
and its place within signification, that is, its modes of relating to other bodies, its 
capacities to signify as well as to make sense. It is exactly the halting of a previously 
uncontrolled process of signification and desire and its reigning into identities produced 
and certified by power, that characterizes the subjection through visagéité (Mille 144). 
Here, racism is the political mobilization of the relation of the self not to an other, but to 
a lesser self, not to an external opposition built on its own terms – because there is no 
and must be no potentially equal exterior – but to a deviance from the racialized norm of 
the White manǯs face:  
                                                        
101 D&G also emphasize two fundamental differences between their understanding of biopolitics and that 
of Foucault: 1) their belief that desire is not only a product of and reaction to power, but also the other 
way round; 2) that, because of this, desire does not simply Ǯconfirmǯ or Ǯresistǯ power, but it is also 
productive before and beyond power (Mille 175, footnote 36). The power that facializes must not be 
equated with a State Apparatus or a simple Master-Signifier. Rather, it is an ensemble of static relations 
foundationally enmeshed with, shaping and being shaped by, a specific historical and material context, not 
only in the sense of economy, but also of physical, cultural, social and technological environment ȋǲpaysageǳ [ǲlandscapeǳ ȋS.W.Ȍ]( Anti 211)).  
102 „All delirium is racial, which does not necessarily mean racistǳ ȋS.W.Ȍ 
103 „Human-white-male-adult-city dweller-speaking a standard language-European-heterosexualǳ ȋS.W.Ȍ 
104 D&G in fact use the term „étalonǲ, which in the sense of ǲstandard measureǳ is almost identical not only 
with the term norm, but also with DuBoisǯ term ǲtapeǳ as considered in chapter I.3.a. 
105 ǲfaceǳ … ǲfacialityǳ ȋS.W.Ȍ 
106 Or, to translate this from D&Gǯs terminology to that used so far: the transforming of flesh into a body. 
107 ǲLe masque ne cache pas le visage, il lǯest.ǳ [ǲThe mask does not hide the face, it is the face.ǳ 
(S.W.)](Mille 145). Accordingly, someone ǲsubjectedǳ to martyrdom ȋǳsuppliceǳȌ is a ǲpersonǳ who loses 
her face/personhood/being-subject and thus becomes-animal, but whose body is not returned to flesh but 
burned in order for the ashes to be shed to the winds (idem.Ȍ. The ǲsuppliceǳ, the cruel spectacle, cannot 
be applied to the subject or human; it either demonstrates or reiterates the dependence, guilt, debt a 
person/subject has, not only in terms of being a person/subject but even a body, towards a power that makes it such. )t is in this sense, that ǲle visage est un conte de terreurǳ [ǲthe face is a tale of terrorǳ ȋS.W.Ȍ] 
(Mille 206): it can be given, withheld or withdrawn from a power that subjectivates and/or abjects by 
brandishing the possibility of not only inflicting cruel pain, but putting to death those that resist it (See 
chapter I.1.a.). 
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 ǲLe racisme procède par détermination des écarts de déviance, en fonction du visage (omme blanc […] Du point de vue du racisme, il nǯy a pas dǯextérieur, il nǯy a pas de gens du dehors. )l nǯy a que des gens qui devraient être comme nous, et dont le crime est de ne pas lǯêtre.ǳ108 (Mille 218). 
 
At this point, the focus of D&Gs analysis of power has shifted. The erasure happening within the process of race is no longer articulated in terms of ǲrefoulementǳ, but as the erasure of the ǲsujet dǯénonciationǳ under the ǲsujet dǯénoncéǳ109 (Mille 160 ff.). This is 
the second of the two kinds of erasure mentioned above (t/race would have to be added 
as a third, so that there would be a psychological, a linguistic and a political erasure, but 
it is not and the consequences of this will be shown in a critique below). All these kinds 
of erasure are not separate but one: they are aspects of a single process of power based 
on the manipulation of desire. Once again, it becomes obvious that the analysis of power then must be an analysis of desire and for this, D&G propose a ǲpsychiatrie matérialisteǳ 
(Anti 29) in the form of ǲschizo-analyseǳ110 (Anti 325 ff.).  
 
Materialist psychiatry is psychiatric in as far as it concerns itself with the psyche, with 
processes and phenomena of consciousness and subject formation, such as the Oedipus 
complex or the question of desire. It is materialist because it approaches these processes 
and phenomena not as universally given and valid, but as specific to precise social, 
historical, economic, cultural and technological circumstances or environments. 
Materialist psychiatry, in other words, radically understands the subject as a product of 
its environment, and because of this a critique of the environment (e.g. capitalism) and 
an attempt to overcome it must also always be a critique of the subject it produces and 
an attempt to overcome this specific subject formation.  
The subject itself is understood as a product of a subjection based on signification 
and the manipulation of desire. This means that power does not simply control a given 
universal subject, but creates it through dispositives such as that of the law-of-the-
father. The subject does not precede power and the political, but ǲavant lǯêtre, il y a la 
                                                        
108 ǲRacism proceeds by determining intervals of deviation according to the White man face […] From the 
perspective of racism there is no outside, there are no outside people. There are only people that should 
be like us, and whose crime it is to not be so.ǳ ȋS.W.Ȍ 
109 ǲsubject of enunciationǳ … ǲsubject of the enunciatedǳȋS.W.Ȍ 
110 „materialist psychiatryǲ ... „schizo-analysisǲ ȋS.W.Ȍ 
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politiqueǳ111 (D&G, Mille 249). In other words: power produces the subject, and it does 
so in basically two ways. First, power is not only an external environment, but through 
its manipulation of desire it serves as matrix for the affective experience of the subject: it is not identical to, yet a part of the subjectǯs self and the way the subject experiences 
itself and the world through this self. The subject and its environment are not two, but 
dual aspects of a unitary whole. Second, through signification, power endows the subject 
with social visibility and legibility, that is: a system of having and making sense. Both 
these processes function is to attempt to halt the flux of non-manipulated desire in order 
to produce rigid and thus controllable identities. Given that such a halting is not 
possible, this means that subjection relies not only on distortion, but also on erasure.  
There is an onto-genetic desire, then, constantly producing the real in spite of the 
attempts to stop it, but there is also a socio-genetic desire that is the product of the 
attempts to halt and control onto-genetic desire. This socio-genetic desire is not only a 
distorted representation of onto-genetic desire, but also a distortion of parts of that 
desire. It is not merely a question of ideological misrepresentation, but of real libidinal 
investment in a certain social formation. In as far as society is shaped by a power that is 
not only constantly revolving around the capture of onto-genetic desire and the 
containing and recapturing of fugitive subjects 112, but also enmeshed with this desire, D&G contend that ǲle désir fait partie de lǯinfra-structureǳ113 (Anti 124). 
 
The main goal of schizo-analysis as one form of materialist psychiatry is to understand 
the desire thus captivated in order to undo it: 
 ǲTel est donc le but de la schizo-analyse: analyser la nature spécifique des investissements libidinaux de lǯéconomique et du politique; et par là montrer 
comment le désir peut être déterminé a désirer sa propre répression dans le sujet qui désire …ǳ114 (Anti 124f.) 
                                                        
111 ǲbefore being, there is politicsǳ ȋS.W.Ȍ 
112 „... une structure ... qui a toujours fermé un système, justement pour lǯempêcher [le sujet] de fuir.ǲ[„ ...  a 
structure ... which has always closed a system, precisely to prevent it [the subject] from fleeing.ǲ] ȋD&G, 
Mille  ʹͶͺȌ. The term „subjectǲ here is used in relation to a becoming subject independent of subjection. In 
other words: the fugitive subject is that which is not a subject determined (though affected) by power, but 
a self becoming subject against and in spite of this determination. 
113 ǲdesire is part of the infrastructureǳ ȋS.W.Ȍ 
114 ǲThis is then the goal of schizo-analysis: to analyze the specific nature of libidinal investments of the 
economic and the political; and to thus show how desire can be determined in a way to desire its own 
repression in the desiring subject …ǳ ȋS.W.Ȍ 
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Schizo-analysis is a process of emancipation, it undermines power by destroying the link 
(desire) that implants it in the subjects it makes and is made of, it subverts power by 
liberating the fugitive subject. The program of schizo-analysis is simply to ǲdétruire, détruireǳ115 (Anti 371) that which impedes the free flux of desire (viz. imperialism and 
the coloniality of power). Because of this, it cannot propose an alternative world, as 
doing so would simply mean to substitute one regime of signification with another; it 
would not free the flux of desire and liberate the subject, but merely free them from one 
environment and its axiomatic and re-subject them to another. Schizo-analysis is a 
methodology for a possible revolution, not a utopian manifesto116. It is exactly because 
of its undoing of the link between the signifier and the signified, between the subject and 
that which it is supposed to contain through subjection, between the ǲsujet dǯénonciationǳ and the ǲsujet dǯénoncéǳ, that it is schizoid117. Schizo-analysis destroys an 
axiomatic and the sense and subjects it produces; it is a way of putting the world to an 
end; something that from the perspective of the axiomatic-to-be-destroyed not only 
seems but also is a-normal, sick, pathological, psychotic. But schizo-analysis is far more radical than the revolution Fanon wants to stage under the same banner of the ǲend of the worldǳ, precisely because Fanon is not psychotic, because with his resort to the ǲnationǳ, he proposes just another imperial regime of signs, while schizo-analysis 
proposes a method whose goal is to remain fugitive. 
 
Through the lens of schizo-analysis then, Black desire is not only not 
impossible118, but it is exactly that which has to be mobilized in order to break the tenets 
and power of White civil society. As mentioned above, though, Blackness is not t/race in 
                                                        
115 ǲdestroy, destroyǳ ȋS.W.Ȍ 
116 „.. la schizo-analyse en tant que telle nǯa strictement aucun programme politique à proposer. Si elle en avait un, ce serait tout à la fois grotesque et inquiétant […] Un programme politique nǯest pas censé sǯélaborer dans le cadre de la schizo-analyse […] La schizo-analyse en tant que telle ne pose pas le 
problème de la nature du socius qui doit sortir de la révolution ; elle ne prétend nullement valoir pour la révolution même.ǲ [„… schizo-analysis as such has strictly no political program to propose. If it did have one, this would not only be grotesque, but disquieting […] A political program is not supposed to be 
elaborated within schizo-analysis […] schizo-analysis as such does not consider the problem of which society must arise from revolution; it does in no way amount to the revolution itself …ǲ ȋS.W.Ȍ] ȋAnti 456). 
117 It is important to emphasize here that it is schizophrenia as a process and not the schizophrenic as a 
person that is potentially revolutionary (D&G, Anti 408). The difference here is precisely in the mode of being fugitive: ǲDu schizo au révolutionnaire, il y a seulement tout la difference de celui qui fuit, et de celui qui sait faire fuire ce quǯil fuit [ …]ǳ [ǲBetween the schizo and the revolutionary there is only all the 
difference between he who flees and he who knows how to make flee that which he flees [ …]ǳ ȋS.W.Ȍ] 
(idem.Ȍ. )t is not about ǲ… fuir le monde, mais plutôt à le faire fuir, conme on crève un tuyau …ǳ[ǲ…fleeing the world, but make it flee, like one would blow up a pipeǳ ȋS.W.Ȍ]  
118 As it is within A[WS]; see Chapter I.3.e. 
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Capitalisme et Schizophrénie, but just another ǲminoritarianǳ position; it is considered 
not as abject but within discourse. This tension between the role of Black desire and the 
ignoring of the specificity of the constitution of Blackness as external to hegemony and 
its dispositives needs to be explained in more detail, before schizo-analysis can be used 
to further the understanding of the constitution of Blackness and help us understand its 
transformation through and in relation to technological change. 
 
The impossibility of Black desire within A[WS] is due to the abjection of 
Blackness: there can be no Black desire, because Blackness is not a social position within 
the dispositive of White civil society that can be thought of in terms of identity and 
enjoyment, but the situation of a flesh exterior to power and in a relation of terror with 
it. As has been shown in previous chapters, power does not inscribe itself into the Black 
flesh in form of a soul, but marks itself on the Black flesh through cruelty119. As argued in 
the chapter on Fanon, this does not mean that a person racialized as Black cannot have a 
libidinal investment in White civil society, but it means that such a desire would not be 
Black desire120. This theorization is close to D&Gǯs approach to racism through visagéité, 
as the face is the product of the inscription of power on a head and stands to it in the 
same relation as body to flesh. Thus D&Gǯs insistence that there is no other exterior to 
the axiom: there is no Black face within White civil society except blackface, that is: as an 
interval of deviance from the White face and thus constituted in its terms. The Black face 
in terms of t/race is abject and thus invisible; seeing a Black face in White civil society 
would be schizoid, having a Black face, or wanting to have one, schizophrenia. Yet, just 
like Fanon, that seems to be exactly what D&G propose in terms of radical politics: to 
make oneself Black, to become Black, to become minoritarian121, just like (as they 
portend) John Brown did122. But the schize is not to be confused with the minor here, it 
                                                        
119 Note the closeness of D&Gǯs defintion of cruelty to that elaborated in chapter I.1.a.: „La cruauté nǯa rien 
à voir avec une violence quelconque ou naturelle quǯon chargerait dǯexpliquer lǯhistoire de lǯhomme; elle 
est le mouvement de la culture qui sǯopère dans les corps et sǯinscrit sur eux, les labourant.ǲ[„Cruelty has 
nothing to do with a contingent or natural violence that one would use to explain the history of mankind; 
it is the movement of culture operating within bodies and inscribing itself on them, working them.ǳ (S.W.)] 
(Anti 170). 
120 D&G emphasize that even Black people still need to become Black: ǲMême les Noirs, disaient les  Black 
Panthers, ont à devenir-noir.ǳ [ǲEven Black people, the Black Panthers said, have to become-black.ǳ ȋS.W.Ȍ] 
(Mille 357). 
121 ǲMinoritarianǳ is not to be confused with ǲminorǳ. While the latter is defined in terms of relative 
quantity, the former is defined as contrary to a majority understood in terms of power and dominance 
independent of quantity (D&G, Mille 356). 
122 ǲJe suis nègre […] dût-on se faire nègre à la manière de John Brown.ǳ [ǲ) am negro … should one have to make oneself negro in like John Brown.ǳ ȋS.W.Ȍ] (Anti 329). 
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has to be taken to its full extent: to sever, to split, but also in a more popular sense of 
having more than one self, a consciousness that is double or more, to identify and dis-
identify simultaneously, that is: to use constituted Blackness as a Trojan horse to intrude 
into constituted discourse, to introduce constitutive Blackness and let lose Black desire 
within this discourse, which cannot be the same after the event. The schize, then, is not 
the becoming negro or minor. It is still connected to the axiomatic, but exploding it. 
 
 This difference between schizoid Black desire and becoming minoritarian is also exactly the point where D&Gǯs model needs to be problematized, because they, too, fail 
to think beyond blackface. D&G continue thinking race in terms of difference, whereas 
abjection is not a quality of difference, but that, which makes the articulation and 
movement within a system built on abjection possible: all the degrees of deviance from 
the face of Whiteness are related in their difference to each other as being not-Black because Ǯnot-Blackǯ is the political ontos of White.  
 
Becoming-negro, becoming minoritarian does not propose to identify with, to end 
up being or imitating abject Black. It means initiating a movement of unfinished 
becoming in which one adopts the ǲpaysageǳ and affective intensities of that which one becomes in order to subvert oneǯs own environment and liberate oneǯs desire from the 
power it is enmeshed with. Becoming is not a movement in which one takes the place of that which one becomes, but it is a movement of ǲinvolutionǳ in which one enters into an ǲallianceǳ or ǲsymbiosisǳ with that which one becomes. Significantly, D&G emphasize 
that becoming is not productive (Mille 291.f.). Its goal is to shake the subject of power to 
the point where parts of it break lose, become fugitive and escape; not into another 
singular self, but into a multiplicity of being. Becoming is not related to filiation, it is 
neither regression nor descent, but an act of contagion (Mille 295) in which what is 
always-already inter-existent reacts in a way that lets it split from the discourse that 
held it. 
 Although this idea of becoming in terms of alliance and contagion holds an 
undisputable attraction for political activism with its implicit vision of communities of 
contagion in which, say, Black and White people not only come together, but exist as one 
in modalities of selves changed through this holism in ways that allow oppositional or 
even revolutionary politics, its consequences in terms of Black abjection are less than 
progressive. Although the notion of becoming does indeed propose a mode of 
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subjectivity that counters subjection, dissolves the subject of power and thus potentially 
holds the possibility of eo ipso modifying the modes of abjection, it does not because the 
movement of becoming relies on abjection just as much as subjection does. This is so, 
because the minoritarian which one becomes is only present in its intra-discursive 
paradigmatic position vis-à-vis the major, that is: because the Black person is still only 
visible in and as blackface. Becoming does attempt to mobilize the constitutive under the 
constituted, but does so only in terms of White desire, on a level of abstraction beyond 
the specific situation of the minoritarian or Black person, which in its being minoritarian 
or being Black are ex vi termini still coagulations of discourse. Although the fetish of race 
as reified relation of production has been deconstructed, race and other minoritarian 
positions are re-fetishized as totems that exist only as catalyst for process within its 
worshippers, but are completely irrelevant as to their own characteristics.  
 Becoming, then, is a political project on a par with Spillers concept of askesis. It 
attempts to change the political through a focus and work on the self. In difference to 
askesis, it does not rely on a rigid system of core self and a universal rationality (which it 
both criticizes) for this. Becoming does not think itself in terms of introspection, because 
it posits a subject and self that are part of a greater whole. Within this whole, a totem123 ȋan animal, a woman, a drug, a minority, a ǲstarǳ, etc.Ȍ is chosen towards which the self 
will become in a movement that is at once external because moving away from the 
subject one already is and internal because the notion that that which one becomes is 
separate from that which one is but an illusion produced by subjection. Becoming is not 
a controlled process, not a controlled transformation, but a letting go of the parameters 
of identification and thus control. The totem serves to sustain this process of letting go 
not by offering a new identification or cathexis, but by annulling the identification 
already in effect. In other words: through the alliance with the totem, the self 
experiences that it is not what it used to be, but it does not know what else it is. 
Becoming, it is not transforming into a unified new subject, but liberating a flux of 
desire, a multiplicity of contacts and communities, a bit of everyone, but no one 
specifically. 
 
                                                        
123 D&G would disagree with this use of the „totemǲ to characterize their work, because they consider it a 
structuralist term to rigid to describe their emphasis on free movement and time independent of structure 
(Mille 291.f.). However, it is precisely my intended point here that D&G never achieve the post-structural 
mobility and flux they believe themselves to have achieved, and remain instead caught in the structures of 
Whiteness as a system of meaning and being, a method of thought and making sense as well as a mode of 
experience.  
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Blackness as totem helps the subject to become fugitive. But the fugitive subject is 
still predicated on the subject, it is not a liberated or transformed and not even a 
haunting abject. Becoming minoritarian is not becoming abject, but merely a refusal to 
remain or become subject/ed. The fugitive subject and its becoming are intra-discursive 
processes, viz. internal to dispositives and their contestation. This, as argued above, is 
not an option available to the abject. Its desubjectification is not an available choice but 
an extra-discursive destiny it is held in through cruelty and terror. The slave, unlike the 
Musselman, cannot reclaim her humanity in degrees of deviance beyond the face of 
Hitler, Pizarro, Livingston. To think, as D&G do, Blackness as interchangeable with all 
other minoritarian positions, to merely define it as not major, that is, as not (yet) in a 
position to dominate a regime of signs and produce desire and subjects, is to 
misunderstand its essential function as something invisible (not even a minority, not 
human at all) on and against which even other minorities will built their claim to 
become (part of) a majority.   
There is no becoming in abject Blackness. Becoming-negro is a formula composed 
against Whiteness, but it is still predicated on constituted Blackness. ǲBecomingǳ marks 
a movement of differentiation within a discourse that the Black abject is not part of. This 
remaining within the realm of the constituted even in speaking about the constitutive, 
D&G claim in a rare moment of schizo-pessimism, is due to the fact that that is the 
discourse that subjectivates us, into which we were born, on which we have to fight and 
whose beyond we might be able to experience, but cannot speak of within this discourse, 
except in an interpreting way (Mille 231), which is to say in a manner that uses the 
known to express and therewith ultimately capture the unknown. Given the erasure of 
abject Blackness this discourse performs, becoming is not a productive tool to further 
the understanding of abjection or its change. Because of this, the two tomes of 
Capitalisme et Schizophrénie are very much focused on the capacity of the White subject 
to undermine the White face, and D&G are aware of this: ǲDǯune certaine manière, cǯest toujours Ǯhommeǯ qui est le sujet dǯun devenir; mais il nǯest un tel sujet quǯen entrant 
dans un devenir minoritaire qui lǯarrache à son identité majeureǳ124 (Mille 357). 
 
At the same time, in D&Gǯs writing the existence of the imperialism of the White 
face in the first place at times almost seems like a socio-historical process independent 
                                                        
124 ǲ)n a certain way, it is always ǮManǯ who is the subject of a becoming; but he is such only in entering a 
becoming minoritarian that rips him form his majoritarian identity.ǳ ȋS.W.Ȍ 
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of that same White subject. The process of becoming always centers on (White) non-
abject agency at the cost of reducing the minoritarian to a catalyst ȋǲle medium ou lǯagentǳ125 (D&G, Mille 357)) within this agency. Though positively connoted, the 
minoritarian remains something incomprehensibly primitive, a quasi-erotic force 
subversive despite itself. D&G themselves do no propose an analysis of why visagéité is 
modeled around a White face in the first place, and they do not explain the relationship 
between the minoritarian and the fugitive subject that one might strive to become, nor 
the relationship between the minoritarian and the minor in which it exists enmeshed 
with a phenotypic stigmatization that is obviously not a question of becoming. The 
overlapping between Whiteness and capitalism is a coincidence126; D&G simply take is 
evident and attempt to focus their efforts on creating a critique that might make it 
possible to break the White face. As a result, their critique amounts to reducing the 
minor to a functional abstraction hidden, if not completely erased, under the 
minoritarian. 
  
This critique is not meant to suggest that D&G ought to consider an Ǯauthenticǯ or Ǯtrueǯ Blackness. It is not intended to argue for another form of ontological politics, but 
wants to draw on the potential schizo-analysis offers exactly in the moment after its de-
fetishization and before the totemization of the minoritarian. In this moment, schizo-
analysis suggests a new kind of Blackness, a schizoid Blackness both constituted and 
constitutive at once, but not through an erasure collapsing constitutive into constituted 
Blackness (that is eliminating one and reifying the other), but through a fusion 
producing a third instance: constitutional Blackness. This would also not be a static state 
(as in the ontology of a universalized human psyche), but a flux, though it would not be a 
becoming, because it is not a movement of the subject but an emergence of the abject. 
What this difference amounts to, can best be shown by considering the differences 
between the signification/subjection of the visage and that of the nom-du-père. 
 
While the visage might be just any visage, once it has coalesced into a general 
form, the process of subjection (of the visage inscribing itself into the flesh of the head) 
is almost like cloning. It is a self-replication of the norm (a normalization) with anything 
                                                        
125 ǲthe medium or the agentǳ ȋS.W.Ȍ 
126 This is yet another overlapping point between D&G and Fanon, who mentions a „société capitaliste, colonialiste, accidentellement blancheǲ [„a capitalist and colonialist society accidentally whiteǲ  (S.W.)] 
(Fanon, Peau 163). 
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not part of the to-be-cloned-image rendered invisible and put on the run, either as 
haunting abject or fugitive subject. From this perspective, the nom-du-père would be 
just another visage within a specific regime of signs. Faciality is not based on the 
Lacanian mechanics of a non-du-père that prevents incest by disrupting the imaginary 
unity between the self and its m/Other, thus creating a lack in the self that drives its 
search for the phallus. Different from the Oedipal nom-du-père model that leads Judith 
Butler to her notion of the ǲlonging for subjectionǳ, the concept of faciality emphasizes the possibility that we might refuse subjection and fight, ǲfleeing our facesǳ ȋLingis 185). 
For D&G, neither faciality nor desire is dialectic: there is no structural necessity for 
an/Other in order to become a subject. While, for Oedipal psychoanalysis, the nom-du-
père is fundamental to every humanǯs being and its subject-formation, faciality not only 
does not occupy such a fundamental role, but must – quite to the contrary – be escaped 
in order to become fully human (Mille 209). The face is not an instance of the individual 
and its singular self127, it is not a moment in the process of individualization as the nom 
(and non)-du-père might be, but it is a process of socialization in the sense of 
generalization. But while most systems of power have to rely on a face, D&G argue that some donǯt and the face thus is not even essential to power as such. )t is just one of many 
possible instances of subjection, and it is never total. Contrary to the non-du-père, the 
face is not dispositivistic in as far as it does not hide its contingency and limitedness.  
 
Considering the subject through the visage then means considering the 
constituted dimension of one very specific type of subject, and through the concept of 
becoming minoritarian schizo-analysis emphasizes that this subject could be different. 
In opposition to Oedipal psychoanalysisǯ attempt to suppress the colonial uncanny, 
schizo-analysis tempts to unleash its haunting, open the Pandora box of the commodity 
fetish of race and set desire free. Schizo-analysis will not interpret (D&G, Anti 213), it 
will not adapt its object to the world it is set in. Its duty to destroy is but a negative 
formulation of its positive duty to liberate the lines of flight. Both processes attempt to unravel the ǲmoiǳ ȋD&G, Anti Ͷ͵ͶȌ, ǲdésubjectiverǳ (D&G, Mille 168) by ǲéchapper auf 
                                                        
127 As Claire Colebrook argues in an astonishing attempt to write about face and race not only against 
D&Gs explicit warning not to read it through art (D&G, Mille 229), but also through a complete misunderstanding of their use of the Ǯbodyǯ and while mentioning Mille Plateaux (which dedicates more 
than a complete chapter to the development of ǲfaceǳ and ǲfacialityǳȌ only en passant in order to focus on 
minor and secondary references to that concept in other texts. 
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visageǳ ȋMille 209), or simply to perform ǲdévisagéificationǳ128 (Mille 232), all of this in 
order to become ǲasignifiantǳ and ǲasubjectifǳȋ Mille 210).  
But the destruction that feeds into becoming minoritarian here is predicated on a ǲsymbolic integrityǳ ȋSpillers, ǲMamaǯsǳ 66) that has historically been withheld from 
slaves and their descendants and feeds into an ǲAmerican grammarǳ ȋSpillers, ǲMamaǯsǳ 
68) that still does not permit Black people to act as fugitive subjects, but continues their 
abjection. By avoiding Oedipal structures, D&G avoid having to ask themselves, how ǲquantitiesǳ that were ǲneither female, nor maleǳ ȋSpillers, ǲMamaǯsǳ 72) might have 
been subjected by the threat of castration. At the same time, writing of a face that 
inscribes itself on a head, they fail to take into account the case in which there was no 
faciality, but simply a stealing of the head and all the flesh Ǯattachedǯ to it. This is the 
fallacy of the concept of becoming minoritarian.  
 
Constitutional Blackness on the other hand is a kind of t/raced schizo-analysis 
that integrates these problematics into its considerations of power and its contestation. 
It relies on the psycho-materialism of schizo-analysis, which permits a pragmatic 
understanding of Blackness as part of a specific dispositive, producing a specific desire 
and specific subjects to sustain a specific system. Schizo-Analysis is that anti-dote to 
coloniality that is the necessary beginning for a semiosis of the abject (that the following 
chapters will consider). The necessary second step is to avoid stopping, as Fanon, 
Spillers and D&G do, with this desire and remain within the discourse that produces and 
manipulates it. Instead of becoming minoritarian, constitutional Blackness will have to 
create a semiosis of the abject. Section II. will consider such a semiosis through a 
consideration of the impact of technological change on the constitution of Blackness, 
before section III. will condense the findings of both section I. and II. into Cyborg Black 
Studies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
128 „meǲ... „desubjectivateǲ ... „escaping the faceǲ... „defacementǲ ... „asignifyingǲ ... „asubjectifǲ (S.W.) 
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II.1. THE RACIAL GLITCH 
 
Cassandra Jackson, an African-American professor of English, born, raised and still living 
in a middle class environment, relates how she encountered repeated trouble trying to 
hire a nanny. Assuming her to be White, due to her middle class dialect on the phone and 
her address, potential nannies were shocked to see that she was Black on their visit to 
her house, and often tried to find a way not to accept the job they had come looking for, 
putting up maneuvers such as doubling their hourly rate or suddenly finding they 
already had prior engagements. Because of the technological determination of their first 
exchange on the telephone, the nannies were put in crisis on their visit: unknowingly, 
they had touched the abject Black and risked the contamination and punishment this 
touching bears in the subjection/abjection mode proper to A[WS]. Jackson titled the 
article in which she published this anecdote ǲThe Accidental Caucasianǳ, directly 
implying a technologically mediated way of passing. It is this accidental passing that this 
section will begin from. Combining it with what was termed racial lag in the 
introduction, section II. will analyze the impact of technological change on the 
constitution of Blackness through considerations of cinema (in chapter II.2.) and 
phonography (in chapter II.3.). In doing so, it will combine the idea of accidental and 
technological passing with Judith Butlerǯs concept of queering in order to develop the 
concept of a technologically created racial glitch, while continuing the theorization of 
constitutive and constituted Blackness begun in section I. by introducing the concept of 
constitutional Blackness. 
 
Thinking the intersections between queering and passing had already been proposed by 
Judith Butler in her book Bodies that matter: 
  
 ǲ)n the last instance, queering is what upsets and exposes passing; it is the act by 
which the racially and sexually repressive surface of conversation is exploded, by rage, by sexuality, by the insistence on color.ǳ ȋͳ͵ͳȌ 
 
In opposition to passing as erasure of color, Butler portrays queering as insisting on color. But contrary to Butlerǯs location of queering processes on the level of individual and voluntary acts in which a self mobilizes itǯs own abjectness to directly interfere with 
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processes of dispositivistic subjection, Cassandra Jacksonǯs article shows how 
technology can create an analogous, yet different dynamic. While Jackson may have been 
accidentally passing on the phone, this technologically created moment of accidental 
passing set up a later encounter whose effect on the nannies was similar to that of the 
queering described by Butler: an unprepared confrontation of subject and abject 
through color. )n Butlerǯs theorizing, queerness can lead to a situation in which the 
subject will come into contact with that which it must not touch in order to be and remain a subject, because of the subjectǯs inability to identify the abject as such. 
Queering happens, when the abject manages to mobilize its abjectness to destabilize the 
norm-conform subject in its confrontation with it. Unable, for example, to identify the 
gender-queer person it faces, the hetero-normal subject may find itself interacting with 
abject homosexuality in a manner taboo to heteronormativity  (e.g., if being a man he 
mistook another man for a woman and treated him according to the gendered norms of 
interactions between a Man and a Woman). Thus, queerness forces the subject to 
confront the normativity usually invisible under the cloth of daily routine, ritual and Ǯcommon senseǯ and hopes to therewith undermine it. By creating a moment of social 
existence for the structurally excommunicated, invisible, illegible and illegitimate abject, 
queerness puts the subject in crisis and thus creates the opportunity for a 
reconfiguration of the subject as well as the abject it is built on.  
 
Like queerness, the racial glitch has an effect on subjection/abjection by disturbing and 
potentially disrupting the inscription of discourse into and onto the body and flesh. Like 
queerness, it works on the relation between subject and abject, mobilizing the abject in a 
manner that may potentially destabilize the subject and therewith the power based on 
the (always fictive) clear separation between subject and abject. However, the glitch differs from queerness in two fundamental aspects. First, as the example of Jacksonǯs 
accidental passing shows, the glitch is not a voluntary act, but an effect not only 
mediated but caused by technology, a process not intended by the participants but 
produced by the parameters of technological social exchange. In opposition to passing 
and queering as conscious performative acts on physical markers, the following 
chapters will develop the concept of a racial glitch caused by the growing abstraction 
from physical and immediate face-to-face situations and a shift to inter-face situations 
caused by technological change. Second, the abjection framed and mobilized by 
queerness is not the same as the abjection framed and mobilized by the racial glitch. 
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As argued in section I., power must constantly try to recapture the fugitive subject and 
the haunting abject. Subjection/abjection is not a static process finished and fixed after 
an initiatory or initiating interpellation, but needs to constantly reiterate its cruel 
inscription into and onto body and flesh. According to Butler, this need to reiterate is 
due to the resistance of the self against total subjection, a resistance that also causes 
micro-differential rifts in the reiterations, so that the subjectivity produced in each 
iteration is never totally identical to the prior subjectivity. This micro-differential rift is 
both the result of and the ground for further resistance. Queerness is a political strategy 
of emphasizing this rift from which, subjection having failed, the abject hails and 
emerges to haunt the subject (Butler, Bodies ͳ͸ͻ.ff.Ȍ. But the abject in Butlerǯs case is homosexuality, and itǯs abjection is different from racial abjection in that it is a body-
abject, not a flesh-abject. Contrary to the flesh-abject, the body-abject as theorized by 
Butler is not only tied to a subjectivity that enables it to articulate queerness as a legible 
social position, but is also tied by that subjectivityǯs desires and specifically the desire 
for subjection proposed by Butler that was the focus of critique in chapter I.3.f. As a 
consequence of this, homosexual abjection may be – and is assumed to be – articulated 
from a human position such as that of White European. The flesh abject, on the other 
hand, has no such access to legibility and cannot express itself and make claims within 
the discourse of civil society, nor is it certain that it would Ǯdesireǯ to. Queerness 
operates from a position of uncertainty and ambiguity; it is able to articulate its 
abjection by playing on ambivalence. As chapter II.2. will show in its analysis of the 
movie The Crying Game, the body-abject can operate by metaphorically exploding from 
under a presumed dispositivist subjectivity, while the flesh-abject can never be 
mistaken for a subject in a face-to-face situation. This possibility to act from the position 
of a presumed dispositivist subjectivity is the ambivalence queerness works from, and it 
is the ground on which Butler draws the parallels between queering and passing, 
describing passing as working from exactly the same kind of ambivalence and giving the 
example of a White racist in a novel, whose subjectivity is fatally shaken when he finds out heǯs married to a Black woman that was only passing as White (Bodies 137). This 
passing, however, is an expression of the Black-White desire (a desire to be White) 
criticized in chapter I.4.a., viz. it is a concept that remains within A[WS] and therefore 
continues the abjection of Blackness by insisting that this abjection can only be 
suspended by masquerade but never be eliminated, by insisting that the Black abject can 
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only cease being abject by becoming a White subject, or at least pretending to be so, 
although this becoming is not only ultimately impossible, but arguably unwanted 
outside of White desire and A[WS]. 
 
The racial glitch describes neither a suspension of abjection, as in passing, nor does it 
retain the psychological model of White desire and individual agency underpinning both 
passing and queering. By focusing on the production of racial glitches in the course of 
the technological change of society, the following chapters move away from 
performance to system error, from individual volition to structural effects. Queerness is 
understood first and foremost as a noticeable and irritating but only momentary 
disturbance of system surface and not of system structure. Although it touches on the 
constituted dimension of the subject, it does not significantly alter its constitutive 
structure. The Fanonian end of the world, on the other hand, means total system 
destruction, and the glitch will be investigated in that sense here: as a system structure 
event that has to be traced on the level of system surface and differentiated from other 
important surface effects without structural impact, such as (e.g.) constitutional 
Blackness. The main research impulse will be to ask how racial glitches may come about, 
how they can be t/raced and if and when they may lead to such structural effects. When 
and how does A[WS] produce a self-subverting failure in its constant reiterations and 
recaptures of fugitive subjects and haunting abjects? When and how does it fail itself in 
its cruel spectacle? What is the role of technological change in this? Is the glitch really 
only possible/thinkable as an event or effect connected to but ultimately beyond human 
volition and action, or may there be a formation such as glitching, that is, a politics of 
consciously provoking and disseminating glitches, of using technological change to 
transform the constitution of Blackness? Is technological change de-racializing (does it 
undo established forms of racialization) or does it create not-yet-racialized forms of 
being? 
 
The following chapters will approach these questions through the problematics of 
subjection/abjection established in section I. They will look at questions of desubjection inspired by Butlerǯs concept of queerness, framing racial glitches and thinking towards 
the Cyborg Black Studies that will be established in section III. This analysis will not be 
propelled by techno-utopian hopes of a future abolition of race, but it will t/race and 
engage with present moments of technology related not-yet- and de-racialization. It will 
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focus on processes that undermine racialization by obstructing the suture of flesh and 
discourse and by disrupting established identities through contact and mutual contagion 
of subject and abject. From this vantage point, the potential of technology to impact the 
constitution of Blackness is based on the notion that technology increasingly 
undermines the spectacularity of Blackness, but in no way obliterates the Ǯnecessityǯ of 
the abjection of Blackness for the maintenance of White civil society. Parallel to the 
racial lag and glitch – to the technologically reduced capacity for identifying someone as 
something or flesh – runs an enhanced transmission of cruel spectacles: the possibility 
to broadcast aunt (esterǯs screams, the beating of Rodney King … Technology 
transforms the relation between flesh and dispositive as it facilitates the inscription 
onto a discursively constituted body of Blackness in general but renders the inscription 
of discourse onto a specific Black flesh more difficult. To speak of a subversion of the 
spectacular, then, is not to speak of a disturbed mediality as such, nor of the end of race 
or Blackness, but of failing mechanics of racial marking and unmarking, of failing 
mechanics of the reproduction of constituted Blackness and its subsequent impact on 
the constitution of Blackness as the axiomatic attempts to recapture what technology 
enables to be or remain fugitive and haunting. Though the spectacle remains cruel, the 
stigmatization and hypervisibility necessary to identify specific individuals as Black are 
rendered increasingly difficult to achieve and thus the mechanisms of defense against 
the abject, the capacity to not come in contact with Black and remain untainted White, 
are hampered. The hypothesis, in other words, is that technology undermines the 
containment of social identities through social death and therewith enhances the 
eruption of that abject while also driving an evolution of structural recapture of that 
abject. 
 
Clearly the impact of technology in form of machines on the constitution of Blackness is 
different in this context from the impact of social technologies such as segregation or 
eugenics, but they must not been seen as separate but as interactive realms129. Connecting to Foucaultǯs theorization of the soul in his analyses of techniques and 
technologies of punishment, one way the interrogation of the impact of technological 
change on the constitution of Blackness will proceed in this section will be by asking: is 
there a (post-)soul in the machine? Is there a possible transcendence of Blackness 
                                                        
129 E.g.: „Segregation, importantly, did not only map space but was also a reaction to the transgression of space brought about by modern technologies, such as trainsǳ ȋChun ͳͺȌ. 
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through the machine? Is there, for example in machine-based music, a potential to create a ǲde-raced cultural sphereǳ, a potential for a ǲreframing, diversification and fragmentation of notions of ǮBlacknessǯǳ, for a ǲpost-soul futuramaǳȋAlbiez ͳͶ͹+ͳͶͶȌ? Or 
are all the glitched and post-soul moments just will-o-wisps in an atmosphere of (e.g.) a 
general Big Data driven technological re-constitution of race and Blackness? The 
following chapters will acknowledge both dynamics (de- and re-racialization) but focus 
and insist on the potential of the former.  
 
 
II.2. FROM CINEMATIC SUTURE TO CONSTITUTIONAL BLACKNESS: THE ABJECTǯS 
HAUNTING SUB-SYMBOLICITY  
 
 
 ǲ … because the oppressiveness of black cultural identity is so intimately connected 
to the anguish and anxiety of the visible, of the epidermal schema, the cinema would 
potentially be a prime site for the corroboration of such an identity. Its 
corroboration, however, takes place not on the screen (or not only on the screen) 
but in the theater itself.ǳ ȋDoane ͷ99ͷ: 226) 
 
Based on schizo-analysis and a critique of different theories of subjection, section I. has 
argued that the abjection of Blackness is not a variable within a specific social system, 
but the (politico-ontological) core fiber in the texture of a White civil society. In this 
context, Blackness has been understood as integrated into a pattern of White desire and 
White enjoyment as well as Black social and civic death, an erasure/impossibility of 
Black desire within the parameters of White civil society. This Black desire has then 
been analyzed as potentially revolutionary. In this chapter, White desire, as the point of 
fusion between self and White civil society (the selfǯs centripetal momentȌ, and Black desire, as the point of rupture ȋthe selfǯs centrifugal moment – the end of the world), will 
be reconsidered in terms of suture in order to delineate the role of technology in the 
manipulations and materializations of such desires. Following the method established in 
section I. and with the critique of Lacanian models of subjection and psychoanalysis in 
mind, this chapter will first frame the classic model of suture in order to sketch an 
understanding of the function of suture in racialization, and then move on to a critique 
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of this model in order to analyze the role of technological suture in the containment of 
Black desire. 
 
The concept of suture was already implicitly present and subverted in the consideration 
of the spectacle and the interrogation of identification as well as the relation between 
flesh and discourse that the spectacleǯs cruelty aims to establish. As Kaja Silverman points out: ǲThe concept of suture attempts to account for the means by which subjects emerge within discourseǳ ȋͳͻͻ.f.). Or, to use Jacques-Alain Millerǯs authoritative 
definition of this concept originally proposed by Lacan:  
 ǲSuture names the relation of the subject to the chain of its discourse … it figures 
there as the element which is lacking, in the form of a stand–in. For, while there 
lacking, it is not purely and simply absent. Suture, by extension – the general 
relation of lack to the structure of which it is an element, inasmuch as it implies 
the position of a taking-the-place-of.ǳ (25.f.)  
 
To think of the cruelty of spectacular Blackness as a process of suture requires minute 
attention to two different forms of suture: that which Ǯsewsǯ a subject into the body and that which Ǯsewsǯ an abject and its stereotype-stand-in onto the flesh. To articulate 
suture merely in relation to the subject, as all existing approaches to suture have done 
so far, reiterates the erasure of race from discourse through the positing of a concept of 
a universal humanity that implicitly equates with Whiteness. While it is correct to note 
that the use of a stand-in mentioned by Miller applies to everyone, White and Black 
alike, the form of insertion into discourse ranges from White subject presence to Black 
abject absence, from hegemony to social death, from full to empty signifier, from 
enunciation to erasure. Considering how these forms have been theorized in section I., 
suture as it has been theorized by different authors so far must be understood as an attempt to create a Ǯtransparentǯ signifier which claims to leave no t/race, a subject 
which claims to contain within itself the whole self, a subject which admits no multitude, 
no selves. Suture, then, is a process, which, as yet, has admitted no excess, and thus, for 
the abject, is performed in the form of a stereotype (Bhabha 115). Contrary to White 
suture, stereotype is the disavowal of the invisibility as human and its transformation 
into hypervisibility as flesh; it is a stand-in which does not integrate but 
excommunicates, it is an ersatz-presence that erases erasure, it is what Deleuze and 
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Guattari have described as ǲrefoulementǳ ȋsee chapter ).Ͷ.c.Ȍ, in which abjection is 
disavowed and discourse posited as total and true and thus, implicitly, static. As Eden 
Osucha has forcefully argued in relation to photography, technologically mediated 
presence and absence have historically been deeply racialized. While, in 1902, a White 
woman named Abigail Roberson could sue a large corporation for having used her 
photographic image for publicity purposes on the grounds of her privacy rights – that is: 
her possession in herself – and encounter large public sympathy for this, this would 
have been unthinkable for the Black woman Nancy Green whose image and persona 
were at the same historical time being used to incorporate the ǲAunt Jemimaǳ minstrel 
figure as a trademark used to sell a pancake mix. In the former case it was argued that: 
 ǲ … because her picture was Ǯconspicuously posted and displayed in stores, warehouses, saloons and other public spacesǯ where Roberson herself would 
never dream of going, given the self-evident unseemliness of female traffic in 
such areas of public life, Roberson was effectively made a prostitute by this 
circulation and display. In other words, her lawyers claimed that the adventurous 
peregrinations of her commodified image brought on her person a shame and distress as real as if she herself had been sold and circulated in such a way.ǳ 
(Osucha 95). 
 
It was argued that the picture belonged to the one pictured as a part of her and that 
anything done to the picture was also done to the pictured person. The picture was part 
of the body. In the case of Nancy Green though, not only were no such claims made, but 
Green was in fact engaged by the pancake company to play Aunt Jemima until her death, when ǲthe company [owning the Aunt Jemima trademark] promptly replaced their spokesmodel without commentǳ ȋOsucha ͻʹȌ. While Roberson sued for control over her 
body, Green exemplifies a stereotype-as-suture like inscription into a flesh that, through 
its social death, is terra nullius in the White public sphere. Green thus literally became 
the physical support of her own stereotype, to the degree where that stereotype could 
be transferred unto other flesh after her death. 
 
Writing about suture, then, it must be kept in mind that pictured bodies are not the same 
as pictured flesh. Although technologies as such may seem race-blind, their conception, 
construction and social significance is in no way colorblind or post-racial per se. This is 
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what the present chapter will theorize. As will be shown in the consideration of suture 
in the cinematic130 apparatus below, doing this requires considering technology on a 
formal, rather than content level. From this perspective, no distinction is made between 
fictional and non-fictional. They are both considered to belong to the constituted in as 
far as the constituted and the constitutive both mark structural dimensions, while the 
subject and the abject respectively mark structural positions or situations within these 
dimensions. Wedged between these dimensions and structured by these positions, but 
not identical to them, is the self. Suture is that which binds the self to its structural 
position/situation in the constituted, it is imbricated with desire, it forms when the self 
is structured into a subject or abject, when discourse inscribes itself into the body or 
onto the flesh. As insertion of the self and body or flesh into discourse, the suture Miller 
writes of is integral to the theory of subjection proposed by the equally Lacan inspired 
Judith Butler in her elaboration of the subject adopting a gendered identity under the 
threat of social death or psychosis. Considering the critique of Butler offered earlier, it 
should be clear that suture is a situation of force, not of choice. Suture is not simply a 
process of integration of pre-formed subjects but it is a secondary process contained 
differently in the process of subjection and abjection. As a methodological tool, its value 
is to permit an analysis of specific aspects of the processes of subjection, rather than a 
general analysis. As shall be explained in relation to neo-formalism below, suture 
emphasizes an analysis of form where the consideration of the subject in section I. 
emphasized the analysis of function. The enquiry into suture and suturation in this 
chapter will permit to ask how specific technologies are contaminated by, how they can 
enhance or how they can disrupt subjection/abjection. In order to do so, it will focus on 
cinema and the contrast between the immediate gaze of a face-to-face situation and the 
technologically mediated gaze.  
 
* 
 
Significantly, the concept of suture has received its most important reception in film 
studies, that is: in the field of vision that is also the primary field for the constitution of 
race qua phenotype. The starting question of suture here is the same as in the cruel 
spectacle: How does the spectator participate in the spectacle? How is an identification 
                                                        
130 )n the context of this chapter, ) use the term „cinematicǲ to stand for the audio-visual field in general. 
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produced that lets the spectator know where to position/situate himself in the discourse 
offered him? In her review of the cinematic approach to suture, Silverman writes that ǲTheoreticians of cinematic suture agree that films are articulated and the viewing 
subject spoken by means of interlocking shotsǳ ȋʹͲͳ). The syntax of alternating shots is 
supposed to conceal from the viewer the limitations of the single frame, it is supposed to 
prevent her from becoming aware of the fact that for everything she sees on the screen, 
there is a lot outside the screen that she not only does not see but which it would not be 
in her power to see if she wanted to. The interlocking shots, in other words, perform the 
art of agnotology, in which the spectator partakes in the narrative, because she is kept willingly unaware of the things she doesnǯt know, but which structure her perception no 
less, that is: she is kept unaware of her constitutive limitation by discourse and thus one 
with it. This agnotology is not forced on the spectator. Just like Butlerǯs version of the 
Lacanian subject, the theory of suture assumes that the spectator not only accepts, but 
desires suture in order to avoid castration, that she accepts an existence in 
predetermined categories (such as camera perspective (Metz 35.f.)) because she does 
not want to remain outside the world formed in, by and as spectacle. Thus, the cutting 
and editing of a film direct the spectatorǯs desire to prevent her from disidentifying with 
what she is offered. By banning the specter of the fugitive subject and the haunting of 
the colonial uncanny, this agnotology allows the spectator to experience herself as part 
of the plenitude of the narrative, when in fact she is absent or lacking therein. 
 
What the agreement among film theoreticians mentioned by Silverman amounts to, 
though, is the overrepresentation of a specific desire as universally valid and adoptable. 
In order to make sense, this theory of cinematic suture as direction of desire must 
assume and presuppose a standardized/normal spectator with a standardized/normal 
desire and a standardized/normal perspective that produces predictable because 
standardized/normal effects in the spectator. It must, in other words, assume not only 
spectators always-already determined by normalizing dispositives but constitutively in 
harmony with them; it must assume bodies always-already inscribed with discourse, not 
flesh. Without such a harmonious normalized spectator/citizen the cinematic process 
could neither claim to be universal, nor would it be able to anticipate or direct the spectatorǯs desire. Desire and identification, here, are therefore understood as being 
independent of who the spectator is. As a result of this, this agreement suffers from a 
constitutional blindness to the exclusions and disidentification performed by discourse 
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both prior to the spectatorǯs visit to the cinema and subsequently during that visit. This 
concept of suture does not create the spectator, but relies on prior processes of 
subjection, which it reiterates. Just like the cruel spectacle of aunt (esterǯs beating, 
suture must rely on prior processes of subjection/abjection, which it does not create but 
reiterate. Silverman is aware of this, writing: 
 
 ǲThe system of suture functions not only constantly to reinterpellate the 
viewing subject into the same discursive positions, thereby giving that subject the 
illusion of a stable and continuous identity, but to rearticulate the existing symbolic order in ideologically orthodox ways.ǳ  
 
and then pointing to the role of sexual difference in suture:  
 ǲ)ndeed, the entire system of suture is inconceivable apart from sexual difference.ǳ ȋ221) 
 
It is not news, then, that theorizing suture as neutral is just another aspect of 
dispositivism. The aim here, though, is not to pick up and continue from an analysis of suture and ǲwoman as spectacleǳ ȋJ. Rose 199) to an analysis of Blackness as spectacle, 
as the analysis of spectacular Blackness in chapter I.1.a. is considered sufficient in this 
respect. Rather, feminist film critique will be used as a stepping stone only. The rest of 
this chapter will start from there to deconstruct the concept of suture to theorize the 
cinematic apparatus as a technologically mediated gaze and ask if its consequences for 
the constitution of Blackness differ from those of the non-cinematic gaze.  
 
Consider, for instance, the following quote in the light of Fanonǯs description of 
the colonial gaze: 
 ǲThus [through the shot/reverse shot] a gaze within the fiction serves to conceal 
the controlling gaze outside the fiction; a benign other steps in and obscures the 
presence of the coercive and castrating Other. In other words, the subject of 
speech passes itself of as the speaking subject.ǳ ȋSilverman ʹͲͶ) 
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This ǲbenignǳ ersatz-other that steps in is exactly what is missing for Fanon when he is 
faced with the coercive and castrating gaze of the little boy pointing a finger at him and saying ǲMother, look at that Negro, )ǯm afraid!ǳȋPeau 90)131. Fanon is not protected from 
the finger directing the social gaze like a camera would that of the spectator in the 
cinema. He is not looking, but looked at and it is precisely this unprotected being-
looked-at-ness, that is: the dependence of his self-conception on the conception the 
White Other has of him, that ȋfrom a Lacanian perspective such as FanonǯsȌ makes it 
possible for that little boyǯs gaze to socio-symbolically castrate him, shatter his self-
image and reiterate his social death. Even though the White desiring Black man in Fanonǯs example would want suture-as-subject and the body-armor it offers to avoid 
castration, even though the subject of speech would like to experience itself as the 
speaking subject, he is not offered it. Quite to the contrary, any spectacle structured by 
A[WS] precisely aims to re-iterate this castration, to keep the Other dependent on the masterǯs gaze, as abjection is the only place Blackness is situated in in relation to this 
discourse. The Black man in Fanonǯs example not only cannot but must not identify with 
a protective ersatz-other in order to move from speech to speaking; he does not speak, 
but as Black man he is spoken within A[WS] and must remain so. Within this dispositive, 
then, the ersatz-other indicates a symbolic existence that is as such not available to the 
socially dead, except – as will be argued below – as living dead, as a haunting sub-
symbolicity. Except, that is, against the dispositive, except, that is, as violence, as 
displeasing from the perspective of the dispositive and its subjects. 
 
The idea of a cinematic ersatz-other is not a variation of surface reading and its idea that 
technology might cancel out the subjectivity of the critic (or the spectator more 
generally) in her relation to works of art (Best & Marcus 9.ff.+17) and create a non-
subjective (viz. non-interpretative and outside the dispositive) interaction with art. As 
has been argued, all perception and desire cannot be understood as per se undistorted 
by power, and they therefore always necessarily require exegesis. In analyzing the gaze 
one has to be careful, as Fanon himself emphasized, to understand how the gaze 
performs a connection between the inner eye ȋǲlǯoeilǳȌ and the outer eyes ȋǲles yeuxǳȌ 
that makes a racialized perception possible (Peau 163). It is important to analyze how 
that connection permits the White gaze an enjoyment of Whiteness that is as such – 
                                                        
131 See chapter I.4.a. 
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Whiteness being defined as non-Black – identical with Black castration and abjection132, 
and which can only be considered as surface if one overrepresents oneǯs own position in 
an act of self-fetishization (viz. by considering oneǯs own constitution as outside any dispositive or ǮnaturalǯȌ. On the one hand, then, the analysis of the gaze in the cinematic 
apparatus is by default embedded in the analysis of the immediate/non-mediated gaze 
in the sense that it is based on the same assumptions about the nature of discourse, 
power and the privileging of visual perception in the framing of race in A[WS] that 
underpin any analysis of the non-cinematic gaze. Cinematic desire and identification, as Christian Metz pointed out, are ǲsecondaryǳ processes imbricated on the desire and 
identification constitutive of the subject-formation that precedes the cinematic-
spectator (32.f.+40). Rather than create a completely new desire at the risk of producing 
displeasure, Metz insisted that cinema in general seeks to guarantee enjoyment (or 
pleasure), that is, to tend to (and thus mold itself along the lines of) always-already 
existing desire in order to generate the attendance and revenue necessary for its 
reproduction (6.f.). To point out, as Kaja Silverman does, that suture is based on sexual 
difference is to emphasize this overrepresentation of the master-gaze and the 
reproduction of non-cinematic desire and its power-infrastructure that it potentially 
performs in the spectator through filmic discourse. Within a civil society not only 
patriarchal but also (to expand on Silverman) White, this reproduction means two 
things. Firstly, with Metz, it means that the pleasure of watching a film lies in its faithful 
reproduction of White patriarchy and that cinema is inherently conservative and 
repressive of alternative desires. This is why and where the critique of cinematic suture 
combines with a critique of ideology (Dayan) and political economy. Secondly, with 
Silverman and Fanon, it means reading cinema through the Oedipus complex in which Ǯwomanǯ and ǮBlacknessǯ embody the displeasure of castration and it means equating 
suture with the assumption of a White male position that by definition avoids such 
displeasure. This second reading also identifies the conservative moment of cinema, but 
it moves beyond that identification by summoning the spectre of non-male and non-
White desire and raising the possibility of the ǲdestruction of pleasure as a radical weaponǳ in filmmaking ȋMulvey ͹Ȍ. 
                                                        
132 The asymmetry between the cinematic Ǯuniversal/neutralǯ gaze and the ability to derive pleasure from 
it has for many years been one of the central concerns of alternative cinemas such as (e.g.) Third, Post-
colonial, feminist and Queer Cinema (Shohat & Stam). However, as the theories these cinemas have 
spawned lead away from the focus on the role of technological change in the constitution of Blackness that 
is the center of enquiry here, they will not be considered here. 
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Raising the possibility of the destruction of pleasure or of displeasure in cinematic 
suture suggests that the cinematic apparatus permits performing a disconnection 
between the inner and outer eyes, between what we see and how we (should) see it. It 
suggests a possible sliding of the gaze, a shift of the control of the gaze from epidermal 
and gender authority to the authority of the camera, the authority of the interlocking 
shot, the authority of the cutting and editing: the authority of cinema as technology. 
Given the assumed similarities between the cinematic gaze and the non-mediated gaze, 
what appears as different between them is precisely the possibility of cinema to permit 
such a sliding through its capacity to both offer and refuse an ersatz-other as a 
technologically generated position within discourse that is not simply occupied and 
enjoyed, but that can also lag, be displeasurable, haunt and be haunted. Contrary to the 
non-cinematic gaze of the dispositive, which implements transparent subjects/abjects in 
which the signified must always correspond to the signifier the dispositive has 
attributed to it or risk punishment, cinema, it will be argued below, offers the possibility 
of creating a lag and therewith disconnecting signifier and signifier.133 This creates a 
dynamic of displeasure in as far as it interrupts and frustrates the primary desire Metz 
argues cinema must reproduce. The question to be asked is thus how cinematic 
technologies might facilitate a subversion of the axiom that defines primary desire and 
the connection between bodies and discourse this desire is meant to perform. 
Approaching the role of the impact of the change of technology on subject/abject 
constitution through the concept of cinematic suture is, then, not about the filmmaker 
and her power of enunciation, but about how the constitutive and the constituted are 
affected and may possibly come apart through the technological manipulation of 
subjection/abjection through  the ersatz-Other and its production of sub-symbolicity134. 
This is at once a more general technological effect, and a specifically cinematic situation. 
As will be argued in this section, technology permits a lag between the constitutive and 
the constituted that is not possible in normal social interaction and that turns into a 
racial lag when it undermines racial marking and identification. Lag and the displeasure 
                                                        
133For a critique of Christian Metzǯ differing argument that the difference between the non-cinematic gaze 
and the cinematic gaze is the absence of the seen object in the latter(45), see Jacqueline Rose (195f.). 
134 It is irrelevant from this perspective, whether or not cinematic suture is in fact identical to the 
technique of shot/reverse-shot or not, as long as it is based on the formation of an ersatz-other. As 
Stephen Heath as argued (65.ff.), any critique trying to deconstruct the concept of suture solely through 
reference to the shot/reverse-shot – either completely dismissing suture on that basis (Rothman) or by pointing to different kinds of shots also able to perform suture ȋsuch as what Slavoj Žižek calls ǲinterfaceǳ, 
a shot which condenses the shot/reverse-shot formation into one frame (Tears 39.ff.)) – must fall short. 
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it can foster are effects possible because of the need for adapted suture that is created in 
technologically framed situations in order to sustain subject-identity (if sustaining this 
identity is essential to discourse, as it is in A[WS]), and they become haunting when lag 
creates the impossible simultaneity of marking and non-marking, existence and erasure, 
symbolic life and social death. Lag, in other words, makes possible the semiosis of the 
abject by deconstructing the ersatz-Other through its effect on suture. 
 
Just like the Oedipus complex, Lacanian suture must always be considered a contra-
factual reality from a schizo-analytic perspective: although its structures do exist and 
are effective and must therefore be analyzed and deconstructed, they do not exist by 
destiny, but as an effect of discourse. Accordingly, there are two ways of thinking lag and 
displeasure in relation to the cinematic gaze, and both revolve around the gaze one 
adopts and the gaze one is assumed to adopt or not to adopt. The first way of thinking 
lag and displeasure is to consider suture through the Lacanian dictum of an imperative 
desire to identify and the idea that, through suture, the gaze of the spectator and that of 
the camera become one. The second way of thinking lag and displeasure is to refuse the 
notion of such an imperative desire and to insist that the specator and the camera may 
as well remain separate and multiple.  )n the first case, lag would amount to the effect of the difference between oneǯs 
assumed identity and the one the cinematic gaze forces one to adopt (e.g. a Black woman 
forced to see herself in a movie through a White male gaze). Displeasure here, as 
Kalpana Seshadri-Crooks argues in her Lacanian enquiry into the relation of race and 
suture in the movie Suture, is the product of disturbed identification, of a disrupted 
desire to identify paired with an imperative to do so that imposes suture, even if a 
crippled and negative one (103.ff.).  
In the second case, lag and displeasure might also be the effects of such a forced 
difference, but here it is only possible, not necessary. In this model, lag must primarily 
be understood as the complete failure of suture, rather than the effect of a forced and 
crippled one. Not only can lag refer to a distance between the social identity of the 
spectator and that offered by the cinematic gaze, but its emphasis on the possibility of 
refusing suture permits the articulation of a crucial point. Lag implies more than that a 
White male might refuse to identify with a White male gaze and attempt to occupy a 
different subject-position (a possibility which might be read as White entitlement). It 
also points out how the abject can refuse to identify with and be erased under 
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stereotype-as-suture, how the Black man can refuse to identify with Sambo or the Gauls, 
rather than suffering from the impossible desire for Whiteness Fanon diagnosed, but 
also how he might chose to identify with another position, how he might refuse symbolic 
death and appear in a discourse he is in principle barred from by simply adopting a 
position other than the stereotype he is supposed to suture into. In this case, displeasure 
arises not from a crooked identification, which the spectator might desire and want to 
avoid at the same time, but from the uncertainty of identification and the malleability of 
identities that are produced in the interaction between film and spectator, from the 
slipperiness of multiple possible points of suture and non-suture. 
 
Obviously, these two ways of approaching suture have differing political potential. The 
Lacanian approach technically suggests that, because of the imperative to identify, a 
White straight conservative might be violently forced to identify with a transgender gaze – as Judith Halberstam suggests in her use of the concept of suture in her comment on Kimberly Peirceǯs film Boys donǯt cry – just as a Black person might be forced to see 
herself through a White camera gaze. This imperative to identify might nurture fantasies 
of state sponsored brainwashing as well as of a brachial cinematic power to force 
(literally) new views on people, but most of all it is a reduction of the analysis of the 
cinematic gaze to the parameters of analysis of the non-mediated gaze because it 
assumes that the spectator must always identify with the gaze it assumes. This is the 
conservative conception of suture, which describes the everyday experience of the 
abject. Driven to the extreme of disrupting identities, it would come at the price of 
psychosis. It would mean subject annihilation not transformation and displeasure, lag 
and ultimately glitch would therefore not be valid political concepts. However, because 
this approach ignores the mediating cinematic technologies, it also ignores the 
difference between disrupting identities in the strictly socio-symbolic space of political 
subjection under the law of the father and the cinematic space of the film in which, due 
to the manipulation of the ersatz-Other (as will be argued with Guattari below), the 
subject is able to enter and exit partially disrupted states and to Ǯplayǯ at transformation 
without the immediate risk of psychosis.  
It is precisely the openness to such play that characterizes the schizoanalytic way 
of thinking lag. This approach emphasizes how the (non-)existence of an ersatz-other 
implies a multitude of different sutures ranging from the plenitude of the transparent 
signifier to symbolic death. It also points out how the ersatz-other allows the spectator 
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to assume a position within the filmic narrative that is at the same time identifying and 
distancing, that is only a quasi-suture (as opposed to a total suture) in which lag permits 
the spectator to touch the horror of abjection without the fear of contamination. To be 
concise: the Lacanian theory of suture assumes an entry of the spectator into the 
narrative of the film on the model of (but not identical to) the entry of the subject into 
the symbolic. The necessary identification with the ersatz-other as guarantor of the 
symbolic integrity of the narrative offered by cinematic technology is an echo to the 
identification with the nom-du-père. Similar to the non-du-père that regulates the 
relation between the signifier and the signified and thereby the subjectǯs place within the symbolic through itǯs threat as well as factual imposition of social death, cinematic technology regulates the relation between the images and the imaged and the subjectǯs 
place in the filmic narrative through a threat or imposition of symbolic death. At the same time, technologyǯs power to force subjection and abjection is significantly less than 
that of the non-du-père, as the threat of narrative castration wielded by technology 
cannot develop the same social urgency tinged with a fear of physical annihilation as the 
threat of socio-symbolic castration, although both are closely linked. Emphasizing this 
reduced threatening capacity of cinematic technology, the second way of thinking lag 
underlines that, furthermore, the possibility of refusing symbolic integrity as well as 
haunting it (that is: assuming an affective presence where no symbolic position is 
offered, colonizing the ersatz-Other) is always-already given in cinema, because there is 
not one single totalitarian symbolic realm, but a multitude of mutually subverting 
discourses (e.g. the cinematic and the social one). The second way of thinking lag refuses 
the truth claim of the narrative; it claims the right to deny the suspension of disbelief 
necessary for narrative capture just as it claims the right of the self to defend itself 
against discursive capture, its right to believe in the face of abjection. This second way, 
then, is a case of schizo-analysis rather than Lacanianism, a case of fugitive subject and 
haunting abject. 
 
Although Félix Guattari is explicit in accusing cinema of being complicit with Oedipal 
psychoanalysis in its attempt to shape subjection through the manipulation of psyche 
and desire according to the ruling discourse of power ȋǲDivanǳȌ, and in spite of Gilles Deleuzeǯs two tomes on cinema ȋCinéma 1 +2), neither Guattari nor Deleuze have offered 
a schizo-analysis of or specific to cinema. Nevertheless, the observations offered by 
Guattari seem to validate further inquiry into the role of the ersatz-other as specifically 
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cinematic moment in the process of subjection/abjection. As he points out, the 
difference between cinema and face-to-face situations such as the analytic setting is, 
that:  
 ǲAu cinéma, on nǯa plus de parole; ça parle à votre place […] une machine vous traite comme une machine, et lǯessentiel nǯest pas ce quǯelle vous dit, mais cette sorte de vertige dǯabolition que vous procure le fait dǯêtre ainsi machiné. Comme les 
personnes sont dissoutes et que les choses se passent sans témoin, on nǯa pas honte à sǯabandonner ainsi.ǳ135 ȋǲDivanǳ ͳͲͳȌ. 
 
While insisting that cinematic desire is but a variation on non-cinematic desire and that 
a mere analysis of the cinematic signifier would be ideologically corrupt in obscuring the 
role of the political in the claim that the cinematic signifier would be beyond politics, 
Guattari also emphasizes the dissociation of symbolic and social threat posed to the self 
within cinema and underlines that the unconscious manifests itself differently in the 
cinematic setting. Due to the absence of witnesses – that is: due to the reduction of 
spectacularity as well as social accountability and surveillance – and the interruption of 
the direct link between interpellating instance and interpellated subject/abject, the 
signifier (and with it the dispositive it condenses and conveys) partly loses its dictatorial 
power. In cinema, in other words, faciality is disturbed. As Guattari claims, the mode of 
expression (the film in its materiality) becomes excessive to the content of expression 
because the mechanics of surveillance and regulation of discourse are reduced in the 
cinema. Film, then, can potentially subvert subjection/abjection in two ways: because 
the abject is less contained by taboos and thus more mobile, more apt to identify with or 
be identified with, and because the subject is less afraid of opening up to the abject, less 
afraid of contamination. In cinema, the Black man might stare at the White woman 
without fear of being lynched and castrated, just as the White man might enjoy seeing a 
Black manǯs quest for justice without being afraid of having to pay the price. Because of 
this, desubjection and de-individualization are rendered more facile in cinema (Guattari, ǲDivanǳͳͻ͹ͷ:ͻͻ f.Ȍ. )mplicitly writing against Metzǯ argument that the identification with 
the camera constitutes a unitary ǲtranscendental subjectǳ ȋMetz ͵͸Ȍ, Guattari underlines 
                                                        
135 ǲ)n the cinema, one ceases to have speech; it speaks in your stead […] a machine treats you like a 
machine, and the essential thing is not what it tells you, but this sort of vertigo of abolition that is given to 
you by the fact to be machined/done in this way. Because people are dissolved in this way and things 
happen without witness, on feels no shame to abandon oneself in this way.ǳ ȋS.W.) 
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the need to think cinema in ǲmultitudes de modes de subjectivation et de sémiotisationǳ136 ȋǲDivanǳ ͳͲͲ.Ȍ.  
 
This enhanced availability (and commodification) of the abject, however, is just a 
potential, not a necessary effect of cinematic technology, as Judith Butler has shown in her comment on the ǲracially saturated field of visibilityǳ that she analyses in relation to the Rodney King video and trial ȋǲEndangeredǳ ͳͷȌ. Thus, contrary to )an Buchananǯs 
proposal to attempt to establish a schizo-analysis of cinema asking ǲsuch questions as 
why we desire to watch particular films and willingly pay money to do soǳ ȋͶ; emphasis 
added), a schizo-analysis must ask how we desire in cinema and what role the 
technology in an by itself plays in this how. ǲ(owǳ, to put this in Butlerǯs paradigmatic question, could the Rodney King video ǲbe used as evidence that the body being beaten 
was itself the source of danger, the threat of violence … ?ǳ ȋǲEndangeredǳ ͳͷ; italics in the originalȌ. (ow does the ǲcommon senseǳ of ǲracializationǳ ȋOmi & Winant ͸ʹ+͸ͶȌ pervade the field of vision, how does it ǲpervade white perceptionǳ ȋButler, ǲEndangeredǳ ͳ͸Ȍ and how is this related to technology? (ow does cinemaǯs potential to 
undermine or reinforce Black social death come to play? (ow is race a ǲmedium … 
something we see through, like a frame, a window, a screen, or a lens, rather than something we look atǳ ȋMitchell xiiȌ? And how is it, as ǲa repertoire of cognitive and conceptual filters through which forms of human otherness are mediatedǳ ȋidem.), 
affected by technological change? 
 Proceeding to understand this Ǯhowǯ from Félix Guattariǯs and Judith Butlerǯs texts, the 
concept of suture confirms itself as another form of ideological interpellation. The trial 
scene analyzed by Butler differs significantly not only in outcome, but also in setting 
from the cinematic context analyzed by Guattari. The courtroom in which the Rodney 
King video was shown was literally filled with witnesses, with attorneys wielding the 
power of positive law and judges supervising and regulating the potentially 
transgressive (viz. undermining central tenets of A[WS]) force of the video. Watching 
here was nothing else than the reiteration of stereotype-as-suture. Built on the relation 
between desire and the signifier, suture is thus not independent from non-technological 
parameters, not indifferent to the difference between body and flesh. In the case of 
                                                        
136 ǲmultitudes of modes of subjection and semiotisationǳ ȋS.W.Ȍ 
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cinematic suture, it must be understood as the technology-specific form of totalitarian 
subjection and abjection. As Slavoj Žižek points out:  
 ǲThe ultimate gap that gives rise to suture is ontological, a crack that cuts through reality itself: the Ǯwholeǯ of reality cannot be perceived/accepted as reality, so the price we have to pay for Ǯnormallyǯ situating ourselves within reality is that 
something should be foreclosed from it: this void of primordial repression has to 
be filled in – Ǯsuturedǯ – by the spectral fantasy.ǳ ȋZizek, Tears 71) 
 The Ǯnormalǯ here is foucaultian. Foreclosure corresponds to the politico-ontological 
process of Black abjection, the ontological crack between Whiteness and Blackness, 
while spectral fantasy relates to the axiomatic formation of race; it is the erasure of 
constitutive Blackness on which Whiteness is built. But contrary to face-to-face social 
interaction, in which the threatening dispositive completely represses the abject in 
order to contain the self in a unitary subject, cinematic suture has only slight threatening 
power and must rely on external actors to force the spectator into a specific subject-
position. Although it does not do so by default, it may allow for a multitudinous self 
sliding between subject-positions and abject-situations. This is a possibility boosted by a 
cinematic setting, but it is created through the technology that makes up the cinematic 
apparatus. Just as peer-groups or film reviews might serve as invisible but present attorneys within cinema, cinemaǯs subversive potential is also present outside the 
cinema as location, for example during home video sessions, or surfing the web. 
 
What, looking at the cinematic apparatus, must be singled out as the impact of 
technological change on the constitution of Blackness and Black abjection? How might 
the relationship between the ontological gap and the ersatz-otherǯs potential to work on 
the white self-overrepresented subject through racial lag be exploited and the 
multitudinous cinematic subject be produced? How might the cinematic 
(deconstructive) work on the subject/abject be fed back into the structures of abjection 
present outside the cinematic setting? 
 
Considering the critique just offered, as well as that of authors such as Kaja Silverman 
and Jacqueline Rose, it must be clear that, against the Lacanian imperative longing to be 
subjected by a dispositive, the simple presence of the White Ǯbenignǯ ersatz-other, say in 
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a film like D.W. Griffithǯs The Birth of a Nation, will not suffice to have just any spectator 
identify with it. Neither is this wanted from the perspective of A[WS], as the 
identification of the abject with the subject of the spectacle would undermine that spectacleǯs performance of power, nor is this possible within the matrix of social death 
that structures its discourse and excludes flesh from suture. This also implies that there 
is no advancement in understanding how the spectatorǯs desire functions and is formed 
in cinema in simply introducing an alternative ersatz-other so as to re-enable suture for 
an assumed Black spectator, as for example the emphatic reception of Melvin van Peeblesǯ Sweet Sweetbackǯs Baadasssss Song by Huey Newton and the Black Panthers ȋWiggins ͶͲ.ff.Ȍ or Frank Wildersonǯs reading of Bush Mama – considered below – might 
suggest. Rather, one must think of the cinema of displeasure when reading how Manthia 
Diawara points out, in his consideration of Black spectatorship, that cinema always also creates ǲresisting spectatorshipǳ ȋͺͻ͵Ȍ. The critique of classic cinema as just another 
form of coloniality, just another form of opium for the (assumedly homeostatic) masses 
ignores all those to whom classical cinema refuses a point of entry into the narrative, all 
those whose social death of the screen translates into symbolic death on the screen. This 
critique ignores the blackfaciality of most of cinema and the resistance, the ǲoppositional gazeǳ ȋhooks, Looks 11ͷ.ff.Ȍ, as well as the haunting it produces. )t ignores cinemaǯs 
potential to not only harbor but also spawn dissent; it ignores the decolonial potential of 
cinema137. )t ignores, that ǲit cannot be assumed that black ȋmale or femaleȌ spectators 
share in the Ǯpleasuresǯ which such films [as ǲThe birth of a nationǳ or ǲBeverly (ills Copǳ] are able to offer to white audiencesǳ ȋDiawara ͺͻ͸Ȍ and how this might help in 
thinking the impact of changing technology on the constitution of Blackness. It is not 
sufficient, then, to simply criticize suture for assuming passive selves under a 
totalitarian imperative to subject themselves as well as for its quietist reproduction of 
abjection, but any critique must revolve around the question of desire and its political 
constitution as well as enforcement. This becomes obvious when considering such 
alternative readings of suture as that of George Butte, Tina Chanter and Frank 
Wilderson. 
 
Like other critiques of suture before him (Bordwell; Carroll), Butte attacks the 
                                                        
137 The notion of a „decolonial cinemaǲ was coined by Octavio Getino and Fernando Solanas in their 1969 manifesto ǲTowards a Third Cinemaǳ. For an assessment of the movement that adopted that name and its theories, see Jim Pines and Paul Willemenǯs Questions of Third Cinema and Anthony R. Guneratne and Wimal Dissanayakeǯs Rethinking Third Cinema. 
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Lacanianism underlying most theories of suture by opposing the formerǯs emphasis on 
lack to a presumed plenitude of consciousness and perception. Ignoring the politico-
economic nature of the constitution of consciousness – especially, as Christian Metzǯs 
theory of cinematic desire emphasizes, in a finance hungry art form such as cinema – 
Butte instead proposes an understanding of suture as ǳembodied intersubjectivityǳ in a 
form of an inter-weaving138 of onto-genetic consciousnesses not fully but nevertheless 
immediately present to each other (Butte 292.f.): cinema as a meeting and entwining of 
souls. The flaw in this, as well as the cause for its incompatibility with the concept of 
Black abject invisibility, is of course its structuring assumption of a race-independent 
socio-symbolic fullness. The problematics of this become clear in Butteǯs attempt to apply his theory to Michael Roemerǯs film Nothing but a Man, which is built on an almost 
exclusively African-American cast starring Ivan Dixon (who would later direct The Spook 
who sat by the Door) and Abbey Lincoln as the main characters Duff and Josie. 
 
Set in the United States South in the early sixties, Nothing but a Man narrates the 
troubles of a young African-American couple in a White supremacist civil society. Butte 
choses two sequences revolving around the couple with the aim to demonstrate that suture ǲilluminates presence, not absenceǳ ȋʹͻͶ; emphasis in the originalȌ. Although this 
is proposed to target the notion of an absence that forces the self to suture in order to 
avoid castration, it obviously also amounts to denigrating the erasure performing Black symbolic death. )n other words: in emphasizing presence, Butteǯs main point is to argue 
that symbolic presence is always-already there and need not be gained. Given his – by no 
accounts representative – example of ͳͻ͸Ͳǯs filmmaking, this amounts to arguing that 
there is no abjection of Blackness in cinema, because there are Black characters on the 
screen. It amounts to claiming that what one sees on the screen is indeed Blackness as 
such, independent of any racializing formations. Thus, it means ignoring the Black loss of 
body, the cinematic commodification of Black flesh and suturing through stereotype, as 
well as its structuring role for Whiteness. By reading suture this way, Butte not only 
evades the question of dispositivist erasure in cinema (carefully choosing an example in 
                                                        
138 Butte uses the term „inter-leavingǲ (294) in order to attach his theory closer to Maurice Merleau-Pontyǯs theory of chiasm. Quoting Merleau-Ponty, Butte speaks of a relationship between consciousness 
and embodiments in which one consciousness or embodiment fills the space left by another consciousness 
or embodiment. Inter-leaving is a pun on inter-weaving Butte uses to emphasize the non-passive stance of 
the self in suture. I will not adopt his terminology here, because I consider it a mannerism of no 
conceptual necessity, but marked distractive potential in the context of the present critique of his 
theorizing. 
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which the filmmaker has attempted to avoid erasure), but changes the basic architecture 
of the concept of suture. Eliminating the participation of the spectator in the filmic 
narrative that suture is built to explain, Butte applies his notion of inter-weaving 
subjectivities solely to the two intra-diegetic characters (296). As he points out, they ǲlook and return looks and return looks yet againǳ ȋʹͻ͹Ȍ, they are present to, they socially exist for each other. Besides the characters, the only other Ǯconsciousnessǯ Butte admits is that of the narrator/camera in which the spectator is present as implied ȋǲthe cameraǯs implied viewersǳȌ, but in no way constitutive of the spectacle ȋʹͻͺf.Ȍ. )n Butteǯs 
reading, focused on the surface of the screen, cinema becomes a double of reality in the service of helping to think this reality and the spectatorǯs relationship is one of looking 
in the most basic sense: sitting in a chair and looking at the screen in a constellation in 
which spectator and movie are two distinct and closed entities with the movie speaking 
to the spectator. Although Butte uses this structure to point out that suture allows the 
spectator to partake in the diegetic intersubjectivity while avoiding its emotional risks 
(300), his approach is fundamentally opposed to the schizo-analytic approach, which 
would emphasize how reality and cinema, spectator and movie constitute each other. 
The consequence of this is that, in Butteǯs argument, the Black symbolic fullness he 
posits does not spill from the screen into the social. His analysis that the characters exist 
for each other in no way implies that they also exist for the spectator as anything else 
than flesh. The difference between his approach and schizo-analysis is precisely that 
between witness and spectator mentioned by Saidiya Hartman (4) in that Butte 
proposes a viewing audience as witness, empathic but in no way implicated, while 
schizo-analysis knows only spectators, a gaze always already imbued with (dis)pleasure 
and desire. Schizo-analyzing suture in Nothing but a Man would begin by pointing out Butteǯs attempt to avoid taking responsibility for his de-politicizing stance by writing that ǲbecause suture is embedded in the social life represented in a narrative, it will carry political implicationsǳ ȋ304). Not only can politics, according to Butte, be observed 
on screen as in a petri-dish, but this is due to the story-line rather than the form and also 
implies that the spectator should feel involved in the narrative qua a universal form of 
social commons shared by the spectator and the characters on screen. Not only does this 
ignore the absence of such commons, as well as the potential of non-narrative political 
cinema, but it also does away with a long tradition of formalist analysis. How a story is 
told does not matter to Butte. More importantly, in emphasizing presence and negating 
the role of a gap in suture and positing a split between the audience and the film as 
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given, he negates the possibility of a productive lag that is at the core of schizo-analysis.  
 
Against this, schizo-analysis will emphasize that the political lies exactly in the formalist 
dimension of narration. The potential for excessive expressivity Guattari saw in cinema can be understood as analog to the possibility for ǲdefamiliarizationǳ that Kristin 
Thompson, borrowing from Russian Formalism, saw in the neo-formalist analysis of 
cinema (10f.). Schizo-analysis shares with neo-formalism its critique of ǳthe 
presuppositions of the Saussurean-Lacanian-Althusserian paradigmǳ of film analysis, 
but it does not agree with its dispositivistic assumption that ǲ[s]ince historical contexts 
make the responses [of the viewer to the film] inter-subjective, we may analyze films 
without resorting to subjectivityǳȋK. Thompson ʹͻȌ. Against this, schizo-analysis assumes that who the spectator Ǯisǯ, e.g. whether she is abjected or subjected, must be 
clearly delineated with every analysis, rather than positing a passe-par-tout stereotype 
non-racial spectator. To be sure, defamiliarization, defined as the potential to let a 
spectator experience things in a new way because of encountering them in a new and 
different (unfamiliar) placement or pattern, is but one form of excessive expressivity, 
but it is an essential and maybe the central one. The emphasis here is double. First, the concept of defamiliarization insists that: ǲMeaning is not the end result of a art-work, but 
one of its formal componentsǳ ȋK. Thompson ͳʹȌ. Second, defamiliarization is based on 
the notion of transformation in the process of re-iteration (as in repetition everything 
may soon become familiar and change meaning).   
 
Looking at Nothing but a Man, several layers then have to be dissected. The film might be 
seen as defamiliarizing in that it focuses on a narrative within the African-American 
community and with Black lead characters, which was still rare at the time of its release. 
At the same time, it does not offer a tale of redemption or perseverance, but merely sees 
itself as a mirror of a bleak reality in a style indebted to Italian neo-realism. Its plot, conceived according to its director, along a desire to portray ǲan intimate story of 
marriage set against the backdrop of the economic effects of racismǳ while trying to avoid that ǲthe film should be overtly politicalǳ ȋRoemer in VasilopoulosȌ, neither was 
nor attempted to portray anything uncommon. This, however, must be put in 
perspective to be correctly understood; something which Butte fails to do. Although a 
spectator of Nothing but a Man contemporary to the writing of the present text may not 
feel defamiliarized by its portrayal of Black people, at the time of the movieǯs release, 
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and writing from the point of view of A[WS], what Nothing but a man did was a t/racing 
of cinema. Against the at the time still pervasive representation of Black as ǲtoms, coons, 
mulattoes, mammies and bucksǳ ȋBogleȌ – that is: against the reiteration of the 
constituted Blackness of the time – the film and its focus on showing the impact of socio-economics on a young coupleǯs life emphasized the level of constitutive Blackness. 
Nothing but a Man was defamiliarizing in that it chose to speak of the constitutive in the 
realm of the constituted. Defamiliarizing as well was its attempt to portray Black people 
as human beings, to render flesh as bodies and give a socially legible form to Black 
abjection. In doing so, it created a moment of constitutional Blackness because it asked 
(but in no way forced) all of its spectators to, through suture, constitute themselves as 
that Black couple and experience the racist discrimination at the root of that coupleǯs 
trials and tribulations. For a White audience, such a demand amounted to requiring a 
multiple identification usually left to Black audiences. Whites were supposed to first 
empathize and then feel the sting of an injustice perpetrated by a White civil society they 
could at best partly dissociate themselves from. This demand was totally independent of 
any intra-diegetic intersubjectivity Butte might wish to prove.  
Following the schizo-analytic lead and with Roemerǯs stated goal not to make a 
political movie, one would have to point out how cinema here at the same time becomes 
political and non-political almost despite itself. The form (cutting, editing, etc.) of the 
film follows standard procedures and only becomes unusual in the application to its 
subject. The defamiliar here is exactly that suture would require, and that the distancing 
intermediation of the ersatz-other should permit, a potentially White audience to 
identify through the usual formal language with a Black perspective. Defamiliarizing is 
that the White subject should occupy an abjected position and thereby transgress and 
break that abjection. It is in this sense, from the perspective of A[WS], that Nothing but a 
Man might be described as a cinema of displeasure. This shows that no analysis of 
cinema whatsoever can proceed without clearly articulating the assumed spectator in 
relation to which the analysis proceeds (rather than treating the spectator merely as an 
invisible presence only implied in the editing). Generally failing at the box office in the 
United States, Nothing but a Man did well among the socially progressive and Black 
public. It found distribution in Black churches and schools, was endorsed by the Nation 
of Islam newspaper Muhammad speaks and won prizes at the Venice and New York film festivals ȋVasilopoulosȌ. )tǯs reception and potential to ȋdisȌplease were and are directly 
related to its spectatorship. On the other hand, the movieǯs rendering of Black humanity 
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within the Black community largely, if not completely, avoids the full displeasure of 
Black social death within White civil society that films such as Sweet Sweetback or 
Uptight (a.k.a Black Power) aim to mobilize. 
 
It is important to be fully aware of the relationship between approaching abjection and experiencing displeasure here, a relationship at the core of Julia Kristevaǯs already cited 
concept of abjection. Displeasure marks the warning track for a subject at risk to de-
subjectify. As such, it also marks a self straining against itǯs intra-dispositivistic borders 
(in which, it must be remembered, it is not contained, but by which it is articulated in a 
specific socio-symbolic setting). A cinema of displeasure is a technologically mediated 
situation in which the spectator is moved to acknowledge something which prior to its 
cinematic experience would have been not only unacceptable, but also unthinkable, 
illegible, unspeakable. It is in this sense, that Deleuze writes of the capacity of cinema to create a ǲnoochocǳ ȋCinéma 2. 204), that is, the capacity of cinema to shock the spectator 
into new categories and forms of thought, perception and ultimately being. Although 
such a noochoc is not exclusive to cinema, cinemaǯs enticement to the subject to dare 
approach the abject is extraordinarily conducive to producing such a shock. A cinema of 
displeasure, then, must be understood as an echo to the theater of cruelty, and it leads us 
back to the situation of the abject outside discourse and the spectacle necessary to 
inscribe this discourse onto the abject Black body. The cinema of displeasure is the 
opposite of the pleasure of the cruel spectacle analyzed in section I. in that its goal is not to Ǯsewǯ a self and body or flesh to a specific discourse, but to dissociate them from it. 
Nevertheless, it is based on similar mechanics. 
 
In a text on theatre, Antonin Artaud (to whom Deleuze and Guattari refer repeatedly 
throughout their writings) points out the following: ǲSans un élément de cruauté à la base de tout spectacle, le théâtre nǯest pas possible. Dans lǯétat de dégénérescence o‘ nous sommes, cǯest par la peau quǯon ferra entrer la métaphysique dans les esprits »139 
(118). Like Artaudǯs cruelty, displeasure is due to the forceful obtrusion of situations 
and sensations that are socially coded in a negative way or even as taboo. The question 
embedded in the notion of noochoc is, if such an obtrusion may reach the point at which 
it breaks the axiomatic, the point at which it is no longer just at a negatively coded 
                                                        
139 ǲWithout an element of cruelty at the root of every spectacle, the theater is not possible. )n our present 
state of degeneration, it is through the skin that one will make metaphysics enter the minds.ǳ (S.W) 
 132 
distance undermining suture, but something which forces itself upon the subject in a 
manner that makes it crack, or leads to a sort of subject-fusion. In this case, the subject 
suddenly realizes that is has touched the abject in an undeletable way. It has seen what 
it was built not to see, senses what it is not structured to make sense of. Subject-fusion 
marks a collapse of dispositivism with no option of return. This fusion might take the 
form of the psychosis the subject had been threatened with by discourse. Or it might 
simply be like a called bluff, a moment of demystification: I have touched the abject, but I 
am still alive. The assumption in either case is that the abject has emerged into perception, where, given that it can only do so after discourseǯs security architecture 
(viz. refoulement, etc.) has been breached, it is present, but not articulated and thus 
needs to be either integrated into the subject or might even end up breaking the subject 
apart and push to the construction of a new form that is neither subject nor abject. It is 
within the realm of the symbolic, but not symbolized: it is within sub-symbolicity. This is 
the experience of a racial glitch that must be understood through the somatic not 
captured by the axiomatic and related to a possible attempt to signify it. This is a first 
possible moment for a semiosis of the abject that section III. will focus on. For the 
moment though, attention must remain with understanding abjection in cinema as a 
technologically inflected form of the constitution of Blackness. Two ways of approaching 
abjection here impose themselves: explicitly, as Tina Chanter does in relation to Julia 
Kristevaǯs version of abjection; or implicitly, as ) will argue Frank Wilderson does in his 
work on cinema. 
 
Writing that: 
 ǲ)dentificatory regimes operate according to imaginaries that facilitate and 
support symbolic matrices in ways that remain inarticulate or invisible to 
dominant representations. By effecting a momentary disruption of such 
identificatory regimes, film can bring into relief alternative images, and in doing 
so can open up the possibility of transforming the terms in which dominant 
socio—symbolic representations construct identification as normative.ǳ ȋͳȌ, 
 
Tina Chanter proposes an approach to film that is close to the idea of a technologically 
produced lag permitting a racial glitch proposed earlier. But as will be shown now, Chanterǯs approach is fatally flawed by her failure to differentiate between abject bodies 
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and abject flesh. This means that, although she explicitly develops her argument through 
the concept of abjection (as formulated by Julia Kristeva) and acknowledges the 
racialized and gendered nature of psychoanalytic theory and the impact of this on the 
possibilities of identification and fetishization underlying suture, her theory diverges 
from the one proposed here in a significant way best illustrated by the following passage 
in her book.  
 
In a comment on a sequence involving the main characters of the 1992 movie The Crying 
Game, Chanter gives the following example of her understanding of the use of abjection 
to destabilize the subject in and through cinema: 
 ǲOn discovering Dilǯs [a male transvestite with whom Fergus was falling in love, 
assuming her to be a woman. S.W.] penis, Fergus hits out at her, and then vomits. 
The moment can be described as one of abjection, the impact of which 
encompasses not only Dil and Fergus, but potentially also the audience. Dilǯs 
abjection occurs as the sexual identity Fergus thought he had established for 
himself is thrown into question, and as those in the audience who had identified with what they ȋand heȌ took to be Fergusǯs heterosexual desire for Dil are, along with Fergus, abjected.ǳ ȋʹ͸Ȍ 
 
Striking in this sequence, more than the moment of gender-abjection considered by 
Chanter (and which, as theorized in section I., must not to be confused with the modes of 
racial abjection), are the mechanics of its containment, its function in relation to sustaining suture, itǯs capture of gender-abject bodies and Chanterǯs ignoring of all of 
this. The condensed event here is that a man who considers himself heterosexual, 
discovers himself desiring another man, whom he had considered to be a woman, and 
thus is confronted with the part of himself that needs to remain repressed in order to 
sustain his image of himself as a heterosexual male. This is a perfectly gender-queer 
moment. The abject here is not so much Dilǯs gender-passing, as it is the possibility of 
homosexual desire that emerges from this passing and that, for a moment, must be faced 
by Fergus and which he then immediately re-abjects. This is first a sequence in which 
something that was abjected in the Butlerian sense explodes out of its invisibility and impossibility into discourse, and second, a sequence in which this desire as well as Dilǯs 
passing is re-abjected, re-repressed. Because of this re-abjection, it is not a proper 
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semiosis of (whatever form of) abject, even though Fergus will slowly accept his love for 
Dil later in the film. Rather, it is a re-capture of a gender-abject body, whose eruption 
into presence (in opposition to an eruption of Black abject flesh) may force those 
affected by it to reposition themselves within the social axiomatic, but can ultimately be 
contained by that axiomatic without forcing it to change. The shock of touching the 
gender-abject is immediately transformed into vomit and violence, offering the 
spectator an intra-diegetic way to purify himself of the experience of contamination and 
thus avoiding a possible recourse to a disidentification of the spectator with Fergus that 
would serve that same goal of protecting oneself against the contact with the gender-
abject. Through this offer, the distance between the subject and the abject can be 
maintained, as well as the identity between the cinematic and the non-cinematic gaze. 
Suture remains intact, the cinematic apparatus remains invisible, the constitutive 
remains erased under the constituted and the abject moment is contained within this re-
capture. This sequence is symptomal, as what is constituted as abject is so in reference 
to a constitutive discourse that is not made explicit but whose erasure is reiterated in Fergusǯ shock. Why, the simple question must be, does Ferguson react the way he does? The alternative possibility, lost in Chanterǯs analysis, would have been to simply let 
Fergus continue his infatuation with Dil uninterrupted, completely unaffected by the 
presence of her penis from the get on, rather than moving him and the hetero-identified 
spectator through a period of shock and awe and reconciliation. This would have been a Ǯtrueǯ cinema of abjection and displeasure, which, I want to argue, consists not in the 
projection and explosion of an always-already contained horror, but in the continued 
presence of an intangible uncanny forcing the spectator to acknowledge a split between 
the on-screen and off-screen worlds, an uncanny sub-symbolicity that forces him to 
experience how the social constitutive is at odds with the discourse constituted on 
screen, how his seeing here undermines his being, how it is different from his usual 
normative seeing, how his gaze here turns against itself, not allowing itself to force 
abjection on others, but fracturing along the abject. A cinema of abjection can by 
definition not be a cinema of realism, as the common-sense real is precisely constituted 
by the invisibility of abjection. The uncanny differs from horror precisely in that it, as 
well as the reaction to it, are not already coded and the subject secured within it, in that 
it is truly unfamiliar and defamiliarizing. The difference between the cinematic and non-
cinematic gaze is emphasized here, as it is only the presence of the ersatz-other that 
makes the cinematic pleasure of horror and the displeasure of abjection possible, as it 
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allows the normative spectator-subject to touch the abject and not touch it at the same 
time, while also forcing it to confront it; to create a moment in which the subject is 
subverted, and to allow this moment to be contained within the movie, so that the 
subject can stop watching it, leave the cinema or switch off the TV set and be just as and 
what it was before its encounter with the abject.  
 
What this proves and what Chanter cannot acknowledge from her theoretical 
perspective, is how the semiosis of the abject (flesh) within the field of the cinematic 
experience not only can, but might effectively need to be enabled through technology at 
the same time that it can also be instrumentalized in a more or less refrained manner by it. The differences between Tina Chanterǯs approach to abjection in cinema and the one 
elaborated here is this: even though Chanter admits for ǲmultiple and shiftingǳ ȋͳͲͺȌ 
processes of identification within cinema, she does not permit for an identification in 
which the gaze of the spectator and the camera are separate at the same time that they 
are one and she can also not see why this would be necessary. This is due to her 
exclusive focus on the narrative structure of cinema, and her ignoring of its 
technological determination. Although Chanter locates the abject in the pre-oedipal 
(which she identifies as the realm of the semiotic (105)), she understands movies as 
firmly set in the symbolic and thus not only ultimately subject to the Lacanian model of 
subjection but also striving to sustain this realm of subjection and, thus, always fixed on 
bodies and blind to flesh, prohibiting sub-symbolicity. From this perspective, she 
describes a cinema of abjection in which the abject seems to move immediately from the 
semiotic to the symbolic because it is always-already contained therein. This is one of 
the fundamental differences between the consideration of the gender-abject and the 
race-abject and an example of why they cannot be put into a relation of analogy. Chanter 
does not acknowledge the capacity of cinema to exist on different, mutually subverting, 
symbolic and semiotic levels simultaneously. Thus, her theoretical framework would be 
unable to conceptualize a situation in which, e.g., what is visually present can at the 
same time remain erased or impossible to the narrative discourse of a movie, how body or flesh can bleed into discourse, such as an uncommented presence of Dilǯs penis might 
do, or, even more so, the difference between the Black actor and his White character in 
Suture140. This is a technological situation, an experience that must have an ersatz-other 
                                                        
140 Although Tina Chanter quotes from the book in which Kalpana Seshadri-Crooks engages with Suture 
(27+284.f.), she does not herself engage with or even mention this movie. 
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and a play on (dis)belief in order to be possible, in order to force itself on the making of 
meaning, sense and being rather than be deleted by the rules of common sense and the 
threat of psychosis. 
 
The model developed here sees the capture of an explosive appearance of the abject by 
the dispositive as performed in The Crying Game, that is, a sudden appearance of the 
abject that is immediately contained through the offering of a legitimate intra-discursive 
response to this appearance, such as vomiting or violence, as the most common form of 
the semiosis of the body-abject. In opposition to this, the form of a haunting uncanny 
lingering in sub-symbolicity is the only possible form for a semiosis of the flesh-abject as 
a process capable of so deeply disturbing suture as to ultimately force fundamental 
shifts not only within the subject but also in the dispositive that produces it. 
Concomitant with this, the theory developed in this text so far would also insist that the 
body-abject co-opted into the symbolic in Chanterǯs theory, is not radically abject at all, 
given precisely the facility with which it is re-integrated into the symbolic, a re-
integration that is not possible for the flesh-abject. As has been argued in section I., the 
Oedipal is understood as a specific model of discourse intimately associated with White 
civil society and capitalism, and it is in failing to acknowledge this and the limitations posed by it, that Chanterǯs model ȋjust as Kristevaǯs model informing itȌ is conservative 
to a degree that locates it firmly within A[WS]. Accordingly, Chanter limits her 
exploration of the abject in cinema to the level of narrative and reduces the semiosis of 
the abject to a narrative trick, such as merely hiding Dilǯs penis from view and then 
making it appear, instead of asking how such a hiding and discovering are determined 
by a dispositive, and how this dispositive is again determined by its technological 
possibilities. Although she argues for a cinema in which there is a ǲsuspension of pleasureǳ ȋͳʹ͹Ȍ, she cannot follow through with this argument, because the 
impossibility of the suture of flesh that she refuses to reflect upon must necessarily be 
maintained in order for her argument to have traction. Chanter, to emphasize this point, 
does not differentiate between the cinematic and the non-cinematic, the technological 
and the non-technological gaze, and because of this, in all the examples of film analysis 
she gives, she can only locate displeasure on-screen, but not as a relationship between 
the subject-spectator and the movie-discourse mediated by technology. The semiosis of 
the abject is here reduced to a detail of and thus within the narrative, rather than the 
disruption of the narrative and the socio-epistemico-political intervention into the off-
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screen world that it necessarily would be, if it truly touched upon the Black abject. 
Suture, as already mentioned, is just such an example ignored by Chanter, in which 
displeasure is produced through the fact that, although there is a discrepancy, a lag, 
between the body/somatic/semiotic of the lead actor and the 
racial/discursive/symbolic identity of the main character, this has no effect whatsoever 
within the movie narrative itself. Against the displeasure of The Crying Game (which is 
clearly located with Fergus and where the gender-abject, through Fergusǯ vomiting, is 
immediately given a symbolic position in which it remains marked as abject and thus 
ultimately re-captured), the displeasure of Suture is conveyed through the apparatus 
and established in the space between the movie and the spectator. The vomit and 
violence, the visceral of The Crying Game are of a markedly different nature than the 
disturbance of Suture, where an abject flesh is present but cannot be contained by the 
movie, creating a pronounced racial lag splitting the character from what would have 
been its body. Chanter is aware of such a possibility, but refuses it as incompatible with her theoretical frame: ǲ)n order to prevent fantasies becoming merely mesmerizing, 
reductive, and repetitive, one must retain the role of interpretation that the symbolic 
can contributeǳ ȋͳͶ͸Ȍ. Chanterǯs analysis of abjection is more of a general approach to 
processes of symbolization, and tied to cinema only by chance, while the approach 
proposed here seeks to detail the specifically cinematic as well as the specifically Black 
in abjection. 
 Nevertheless, Chanterǯs approach to a ǲsuspension of pleasureǳ provokes a necessary 
refinement of the concepts of the abject (gender versus race abject) and of desire to be 
used in an analysis of a cinema of abjection and a semiosis of the abject. Clearly, as has 
been argued throughout this chapter, the desire considered must not simply be that of 
the characters on-screen but it must be that of the subject/abject-spectator. It is the 
(im)possibility of Black desire that is at stake here, and the analyses so far have shown 
that, although queer and feminist film theory are of fundamental help in approaching 
this desire, the analysis of Black desire is in no way sufficiently fathomed by an analysis 
of feminine or homosexual desire as in The Crying Game, nor even of a Black homosexual desire, such as that in )saac Julienǯs movie Looking for Langston analyzed by David 
Marriott (Haunted 106). It is in performing such an analysis that this chapter has shown 
how this desire defined by sexuality and gender is ultimately compatible with A[WS], 
while Black desire, by definition, is not. This has been extensively demonstrated in 
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section I. and it will now be reiterated, once more, to close this chapter by returning, 
once again, to the work of Frank Wilderson. 
 
In his book Red, White and Black, Wilderson himself proceeds to apply his theoretical 
work to cinema. While doing so, he insists on the importance of Black symbolic death 
within cinema (Red ͳ͵ͻȌ, asking: ǲCan film tell the story of a sentient being whose story can be neither recognized nor incorporated into (uman civil society?ǳȋRed 96). Already 
implicit in this question is Wildersonǯs attention to the difference between body and flesh, as well as the focus of his approach on ǲstoryǳ at the detriment of what he calls ǲdiscourseǳ, which he defines as ǳthe formalism of cinematic strategies ȋlighting, sound, 
camera angle, editing, mise-en-scèneȌǳ ȋRed 156), and which will be called 
cinematography here. He considers cinematography as the language in which story is 
transmitted. Permitting for a creative tension between story and cinematography, while 
at the same time paying almost no attention to the relation between film and spectator, 
Wilderson reduces the latter to the structural position/situation of either subject or 
abject and defines these as determined by the political context of their time.  
Accordingly, Wilderson argues that abject invisibility in cinema would simply 
equate with a story line in which the abject is presented as not structurally and 
constitutively banned. This would be a story line that would insist that it does not trade 
in stereotypes but in bodies, a story which would insist that Black people really do 
decide to live outside society, or are forced to do so by bad luck and fate, rather than 
being forced there on a politico-ontological level, on the level of the constituted, by 
A[WS]. Sustaining abject invisibility would amount to narrating gratuitous violence as 
contiguous violence, it would amount to telling the story of mass incarceration as due to 
mass criminality as opposed to telling it as due to results produced to sustain A[WS]. 
Contrary to such a form of storytelling (which he analyses in the example of Antwone 
Fisher) Wilderson contents that a movie like Bush Mama does manage to narrate the 
structural situation of Blackness as produced by gratuitous violence by showing the 
Black as flesh, which means by showing gratuitous violence: the rape of a little girl by a police officer and his killing by the girlǯs mother. At the same time, he insists that the filmǯs ability to do so is not itǯs own achievement, but the creation of the zeitgeist that 
produced it, a possibility generated by the political movements contemporary to the 
film. This is a zeitgeist so strong, that Wilderson assumes the violence to be perceived as 
gratuitous even though, as he himself admits, it is obviously scripted as contingent on a 
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specific transgression, which is the girlǯs rape ȋRed 143). 
 Not only is this a highly subjective reading of the movie and the relation of story to cinematography it performs, but it also exemplifies the problematic of Wildersonǯs 
approach for the task posited here. The goal of his film analysis is to read film against 
the grain of the political ontology of Blackness (the abjection of Blackness) he identifies 
in his theoretical work. In his reading, Black desire becomes possible in films, which 
offer a story in which Blackness is sutured not as stereotype (not through erasure), but as presence, as t/race. But contrary to the approach developed here, Wildersonǯs does 
not think of t/race in relation to constitutional Blackness, which implies the possibility 
of a revolutionary presence of Blackness within A[WS], but only in terms of total and irreconcilable opposition, ǲthe black desire to take the country downǳ ȋRed 139). 
Arguing for constitutional Blackness, Wilderson would say, amounts to reducing a structural and ontological antagonism, ǲan irreconcilable struggle between entities, or 
positions, the resolution of which is not dialectical but entails the obliteration of one of the positionsǳ ȋRed 6) to a mere intra-hegemonic ǲconflictǳ. This argumentation requires 
him to reduce spectatorship to paradigmatic structural positions of Whiteness and 
Blackness, or, in other words, requires him to implicitly work with suture141 through 
stereotypes himself. Such stereotyping pre-determines any analysis of suture and the 
impact of cinema and its technology on the spectators, as these are theorized as set and 
static positions, and allows Wilderson to use the concept of spectator as self-fulfilling-
prophecy (the Black spectator who sees the gratuitous violence because of the Black 
Liberation Movement, the Black spectator who can only enjoy if offered a story that 
reflects Wildersonǯs structural analysis, the White spectator who can not enjoy …Ȍ.  
One must be concise here – as this is the kind of critique Wilderson would 
anticipate – that what this amounts to is an ontology of desire that presumes to be 
political ontology, but ultimately tilts into ontological politics that guarantee the 
possibility of Black desire at the same time that they preclude constitutional Blackness. Consider, for instance, Wildersonǯs following question:  
 ǳ(ow do we explain a White political cinema genuinely anxious about 
government corruption, the integrity of the press, a womanǯs right to choose, the 
                                                        
141 Although Wilderson repeatedly uses „sutureǲ as a verb, he elaborates on it only once, pointing out what 
can be paraphrased as the conflation, within suture, of the human and the sentient being through an 
erasure of the latter (Red 249). 
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plight of turtles and whales or the status of the public square, and a Black political cinema calling for the end of the world?ǳ ȋRed 131) 
 
As has been pointed out in chapter 1.4.a., the end of the world must be read as a radical 
disruption of established discourse and its process of subjection/abjection, and it has been noted that Fanonǯs proposal on how to create this moment was the use of 
revolutionary violence. It seems very strange, then, to see Wilderson note the possible 
subversion of story by cinematography (Red 340) but emphasize antagonism within the 
story and not choose to theorize the violent potential of cinema itself, the potential for 
noochoc, the potential of t/race to inscribe itself into the body, but instead permit a tilting of ontology in which a cinemaǯs revolutionary potential is not only bound to 
specific racial prerequisites but also exhausts itself in a cinema of displeasure on the 
level of story, rather than the cruel displeasure of a punch against the performative 
integrity of body and discourse (a punch, which, of course, is not possible in ontological 
politics, where discourse and body are always one and discourse and flesh always two). 
Black desire, here, is nothing but a question of emplotment of something assumed given, 
rather than the performative force as which the present text has attempted to theorize 
it. Thus, paradoxically, Wilderson himself transforms antagonism to conflict by 
restricting his articulation to the realm of discourse. 
Understanding Black desire in this way ultimately forces Wilderson to locate a 
cinema of displeasure on the level of the story, as he does when he identifies a cinema ǲcalling for the end of the worldǳ with movies such as Bush Mama. He does not theorize 
desire and pleasure on the level of the somatic and of sub-symbolicity, but merely as 
already symbolized – which ultimately means: contained – threat. By doing this, 
Wilderson falls short of being able to really theorize a cinema of gratuitous violence, a 
cinema of displeasure as a reverse cruel spectacle that is. This, I want to argue, is the 
result of two things. First, his choice to ignore the materiality of cinema, that is, its 
existence as technology and as an apparatus with the power to inflect race, rather than 
simply reproduce or represent it. This is the fundamental difference between his 
approach and the one proposed here. Secondly, the fact that such a focus on the 
materiality of cinema would fatally undermine the racial politics of his writing, as it 
amounts to a total indictment of his choice to not only classify movies according to the 
racial identity of their directors and main characters, but also of his decision to reserve a 
particular political agency to that specific racialized identity. Note, for example, that 
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Wilderson, just like Tina Chanter, cites Kalpana Seshadri-Crooks book Desiring 
Whiteness, but does not engage with Suture (Red 310.f.). Given his acknowledgment of a 
possible tension between a filmic narrative and the dispositive of White civil society, it 
would have been highly interesting to read his assessment of Sutureǯs sub-symbolicity and its potential for forcing a semiosis of the abject, itǯs potential for haunting the 
spectator and, most of all, the eruption of abject flesh it stages. Unfortunately, the White 
racial identity of Sutureǯs directors, as well as its main character ȋbut not main-flesh!) 
seem to stand in the way of such an analysis of Suture as radical cinema in Wildersonian 
terms. A the same time, it remains unclear why, mutatis mutandis, Suture would then not 
have been worthy of an analysis demonstrating in how far it must be considered White, or as Wilderson calls it: ǲSettler/Masterǳ cinema (Red 251). It can only be assumed that 
this is due to the lack of the fulfillment of Black desire as defined by Wilderson within 
Suture, as well as the possibility it offers to interpret Black desire as fulfilled in its 
perverted form: as the desire to be White. 
 Frank Wildersonǯs approach to the absence of the abject in cinema must be described as dispositivistic in its own rights, if not to A[WS], then to Wildersonǯs own pronounced 
racial axiomatic. Wilderson cannot theorize the impact of technology on race, nor the 
political potential of cinema beyond conservatism. In his view, the constitutive and the 
constituted collapse into each other in cinema just as anywhere else, except for a few 
very rare exceptions. This, for him, is the cinematic collapse of ǲthe story of the slave estate and the story of civil societyǳ ȋRed 144), a collapse that he cannot think of as 
narrated in a self-subverting way, but only as violently opposed. This is Black desire in 
cinema: the threat of annihilation, the threat of violence. But it is this refusal of self-subversion and his structural analysis cum ontological ǲafropessimismǳ ȋRed  258), 
which prohibit him from perceiving the possibility of a semiosis of the flesh-abject or 
constitutional Blackness as a transformative force arising when a tension between the 
constituted and the constitutive is mobilized, and of which sub-symbolicity describes 
but one possible moment and a cinema of displeasure and cruelty but one possible form. Although Wildersonǯs structural analysis is of great importance for section I. of 
the present book, the ontological tilt in his analysis of cinema cannot be accepted. This is 
not only due to the theoretical reasons elaborated above, but also necessary for the 
present book to assure the conditions of its own possibility, as a text written by a White 
author on the abjection of Blackness and claiming for itself, just as it does for Suture, the 
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capacity to stage in its discourse what is not of its own experience except for the 
encounters with flesh and White displeasure. These conditions ground the possibility of 
writing on A[WS] with one foot outside it, a necessity without which the flesh-abject 
would have to remain invisible. This outside foot stands precisely on works of post-
colonial and African-American authors, artists and encounters that have created 
moments of constitutional Blackness for this author. The consideration of the impact of 
technology on the constitution of Blackness, then, posits the present text in the realm of ǲblack optimismǳ, a ǲmetacritical optimism … bound up with what it is to claim 
Blackness and the appositional, run-away, phonoptic black operations – expressive of an 
autopoetic organization in which flight and inhabitation modify each other – that have been thrust upon itǳ ȋMoten, ǲBlack Opǳ 174). While this optimism does not deny what 
Wilderson described as Black desire in cinema, it lacks his insistence on physical war as 
the only possible path to Black emancipation in as far as it considers coalition politics 
and entrism a theoretically – if not necessarily practically – possible way to politico-
ontological change. Focusing on the deconstructive rather than destructive aspect of this 
desire, the aspect that has been called constitutional Blackness, this text renders itself suspicious of ǲunconsciously prefer[ing] the violence of the state to the violence of the Blacksǳ ȋWilderson, Red ͳ͵ʹȌ, given Wildersonǯs ontologico-political assumption that:  
 ǲthe imaginative labor of White radicalism and White political cinema is 
animated by the same ensemble of questions and the same structure of feeling 
that animates White supremacy […] Anti-Blackness, then, as opposed to White 
apathy, is necessary to white political radicalism and to White political cinema 
because it sutures affective, emotional, and even ethical solidarity between the ideological polar extremes of Whitenessǳ ȋRed 131). 
 
This chapter has analyzed cinema as technology by engaging with the concept of suture, 
the difference between the non-mediated and the cinematic gaze and the difference 
between the body-abject and the flesh-abject. It has posited the presence and absence of 
an ersatz-other in the cinematic gaze as that difference and developed the possibilities 
of producing constitutional race through such methods as a cinema of displeasure and 
cruelty, and defamiliarization, and such moments as sub-symbolicity. In doing this, it has 
framed the difference between Black desire and constitutional race and has located this 
text within the tension between afropessimism and afro-optimism. The impact of 
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technological change on the constitution of Blackness that has been theorized while 
doing this, was the capacity of cinematic technology to produce racial lag, to glitch race, 
to make the spectator experience t/race and thus inflect the structures of subjection and 
abjection. The following chapter will now continue the analysis of this capacity of 
technology to glitch and inflect by engaging with phonography and its potential to 
harness sub-symbolicity in, through and as noise.  
 
II.3. THE NOISE OF BLACK UNBLACKNESS  
 
 
ǲ)t was post-human in affect if not quite in construction, 
deliberately using only machines and processing the voice heavily when it was used. 
It was cinematic, evoking, by turns, gothic scenarios of decaying urban centers and 
transcendent images of consciousness, riding the electronic airwaves.ǳ 
(B. Williams 154) 
 
The analysis of the potential role of sound technologies in politically constituted fields 
spontaneously suggests an analysis of how sound becomes an instrument of power. As 
Jacques Attali points out, such an analysis of sonico-political fields could focus on control 
and manipulation both in terms of sound reception, for example through bugging 
devices, and sound production, for example in the mass production and 
commodification of sound and its potential ideological implications. Sound technologies, 
in this case, would serve homeostasis. Their role would be to help prevent fugitivtity and haunting by making dissident Ǯsilenceǯ (the reverse application of agnotology to the 
state) near impossible, as surveillance of sounds and other forms of communication 
becomes pandemic, while also censuring unwelcome sonic presences (what this chapter 
will theorize as Ǯnoiseǯ) and imposing other, more accommodating and axiom-compatible sounds instead ȋǮmusicǯ, Ǯinformationǯ). Sound technologies as technologies 
of power would not only render a haunting of the dispositive by the abject impossible by 
reducing the possible space of silence (or secrecy more generally), but reverse this 
haunting, enforcing the grip on the abject, as well as the fugitive subject by 
implementing in the subject and abject the constant fear of such surveillance, creating a 
form of disciplinarity in which power is a constant ghostly presence. Not only would 
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such technologies increase control of sound production (in a broad sense), but sound 
technologies in terms of mass production and distribution of Ǯlegitimateǯ sound would 
also shape sound perception, enforcing the distinction between legitimate and legible music and mere Ǯnoiseǯ. This would be sonic coloniality in a mode described by John Mowitt as ǲthe electronic colonization of listeningǳ ȋʹͳͷȌ. But although these are 
certainly very real and important potential uses of sound technology, this chapter will 
not consider them at length. As was the case in chapter II.2., the focus will not be on the 
conservative potential of technology, but on its potential impact on changing the 
constitution of Blackness. Nevertheless, Attaliǯs ȋhistorio-graphically and theoretically 
highly defective) politico-economic analysis of sound offers an important starting point. 
Consider his following statement: 
 ǲ)l nǯy a pas de pouvoir sans contrôle du bruit, sans code pour analyser, marquer, 
restreindre, dresser, réprimer, canaliser les sons. Ceux du langage, du corps, des 
outils, des objets, des rapports, avec les autres et avec soi-même. Toute musique, 
toute organisation des sons constituent un moyen de créer ou de consolider une communauté, le lien dǯun pouvoir avec ses sujets, un attribut de ce pouvoir, quel quǯil soit.ǳ 142 (16)  
 There is a crucial lack of distinction in this statement about powerǯs reach into the sonic; 
a significant erasure that occurs in the de facto equation of noise and sounds and noise 
and Ǯmusicǯ that Attali performs in his book misleadingly titled Bruits143. For it is in the 
impermanent and oscillating relationship between what counts as noise and what counts as Ǯmusicǯ144 that this chapter, taking its cues from Deleuze and Guattari as well as Jacques Rancièreǯs notion of the ǲpartitions of the sensibleǳ ȋwhich will be elaborated 
on below), locates the political dimension of sounds and sound technology. Is there, the 
question will be, a ǲsonic afro-modernityǳ ȋWeheliye, Phonographies) made possible by 
                                                        
142 „There is no power without control of noise, without codes for analyzing, marking, holding back, 
training, repressing, canalizing sounds. Those of language, of the body, of tools, of objects, of relations with 
others and with oneself. Every music, every organization of sounds constitutes a medium for creating or 
consolidating a community, a relation of a power with its subjects, an attribute of that power, whatever it may be.ǳ ȋS.W.Ȍ 
143 „Noiseǲ[SW]. The title is misleading in so far the bookǯs subject is not so much noise as Ǯmusicǯ. 
144 For the sake of argument, this chapter will focus on Ǯmusicǯ as referring to common sense music genres 
such as jazz or blues, etc. (ence, Ǯmusicǯ needs to be written in quotation marks in order to distinguish it from the musciologically more precise understanding of music as defined as ǲorganization of soundǳ  at 
large (Cage 3). 
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or even always-already inherent to sound technologies such as phonography? Is the relationship between noise and Ǯmusicǯ transformed by sound technologies in a way that 
enables a semiosis of the (sonic) abject or at least an unsettling of the (sonic) subject? Is 
there, in other words, a possible role for sound technologies in transforming noise into legible and legitimate Ǯspeechǯ, legible and legitimate social presence? Can sound 
technologies affect and transform social and symbolic death? In order to analyze the 
impact of these technologies on the constitution of Blackness, it is crucial to develop an 
awareness of this relationship between Ǯmusicǯ, noise and also silence independently of 
technology first. Understanding all of these as aspects of sound, this chapter will 
emphasize that sound technologies are not only about recording and recorded Ǯmusicǯ, 
but about recording and producing sound more generally. This chapter will argue 
against the innumerable attempts to construct Black agency within White civil society through considerations of ǮBlack Musicǯ. The following pages will not dive into the 
endless stream of publications on gospel, blues, jazz and hip hop (etc.) as politically 
powerful expressions of African American culture or identity. Instead, they will consider 
phonography and technologically produced music, such as Detroit Techno, engaging with the ȋimȌpossibility of a sonic ǲBlack Atlantic Futurismǳ, of which Kodwo Eshun has written that its ǲmayday signal … is unrecognizability as either Black or Musicǳ ȋ More 
brilliant, 00[–001]145).  
 
This chapter straddles the fields of Black Studies theory, Political Theory and Sound 
Studies and it is therefore necessary to prepare the argument with a consideration of what the terms Ǯmusicǯ and Ǯsoundǯ (music as well as noise and silence) imply. The 
necessary first step here has to be a repudiation of the belief – ranging from orientalist 
to quasi-religious – in Ǯsoulǯ and improvisation as not only the subversive elements in 
and of Black Music, but also the essential factors in processes of twentieth century Black 
liberation struggles. This belief informs most writing on music and Blackness, but the 
thrust of critique here will be focused on Attali and Fred Moten, who share the same 
simplistic conceptualization of improvisation. Never offering a concise definition of improvisation, both sketch improvisation as ǲsubversionǳ ȋAttali ʹͲͶff.Ȍ, as a technique that subverts the Ǯmusicǯ identified with power by inserting the individual into a field of 
discourse whose universalizing structure, Attali contents, is broken by that insertion. 
                                                        
145 Kodwo Eshun choses a particular pagination for More Brilliant than the Sun that references will follow 
here. 
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This is also true for Moten, for whom improvisation creates the ǲsonic eventǳ ȋBreak 12) 
that creates breaks, cracks and fissures within discourse, therewith rendering the Ǯinvisibleǯ created by dispositivistic erasure present. Improvisation, for Moten, creates a ǲsurplusǳ ȋidem.) of being within the symbolic, a surplus that enters discourse through ǲfissures or invaginationsǳ which he considers as the core of ǲblack performancesǳ 
(Break 14). 
 
II.3.a. Improvising being Black as Black Being 
 
Improvisation, as Attali and Moten conceptualize it, is based on unitary subjects and an agency arising from their inner ȋor ǮtrueǯȌ self not only in spite of, but completely 
independent of the process of subjection/abjection that forms then. For Moten, the 
objectification of the Black person consisted above all in its muting, that is, in a 
destruction of symbolic presence that may at first glance seem similar to social and 
symbolic death. But Moten considers social death as always-already undone in and 
through Black performance, therewith reducing it to a symbolic death that explicitly 
refuses to accept the politico-ontological dimension of the concept of social death 
(Moten, Just friends 2). Throughout his writings, Moten refuses to accept the lack of 
relationality that social death implies. For him, invisibility is a problem of representation 
and identity, not being. It is the force of Black performance (and specifically 
improvisation) to transform representation and identity by introducing what finally amounts to Ǯauthenticǯ Blackness into discourse. ǮMusicǯ and improvisation, here, are the 
modes of entering into a community of those who are not born into a community; they 
are, in a sense, a becoming-human: ǲWhere shriek turns speech turns song – remote 
from the impossible comfort of our origin – lies the trace of our descentǳ ȋ Break 22).  
 
But what is Moten really proposing in what seems like a description of a transformation 
of noise into music and ultimately speech? What does it mean to not only suggest that 
improvisation accomplishes this transformation, but that this is also more than mere identity politics? And what is this ǲBlacknessǳ Moten ascribes to such performance? Although Motenǯs idea of improvisation seems similar to that of haunting and fugitivtity 
developed in section I., it is fundamentally different in that it not only assumes that 
haunting and fugitivtity exist, but also pretends that their expression enters the one and 
only (as opposed to a multiple) symbolic realm easily, necessarily and with guaranteed 
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political repercussions. Both Attali and Moten assume not only a natural drive from the 
semiotic to the symbolic, but also a readability and acceptance as Ǯmusicǯ within A[WS] 
of the sounds improvisation produces. But why would there not only be an authentic 
Blackness, but one at that, which would strive to be recognized not only as Black, but as 
a specific form of Blackness? How would improvisation as such generate its reading as Ǯmusicǯ and not merely noise-making and thus have the potential to make such a 
recognition of authentic Blackness possible?  At this point it is important to point out ǲthe Ǯpara-ontologicalǯ distinction between 
Blackness and the people (which is to say, more generally, the things) that are called blackǳ ȋMoten, ǲBlack Opǳ, ͳ͹Ͷ4) that Moten attributes to Nahum Chandler ȋǲCase …ǳ, 
215) and adopts in his more recent works. Motenǯs notion of being Black, then, is not 
Black being (viz. an ontological mode of race), but something he theorizes as based in a 
Black experience, that is, in the experience of those marked as Black in a specific society. 
As the para-ontological distinction emphasizes, this being Black is not necessarily 
exclusive to Black bodies, even if Moten thinks being Black solely from a Black-body-
perspective. While afropessimism insists on the ascribed identity of Blackness and 
attempts to think being beyond Blackness and being Black, Moten insists on the 
givenness of Blackness and theorizes how Blackness can be reclaimed by those that are 
(marked as) Black. Afropessimism, in other words, explores how to create new worlds 
and exit the axiomatics that create Blackness and beings that are Black, while Moten 
posits that there is only one world and that, therefore, Blackness cannot be refused, only 
reclaimed. Authentic Blackness, in this sense, marks a constellation in which both 
segments of the para-ontological equation coincide, that is, when Blackness is determined by those who ǲare called blackǳ.  As will be shown below, this leads him to 
explicitly adopt Judith Butlerǯs model of subjection, according to which the self 
necessarily accepts the way it is interpellated by power out of a desire for social 
relationality146. He then goes beyond that model, by pointing out that axiomatic 
Blackness is not able to contain Ǯauthenticǯ Black subjects and is thus subverted in and 
through Black performance. Although those who are Black must adopt Blackness, Moten 
argues, this Blackness is changed in the process of that adoption. 
                                                        
146 Although Moten attempts to think a refusal of the self to accept that interpellation in Just friends, he 
fails to do so, as his interrogation revolves around the refusal of Black people to accept one specific form 
of Blackness and not Blackness in general. Thus, his position of thought revolves around a position that is 
always-already interpellated (as Black) and therewith beyond the pre-subjected point Moten assumes he 
theorizes. 
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Black performance, then, is Black just as black people are Black, by fact of the structural 
position it occupies and emanates from. What Moten fails to accept, though, is that the 
improvisation performed by Black people is marked as Black by that same positionality, 
and therefore never a sonic event at all. This, in fact, is the underside of Motenǯs refusal 
of Black social death and his emphasis on re-coding Blackness rather than creating a 
semiosis of the abject. Black musical performance ȋin terms of both ǮBlackǯ and Ǯmusicǯ) 
has not been the unflinching eruption of the noisy abject into the dispositive A[WS], but 
has always-already been contained in the black hole of its origin147, viz. in a series of empty signifiers ȋe.g. Ǯrace musicǯ) that are both the foundation of Motenǯs Black 
relationality and are specifically produced by the dispositive in order to contain possible 
subversive semiotic eruptions of that which is called Black, of that which is racialized as 
Black in order not only to be but to remain Black. Therefore, not only are the sounds 
produced through improvisation in Black Music always-already contained, but 
improvisation itself, as an identifiable musical praxis opposed to merely making noise, is 
performed by someone who already has a symbolic authority to perform music, that is, 
someone already positioned and subjected within a dispositive in a specific manner. 
This is precisely the problematic of thinking about/through ǮBlack Musicǯ: every 
eruption of the haunting in improvisation is never an event at all, because it is always 
already contained as ǮBlackǯ or/and Ǯmusicǯ. Instead of an event, a noisy eruption of an 
alternative language, a new world, there is a development of micro-differential (viz. 
intra-symbolic) movements in form of short moments of Ǯextravaganzaǯ still embedded 
in easily identifiable Blackness and Ǯmusicǯ and thus embedded within the limits of Ǯmusicǯ at least through a quasi-montage ȋviz. these sounds are Ǯmusicǯ because they are presented in the context of Ǯmusicǯ as Ǯmusicǯ) that ensures their legibility. In this case, as Sean (iggins points out, one is not dealing with noise but with ǲnoisesǳ which: 
 
 ǲare identified and then incorporated into music, and thus the noise aspect of theses Ǯnoisesǯ has been suppressed. A differential sonic noise would be more 
than, for instance, a composed noise – noise still in the service of a masterful, aesthetic whole.ǳ ȋͷʹȌ 
                                                        
147 This is a ‚black holeǯ in the sense that it marks a point in discourse that absorbs and assimilates anything that comes close to it. )t is a black hole in the sense of D&Gǯs ǲtrou noirǳ, which stops 
deterritorialization and de-subjection by colonizing its line of flight (Mille 167+179). 
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 Obviously, the legibility of noise, its potential capture in the form of ǲnoisesǳ, expands 
through time as micro-differences accumulate, so that what might have been a noise-event in the time of Duke Ellingtonǯs symphonic music, was less so when Eric Dolphy 
performed with his free-wheeling quintet, and is fairly familiar in Matana Robertsǯ 
contemporary compositions. But both Attali and Moten do not see this, insisting instead 
on the immediate liberatory nature of improvisation as such, that is, of improvisation as 
the act of introducing into a dispositive something that is, according to Moten and Attali, 
in but not of that dispositive, as a singularity that exists in relation to, but cannot be 
contained in the dispositiveǯs universalizing claims. There is a movement, then, from 
constitutive to constituted Blackness in this mode of improvisation, in the tension 
between axiomatic and authentic Blackness. But as will be shown below, that movement 
is (mis)theorized by Moten as drive and thus remains contained within the confines of a 
specific subject model based on exactly that Black abjection that Moten refuses to admit. 
Here, no constitutional Blackness is possible, as the subversive singularity located in 
improvisation is re-universalized and re-racialized as libidinal process. Through this 
drive, being Black reverts to Black being. Improvisation becomes a kind of ritual linking 
of different realms of moral existence: the constructed (Blackness) and the true (Black 
experience). Not only is such a theory of improvisation politically dubious for reasons 
that will be elaborated on below, but ignoring the differences between the various 
existing forms of improvisation also transforms any considerations of improvised music 
into a homeostatic process in its own right. Thus, although improvisation as ritual might be a fruitful approach to understanding John Coltraneǯs Ascension, it proves fallacious 
when applied to more secularly minded and differently structured forms of improvisation, such as Ornette Colemanǯs Free Jazz or the work of Max Roach (that 
Moten himself refers to), whose potential event-ness are muted, rather than amplified, 
in this specific interpretation. 
 
In order to think through improvisation, two points must thus be given detailed 
attention. Firstly, the relevance of the question of how noise becomes legitimate and 
legible sound. Secondly, the role of the figure of the subject and abject in the process of 
answering this question, this interrogation being based on the locating, within a specific axiomatic, of the subject in Ǯmusicǯ and the abject in noise. The present chapter does not share Motenǯs optimistic belief in an onto-genetic drive allowing the object to become 
 150 
subject in a form different from its dispositivistic (viz. socio-genetic) interpellation as 
stereotype, a drive whose presence would leave the reader asking why and how that 
subject ever became an object or abject in the first place. Rather, this chapter will 
attempt to understand how sound technologies (which play no role in Motenǯs 
theorization of Black Music) might create racial glitches (which are structural events) 
and produce moments of constitutional Blackness (which is created by individual acts, 
such as t/racing) from which a semiosis of the abject may arise by short-circuiting 
authenticity and improvisation (as ritual revelation of a specifically White form of 
autonomous subjectivity) all together. On the sonic level, a racial glitch will necessarily 
express itself as noise, that is, as sound not yet contained in Ǯmusicǯ, while constitutional 
Blackness will bear noises but not be noise. In complete opposition to improvisation, the 
glitch is decidedly anti-humanist; it is not a performance by an individual, it does not 
explain the (re-)production of the human by way of human volition. Rather, it posits the 
human as a political effect, both in terms of human as self-overrepresentation of a 
specific group (for example White European men, or what Sylvia Wynter terms ǲManͳǳ and ǲManʹǳ (264) and what will be written as huMan1/2 here) and in terms of an 
alternate humanity opposed to or transcending the self-overrepresented huMan1/2. 
Noise, here, is how the new language Fanon calls for will be perceived from within the 
axiomatic A[WS] with its huMan1/2. )t is the sonic form of a new Ǯhumanityǯ that will not 
constitute Man, but something altogether different, neither White nor Black. 
Constitutional Blackness, on the other hand, is closer to Motenǯs thinking, in that it does not abolish an axiomatic, but aims to modify it. (owever, it does not share Motenǯs 
implicit belief that racialization will be undermined from within the ontologically human 
itself. Constitutional Blackness is not an unstoppable force but a place for human 
volition and agency created when technological change spawns spaces that are not yet 
completely axiomatically over-determined. It is ultimately a form of Blackness in which 
Blackness comes to an end, in which (as will be elaborated on below) both Whiteness 
and Blackness become unBlack unBlackness, but which, through remaining Black, never 
totally transcends the axiomatic that produced it. The question of the present chapter is 
how sonic technologies impact the constitution and perception of such post-human 
noise and noises, of not only post-Blackness but un-Blackness. 
 Though Motenǯs idea of sonic surplus may seem to offer an example of a sonic sub-
symbolicity at first glance, of a sound in which something more than huMan1/2 appears, 
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its ostentatious identification as authentically Black prohibits thinking sonic sub-
symbolicity in his terms of Black performance, as will be shown below. It is for this 
reason – the difference between the structural effect of the de-racializing glitch, the 
structurally enabled abject action in constitutional Blackness and the ontologically 
guaranteed subject agency in Motenǯs racialized improvisation – that this chapter will 
move the problematization away from Ǯmusicǯ widely and easily identified by common 
sense as Black. The focus will instead shift to technologically produced/electronic music 
in general and early Detroit Techno in particular, in order to be able to ask if technologyǯs impact on Blackness in the sonic field ǲdid result in a reframing, 
diversification and fragmentation of notions of ǮBlacknessǯǳ ȋAlbiez ͳͶͶȌ. The focus 
therewith moves away from Ǯmusicǯ produced by people always-already racialized as 
Black (as in Moten) to sound producing (post-/ un-)Blackness. 
 
Sound is not simply the raw material of Ǯmusicǯ or language, as Moten argues (Break 13). 
Rather, the legibility and legitimacy of sound as music or language as opposed to its 
being considered mere noise, is the product of a social, political, epistemological and 
psychological differentializing process that section I. has analyzed in relation to 
coloniality, colonial difference and the process wherein ǮBlackǯ becomes equated with Ǯprimitiveǯ, Ǯslaveǯ and Ǯnon-humanǯ. Through epistemic coloniality, noise is to music 
what the savage is to civilization. Accordingly, sound will be analyzed in the following 
pages along the lines of a dispositivistic enmeshing of power and knowledge that was 
already touched upon in relation to Foucault as well as Deleuze and Guattari. It is 
assumed, then, that there is no Ǯnaturalǯ aesthetic affect, but rather a series of socio-
genetic sensations such as beauty or (dis)pleasure and (de)familiarity. There are no high 
and low arts, rather, just as there is coloniality and a racializing common sense to which 
Blackness is an obvious fact, there is ǲcommon senseǳ ȋ(iggins ͷ͹Ȍ of what counts as music and what counts as noise, of what is art and what isnǯt. But while this common 
sense is easier to frame when concerned with material forms such as film, sculpture or 
painting, where the bone of contention can be literally pointed to and its presence – if 
not necessarily its quality – be acknowledged148, it seems less easy to agree on even the 
                                                        
148 Although such an acknowledgment is easier, it is in no way detached from the politics inherent to every 
acknowledgment as an act of giving social validity/ social life. Consider for instance the coloniality of art in 
the debate on where and if to draw a line between art and artifact, the former often being equated with 
the West and individual productive expressivity, and the latter with the non-west and communal (or 
tribal) reproductive representation. 
 152 
presence of music as opposed to the presence of sound or noise. Consider for instance, 
the problematic of this statement: 
 
 ǲThe main thing, in the end, is to think about what the foreclosure of music has 
wrought where music is understood not only as a mode of organization but more 
fundamentally as a phonic substance, phonic materiality irreducible to any interpretation but antithetical to any assertion of the absence of content.ǲ (Moten, ǲ)nterpolationǳ ͳͳ͹Ȍ 
 
Given the present understanding of Ǯmusicǯ as precisely nothing but a category of 
interpretation, Motenǯs identification of Ǯmusicǯ with substance or materiality is a 
process of fetishization in which a social and socio-genetic category ȋǮmusicǯ) becomes 
located outside of society, in the physical and ontological support deemed to sustain 
social existence below and beyond meaning. What does Moten do, when he transforms a structure ȋviz. Ǯmusicǯ as structure, as a mode of organization, as a category identifying 
the location of a specific set of relations of sound within an axiomatic, as well as the 
relation of this set of relations to the other relations structured by that axiomatic) into 
substance? What would be different in the phonic materiality of noise or sound compared to that of music? Moten doesnǯt tell, and the difficulties of his fallacious 
writing are increased by the evocative and sometimes self-contradictory mode he has 
chosen for his writing in what seems to be a failed attempt to formally reproduce such 
materiality, a failed attempt to mobilize both the haunting and fugitive character he 
ascribes Black performances.  
 
This chapter continues where the last one ended, with an engagement with ǲphonoptic 
black operationsǳ, in order to sound the constitution of subject and abject in Ǯmusicǯ and 
noise, the difference between the latter terms being the colonial difference. This is what Moten suggests when he writes of a ǲmateriality irreducible to any interpretation but antithetical to any assertion of the absence of contentǳ. (ere, this materiality will not be 
(mis-)named Ǯmusicǯ, but noise. This noise is defined as a perceptible presence that does 
not make sense or carry meaning within a specific axiomatic; its seemingly Ǯpureǯ 
materiality is due to its (only comparable and never total) lack in relationality. Though it 
has a symbolic presence as noise, it is not valid information, that is, it has no positive 
symbolic value in the axiomatic from which it is described as noise, but is defined first 
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and foremost through its mere presence and its disturbing qualities as well as potential 
for (a politics of) displeasure. Speaking in terms of abject Blackness, it would not be 
symbolically always-already charged and contained Ǯmusicǯ, but noise that could be the 
trace of a haunting of the axiomatic by the presence of the abject. Moten steps in this 
direction but fails to go the distance, thinking this in terms of the already criticized ǲlyricism of the surplusǳ ȋBreak 26) and ǲexcessǳ ȋBreak ͶʹȌ that he describes Ǯmusicǯ as 
bringing into discourse.  
 
Like the notion of sub-symbolicity developed in the preceding chapter, the sonic 
haunting of noise would mark the first step of a semiosis of the abject: no longer totally 
invisible, not yet fully legible and legitimate within the dispositive that constitutively 
excludes it. But, as indicated above, this approach needs to be handled with care. It is not 
the fate of noise to become music, it does not have to turn into a unit that is legible 
within discourse, but it may just as well remain noise, become Ǯmusicǯ or foster silence, 
viz. a space that is not (yet) racialized, a blank that marks an absence of constitution. 
Maybe one function of the mass production of Ǯmusicǯ is to avoid the discovery of such 
silence, a place neither spoken from nor to. But can there ever be no Ǯmusicǯ? Can there 
be silence outside coloniality? Must the semiosis of the abject not rely on an 
amplification of noise (an enforced presence of its own, a re-capture and 
deterritorialization, a de-racialization), rather than on the hope for a moment of pure 
silence, a heterotopia in which the abject would not (yet) be abject? This is one of the 
questions this chapter will have to deal with. But either way one must bear in mind that 
there also exists a sonic void different from silence in that the sonic void is the product 
of axiomatic erasure, while silence is a space of non-colonization, a place where neither 
noise nor Ǯmusicǯ sound. 
 
The present chapter reads the impact of sound technologies on the constitution of 
Blackness in terms of a politics of noise, sound and silence/s. It will offer a consideration 
of this impact in terms of amplification, before it considers its relation to silence in 
chapter II.3.3. This chapter connects the idea of amplification to Motenǯs critique of the 
very real existence of a speaking commodity that Marx ignored (see chapter I.2.a.), a 
critique that prepares for a haunting of Ǯmusicǯ by that speaking commodity, by that 
content that is irreducible to interpretation, by that displeasure, by that noise. But, as argued, it needs to translate Motenǯs ideas from his incompatible axiomatic to the one 
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used here. In order to proceed in its endeavor, it must deconstruct Motenǯs notion of a Ǯmusicǯ producing drive that turns the object into subject, his never explicit (and 
theoretically inconsistentȌ location of what is known as Ǯsoulǯ in Black performance.  
 The problem with Motenǯs book on music can be summarized as follows: Moten 
forcefully attempts to work within one specific discourse, one specific language whose 
limitations he constantly tries to bend, expand and subvert by an evocative and poetic use of language. From this result two difficulties. Firstly, Moten refuses afropessimismǯs 
notion of political ontology and social death and opts for a para-ontological distinction 
instead, the latter offering the possibility of changing the world as it is through a 
transformation of a relational Blackness, while the former insists that Blackness will 
only change when the world ends. At the crux of this choice for para-ontology is Motenǯs 
adoption, qua Judith Butler, of the Oedipal subject model (Moten, Break 2)149. Thus, 
although para-ontology permits a differentiation between Blackness and bodies being 
Black, the Oedipal selfǯs desire for socio-symbolic existence prohibits a dissociation of 
bodies being Black from their interpellation as Black. This leads to the second difficulty. 
Because within a globally significant A[WS] bodies being Black can only exist as Black beings, Motenǯs thought revolves around the re-signification of Blackness, rather than 
the refusal of Blackness altogether. It is because of this impossibility to conceive of a 
realm beyond the axiomatic of (anti-)Blackness, that he must refuse the notion of Black 
social death. Unable to posit multiple different, if enmeshed, realms of existence – one of 
Black social death, one of life in something other than Blackness – Moten needs to bend 
Blackness to have it contain both life and death at once. He does this by insisting that 
those racialized as Black are not contained in constituted Blackness and that the 
axiomatically erased surplus of Black experience over Blackness as a mode of socio-
symbolic existence is re-injected into White civil society through arts, and specifically 
improvised music. 
  
It is from this conception of a need for a resignification of Blackness that Moten writes that ǲblack [political S.W.] radicalism is ȋlikeȌ music. The broken circle demands a new 
                                                        
149 In his recent work, Moten has begun to move away from this position: „What if Blackness is the name 
that has been given to the social field and social life of an illicit desire, an alternative capacity to desire? 
Basically, that is precisely what I think Blackness is.ǳ ȋJust Friends 53f.). But as he has not yet elaborated 
on this change, nor explained its consequences for his thinking on music, I will continue my critique along 
the lines exposed in his earlier writings. 
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analytic (way of listening to music)ǳ ȋMoten, Break 24). Instead of producing Black life, 
Black radicalism and music aim at having the life already present recognized as such. Motenǯs project thus is ultimately about representation and identity, about the way 
Blackness captures bodies being Black and is re-captured by those bodies. His project, in 
other words, is one of participation not revolution. This is crucial: when Moten writes of a ǲradically exterior aurality that disrupts and resists certain formations of identity and 
interpretation by challenging the reducibility of phonic matter to verbal meaning or conventional music formǳȋBreak 6), he locates his inquiry within a symbolic realm that 
may change in detail, but is not supposed to ever end. Moten, in other words, does not 
believe in the necessity, nor in the possibility of the end of the world, the end of 
Blackness and the need for a new language, and this translates – in all of his writing – 
into an insistence on Black social life, that is, of Black life in terms of authentic Blackness.  
 For Moten, ǲBlack Musicǳ is ǲmaterialityǳ ȋBreak 205; italics in the original), that space in 
which the Black experience erased in constituted Blackness not only resides, but from 
which it haunts that Blackness and in which it grounds a different Blackness. But in spite 
of this conception of a non-melancholic and non-castrated Black self and despite his mentioning the role of „a priori interpretive racialization of human desireǯs basis in castrationǲ ȋBreak, 178), Moten never puts the validity of the Oedipal subject structure as such ȋor that structureǯs political consequences) in question. Motenǯs Black self, in 
other words, may be misplaced (or at least mis-understood) in the Oedipal model, in as 
far as it is assumed to be an object rather than a subject according to A[WS], but the model itself remains the interpretative frame guiding and determining Motenǯs analysis. 
Just like Fanon, on which he grounds large parts of his thought, Moten thus accepts a 
model of the human as huMan1/2, therewith introducing internal contradictions into his 
theorization of Blackness. Thus, like Butler, Moten believes in an inner imperative for 
the subject to integrate the symbolic. But unlike Butler, who theorizes subjection 
through the subject-to-beǯs melancholic compliance with the interpellation by the 
symbolic order, Moten implicitly (never explicitly) presents a model of improvisation 
that amounts to the assertion of that which is lost in the process of subjection. Black 
performance, in other words, produces subjects that can resist the nom-du-père and are 
not broken by lack. Accordingly, in the case of Black performance, Moten thinks the 
drive that makes the subject-to-be comply with the imperative of subjection as a ǲheroic but bounded eroticismǳ ȋBreak ͳͶȌ. While the heroism expresses Motenǯs belief in 
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subject agency, both the term bounded (which refers to the dispositive) and eroticism 
(which refers to the shared humanity of libidinal economy) qualify this agency as 
limited. The subject must and will act, even if it can only do so to a certain degree. This agency is the expression of the ǲfreedom drive that animates black performancesǳ 
(Break ͳʹȌ as a ǲmaterial productivity of black performanceǳ that Moten ultimately considers an ǲontological conditionǳ ȋBreak 18). While this ontological condition must as such be present in all subjects, one must assume that Motenǯs insistence that the 
freedom drive is specific to Black performances implies the assumption that the 
difference between authentic existence and its axiomatic representation is more 
pronounced in the case of Blackness and thus the freedom drive more intense in Black 
subjects than in others. Unlike the constitutional Blackness it resembles, this freedom 
drive is thus based on a meta-physical kernel that, in spite of the para-ontological distinction, is ultimately nothing other than Ǯsoulǯ, a force common to all humans, but 
present in bodies being Black in a degree of intensity that makes it specific to those 
bodies, socio-genetic in form even if onto-genetic in origin150. 
 Although Motenǯs partial refusal of castration should be greeted, his recourse to a quasi-
orientalist model of a Black authenticity and eroticism that does not escape coloniality 
cannot be accepted. Instead of de-constructing the fetish or totem character of Blackness 
itself, Moten taps into the colonial difference Ǯmusicǯ is charged with and reproduces it: 
 ǲBlackness – the extended movement of a specific upheaval, an ongoing 
interruption that anarranges every line – is a strain that pressures the assumption of the equivalence of personhood and subjectivity.ǳ ȋMoten, Break 1). 
 Motenǯs answer to the question ǲ(ow does noise become music?ǳ is foreclosed by his naturalization of music. ǮMusicǯ is given as self-evident, so is the production of Ǯmusicǯ by 
people racialized as Black, and thus Black performance changes Blackness just like this, 
qua definitione. Motenǯs theory of being Black ends up proposing a Black being identical 
to a hyper-intensive freedom drive that guarantees the subversion of power and its 
modes of knowing, being, making sense. Again, his writing does simply assume 
                                                        
150 One cannot help but notice the similarity to models of hyper-sexualized or hyper-violent Blackness, in 
which drives common to all of humanity are also theorized as hyper-intensive in bodies being Black to a 
degree that effectively determines the meaning of being Black. 
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subjectivity as given and merely focuses on subjectivityǯs social existence in form of 
identity and personhood. His is not a model of a White subjection based on Black 
abjection, but Blackness is one identity among others and it can change without the 
others having to change. The freedom drive, then, renders Black social death impossible, 
as the very definition of being Black insists on a socio-symbolic drive.  
 
In opposition to this, the concepts of both the racial glitch and constitutional Blackness 
do not think of a Black subject working its own way into the dispositive through its 
sheer will and individual effort. Rather, they theorize a semiosis of the abject through 
structural changes. The racial glitch is an event made possible by a structural incapacity 
to reiterate power in a specific constellation that can occur when a dispositive is not 
(yet) able to contain dynamics created through (for example technological) changes to 
its constitution, changes that potentially annul prior moments of erasure and therewith 
undermine constituted Blackness. This is a structural dynamic, not an ontological force comparable to Motenǯs drive, to his unavowed soul and, most importantly, it is not 
compatible with the Oedipal subject model. While Moten thinks of music and Blackness 
in terms of representation, the glitch and constitutional Blackness, as will be argued 
below, will think of music and sound technologies in terms of production and disruption 
of enslavism and abjection. 
 Although Motenǯs Black Optimism resides precisely in his refusal of the concepts of 
Black social death and Black abjection and his belief in a performance that can end the ǲongoing repression of the primal scene of subjection that one wants to guard against and linger inǳ ȋBreak 5), this does not amount to a t/racing of Blackness, because the Ǯtruth of raceǯ for Moten is given and set, not constitutive and subject to change. The ǲarchétraceǳȋBreak ͶͷȌ and the ǲtrace of the breakdown between the person and the thingǳ ȋBreak 213) that Moten wishes to see uncovered through Black performance are, 
for him, the traces of a shared humanity, while the t/race insists that humanity itself is a 
concept based on Black abjection. Unlike Motenǯs notion of Black performance, 
constitutional Blackness does not deny the reality of Black castration within A[WS], 
while relativizing this castration by insisting on the limited and contingent character of 
this axiomatic. Moten, in other words, thinks anti-Blackness in terms of conflict, rather 
than antagonism, and this is reflected in his focus on Black Music, rather than noise 
whose existence he also acknowledges (Break 68). 
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Noise, by disturbing the smooth surface of Ǯmusicǯ, also scratches the smooth surface of constituted discourse, but the question is: to what degree does it do so? )n all of Motenǯs 
examples (Duke Ellington & Billy Strayhorn, Max Roach and Abbey Lincoln, LeRoi Jones …Ȍ noise is always already part of Ǯmusicǯ. It emerges within a setting that already is Ǯmusicǯ and remains so after the (non-)event of (non-Ȍnoise. These ǲsonic event[s]ǳ, as mentioned above, are framed as Ǯmusicǯ and not truly events, they are ǲnoisesǳ not noise. Strayhornǯs compositions or Lincolnǯs screams in ǲTriptych: Prayer/Protest/Danceǳ or Jonesǯ ǲBlack Dada Nihilismusǳ poetry may point to a constitutive Blackness repressed 
under constituted Blackness, but they are also already coded as Ǯmusicǯ, which means 
that their potential for defamiliarization is always-already contained within the 
dispositive. They are thus not moments of constitutional Blackness that destabilize the 
listening subject and create a semiosis of the abject. The conditions of their possibility of 
production and reception have been pre-determined within the axiomatic and they 
function (at best) in the micro-differential mode of resistance proposed by Butler. This is obvious in Motenǯs repeated description/containment of Black performances as ǮBlackǯ 
(viz. in a term reproducing a racializing axiomatic) in the first place. While the present 
text would understand this Blackness as a product of a specific axiomatic, Moten uses it in a manner that Ronald Judy would describe as ǲnigga authenticityǳ. Through Judy, ) would put Motenǯs proposition that performance transforms the commodified object into a subject into question by asking: ǲCan a commodified identity be authentic?ǳ ȋʹͳͶȌ, 
that is: can that which has been commodified and been put to social death in order to 
found a society be anything other than commodified and socially dead in the modes of 
knowing and making sense of that society? Is not commodification the mark of 
authenticity of Blackness in the political ontology of that society? I would agree with Judyǯs analysis that: ǲAuthenticity is hype, a hypercommodified affect.ǳ ȋʹʹͻȌ; it does not 
exist except within a specific axiomatic whose closure it signals by reproducing its 
names, concepts and logic. It is nothing other than the insistence on the truthfulness of 
the stereotype and its apperception, and by implicitly referring to notions of authenticity 
Moten binds himself to the stereotypes and locks himself within the axiomatic that 
produces Blackness, that is, within A[WS]. Put another way: the event of the racial glitch would not be identifiable as ǮBlackǯ, but would have to happen as something that cannot 
be grasped in these dispositivistic categories in order to be a racial glitch at all. As bell hooks writes about ǲpostmodern Blacknessǳ: ǲ[c]ontemporary African-American 
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resistance struggle must be rooted in a process of decolonization that continually 
opposes re-inscribing notions of Ǯauthenticǯ Black identityǳ ȋYearning, 28). 
 
The present chapter attempts to think towards such postmodern or post-soul151 
Blackness and to theorize such a decolonization and production of constitutional 
Blackness through a consideration of the event of noise as music and speech, rather than 
its presence as or within Ǯmusicǯ. The focus of analysis here is not on learning or 
transforming an existing axiomatic, but, as mentioned, on the new language Fanon wrote 
of. Transposed to the present enquiry, one question would thus be, if sound technologies 
as such do not only replicate such a containment of noise, but even enhance the control 
over sound and its modes of subjection by reducing the possibility of the event of noise 
to zero because, as Jacques Attali argues (163), the lag between performance/recording 
and reception introduced by phonography permits more censorship of sound? Does the 
time lag between sounding and listening that is produced by phonography permit the 
erasure of potential moments of racial lag? Certainly so, but in this it is no different from 
the cinematographic apparatus. As was mentioned in the previous chapter, although the 
present project focuses on the potential of technology to produce racial glitches and to 
advance constitutional Blackness and the semiosis of the abject, this does in no way 
imply that technology as such is necessarily empowering. It will suffice, then, to finish the consideration of Attaliǯs argument by reiterating that technology is not an 
independent actor with definite effects. It is an additional vector, whose impact is 
considered in the potential to alter the constitution of anti-Blackness with a focus on 
potential openings towards a semiosis of the abject and the creation of post- or even 
unBlackness.   
 
II.3.b. Noisy Subjects 
 
Chapter II.2. has located a potential sub-symbolicity in the cinematic apparatus that can 
amount to a technologically created moment of a semiosis of the abject. This sub-
symbolicity was defined as a clearly delineated presence impossible to integrate into the 
dominant symbolic register, yet present as haunting. The notion of noise bears 
resemblance to this concept of sub-symbolicity – clearly in, yet not of a specific realm; 
                                                        
151 The notion of ‚post-soulǯ will be considered in more detail below. It will be understood as identical to hookǯs proposition of postmodern Blackness. 
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easy to mobilize for a politics of displeasure – and information theory has offered a 
definition of noise as a signal or bit of information illegible and thus excessive and 
disturbing within one system or axiomatic, yet possibly rich in meaning within another 
system or axiomatic (Attali 49). This approach delineates noise as a problem of context 
or axiomatic compatibility; it avoids more classical aesthetic categories of beauty and 
truth that tend to organize thinking about noise and music around claims of 
universal/trans-axiomatic legibility. This difference between information and aesthetics 
is the difference between the approach this chapter has taken to sound and 
phonography, and the approach chosen by Moten and Attali in their writing. Especially in Motenǯs writing, improvisation is nothing else than the aesthetic event created by the 
emergence of truth through authenticity into a system of mis(re)presentation. It is 
because of its origin in the ontological ȋthat underpins Motenǯs writing in spite of his 
reference to the para-ontological distinction) that it can be theorized in terms of drives 
and desire. As has been pointed out though, this system of drives and desires maintains 
Black abjection in that it gives a truth-value and permanence to the subject model 
rooted in A[WS]. The concept of noise referred to here is the complete opposite of such 
an understanding. As Sean Higgins writes: 
 ǲWhen noise successfully drives an act of thought it is the intrusion of the outside 
into a system, forcing that system to break down and rebuild in an attempt to 
maintain stasis. This interference is a motor of creation – the transmission of 
noise stimulates the system to develop, to become different in spite of attempts to stay the same […] Noise is an essentially evasive limit concept … ǳ152 (54; italics in 
the original) 
 
What is this noise? How does it come to be? What is the role of technological change in 
shaping the answers to these questions, and how does noise relate to the constitution of 
Blackness? Both Higgins (65.f.) and Alexander Weheliye (as will be shown below) argue 
that phonography increases the possibility of noise to appear and to proliferate. These 
are two important points. First, noise can appear on its own; it is often produced as a 
side effect in phonography, that is, as an effect of technology as such, independent of 
                                                        
152 Although Sean (iggins offers an interesting projection of noise into Deleuzeǯs writing, he sometimes describes noise as ǲthe purely sensoryǳȋͷͷȌ, a concept inconsistent with my reading of Deleuzeǯs work with Guattari, in which no pure perception and thus nothing ǲpurely sensoryǳ can exist. 
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human volition. This is noise as glitch. Second, noise may, nevertheless, be proliferated, 
thus shifting the role of phonography from re-production/ representation of Ǯmusicǯ to 
the production of sound. This is the noise of constitutional Blackness. 
 
The shift from representation to production parallels Deleuze and Guattariǯs critique of 
the Oedipal subject model, and the argument for noise made here reiterates this in its critique of Ǯmusicǯ as representation (as in Moten and Attali) and its proposition to think 
of noise as breaking up dispositivistic subject/abject constructions. What prevents the 
sub-symbolicity of noise to be as politically powerful as that produced through 
cinematic technologies, is its comparably negligible potential to splice open the symbolic 
on different levels simultaneously and thus force itself onto the subject in the form of 
cognitive dissonance between levels. Noise cannot present a body and a discourse at 
odds in the same manner a film like Suture can. But does this reduced potential for 
dissonances imply that noise may easily be discarded and ignored and thus has only a marginal potential to create a semiosis of the abject? Or is it possible to ǲȋmisȌus[e] 
technology to make noise unavoidable to the listener … ǳ ȋ(iggins ͷͷȌ? )n order to 
develop an understanding of the potential of noise, it is necessary to begin by 
delineating a sonic subject model different from that of Moten and Attali. 
 Significantly, referring to Deleuze and Guattariǯs work in the Capitalisme et 
Schizophrénie books hits a dead end at this point. On the one hand, the analysis of the 
role of phonography in the constitution of Blackness relies on the theory of subjection 
and abjection developed mostly in section I. and heavily influenced by D&G. On the other 
hand, D&G themselves think of music only in terms of Ǯmusicǯ and their theorizing of 
rhythm and melody is orientalist, at best. Also, in spite of recognizing (in one footnote 
and one sub clause) that electronic music (viz. music relying on machine technologies 
for its production) does possess a radical potential that can undo faciality and its 
totalizing forces by proposing ensembles defined by the multitude of its individual and 
non over-determined constituent parts (Mille ͵͹ͳ+͵͹ͻȌ, D&Gǯs elaborations on music 
tend to focus on classical music exclusively and do consider noise only en passant to 
deny it all subversive potential (Mille 424). Significantly, though, these elaborations 
 162 
include Edgar Varèse, a border case between classic and electronic music153. D&G point out the following about Varèseǯs music: 
 ǲExemplaire serait la démarche de Varèse, à lǯaube de cet âge [de la Machine]: une 
machine musicale de consistance, une machine à sons (non pas à reproduire les 
sons), qui molécularise et atomise, ionise la matière sonore […] Assemblant les 
modules, les éléments de source et de traitement, les oscillateurs, générateurs et 
transformateurs, aménageant les micro-intervalles, il rend audible le processus 
sonore lui-même, la production de ce processus, et nous met en relation avec dǯautres éléments encore qui dépassent la matière sonore.ǳ ȋMille 423; italics in 
the original)154 
 
The key point is the process of sound production as opposed to sound re-production, not 
sonic materiality as opposed to composition (as Moten would have it). Focusing on 
production instead of reproduction and representation, there is no authenticity here, 
only originality. But this originality is still contextualized in terms of an implicitly pre-
supposed knowledge of what exactly would be legible and legitimate as Ǯmusicǯ, while 
the present chapter proposes that this pre-knowledge (or common sense) is exactly that 
mark of power that one needs to think beyond. Any understanding of Ǯmusicǯ is exactly 
what must be debilitated in the listeners encounter with noise (which is noise not in 
itself but in the context of a specific listening only), just as subjectivity must be debilitated in the individualǯs encounter with the abject. One then needs to make some 
noise here, to make the shift from material to process productive, in order to advance in 
the analysis from the consideration of Black Music to the consideration of the impact of 
music technology on the constitution of sound and Blackness.  
 
                                                        
153 For a reading of popular electronic music through Deleuzo-Guattarian concepts see Drew Hemment. 
Although Hemment considers the role of technological change (and the importance of the phonograph 
specifically) for a Deleuzo-Guattarian understanding of music, he focuses on its impact on sound as such, 
not its socio-political or cultural implications. Thus, he analyzes how these technologies have enabled a move of focus from musical construction to musical materiality or ǲsurfaceǳ in the course of the ʹͲth 
century, for example through the newly created possibility to manipulate recorded sound in the process of 
its reproduction ad therewith transform reproduction into production, copy into original. 
154 „Varèseǯs method would be exemplary, at the dawn of that [Machine] [A]ge: a musical consistency 
machine, a sound machine […] Assembling modules, source elements and elements of treatment, 
oscillators, generators and transformers, setting up micro-intervals, he makes audible the sonic process 
itself, the production of the process, and puts us in relation with even more other elements that go beyond sonic matter.ǳ (S.W.) 
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As mentioned, Alexander Weheliye locates in phonography a potential to impact subject 
constitution and the constitution of Blackness. He argues that sound technologies permit thinking a ǲsonic afro-modernityǳ that is not a ǲcountermodernityǳ that would run 
parallel and in opposition to Western modernity, but would consist in ǲtechnocultural practices that are indicative of and shape modernity as suchǳ ȋPhonographies 207). 
Besides phonography in general, Weheliye mentions specific sound technologies such as 
the Walkman as an example of such technocultural practices. Phonography, he argues, 
relates to noise in ways that impact the constitution of Blackness. It undermines the 
formation of race by delinking race from bodies and therewith delinking Ǯmusicǯ from 
what this chapter called the black holes (viz. its containment within the categories of ǮBlackǯ and Ǯmusicǯ) of its origin, while at the same time permitting subversive practices 
of racial-(counter)formation.  
 Most of Weheliyeǯs argument focuses on the phonograph and its potential to bring noise 
into discourse. Emphasizing that the phonograph is not only reproduction, but also 
production of sounds, he notes, firstly, that in the process of reproduction, sound can be 
transformed, for example by mixing or scratching or through other sonic distortions 
made possible by technology (Phonographies ͹͵ff.Ȍ. Secondly, he notes how ǲthe phonographǯs perception of sound differs manifestly from the human earǳ 
(Phonographies 35). This difference is not due to the perceptual faculties as such, but to 
the fact that categories such as sound, noise, music and silence mark social 
differentiations within the field of sound in general. As such, they impact a human 
listening socially formed to ignore certain sounds, but are, Weheliye argues, per se not 
factors in technological listening, where every sound is recorded. While this argument 
marks the fundamental difference between recorded and written music (the latter, 
obviously, does not record noise), it ignores how human listening and technological 
listening shape each other. It romanticizes technology at the cost of ignoring pre- and 
post-production processes, as well as the possibility to program technology to ignore 
specific sorts of sounds or the adaption of listening to its technological conditioning (so 
that, for example, the noises of a used cassette are simply ignored). Nevertheless, 
Weheliye argues that the phonograph promotes the propagation of sounds or noise(s) 
that were either recorded inadvertently or unwillingly, or that may be produced through 
technical defects in the reproduction apparatus. Thus, Weheliye argues that 
phonography frees sounds from the authority of the musician and the black hole of 
 164 
Ǯmusicǯ, because the Ǯmusicǯ that is recorded can become something other than that in 
the process of its reproduction and technologically mediated reception. By voluntary or 
accidental manipulation of the source material, the reproduction is not simply a copy but produces a sonic surplus over the ǲoriginalǳ. 
 
The problem with this approach is, firstly, that it takes the notion of noise all too literally 
as noises in the sense of accidental rather than Ǯillegitimateǯ sound, confusing the 
distinction between a purely technical effect and a consciously repressed sonic presence 
(although, of course, the line of separation between these categories and their 
interaction is not always clear cut). The second problem is that, because of this, its 
theorization of the social potential of noise unknowingly locates this potential not so 
much in the emerging sounds enabled by new sonic technologies as in the socio-
symbolic authority of the technological apparatus as such, therewith replacing one black hole containing noiseǯs political potential ȋthe authority of the musicianȌ with another. 
Thus, Weheliyeǯs argument assumes that the noise (re)produced by the phonograph is 
not immediately dismissed as such by the listener, seems to hark back to a supposed 
suspension of disbelief with which the listener faces the phonograph. The implicit 
assumption here is that anything that is (re)produced by technology partakes in a 
specific mode of socio-symbolic existence through that fact of technological 
reproduction. As John Mowitt suggests, what Walter Benjamin theorized as the aura of a 
thing or performance is reconstituted in the age of electronic (as opposed to 
mechanical) reproducibility155 (Mowitt 218), where a difference between original and 
copy is in many cases no longer pertinent (there is no difference between an Ǯoriginalǯ 
piece of software and its copies, between an Ǯoriginalǯ electronic sound, and its 
reproduction). Like Weheliye, Mowitt insists on the productive qualities of sound technologies, which take over the ǲauraǳ that Walter Benjamin describes as the ǲAutorität der Sacheǳ156 (13) and assert themselves through that authority. There is, then, a double and closely entwined authority that complicates Weheliyeǯs argument: 
first, the authority of technological originality, and secondly, the authority of an 
apparatus equated with civilization and thus Whiteness. The paradoxical effect of that 
double authority when applied to Black Music – assuming that there is no other racial 
                                                        
155 This play on the title of Walter Benjaminǯs essay ǲThe Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproductionǳ is only possible because of the mistranslation of the original title that speaks of ǲtechnical/technologicalǳ reproduction. 
156 „Authority of the thingǲ (S.W.) 
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inscription, for example through the sleeve design or the possible categorization as Ǯrace musicǯ or under any other genre pre-identified with Blackness in record stores or on 
radio programming, etc.157– would be a trans-coding of the social death of the Black 
performer into the socio-symbolic authority of a recording that is coded as White 
because of being technology-based. In other words, Weheliye can only theorize sound 
techniques and technologies, such as the scratch, as emancipative Black sonic practices, 
because he choses to consider technology as a not-(yet)-racialized realm, ignoring how 
(as pointed out in chapter II.1.) within A[WS] technology is coded as White, and 
Blackness is equaled to techno-illiteracy. One central problematic in considering Black 
technological practices thus is the possible identification of such practices as Black, as 
opposed to their continued erasure under the parameters of constituted Blackness. As 
will be elaborated below, rather than theorizing technology as a not-(yet)-racialized 
space, one will need to consider technology in terms of its potential for de-racialization. 
 
This is an important point, considering that Weheliye continues Phonographies by 
arguing that the phonograph transforms Blackness because it frees Black Music from the 
stigma it becomes attached to when produced live: the stigma of Blackness inscribed 
onto Black bodies and, therewith (what was in Moten) the black hole of Blackness. For 
Weheliye, racialization is firmly optical, and the phonographic emancipatory potential lies in technologyǯs capacity to ȋreȌproduce the sonic without the visual. The social 
constitution of the sensible is subverted by ǲthe very Ǯrealǯ ȋreȌformulation of the sound/source relationship occasioned by the phonographǳ ȋWeheliye, Phonographies 
35). Sound technologies are theorized by Weheliye as being able to shield Black Music 
from social death by subtracting it from the visual field of Blackness that would mark it 
as a specific form of Blackness. Writing about the phonograph, Weheliye notes that ǲBlackness necessitated redefinition in relation to this new technology; as it could now 
be imagined phonographically, and had therefore to be recast in order to fit into the already existing templates for racial formationǳ ȋPhonographies 40). Although this 
argument is compelling in as far as it proposes a technologically produced glitch in the 
constitution of Blackness, its insistence on the persistence of Blackness in the process of 
                                                        
157 The comparatively negligible absence of such possibilities of visual colonization of sound is one of the 
main differences between the glitch produced by the telephone and the potential glitch produced by the 
phonograph, although it is not necessarily completely absent in telephony. Consider, for instance, how the display of the callerǯs telephone number might indicate her or his location in a racially coded 
neighborhood. 
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technological (re)production of sound is problematic. One must wonder what a sonic 
Blackness that is de-stigmatized but still Black would be in the first place? How would 
the phonograph both de-link and re-link sound from and to Blackness at the same time? 
How would such a de-re-linking transform Blackness from abject to subject? Why would Blackness ǲnecessitate redefinitionǳ, viz. be reformulated in order to continue fitting into 
the dominant discourse, instead of being mobilized to end the world altogether? Given Weheliyeǯs analysis of this model in Ralph Ellisonǯs description of Louis Armstrongǯs 
music in his Invisible Man, that is through Black Music rather than a technologically 
enabled post- or unBlack music, it becomes clear that Weheliyeǯs approach to sound 
remains attached to the black holes his theorizing of technology would enable him to 
avoid. Yet, these black holes change in character. 
 
In his portrayal of the phonographǯs potential for subversive racial-(counter)formations, 
Weheliye does not consider the representation of an authentic Blackness so much as the production of a Ǯnewǯ Blackness and he emphasizes Blacknessǯ performative character in 
terms of differential effects between sound and noise, rather than the expression of Ǯsoulǯ through Ǯmusicǯ. The phonograph, Weheliye suggests, does not amplify a pre-
existing notion of what Black authenticity is, but plays a central role in the constitution 
and distribution of what will be/come Blackness. The phonograph produces originality 
not authenticity, which Weheliye explicitly refuses, just as he refuses – what would have been Attaliǯs – criticism of the phonograph as erasing such authenticity (Phonographies 
20). This enables him to elaborate his shift of theoretical focus from musical techniques, 
such as improvisation, or musical aspects, such as rhythm, to the impact of sound 
technologies on such techniques and on the constitution of Blackness. Thus, he argues: ǲSound recording and reproduction technologies have afforded black cultural producers 
and consumers different means of staging time, space, and community in relation to 
their shifting subjectivity in the modern worldǳ ȋPhonographies 20). 
 
While time, space and community are impacted by the enhanced potential to distribute 
sound, the central importance of phonography for the constitution of Blackness resides 
in its potential to change both the modes of (re)producing and listening to sound and 
thus challenge what counts as legible and legitimate sound/speech. But although 
Weheliye mentions mixing and scratching as technology based techniques of sound 
(re)production, he neither can (nor tries to) explain how the sound produced in such a 
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manner is identified as Black, nor why it should be or why such sound would be legible 
as Ǯmusicǯ, rather than being qualified as exactly the noise it mobilizes? There is a slight 
modification of his argument here, a back-pedaling into the mainstream of soul-based 
Black Music theory, in as far as the be/coming of Blackness enabled through sound 
technologies ultimately relies on a pre-constituted Blackness it de-constructs158. Thus, 
Weheliye pits a Black experience and a Black stereotype against each other, as Moten 
does, but he does not reclaim a correction of the representation of Blackness to reflect 
Black authenticity more accurately, but insists on the formation of a completely different 
Blackness originating in sonic technology, yet based on the Blackness of racialized 
bodies. Phonographic de-stigmatization, for him, is only partial, yet substantial. )tǯs most 
important potential lies in the move away from the reproductive consumption of hyper-commodified authentic Blackness to the production of Ǯnewǯ Blackness. )n Weheliyeǯs 
argument, sound technologies produce a shift away from the Blackness of the White 
gaze of modernity (and A[WS]) to the Blackness of sonic afro-modernity, away from a ǲwhite projection of Blacknessǳ to a ǲblack image of Blacknessǳ ȋPhonographies 40). But 
how does this shift resonate and impose itself within White civil society?  
 )n implicit opposition to Moten and Attaliǯs notion of improvisation and in explicit 
opposition to Friedrich Kittler, Weheliye emphasizes that the phonograph does not produce ǲacoustic events as suchǳ ȋKittler, quoted in Phonographies 33). Sound 
technologies will not suddenly change the constitution of Blackness and the axiomatic 
that determines it by letting the symbolic explode through a sudden infusion of the real 
or by destabilizing the discourse of music by introducing individual expressivity. There 
is neither improvisation-as-subversion, nor noochoc here, even though Weheliyeǯs emphasis on the unfiltered listening of technology as well as on the phonographǯs raw ǲsonic materialityǳȋPhonographies ͵͸Ȍ might suggest this. Rather, in Weheliyeǯs 
argument, moments of axiomatically defined Blackness have to always-already be and 
remain present in sonic (re)production in order to enable a technological 
transformation of Blackness. It seems, then, that one could rephrase Weheliyeǯs 
argument as follows: through the symbolic authority of technology, noise is slowly 
trans-coded into sound in a process that parallels a slow becoming subject of the abject. 
This is a micro-differential shift remaining within the confines of A[WS]. The reason why 
                                                        
158 ǲSurely, Phonographies concerns itself with black culture given that all the Ǯprimaryǯ artifacts discussed were authored by subjects rumored to be of African Origin … ǲ (Phonographies 206). 
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it can impact the constitution of Blackness specifically is that according to Weheliye, 
Blackness is an essentially visual concept that relies on the optic for its inscription onto 
the Black body. Freed from the chains of the visual, Blackness is more agile to shift from 
haunting presence to tangible existence in the sonic realm. Just as the cinematic setting 
facilitates the contact between the abject and the subject, so the sonic, according to 
Weheliye, reduces the threat incorporated by the abject. Just as in the cinematic setting, 
the question remains, however, how this potential sonic subjectivity of the abject affects 
the White civil subject, how it translates back into social subjectivity instead of social 
death? It is as if we must assume a White negrophilia implicitly suggested in Weheliyeǯs 
argument, a desire for Blackness which sound would permit the White subject to satisfy, 
changing this subject in the process of consumption. Should one not, against these 
metaphysics of desire, assume a technologically increased potential for a politics of 
displeasure, an almost literally amplified threat posed by noise to the axiomatic that 
defines it as noise? 
 
Before this question can be answered, it is necessary to consider Weheliyeǯs only 
conceptual specification of this noise. In a chapter on mobile devices for sound reproduction, he opposes ǲnoiseǳ to ǲmusicǳ, defining the former as sounds imposed 
upon people by others, while suggesting that devices such as the Walkman permit building a private space through playing ǲmusicǳ that will protect one from the intrusion 
of noise (Phonographies 107). Crucially, Weheliye here insists that the respective definitions of noise and ǲmusicǳ ǲboth are heavily reliant on the perspective of the sonic 
consumer vis-à-vis the borders between Ǯmusicǯ and Ǯnoiseǯǳ ȋidem). This emphasis on 
the consumer runs counter to his prior argument that phonography changes the relation 
between noise and music on the producing side. If it is mainly upon the consumer and his ǲcommon senseǳ to decide what counts as noise and what as music, what socio-
political force do sound and phonography have? The answers to these questions are significantly tied to Weheliyeǯs negative coding of noise. One is reminded that, as a 
consequence of his necessary reliance on pre-existent categories of Blackness and Ǯmusicǯ – which are merely modified, leaving the logic that produced them as black holes 
largely intact – his understanding of technologyǯs mobilization of noise is geared 
towards an enlargement of the field of Ǯmusicǯ, and not towards an enquiry into the 
subjection re-coded and abjected as, erased and hidden under and in noise that this 
chapter aims to propose. Just like Moten, whom he quotes, Weheliye equates music with 
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sound (Phonographies 69) and locates subjectivity in the field of Ǯmusicǯ, rather than 
noise. For Weheliye, new subjectivities do not arise from the re-coding of noise as Ǯmusicǯ and fracturing of modes of knowing and being this entails, but from the 
transformation noise occasions in that which is and is known already. This is the 
becoming noise of music in a modality similar to the fetishistic becoming minor. Weheliye criticizes Stuart (allǯs distinction between identity and subject, insisting that the constitution of Blackness is best summarized in the formula ǲ) am ) beǳ, that is, as a 
fusion of subjectivity and identity in which oneǯs self-experience gives rise to the articulation of oneǯs social relationality, in which ones axiomatic Blackness is the basis for oneǯs production of a new Blackness ȋPhonographies ͸ͷȌ. The phonographǯs impact on the constitution of Blackness, to repeat Weheliyeǯs argument, lies precisely, firstly, in 
its delinking of Blackness and the visual formation of race, and, secondly, in its capacity 
to give Black people the means to fuse identity and subject formation through the 
originality of sound technology. Like Moten, Weheliye suggests that music subverts stereotypical identity formations, enhancing a ǲblack cultural productionǳ 
(Phonographies 71) that would recapture identification as self-identification. But unlike Moten, Weheliyeǯs model is not grounded in the ontologico-political universalism of 
Lacanianism, but links itself explicitly to schizo-analysis. It insists, with Edouard Glissant, on the ǲopacityǳ and the becoming of the subject, rather than its attaining 
transparency and being in improvisation (Phonographies 68f.). As opposed to Moten, Weheliyeǯs emphasis on Black Music as permitting a grounding of identity in subjectivity 
does not mean that that subjectivity can be completely known or must be re-presented 
in identity. The reason why Blackness cannot be equated with symbolic castration, then, 
is, that castration itself is merely one among many models of subjection, not, as Moten 
claims, because of Black people having a freedom drive that ends castration through an 
erotics of improvisation. For Weheliye, in other words, music is not the recovery of a 
surplus erased in subjection, but it is a place of producing a surplus that does not exist 
outside of or prior to its performance and the technologies that enable them. Both 
castration and authenticity are not possible, because there is no Ǯrealǯ Blackness apart 
from its axiomatic formation and counter-formation. This means that one must ignore 
ontological politics and focus on the political ontology of structure and performance 
exclusively, while at the same time assessing the quasi-ontological character of axiomatic Blackness within this political ontology. Technologyǯs potential for 
constitutional Blackness lies exactly in disrupting racializing structures and therewith 
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creating the possibility of performance and the space for Ǯnewǯ Blackness. )t is 
constitutional because it aims to produce a different constituted Blackness and 
therewith affect the constitution of Blackness, it is Black because it relies on the t/race 
and is grounded on the quasi-ontology of constitutive Blackness. 
 
In a critical move away from models that assume the know-ability of the subject, Weheliye distances himself from ǲpsychoanalytic theorizations of sound and subjectivity 
[that] suggest that all listening experience hark back to this instant in which the child 
cannot distinguish between itself and itǯs motherǯs voiceǳ ȋPhonographies 59). These 
models and the pre-Oedipal object relations theory they sustain, move to a moment 
prior to castration without putting its theoretical legitimacy in doubt. They focus on a 
not yet erased surplus in exactly the same manner Moten does. According to this 
perspective, the para-ontological de-linking of Black experience and Blackness produced 
in music would either have to remain outside the symbolic, or ultimately be recaptured 
at its moment of entry into the symbolic. The dispositive that commands legibility and 
legitimacy, here, can never change, though it is possible to reside in an outside that is 
defined not as another realm of legibility and legitimacy (not as another dispositive), but 
as mere affect, as mere materiality free of any form of axiomatic. Weheliyeǯs particular target for critique here is Kaja Silvermanǯs concept of the acoustic mirror and he insists 
that sound must not be thought in terms of unproductive pre-symbolic being, but be 
understood as a continuously productive force never hedged in by the symbolic or a 
dispositive. But what, then, is it, that Weheliye thinks sound performs in terms of 
subjectivity, given his refusal to let go of such staunchly dispositivistic terms as Ǯmusicǯ 
(as opposed to noise) and ǮBlackǯ? Why would sound be more than dispositivistic discourse? Weheliyeǯs frequent quoting of Deleuze and Guattari suggests an 
understanding of the subject similar to that expounded in the critique of suture in 
chapter II.2. Although the Oedipal model does exist, it is not absolute, and it may be 
disturbed or even disrupted through technologically enabled symbolic processes. As 
was the case in the critique of Silverman and visual suture in chapter II.2., Weheliye 
points out that the idea of the acoustic mirror necessarily implies that whatever de-
subjection sound may induce is ultimately recaptured and reintegrated into the Oedipal 
structure (63). It is here that the significance of sound technologies for the constitution of Blackness in Weheliyeǯs argument, as well as the difference between him and Moten is 
most visible. As mentioned, Weheliye does not refer to a liberatory drive. The de-
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subjectifying potential of Ǯmusicǯ is not located in the subject and the music itself as 
much as it is a product of its mechanical reproduction in so far as this reproduction enables ǲopennessǳ towards engaging with Blackness, or what, in the language 
developed so far, would have to be called an openness of the subject towards the abject:  
 ǲOver the course of the twentieth century this openness has been boosted by 
sound technologies such as the phonograph, which, by disturbing any seemingly 
predetermined symbiosis between the aural and the visual, have allowed for a 
multiplication of practices and contexts for both the production and reception of black musical cultures.ǳ ȋPhonographies 70)  
 
Weheliye, in other words, insists that the implementation of the Oedipal model of 
subjectivity is visual and dispositivistic at its core. Against this, he explicitly theorizes a 
phonographic potential along the lines of W.E.B. Du Boisǯ concept of double 
consciousness. While the Black person may be abject in terms of constituted Blackness ȋby the ǲtapeǳ of White society), that constituted Blackness is rooted in the visual. 
Phonography, on the other hand, permits an emergence into the symbolic of erased 
Blackness and an encounter of the White civil subject with that which has been/is 
erased under constituted Blackness. It therewith produces a moment of constitutional Blackness that Weheliyeǯs writing somehow presages when he writes of ǲthe surplus gift 
inherent in Afro-Diasporic double consciousnessǳ ȋPhonographies 36). Instead of 
emphasizing, as Moten does, a surplus existence that is always already there and is 
introduced into the symbolic as excess through performance, Weheliye points out a ǲsurplus giftǳ, that is, a potential to produce surplus. But while Weheliye describes a 
symbolic that is not unitary, but multiple and fractured (among other things) along the 
different lines of sensual perception, he clings to the idea that all of these dimensions are 
based on the same logic of being and knowing. While improvisation expresses itself 
within a singular symbolic, which it seeks to fix, sound technologies emphasize the 
multiplicity of the symbolic at those points where one symbolic register is no longer 
erased under another, while insisting that these points are not in an antagonistic 
relationship of impossible reconciliation, but, rather, in a conflict that technology helps 
solve. Thus, Weheliye writes: 
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ǲThe phonograph disturbed this traffic between the sonic and visual by denying 
the audience, at least initially, any easy way to determine the performerǯs racial 
identity. At stake was clearly discerning a white projection of Blackness from a black image of Blackness … )t further suggests, that Blackness necessitated 
redefinition in relation to this new technology, as it could now be imagined 
phonographically, and had to therefore be recast in order to fit into the already existing templates for racial formation.ǳȋPhonographies 40) 
 
This is the essential difference between thinking through noise or thinking noises as the 
fetish that helps music become minor: noise is not based on the same logic as Ǯmusicǯ 
and its appearance in the symbolic explodes the concept of Ǯmusicǯ. Contrary to this, Weheliyeǯs model is one of ǲrecastingǳ and of coming to terms. Weheliyeǯs work, thus, by 
refusing to let go of Blackness, remains contained within the axiomatic that defines it. 
From this perspective, both the White and the Black image of Blackness within White 
civil society are based on the same constitutive Blackness, though the constituted 
Blacknesses they produce differ. It is also for this reason that Weheliyeǯs model is not 
one of glitch. Sound technology, in his argument, mobilizes instances that are not sub-
symbolic, but can still be aptly articulated within the dominant axiomatic.  
 
In order to facilitate the conceptual move from Ǯmusicǯ to noise, a short look at Jacques Rancièreǯs notion of the ǲpartitions of the sensibleǳ will be of help. (e states:  
 ǲPolitical subjectivity thus refers to an enunciative and demonstrative capacity to 
reconfigure the relation between the visible and the sayable, the relation between words and bodies: namely, what ) refer to as the Ǯpartition of the sensibleǯǳ. 
(Panagia & Rancière, 115) 
 
 By this partition, as Davide Panagia points out, Rancière,  
 ǲ … does not simply mean that an aesthetic attunement to the world of politics 
shows us that there are different perspectives or points of views that must be recognized. On the contrary, Rancièreǯs phrase suggests that our modes of 
perceiving the world, of sensing the presences of others, are parsed; that as 
subjects of perception, human beings are partial creatures variously divided. A 
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partition of the sensible thus refers to perceptual forms of knowledge that parse 
what is and is not sensible, what counts as making (i.e. fabricating) sense and what is available to be sensed.ǳ ȋPanagia ͸Ȍ 
 The crux here is on the ǲrelation between the visible and the sayableǳ, and the possibility of putting it into analogy with Weheliyeǯs emphasis on the split between the optic and 
the sonic exploited by technology. Although Ǯmusicǯ seems to describe more than just what can be said, this is incorrect in Weheliyeǯs case precisely because he reduces music to ȋcanonicȌ Ǯmusicǯ by thinking it in terms of conflict, while excluding the antagonistic 
potential of noise from his thinking of the impact of sound technologies on the constitution of Blackness. At the same time, ǲthe relation between words and bodiesǳ 
points to the complicated inscription of race and power into and onto bodies and flesh, 
the complication of the relation between discourses and their inscription into bodies 
that has been theorized as the racial glitch. 
 
Thus, although both the racial glitch and the constitutional Blackness of Weheliyeǯs ǲsurplus giftǳ ǲstep in the direction of creating hitherto nonexisting forms of subjectivityǳ ȋPhonographies 61), they do so in fundamentally different ways, with 
different goals and with different potential. The constitutional Blackness of the ǲsurplus giftǳ is located in subject agency and the tension between different kinds of symbolically 
valid Blacknesses: the White and the Black versions of constituted Blackness, which, due 
to the power struggle their differences imply, is always also a tension between 
constitutive and constituted Blackness. The racial glitch, on the other hand, is the 
product of the disintegration of only one single form of symbolically valid Blackness and 
describes a productive dynamic that emerges at those points where the dominant 
axiomatic falters to racialize, those points where it is no longer/not yet able to exert its 
power. Because of these differences between the glitch and constitutional Blackness, it is hard to follow Weheliyeǯs enthusiasm for the productive power of Black images of 
Blackness, not only because it sustains the notion of Blackness as such (which means, 
that a re-constituted Blackness will still be Black, which it can only be if the axiom that 
makes it so persists), but most of all because it thinks this Blackness and its music as 
being less infused with the gaze or other modes of dispositivism. There is no sub-symbolicity here, no consideration of musical ǲcommon senseǳ and stereotyping. Weheliyeǯs assumed surplus springs from his vision of a Black (image of) Blackness that 
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may not be authentic in an ontological sense, but is very much so in a performative 
sense. Although this is not the same kind of soul Moten relies on to literally drive his 
argument, it is still soul in terms of cultural politics, in as far as it does admit the possible 
non-existence of Blackness in ontological terms, while, due to its emphasis on opacity, 
still thinking and acting as if it were based in eternal truth nevertheless. But how would 
even Black Blackness within A[WS] not be abject? What Ǯmusicǯ, indeed, would drive 
non-abject phonographic Blackness? Must one not, rather, leave behind the black holes of Ǯmusicǯ and Blackness? 
 
This is precisely the point Kodwo Eshun has made in the lines quoted at the beginning of 
this chapter (that one must think of sound that is neither ǲblackǳ nor ǲmusicǳ). It 
suggests moving the analysis of the impact of sound technology on the constitution of 
Blackness away from Ǯmusicǯ to noise, that is, away from an analysis bound to given 
social categories and merely engaged with micro-differential transformations, towards the creation of something completely new and different. This Ǯnewǯ Ǯthingǯ would not 
have to immediately replace Blackness, but begin by providing a model of 
technologically originated post-Blackness, or – as will be theorized in chapter II.4. – 
Cyborg Blackness. In other words: rather than theorizing technology as connecting the 
subject to a realm outside the dispositive it originated in, or to a different variation 
proposed by the same dispositive, one needs to understand technologyǯs potential to create itǯs own way of making sense and maybe even itǯs own dispositive and modes of 
subjection. Instead of thinking in terms of soul and or stereotyping vs. self-identification, 
one must begin to understand the ǲpost-soul futuramaǳ ȋAlbiezȌ technology offers. Noise 
must not be understood as an absolute category. Rather, referring to it as noise indicates 
its subversive political valence in relation to a specific axiomatic. In this sense, 
producing, recording, distributing noise are modes of counter-becoming-subject in that 
they sound against the neatness and therewith the naturalization and reification of Ǯtheǯ 
subject through a politics of displeasure. But how could such noise promote 
constitutional Blackness? In how far is it already beyond Black in producing an 
unBlackness aimed at ending the world that racializes Blackness? When is noise a 
Fanonian new language? Is it the specific potential of sound technology to produce such 
a de-subjectifying tension between Ǯmusicǯ and noise? In order to answer these 
questions, one must move away from conceptualizing technology as offering not-(yet)-racialized spaces and propose an understanding of soundǯs de-racializing potential. A 
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consideration of Detroit Techno Music as a specific intersection of sound, technology 
and Blackness will permit doing this.  
 
II.3.c. From Detroit to the (Afro-)Future: Technology and UnBlack Blackness 
 
ǲTechno is probably the first form of contemporary black music which categorically breaks 
with the old heritage of soul music […] Techno is a post-soul sound.ǳ  
(Cosgrove 88) 
 
A short glance at the discourses from and on 1980ǯs Detroit Techno and its birth in the cityǯs African American community will demonstrate how sound technologies play a 
fundamental role in assessing the impact of technological change on the constitution of 
Blackness and help refine the concepts of the racial glitch and constitutional Blackness. This glance will not offer an analysis of technoǯs history or musical structures, but focus 
on the understanding of this music offered by writers as well as the producers themselves. As the term Ǯproducerǯ indicates, what will be sketched her is in how far 
Detroit Techno uses technology to create an art form that is productive, not 
representative, an art form that is not Ǯmusicǯ (therefore no musicians but producers), 
but connected to noise because it emanates from beyond the field of canonical Ǯmusicǯ 
both in terms of creation (by whom, with what) and philosophy. Neither is this music 
still Black in a ǲcommon senseǳ way, nor already unBlack159. This chapter will ultimately offer a perspective on technologyǯs post-human and post-racial potential. Thus, it is in 
itself not precisely a consideration of noise, but by being beyond Ǯmusicǯ it indicates 
ways of thinking of noise in relation to Blackness qua technology, of detecting a (as one 
example of the paradigmatic Fanonian new) language to come in the language that is. 
 
* 
The focus on the post-human is what differentiates techno160from hip hop, another 
major African American music genre to emerge in the 1980ǯs and relying heavily on 
sound technology. As Ben Williams points out, the main difference between techno and hip hop was not only technoǯs hybrid birth from a mix of Black funk (such as that of 
                                                        
159 The term ‚unBlackǯ will be used to designate something that is neither ‚Blackǯ nor the ‚not-Blackǯ that 
describes Whiteness. 
160 Although ǮDetroit Technoǯ refers to a specific form within the ǮTechnoǯ genre of music, the latter term 
will be used as short form for the former here.  
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George Clinton and Parliament Funkadelic) and European electronic music (such as that 
produced by the German band Kraftwerk), but the development of techno away from 
these influences towards a post-human space that starkly differed from hip hopǯs 
embrace of African American aesthetic traditions and cultural heritage: 
 ǲDespite all these influences, techno also significantly departed from African 
diasporic music traditions, which may have prevented its acceptance in centers of 
black music like New York. Where hip hop firmly inscribed its Blackness within 
machine-created grooves by recontextualizing the oral tradition and sampling 
canonical funk grooves, technoǯs more total embrace of a mechanized sound and 
aesthetic moved away from such traditional signifiers of the black body as 
gospel-derived vocal harmonies, oral narrative, and instrumental virtuosity …ǳ 
(B. Williams 163) 
 
Williams emphasizes a, 
 ǲ… tension between African American tradition and technology that seemed to produce music devoid of cultural and human reference points … ǳ ȋidem.) 
 
Thus, although hip hop culture, too, relates to Ǯnoiseǯ in terms of legibility and legitimacy 
of Black presences in a society structured by A[WS], it does so in a different manner than techno. First of all, hip hopǯs self-conscious production of ǲǯ[n]oise on the one hand and communal countermemory on the other ...ǳ ȋT. Rose ͸ͷȌ, depending on which 
perspective in the matrix of double consciousness one choses to speak from, is fundamentally different from technoǯs turning away from ȋcounterȌmemory towards a ǲcounterfutureǳ ȋEshun, ǲFurther Consideration …ǳ ʹͺͺȌ. This does not imply that 
African American techno producers chose to ignore the past or its impact on the present. 
Some African American techno artists explicitly link their explorations of technology to 
Afro-futurist engagements with the slave-past, such as Sun Raǯs vision of the 
intergalactic mothership as futurist counterpart to the slave ship. Others, like Detroit 
techno-collective Drexciya have developed an extensive African American mythology 
according to which the unborn children of the pregnant slave-women thrown overboard 
during the Middle Passage founded a technologically advanced mutant civilization below 
the surface of the sea whose members have returned back to the mainland, living 
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unrecognized among the Black population (Eshun, More brilliant 06[083]f.). According 
to this mythology, techno is the product of this mutant civilization, that is, the product of 
those determined to the core of their being by the slave past. The difference in focus 
here, is between a technological recovery of cultural heritage and a history of denied 
humanity in hip hop, and technoǯs conviction that such a humanity not only cannot be 
recovered, but that the heritage of Blackness is always-already one of post-humanity 
which the epistemological breaks produced by technological change further emphasizes. 
Thus, Ben Williams writes the following about Drexciyaǯs mythology: 
 ǲ)n this context, the mechanical metaphors we have been tracking extend beyond 
signifying post-humanity to embody a history that began with slavery; indeed 
slavery, the original unit of capitalist labor, is here considered to be the originary 
form of the post-human […] Thus the utopian myth of a music that crosses all 
national and ethnic boundaries to speak in the pure language of electronic tones 
is grounded firmly in the all too concrete history of slavery, which is conceived as 
the founding dislocation of modernity, the condition that lies at the heart of the 
global network that began with the colonial adventures of the great European powers.ǳ ȋͳ͸ͻf.Ȍ 
 
In hip hop, then, the idea of noise pushes against the limits of Ǯmusicǯ and its political 
implications, but it still remains contained in the black hole of Blackness. Techno, on the 
other hand, acknowledges its heritage, but understands it differently than hip hop does 
and seeks to avoid being constrained by it. From the standpoint of analyzing the impact 
of technological change on the constitution of Blackness, the fundamental difference 
between hip hop and techno is that hip hop is theorized in terms of Black ǲuse of electronic equipmentǳ ȋT. Rose, ͸ͶȌ, while techno focuses on the interbeing of Blackness 
and technology. 
 
From this difference, the questions of authenticity and soul re-emerge that were already 
touched upon earlier. While it is not necessary to expand the critique of authenticity 
already offered161, Dan Sickoǯs observation that ǲ[e]ven the most Ǯhard coreǯ and 
militant-sounding techno groups, like Detroitǯs Underground Resistance, have lofty … 
                                                        
161 For a critique of authenticity in hip hop, see Ronald Judyǯs ǲOn the Question of Nigga Authenticityǳ. 
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ideals at heart – scenarios where race is no longer an issueǳ ȋͳʹȌ and Sean Albiezǯ 
understanding of techno as a ǲpost-soul futuramaǳ162, offer a path to an important 
reconsideration of soul and the marking of Black bodies as understood through the 
perspective of technological change. More than just a notion of Black authenticity, the 
racialization of musical talent or of a specific musical affect, the concept of soul has been 
theorized (in chapter I.1.a.) as the perceived capacity of power to inscribe itself into, as 
opposed to just onto, the flesh. It was the axiomatically posited absence of a micro-
political soul, it was argued, that posited Black flesh outside the realm of humanity, 
exposing it to terror, cruelty and gratuitous violence, putting it in a relation of 
irresolvable antagonism with White civil society. The concept of glitch focuses on this 
relation between discourse and body, marking moments in which there is not only no inscription into, but also a disrupted inscription onto the body. What technoǯs post-soul 
futurama allows us to enquire into is the significance of the glitch for the theorization of 
micro-political soul in musical soul and what their relation tells us about the impact of 
technological change on the constitution of Blackness. 
 Albiez takes the term ǲpost-soulǳ from a larger corpus of writings163 that generally use 
the term to refer to the post-civil-rights historical period and define post-soul as an 
artistic approach striving for independence from both White and Black dominated race 
politics and leading towards a slow dissolution of the differences between Black and 
White cultural identities (Ashe 612). Emphasizing neither purely White nor purely Black 
cultural influences on the creation of techno (Albiez, 132), Albiez thus shares Bertram Asheǯs understanding that ǲthere, in the unstable, wobbly interstices of those two 
categories [of Black and White. S.W.], is where the post-soul aesthetic livesǳ ȋ͸ͳͳȌ164. But 
contrary to this common approach, the present text will not define post-soul as a 
historical period, but defines it as an epistemological break in constitution of Blackness 
and the first phase in the shift from huMan1/2 to cyborg (that section III. will elaborate 
                                                        
162 Sicko himself, as the single exception in an otherwise concordant field, considers technoǯs description as ǲǯpost-soulǯ […] only partially accurate – techno has an obvious relationship to soul and even to Motown …ǳ ȋ͹ͲȌ. Unfortunately, he does not specify this ǲobvious relationshipǳ. 
163 As Albiez himself points out, techno has previously been described as ǲpost-soulǳ by Stuart Cosgrove 
and Kodwo Eshun. He also explicitly relates his understanding of the term ǲpost-soulǳ to the work of 
Nelson George and Mark Anthony Neal (Albiez 130).  
164 In an effort to define a post-soul aestheticism, Ashe acknowledges that a mere historical definition is insufficient. Therefore, he adds what he calls ǲmy triangular post-soul matrixǳ to his approach to aesthetics. These are ǲthe cultural mulatto archetype; the execution of an exploration of Blackness; and, 
lastly, the signal allusion-disruption gestures that many of these [post-soul] texts performǳ ȋ͸ͳ͵Ȍ. 
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on) that were and continuously are brought about by technological change. Therefore, 
rather than considering existing writing on the subject in detail, the question of the 
glitched (post-)soul and the consideration of Blackness it entails will be analyzed 
through the concept of constitutional Blackness. 
 Three different kinds of Ǯsoulǯ, all connected to the relation between Blackness and Black 
people or bodies-being-Black, have been touched upon so far.  First, a ǮWhite Blacknessǯ connected to bodies-being-Black through cruelty. This 
Blackness implies the absence of a Black micro-political soul and marks the total erasure 
of constitutive Blackness under constituted Blackness, as well as the absence of 
constitutional Blackness. White Blackness is the identification of Black people with a 
White defined Blackness; it is entirely dispositivistic and based on ontological politics. 
Here, body and discourse are not separate, there is no soul, the Black person is only a 
body-being-Black, mere corporeality. 
Second, W.E.B. Du Boisǯ souls of Black folks and their double consciousness. Du Bois 
insists on the presence of a metaphysical soul in spite of the White perception of an 
absence of a micro-political soul. This idea finds its contemporary translation in Fred Motenǯs idea of a ǲblack blacknessǳ and the liberatory drive, whose ultimate goal is to 
create an identity between metaphysical and micro-political soul. The theoretically 
possible tension between the structural categories of constitutive and constituted 
Blackness is elided in this model by recurrence to authenticity and White ontologico-
political analytical frames such as the recurrence to humanism and the huMan1/2 of 
Oedipal psychoanalysis. There is no constitutional Blackness here, because Blackness 
itself is not understood in terms of production and position but representation and 
being.  
Third, soul in terms of an ǮunBlack Blacknessǯ. This is the soul in the common 
definitions of post-soul and post-Blackness and to a certain degree in writings such as 
that of Alexander Weheliye. It is unBlack, because it is neither Black nor that not-Black 
that defines Whiteness. It can be produced by people of any color. This is a politico-
ontological position that refuses the idea of Black authenticity and emphasizes the 
existence of an irreducible multitude of constituted Blacknesses. Instead of the absence 
of soul and the ⧂ of White Blackness, instead of the double consciousness of Black 
Blackness, unBlack Blackness conceptualizes ǲ… triple consciousness, quadruple consciousness …ǳ ȋEshun, ǲFurther Considerationsǳ ʹͻͺȌ. This multitude of constituted 
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Blacknesses is as such articulated in relation to and partly limited by the confines of 
A[WS], because it is this axiomatic structure that defines Blackness as Black. As was 
indicated in the remarks on the differences between hip hop and techno, two sorts of 
post-soul exist. One kind assumes a meta-physical kernel of Blackness but insists on the 
constructed nature of both structural Blackness and the micro-political soul. This kind is 
unable to imagine the possibility of the end of the world and therewith Blackness. The 
second kind refuses both the metaphysical and micro-political soul and aims to 
ultimately move away from Blackness toward (what will be theorized below as) unBlack 
unBlackness. Although it cannot yet articulate an end to the discourse of A[WS], it marks 
a first movement towards the possibility of this articulation. It is because of its origin in 
and continued relational identity to A[WS] that it still remains Blackness, even if of an 
unBlack kind striving towards unBlackness. The constitutional Blackness it creates remains limited in scope. )t allows a ǲpost-soul blaxplorationǳ of Blacknesses that argues that ǲBlackness is constantly in fluxǳ ȋAshe, ͸ͳͷȌ but does not yet permit any 
transcendence of Blackness as such. 
 Albiezǯ post-soul futurama locates Detroit Techno in the second sort of unBlack Blackness. While noting itǯs rootedness in African American culture and music, he emphasizes technologyǯs capacity to create – through such things as the new electronic 
sounds produced by new and therefore not yet racialized electronic instruments (such 
as the by now legendary Roland 808 drum machine) and the new sonic structures they 
made possible – a space beyond this heritage, a futurama with the potential to ǲde-raceǳ and ǲdeterritorializeǳ music ȋͳͶʹȌ. (e describes this as a ǲ … progressive desire to move beyond essentialized ǮBlacknessǯ […] the process of ethnic dislocation … central to techno … ǲ ȋͳͶ͵, emphasis in the originalȌ, yet also warns that ǲwe should not be tempted to inflate the transformative potential of [technoǯs] escapist rhetoricǳ ȋͳͶͻȌ. 
 While Albiezǯ warning is based on the fact that technoǯs post-racial dynamics have had 
little to no effect on the daily lives of Black people in the Unites States (or elsewhere), this should not impede consideration of the full extent of technoǯs de-racializing utopian 
potential. Such a consideration would mean delineating the potential of technological 
change to open up un-raced dimensions not only in terms of a literal creation of new 
spaces that do not need to be de-racialized but are assumed to be not-yet-racialized (as 
in Weheliyeǯs workȌ, but most of all in form of de-racialization. This dynamic amounts to 
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the promise of a fourth type of (post-)soul. Thus, this chapter wants to argue that 
technological change creates the possibility of an ǮunBlack unBlacknessǯ, that is, the 
possibility of a racial glitch and constitutional Blackness that are unlimited in scope and 
can expand beyond their originary Blackness, to not only post- but even unBlackness. 
UnBlack unBlackness shares with unBlack Blackness its focus on the production of 
Blackness, the multitude of constituted Blacknesses and the central importance of a 
single constituted Blackness antagonistic to White civil society. But contrary to unBlack 
Blackness, unBlack unBlackness aims to move beyond constituted Blackness and the 
structure and cruelty that define it as Black. UnBlack unBlackness (u.u.) is the only 
conceptualization of Blackness that implicitly theorizes the possibility of an end to 
Whiteness, its discourse, and its enslavist regime. It is important to repeat, though, that 
the concept of u.u. describes an idealist potential effect of a technological matrix such as 
the racial glitch and in no way automatically implies its always-already translation from 
the sound of the ghetto blaster, so to speak, into the streets of the ghetto system. In this sense, the ǮBlacknessǯ in unBlackness at once marks the battle field ȋA[WS]) in relation 
to which it is Black, and indicates a temporal matrix: Ǯun-ǯ as a prefix pointing beyond the present, ǮBlacknessǯ as a trace of the past that both indicates the present and the 
maieutic function of Blackness in bringing about the unBlack future. This is a trap of 
words here: to speak of a language which is not yet a language, to give sense to noise 
that would therewith cease to be noise, viz. to speak of a noise that constantly remains 
to come, that would evaporate in enunciation, yet is present. This is a trap of words, where both Black and White people can become unBlack, but as long as ǮBlackǯ and ǮWhiteǯ make sense, only Black will have a u.u. coming, while White is not quite u.u., 
remains w. until the difference between them has become noise to other ears 
determined by another language. 
 
To consider the impact of technological change on the constitution of Blackness means 
thinking together its present effect on the production of unBlack Blackness and its 
potential dynamic towards the production of unBlack unBlackness. By emphasizing this 
difference between the actuality of what is and the (Deleuzian) virtuality of something 
that de facto is not (yet), but whose ideal existence produces effects as if it were real, 
thus creating the conditions of possibility of its becoming actual, one avoids the 
recurrent accusations leveled against considerations of technology and race (e.g. within 
AfroFuturism) as having fallen prey to an idealization of technology at the cost of 
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ignoring real world racism. The post-soul operating between unBlack Blackness and u.u. is not part of the imaginary described by Marlo David as follows: ǲAs some would have 
it, in a post-human universe governed by zeroes and ones, the body ceases to matter, 
thereby fracturing and finally dissolving ties to racialized subjectivity, positionality and 
selfǳ ȋ͸ͻͷȌ. First of all, Davidǯs remark fails to distinguish different modes and levels of 
Blackness, proposing the fusion of a mode of constitutive Blackness ȋǲthe bodyǳ, the 
micro-political cruelty, the inscription onto the flesh) with a future form of constituted Blackness ȋǲzeroes and onesǳȌ, while the constitutional Blackness of the Ǯbetweenǯ-post-
soul still operates in the tension between constituted and constitutive Blackness.  Although ǲthe promise of a placeless, raceless, bodiless near future enabled by technological progressǳ ȋNelson ͳȌ is present in this Ǯbetweenǯ, it remains virtual. 
Insisting on this virtuality means insisting on the fact that pure u.u. can not yet be 
imagined or articulated within A[WS], but exists in a totemic manner similar to the ǲbecomingǳ of D&G, or, as argued above, as noise. As such, u.u. is the exact opposite of 
the colonial empty signifier of Blackness: while the latter served as a ǲblack holeǳ to 
contain that which exceeds discourse within the confines of that discourse, the former 
serves as a wormhole that brings that excess into discourse and therewith forces that 
discourse and the axiomatic that structures it to change or even explode. The dynamic 
towards u.u. is a process on the level of constituted Blackness whose ultimate 
implication would be that the cruelty that founds constitutive Blackness (the pessimist 
permutations from the plantation to the penitentiary theorized in section I.) would cease 
(and constitutive Blackness with it) because the form of subjectivity and abjection it 
sustains has become unfit to the socio-politico-epistemological realities created, among 
other things, by technological change. The racial glitch can be read as a first signal of a 
disjunction between body and discourse that creates the possibility for the post-soul 
unBlack Blackness of which u.u. is an extrapolation. At the present point, this disjunction 
is not total, and the post-soul between unBlack Blackness and u.u. does not claim 
anything to the opposite. But even though bodies still are racialized enough to 
magnetize bullets, the importance of the physical space of the body for socio-politico-
psycho-epistemics is (very slowly) decreasing due to technological change. The multiple 
nature of the subject/abject implies a simultaneous presence in different forms and 
different spaces and locations at the same time, and simultaneous fragmentation that 
permits theorizing the interlinked persistence of pessimist permutations of anti-
Blackness and technological dynamics of unBlackness without risk of contradiction. 
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Marlo David, then, is right in pointing to a ǲǯpost-soulǯ or Ǯpost-blackǯ aesthetics, through 
which contemporary artists and writers strategically reject Blackness as a unitary subject positionǳ ȋidem.), but he is wrong not only in locating such a unitary position in 
the body (as he did in the previously quoted passage) but also in assuming that such a 
position ever existed outside the dispositivist perspective of A[WS]. 
 
Part of this problematic is that, due to the adoption of dispositivist perspectives not only 
by those racialized as white but sometimes also by those racialized as Black, post-soul 
itself is a highly contested terrain. This adoption is also highly relevant in the 
consideration of techno. The fundamental questions here are these: when does one move beyond the Ǯbetweenǯ unBlack Blackness and u.u. into u.u.? How does one 
recognize/experience u.u.? Is it just any un-racialized space? Does it already exist, viz. 
are there already techno-epistemical breaks in the fabric of White civil society that 
permit imaging un-racialized spaces in this given world, language, axiomatic? How 
would unBlackness affect anti-Blackness, how do dynamics in the field of aesthetics spill 
over into the social and the political; how does sound interact with flesh? Consider the 
following. The potential for a de-racializing politics of displeasure that the analysis of 
cinematic technologies traced was based on a tension between different aspects of the 
filmic narrative that offered contradictory racial markings on the level of the visual and 
the flesh/body on the one hand, and the level of discourse on the other. This was a 
tension between recognizably racialized poles. When looking at techno-tracks, one could 
argue (as was done in the critique of Weheliye) that electronic music genres such as 
techno are perceived as White precisely because they are technology based and that 
Black techno producers such as Juan Atkins ǲ … adopted and adapted what was viewed by some as the most Ǯwhiteǯ of Ǯwhite musicǯ …ǳ ȋAlbiez, ͳͶʹȌ. The Whiteness of the 
tracks could then be put in tension with the Blackness of their producers and thus the 
same tension of unBlack Blackness would arise that was delineated in chapter II.2. But 
contrary to cinematic technologies, this tension is not inherent in sound technologies, 
but arises from their setting. The racial tension of a live DJ-set, where the producer is 
present, is not given in, say, a track played on the radio, that might simply be registered 
as White, as Simon Reynolds or Juan Atkins suggest165. In this case, one could argue that 
                                                        
165 Reynolds writes: „)n Detroit, everybody assumed [the pioneering African American Techno duo] 
Cybotron were white guys from Europe. And indeed, apart from a subliminal funk pulsing amidst the 
crisp-and-dry programmed beats, there was scant evidence to hint otherwiseǳ ȋͳͳȌ. And Sean Albiez 
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the colonial difference and its contemporary expression in the digital divide still 
function effectively to erase moments of constitutional Blackness. 
 
Some authors, such as Mirko Hall and Naida Zukic or Kodwo Eshun, refuse this pessimism, insisting that: ǲBy the ͳͻͺͲs, the emergent digital technology of sequencers, 
samplers, synthesizers, and software applications began to scramble the ability to assign 
identity and thereby racialize musicǳȋEshun, ǲFurther Considerations …ǳ ʹͻ͸Ȍ. These 
authors build their argument by taking the references to Deleuze and Guattari that structure Albiezǯ and Weheliyeǯs work a step further. Just as in the latter pairǯs writings, 
Eshun implicitly thinks music through such Deuleuzo-Guattarian concepts as the war 
machine or de-racialization as deterritorialization. While they use ǲdecodingǳ to 
characterize intra-axiomatic change, D&G describe deterritorialization as a form of 
axiom-deconstruction that aims to undo not only a specific code, but the discourse 
within which a code makes sense altogether (see Mille 437). In this sense, 
deterritorialization would undo not only the structure imposed on something (e.g. a territory, a body, a desire …Ȍ by an axiomatic, but the complete axiomatic within which a 
structureǯs consistency is anchored (Anti-Oedipe 42.f.). From Eshunǯs perspective, the 
deterritorializing potential of contemporary sound technology is sufficient to create 
sounds that are neither Black nor Ǯmusicǯ, that is, sound technology impacts cultural 
constellations in a manner permitting the creation of unBlack unBlackness. As he writes 
about contemporary Ǯmusicǯ: ǲBlack music is in the machines. Therefore an approach to 
the machine and machinethought obsolesces premachinic identityǳ ȋMore brilliant 
03[31]; emphasis added). It is important to note that from this perspective, unBlack 
unBlackness is not created by the emergence of silent or not-yet-racialized new spaces 
(for example early cyberspace or soundscapes created by new technologies), but 
through de-racializing something ȋǮmusicǯ) that was racialized prior to that de-territorialisation. This is a ǲprocess of deterritorialization [that] creates new sonoric configurations by aligning itself with the forces of chaosǳ ȋ(all & Zukic, ͳͲͻȌ, a chaos 
that is such only from the perspective of the axiomatic it attempts do undo, a perspective 
from which it will ultimately be perceived as a sort of noise whose ǲchaosmoticǳ166 
                                                                                                                                                                             
quotes Juan Atkins assessment that specifically ǲ… African American audiences think of techno as essentially white and European …ǳ ȋAtkins according to Albiez, ͳͶͻȌ.  
  
166 Section III. will elaborate on the concept of chaosmosis. 
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potential for (de-)subjection informs the shift from the human to the cyborg that the 
next chapter will analyze in more detail.  
 
Considering the originality of electronic music already noted by D&G, as well as Fred Motenǯs conceptualization of what would be deterritorialized sound as existing in a form of ǲbeing maternal that is indistinguishable from a being materialǳ ȋBreak 16; emphasis 
in the originalȌ and Weheliyeǯs notion of the production of Blackness in music in form of an ǲ) am ) beǳ, theory at this point becomes what Sun Ra termed ǲMythScienceǳ 
(according to Eshun, More brilliant 09[156.ff.]). It becomes a post-foundational 
intervention into Black social death in which the lack of world and historical 
relationality is supplanted by a new world created through not so much de- as counter-
colonization, through a Black agency from which will spring unBlack Blackness and 
ultimately u.u. This is the cyborg Blackness moment, when, in Drexciyaǯs MythScience 
and in much of Afro-Futurist arts, the logic of the denial of Black humanity is taken to its 
extreme conclusion by the action of the abject Black being itself. The unBlack Blackness 
of cyborg-Blackness is the Black abject shed of its invisibility by exploding abjection 
from the inside. Just like the abject Black person, the unBlack cyborg remains an-other 
to humanity that puts it under constant threat. But in constructing a MythScience in 
which (e.g.) racial narratives are shifted from alien abduction by slave traders to self-
constructions as interstellar aliens, from representational absence to being-beyond-
humanity, from authenticity to becoming, cyborg-Blackness exemplifies constitutional 
Blackness. This is a constitutional Blackness in which t/race – both as the truth of race 
and the historical marker of its social construction – morphs from indicating stigma and 
marks of the cruelty of constitutive Blackness that become visible in constituted 
Blackness, into the productive force of a constant refoundation of Blackness in which 
constituted and constitutive Blackness have become one, not in terms of authentic 
representation, but in terms of socio-genesis taken literally: the unBlack Blackness of 
the cyborg is constructivism become flesh, it does not indicate a literal machine-body-
hybrid, but signals how the racialized body is always-already a cybernetic organism 
inscribed with something other-than-itself, how an axiomatically Black body is always-
already more than its flesh or material, how it is always-already infused with 
technology.   
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Although – even if one shares Eshunǯs belief in the possibility of unracialized 
technological spaces – u.u. must still be located in an utopian realm, it is important to 
keep in mind that the racialized body is always-already a cyborg and therefore cyborg 
Blackness is still unBlack Blackness, not always already u.u. The racial glitch is a 
disruption in cyborg-genesis that offers a path for constitutional Blackness from the 
body racialized as Black to unBlack cyborg Blackness. But it does not sever the flesh 
from discourse as such. It disturbs the inscription of discourse into the body and onto 
the flesh. As a de-racializing and de-territorializing effect of systemic failure, it creates a 
de-coded space in which subject and abject – which may now be understood as specific 
cyborg-configurations – are less determined by context (such as, for example, visual 
racial markers and the bio-political orders they indicate) and thus more open to 
potential transformation. Technological change, by creating such glitches, transforms 
cyborg-configurations, creating both re-written racial codes (for example definitions of 
Blackness through the genomic code rather than skin color) and potentially un-
racialized bodies (for example electro-sonic bleeps and bloops, clicks and cuts, noise). 
Yet, so far, unBlack Blackness has not generated an u.u. that would alleviate the 
dispensability and disposability of Black bodies. The axiomatic system, so far, has been 
able to persist with its glitches and to contain constitutional Blackness. 
 
It is important to note that although technological change has an impact on the 
constitution of Blackness in terms of the relation between constituted and constitutive 
and the production of constitutional Blackness, it has not (yet) had a sufficient impact on 
the axiomatic necessity of (anti-)Blackness that ultimately determines Black social and 
civic death. Far from being only a messenger of hope and harbinger of liberation, 
technology in the form of the robot, the computer or the cyborg not only emerges as de-
racialized humanoid instance, but may also be re-coded into a black hole that contains 
and regulates the potential of unBlackness – thus both moving Blackness to that Ǯbetweenǯ between Black unBlackness and u.u. and keeping it there. If indeed techno 
sounds were perceived as neither White nor Black, they would mark a space theorized earlier in this chapter as Ǯsilenceǯ or Ǯno musicǯ. Such silence (viz. the absence of 
discourse and the power it embodies) would mark a permanent state of crisis in an 
epistemo-political system that is defined by the Black–non-Black binary. This crisis 
could take the form of the racial glitch theorized in earlier chapters, with its potential to 
de-subjectify through racial indeterminacy. However, far from extending the state of 
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crisis, the figure of the cyborg seems to have become yet another empty signifier to 
contain the glitch. Cyborg tones, humanoid sounds: somehow human, but also somehow 
not. If human enough, they are often considered White. If not, they are mostly captured into a Ǯmachine musicǯ that is cognitively severed from humanity, or remains coded as 
noise. Nevertheless, sound technologies have produced a significant enlargement and 
therewith reconfiguration of the partition of the sensible by producing at least 
potentially de-racializing war machines that may not yet have taken to the streets but 
started re-coding constituted Blackness from soul to post-soul, from the non-humanity 
of the animal like thing to the non-humanity of the cyborg. In order to properly assess 
and analyze this impact of technological change on the constitution of Blackness, a 
methodology for Cyborg Black Studies is necessary. 
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Section III. Cyborg Black Studies 
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(CONCLUSION:) 
III.1. CYBORG BLACK STUDIES  
 
ǲThis project is complicated by the fact that, in the historical era of advanced 
postmodernity, the very notion of Ǯthe humanǯ is not only de-stabilized by technologically 
mediated social relations in a globally connected world, but it is also thrown open to 
contradictory redefinitions of what exactly counts as human.ǳ ȋBraidotti, ǲAll too humanǳ ͳͻ͹Ȍ 
 
ǲ[This statement about] the coexistence of the Ǯhumanǯ with various Ǯtechnologicalǯ 
structures and processes … presumes that the human and the technological 
represent separate, if not antagonistic stable identities, which at this point, and 
perhaps always already, seems untenable, to say the least, given that one is hardly 
conceivable without the other. Why then does black cultural production still 
function as a convenient outside to this interface that will not quite listen to the 
catachrestic nominalism Ǯcyborgǯ?ǳ  
(Weheliye, Phonographies 2) 
 
 
In 1937, the architect Le Corbusier published notes on his travels to the Unites States. 
Discerning in the American Black man and his musical expression an uncanny affinity with the ǲspirit of the machinesǳ ȋͳͷͺȌ that he saw as shaping the twentieth century, Le 
Corbusier wrote in When the Cathedrals were White:  
 ǲNegro music has touched America because it is the melody of the soul joined with 
the rhythm of the machine. It is in two-part time: tears in the heart; movement of 
legs, torso, arms and head. The music of an era of construction: innovating.ǳ 
(idem; emphasis added) 
 
Le Corbusier saw the frenzy of jazz as the ultimate rendition of the experience of his 
times, times which he welcomed and in in which he saw machines as positively 
connoted harbingers of the future, rather than as the signs of dehumanization they have 
become in much contemporary thought. Although repeatedly acknowledging and 
decrying the persistent discrimination and exploitation of Black people in the United 
 190 
States, he emphasized that it was what he perceived as the physicality of the Black past 
and present that made Black music so attractive. Black people, in other words, lived a 
more intense relationship between body and soul than White people did, and as Le 
Corbusier saw modernity turn this intense relation into the dominant model in society, 
so he saw Black music became modernityǯs most fitting form of aesthetic and emotional 
expression. Black people and the machine shaped the United States in his eyes, they 
shaped its culture until it, too, became Black, became machine, defined by vitality, force 
and rhythm. But although Le Corbusier emphasized the spontaneity of Black creation in a ǲprimitivist and essentialistǳ manner ȋDinerstein ͶȌ167, he did not intend to portray a 
Black soul as opposed to or excluding a White mind or rationality. Rather, he attempted 
to distill the dynamics of a specifically American cultural blend. Writing of Louis Armstrongǯs music, Le Corbusier noted: ǲ)ts precision is staggering … That implacable 
exactitude expresses American taste; I see in it an effect of the machineǳ ȋͳͷͻȌ. A moment later, he observed: ǲTap dancers are very popular in the USA – silent Negroes, as mechanical as a sewing machine …ǳȋͳ͸ͲȌ. )n Le Corbusierǯs writing Black people were 
not just a socio-economic, but also a spiritual and aesthetic factor in United States 
society, and he emphasized that the impact of this spiritual role increased not only 
because Black music represented the spirit of the machine so well, but also because the machine played an essential role in its form and propagation, be it through ǲradio broadcastǳ ȋidem.Ȍ or ǲmechanical recordingsǳ ȋͳ͸ʹȌ.  
 
Arguably, Le Corbusierǯs vision of a Black man-machine hybrid as the future of the 
United States can be read as a form of paleo-AfroFuturism, a first step towards reading 
Blackness and technology as not merely intersecting but constitutively enmeshed. 
Although Le Corbusier still wrote of a Black authenticity – a Black soul of the machine, 
not a post-human, a cyborg or a post-soul moment – his musings on technology took 
part in transforming the Black (non-huMan1/2)-machine–trope from that of the slave as 
                                                        
167 Although the reference to Le Corbusier here is inspired by Joel Dinersteinǯs reference to him in her 
introduction to her book Swinging the Machine, it must be emphasized that her approach to Blackness and 
technology can be neither adopted nor approved from the theoretical perspective of the present text. This 
is due to several reasons, of which the principal are: her opposition between ǲwhite technology and black cultureǳȋʹͳȌ; her primitivist reduction of Black culture to ǲportable cultural forms such as music, dance and slangǳ ȋͳͻȌ; and propositions such as that of a Black cultural ǲSaturday night functionǳ in which Black people would ǲreclaim their bodies from their boss and Ǯthe manǯǳ in a ǲsuspension of social conventionǳȋʹʹȌ. Especially this last argument has been the subject of the critique of cruelty and 
spectacular Blackness elaborated in section I., and its repudiation forms one of the main thrusts of Saidiya (artmanǯs book Scenes of Subjection. See Mabel Wilsonǯs Dancing in the Dark for an analysis of the racism in Le Corbusierǯs White Cathedrals. 
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machine with no (micro-political) soul – of the slave as ǲthe ultimate human toolǳ 
(Patterson, 7) or as ǲservomechanismǳ168 – into a Black soul that is still very much machine, but also human and therefore, in Le Corbusierǯs eyes, the herald of a new and better humanity. Le Corbusierǯs Cathedrals is located in a historical moment in which the 
social death of slavery has already largely morphed into the civic death of the prison-
slave-in-waiting, while new technologies ȋǲbroadcastǳ, ǲrecordingsǳȌ have become 
increasingly important in the reproduction of symbolic death, both fostering the 
propagation of pessimist permutations of cruelty – from lynching-postcards (Allen) to 
the infamous Willie Horton mug-shot to media hysteria on Black hooded youth in the 
wake of the Trayvon Martin murder – and creating disruptions in the racializing suture 
of body and discourse, modes of technologically enabled and enhanced haunting that 
have been the subject of chapter II.2 and II.3.  
 This chapter will continue Le Corbusierǯs industrial theme in a techno-music-post-
industrial mode, by proposing a Cyborg Black Studies approach that is both historically and theoretically situated after a moment, when, as Ben Williams writes, ǲBecoming 
robots was, for African American musicians, a subliminally political empowerment and 
an identification with otherness, whether technological or racialǳȋͳ͸ͳȌ. )n order to do this, a short terminological clarification is necessary. Although ǲ[t]he cyborg and the 
posthuman are often used interchangeably, with both formations intended to signify a profound transformation in human identityǳ ȋ(arvey, ͵ͷʹȌ, there is a crucial difference 
between them that will lead this chapter to first explain why they are not identical, and 
then argue why they do have to be combined in order to permit the analysis of the 
impact of technological change on the constitution of Blackness. 
Given the elaborations on the constitution of Blackness and the analysis of 
racialization as a social technology of suturing flesh and discourse, chapter II.3. argued 
that both White subject and Black abject must be understood as cybernetic organisms 
(cyborgs). This terminology emphasizes the idea of the body as an enmeshment of a 
mode of axiomatic discourse (in this case cybernetics in the sense of Norbert Wienerǯs 
science of information and system regulation169) with the corporeality of flesh. In doing 
                                                        
168 ǲLike the robot – Karl Capekǯs Ǯ21 Czech neologism for a mechanized worker – the slave was actually 
manufactured to fulfill a function: as a servomechanism, as a transport system, as furniture, as 3/5 of the 
human, as fractional subjectǳ ȋEshun, More brilliant 07[113]). 
169 The reference to cybernetics here is purely terminological. Norbert Wienerǯs model itself is not 
adopted by the Cyborg Black Studies proposed here. 
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so, it differs from previous elaborations on the intersection of Blackness and the cyborg 
in two things. Firstly, a Cyborg Black Studies approach claims, following AfroFuturism, 
that Blackness has always–already been constituted as a posthuMan1/2 as well as 
cyborg identity. But because this has not been reflected within most of Black Studies 
outside AfroFuturist approaches, Cyborg Black Studies secondly propose to mobilize the 
figure of the Cyborg as a trope for thinking the constitution of Blackness beyond the 
huMan1/2, viz. beyond subjection and abjection. In spite of reclaiming a longue durée 
analysis of Blackness, Cyborg Black Studies is first and foremost focused on 
contemporary and future configurations of Blackness and the role of technological 
change therein. It is because of this double step of reclaiming explanatory power for 
both the past constitution of Blackness and the future of what Blackness may become, as 
well as because of the longstanding dispositivism within Black Studies, that Ǯcyborgǯ 
describes both the political ontology of Blackness and the trope that will permit thinking beyond this political ontology. )n this, the notion of the Ǯcyborgǯ in Cyborg Black Studies 
is different from other elaborations combining Blackness with the cyborg or the 
posthuman, which do not approach the cyborg as a trope for a critical reading of the 
relationship between discourse and flesh and the deconstruction of the notion of the 
huMan1/2, but take the huMan1/2 as given, focusing either on the cyborg-body as a recent or yet to come ǲhuman-artificial hybridǳ ȋLavender ʹ͸Ȍ or reducing its potential 
to the cyborg as literary metaphor of the past rather than analytical model of ongoing 
modes of racialization170. In these latter approaches, the cyborg is portrayed as a Ǯnewǯ 
or additional race (Lavender 182) rather than the prototype of racialization as such. 
Mostly, they have been centered on analyzing the parallels of race and technology as 
binary oppositions (rather than constitutionally enmeshed aspects within 
subjection/abjection) in SF (speculation fiction/science fiction). This can be exemplarily observed in )siah Lavenderǯs notion of ǲtechnicityǳ:  
 ǲ) define technicity as the integration of various technologies with humanity to 
produce new racial forms such as AI (artificial intelligence), cyborgs, artificial people 
and posthumans. Technicity is a reimagining of how race is affected by technology, a 
                                                        
170 See for example Thomas Fosterǯs reading of the cyborg as metaphor for slavery ȋͳͷͲ.f.Ȍ. 
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way of imagining how individuals might conceive identity within increasingly technological worlds.ǳ ȋͳ͹Ȍ171.  
 
Although such works and their primary sources often offer valuable insights into racist 
structures underlying SF, they also over-identify cyborgness with Blackness, thereby 
reproducing the qualification of both the huMan1/2 and Whiteness as unmarked or 
natural (not technologically infected) and will therefore not be taken into account here. (owever, due note must be made her of (arryette Mullenǯs idea of the ǲmedia cyborg 
constructed as a white body with a black soulǳ ȋͺ͸Ȍ. The media cyborg is a fairly loose 
term that extends from the assimilation of Black culture by White people to the dubbing 
of White film actresses with Black singing voices. Here, the media cyborg harks back to 
the racial glitch theorized in relation to Suture, yet differs from it in the crucial point that 
in the media cyborg there is neither disruption (no glitch) nor deconstructive 
modification (no constitutional Blackness), but an artificial and voluntary racial 
assemblage that most often goes unnoticed and is designed to do so. Thus, in spite of its 
dissociation of constitutive and constituted Blackness, the media cyborg is not a trope of 
radical critique, but serves to conserve racial binaries beyond their seeming 
deconstruction. This, as Michael Chaney observes, is in fact the main goal of Mullenǯs 
creating this figure as a trope for analyzing miscegenation:  
 ǲUnlike [Donna] (arawayǯs cyborg, which is ideally able to occupy a radical new 
subject position by denaturing both of its constitutive terms (the human and the machineȌ, Mullenǯs cyborg underscores the way in which a particular term is always favored even after hybridizing Ǯonticǯ binaries, in this case not merely 
human and machine but also black and white. Assimilation is equated with cyborgization in Mullenǯs view, and the media cyborg always entails a production of Whiteness…ǳ ȋʹ͸ͶȌ.  
 
Cyborg Black Studies move away from this narrow and negative identification of 
cyborgness with a specific mode of racialization and insists that all Ǯracesǯ are cyborg 
configurations. However, Whiteness and Blackness (to focus just on these two), subject 
                                                        
171 The term „technicityǲ has also been used by other authors. Thomas Foster, for example, criticizes „David Tomasǯs suggestion that Ǯtechnicityǯ is replacing Ǯethnicityǯǲ in terms of technological changes „making racial categories obsoleteǲ ȋxxivȌ. 
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and abject are not the same configurations. Connecting to Ben Williamsǯ description of 
the cyborg as the contemporary follow-up to the robot as Black political trope, Cyborg 
Black Studies offer a general model of the cyborg as thinking beyond the huMan1/2, all the while emphasizing that reclaiming oneǯs cyborgness, just like reclaiming oneǯs 
humanity, takes on a different character depending on which side of the colonial 
difference that claim is made from. Thus, the model of the cyborg is universal, while the 
trope of the cyborg in Cyborg Black Studies is particular and localized in as far as it 
focuses on the cyborg configuration ǮBlacknessǯ. Expanding on Juan Atkinǯs introduction 
of the robot figure into Detroit Techno-culture172, Ben Williams writes of such a cyborg: 
  ǲThe body that this music creates is not armored against the world with robot 
technology, but rather open and redefined by technology. Atkinǯs robot has been 
replaced by the cyborg, and the difference, as Claudia Springer points out, is crucial: ǯWhile robots represent the acclaim and fear evoked by industrial age 
machines for their ability to function independently of humans, cyborgs 
incorporate rather than exclude humans, and in so doing erase the distinctions previously assumed to distinguish humanity from technologyǯ.ǳ ȋͳ͸͹Ȍ  
 
Unquoted by Williams, Springer continues her elaboration by pointing out that the 
development towards cyborgs means that: ǲAlthough human subjectivity is not lost in 
the process, it is significantly alteredǳ ȋSpringer ͵Ͳ͸Ȍ. Unlike the robot, the cyborg is not-
any-more-yet-still (as opposed to always-already) human, viz. the cyborg as understood 
here is not defined through a man-machine construction with clearly delimitated human 
and machine parts but through a man-technology interbeing that undermines both these 
categories to create a hybrid being not in terms of synthesis between thesis and anti-
thesis but as binary breaking third term. When referring to cyborgs, the term Ǯhybridǯ is 
mostly used to signify the combination of the human and technology, both in terms of 
material machines (bionic prosthesis) and immaterial machines/technologies 
(genetically modified organisms). Yet, Ǯhybridǯ also denotes postcolonial and decolonial 
attempts to undo the coloniality of subjection and abjection and avoids Oedipal 
triangulation and the Other it implies. In Cyborg Black Studies, the cyborg therefore is 
                                                        
172 ǲBerry Gordy built the Motown sound on the same principles as the conveyor or belt system of Ford. Today the plants donǯt work that way – they use computers and robots to built the cars. )ǯm probably more interested in Fordǯs robots than Berry Gordyǯs musicǳ ȋAtkin quoted in Cosgrove ͺͻȌ. 
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hybrid both in terms of the human-machine interbeing and as a condensed form of 
referring to the Deleuzo-Guattarian concept of the assemblage that replaces the 
triangulated subject and abject. Furthermore, it is a hybrid between the huMan1/2 past 
of Blackness and the cyborg future of unBlackness, thus marking the position of the 
cyborg as simultaneously inside and outside A[WS] and emphasizing the conceptual 
hybrid of unBlack Blackness and the MythScience that concerns itself with it. 
 
The cyborg hybrid, then, is post-human in more than one sense. While both Whiteness and Blackness may be cyborg configurations, the interest of Cyborg Black Studiesǯ 
interrogation of the impact of technological change on the constitution of Blackness lies 
in its post-huMan1/2 dynamics; it lies in the change – the afropessimist permutations – 
in the constitution of cyborg Blackness, not in the fact that it is a cyber organism 
(precisely because Blackness and race are so by definition). A cyborg, in other words, 
can still be huMan1/2, it can still be anthropo- and andro-centric173 and intrinsically 
White and therefore the terms cyborg and posthuman must not be used 
interchangeably. A similar critique, however, also applies to trends in posthuman theory 
that, although critical of the historical trajectory of the term Ǯhumanǯ, tend to confuse 
and lump together White (settler) humanity and Black (slave) non-humanity and often 
use the notion of the posthuman to extend the human both as a cognitive category and a 
value system beyond those identities explicitly posited as huManͳ/ʹ towards a ǲpan-humanityǳ ȋBraidotti, Posthuman ͳͳȌ that does not only not account for oneǯs own 
situatedness in relation to the epistemic split created by A[WS] but also re-produces the 
erasure of Blackness174. Cyborg Black Studies is not about proposing a new form of 
totalizing narrative, it is not about the Aufhebung of race in a salvaged neo-humanism. Cyborg Black Studies refuses to recognize ǲadvanced capitalismǳ as ǲpost-racialǳ 
(Braidotti, Posthuman 98) and refers to the always-already post-human of Blackness in 
order to theorize the constructedness and constitutive nature of race not in terms of 
                                                        
173 Claudia Springerǯs goal, in fact, is to show how the figure of the cyborg serves to uphold male 
subjectivities and what in the present terminology would be considered the general axiomatic of 
huMan1/2. Thomas Foster also analyses this strain in cyberpunk writing and movies such as Robocop 
(171.ff.). 
174 The work of Rosi Braidotti shows why a critique inspired by D&G remains insufficient if it does not include D&G ȋspecifically their notion of ǲbecomingǳ and who can ǲbecomeǳȌ within that critique. Thus, 
although the present text has many points in common with Braidottiǯs conception of the posthuman, it 
also proposes fundamental differences drawn from its engagement with the erasure of Blackness and the 
embracing of its own emanation from a White position of knowledge production. See Hayles and 
Halberstam & Livington for further examples of feminist post(-)humanism limited by their insensitivity to 
their own racializing mechanics. 
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abolition, but in terms of its technologically induced and framed permutations and 
continuity. Although it carries the utopian promise of u.u., Cyborg Black Studies is both 
grounded in unBlack Blackness and – as the term unBlack unBlackness indicates by 
insisting on clinging to Blackness in spite of the un- – the forever impossible erasure of 
the constitutive nature of Blackness even in a hypothetical times that would not abject 
Blackness: the future will forever have been made of anti-Blackness. Cyborg Black 
Studies distances itself both from the focus on futurist huMan1/2-machine-
constructions of most Cyborg theories and from the huMan1/2ism of much of 
posthuman theory, focusing instead on an anti-humanist humanoid-technology-
interbeing whose pessimist permutations have been in process since the beginning of 
the transatlantic slave trade. The goal of the present chapter is to think of the post-
huMan1/2 cyborg in terms of the decentered, non-linear assemblage that is the hybrid 
cyborg. The cyborg is not castrated by the master-signifier: it refuses the axiomatic lack 
in B/lack. Instead, it has to be thought of as a hybrid, productive and autopoietic 
instance (as will be further explained below). 
  
But in spite of these reservations towards existing scholarship concerned with the post-
human and cyborgs, Cyborg Black Studies owes a considerable debt to feminist writing, specifically Donna (arawayǯs ǲCyborg Manifestoǳ. )n the ǲManifestoǳ, the cyborg 
becomes the ideal post-huManͳ/ʹ utopian figure. Although still defined as ǲa hybrid creature, composed of organism and machine,ǳ Harawayǯs cyborg-trope already reaches 
beyond the binary opposition of man and machine, towards the hybrid:  
 ǳ … cyborgs are compounded of special kinds of machines and special kinds of 
organisms appropriate to the late twentieth century. Cyborgs are post-Second 
World War hybrid entities made of, first, ourselves and other organic creatures in our unchosen Ǯhigh-technologicalǯ guise as information systems, texts, and 
ergonomically controlled laboring, desiring and reproducing systems. The second 
essential ingredient in cyborgs is machines in their guise, also, as communication 
systems, texts and self-acting, ergonomically designed apparatuses.ǳ ȋͳͷͲ; 
emphasis added) 
 Describing her vision of cyborg politics as an updating of Foucaultǯs notion of biopolitics 
(idem.Ȍ into ǲtechnobiopowerǳ ȋGane & (araway, ͳͶͺȌ, (arawayǯs Cyborg Feminism 
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both diverges from (for example in terms of historical narrative) and anticipates and 
inspires many of Cyborg Black Studiesǯ central ideas. She writes: 
 ǲBy the late twentieth century, our time, a mythic time, we are all chimeras, 
theorized and fabricated hybrids of machine and organism; in short, we are 
cyborgs. The cyborg is our ontology; it gives us our politics. The cyborg is a 
condensed image of both imagination and material reality, the two joined centers structuring any possibility of historical transformation […] the relation between 
organism and machine has been a border war. The stakes in the border war have 
been the territories of production, reproduction, and imagination. This chapter is 
an argument for pleasure in the confusion of boundaries and for responsibility in 
their construction […] the utopian tradition of imagining a world without gender, 
which is perhaps a world without genesis, but maybe also a world without end. 
The cyborg incarnation is outside salvation history. Nor does it mark time on an oedipal calendar […] The cyborg is a creature in a post-gender world; it has no 
truck with bisexuality, pre-oedipal symbiosis, unalienated labor, or other 
seductions to organic wholeness through a final appropriation of all the powers 
of the parts into a higher unity. In a sense, the cyborg has no origin story in the Western sense […] ǳ ȋͳͷͲ; emphasis in the original) 
 
The connections here are best established in dialogic form. 
 
ǲNo origin story in the Western sense … ǳ  
_ but MythSciene, the AfroFuturist method of locating the origin of the posthuman 
in the Middle Passage, the alien abduction, the slave ship as the womb into which flesh 
enters and from which a cybernetic organism is pushed out; not entirely flesh, because 
freshly inscribed with Blackness, but also not huMan1/2, not body, already posthuman because made flesh in order to Ǯcreateǯ the huManͳ/ʹ that is not-Black. 
 
ǲThe cyborg is our ontology; it gives us our politics … ǲ _ 
 _  a political ontology; the race which is not given yet destiny in the world made 
with a colonial difference; but also a hauntology (see below). A cyborg configuration is 
an axiomatic identity and the Black Cyborg that is the abject of study here is internal to 
A[WS] in as far as it is Black. Cyborg politics are not about abolishing the enmeshment of 
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cybernetics and organism, body and discourse – they are not about regaining a lost 
purity and innocence or what (araway calls ǲsalvationǳ –, but of changing the 
configuration, changing the cybernetic axiomatics, about substituting it for another 
axiomatics by whatever means possible175. Even in u.u. the cyborg would still be cyborg, 
but of another political ontology and with another politics. The posthuman cyborg has 
no soul: it has been and can be reconfigured. This is what it means for AfroFuturism, 
Techno and other Black radical (culture) politics to not only embrace but try to move 
beyond post-soul. 
 
ǲBy the late twentieth century, our time, a mythic time, we are all chimeras, theorized and 
fabricated hybrids of machine and organism; in short, we are cyborgs …ǳ  
 _ MythScience, not anti-science: a science that ventures to explore that which is 
beyond itself, the language striving to catch the first rays and sine-waves of one of those, of 
that Fanonian new language(s) and new modes of being, thinking, making sense. Science, 
because still bend on discovering and explaining structures that allow explanation of 
causality, effect, predictability, because still respecting the requirements of intra-axiomatic 
falsifiability/verifiability. Myth, because insisting on the contingent foundation and 
malleability of the axiom that founds the realm of the explainable, thinkable, perceivable, 
predictable. MythScience because hybrid. Given the enmeshment of coloniality, modernity 
and rationality (see section I.), any attempt to un-think coloniality is always-already at 
risk of being axiomatically discredited as mythological-or-indigenous-as-politically-
correct-noun-for-primitive. For the axiom, itǯs own undoing starts in the form of noise 
and non-sense. At another moment in her Manifesto, Haraway writes: 
 
 ǲCyborg politics is the struggle for language and the struggle against perfect 
communication, against the one code that translates all meaning perfectly, the 
central dogma of phallogocentrism. That is why cyborg politics insist on noise and advocate pollution, rejoicing in the illegitimate fusion of animal and machine.ǳ 
(176; emphasis added) 
 
Noise as illegible and illegitimate presence, haunting presences, t/races of information 
from another axiom. Emphasizing, as is done here, the cyb-ernetic in cyb-org, noise 
                                                        
175 In this, they differ from the schizo-analytic goal of simply abolishing an axiomatic without substituting 
it with another. 
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becomes interference in the ǲinformatics of dominationǳ ȋͳ͸ͳȌ, it becomes a re-wiring of 
the –org. As Nicholas Gane and Donna Haraway muse:  
 ǲNG: This means, in turn, that resistance – if we can call it that – might play 
through the breakdown of communication, or in the formulation of codes that 
prevent the easy translation of all cultural-natural forms. In light of this, is noise – 
that key term in cybernetic thinking – of increased political significance? 
 
DH: Yes, ) think it is. […] )ǯm interested in tropes as places where you trip. Tropes 
are way more than metaphors and metonymies and the narrow orthodox list. Noise is only one figure, one trope that )ǯm interested in. Tropes are about 
stutterings, trippings. They are about breakdowns and thatǯs why they are creative. That is why you get somewhere you werenǯt before, because something didnǯt work.ǳ ȋInterview 151.f.) 
 
Noise not just as counter-axiomatic signal, but as methodology, a form of t/racing that 
can only be articulated in MythScience precisely because what it has to speak of cannot 
be witnessed within the axiomatic. 
 
ǲThis chapter is an argument for pleasure in the confusion of boundaries and for 
responsibility in their construction …ǳ 
_ and displeasure: displeasure shaking the subject, the displeasure created by the 
semiosis of the abject that returns the cruelty that has made and is constantly remaking 
it. 
 
ǲThe cyborg is a creature in a post-gender world; it has no truck with bisexuality, pre-
oedipal symbiosis, unalienated labor, or other seductions to organic wholeness through a 
final appropriation of all the powers of the parts into a higher unity … ǲ 
_ antagonism, not conflict. Haraway, too (and afropessimism would agree with 
this analysis of the posthuman, but disagree with the analogy between gender and race), 
understands the posthuMan1/2 as irreconcilable with White civil society. She shares AfroFuturismǯs vision of the cyborg as something altogether different than human: the 
cyborg not simply as a hybrid that encompasses both the subject and its other but as the 
utopic figure of an emancipated abject. Yet both Haraway and AfroFuturism over-
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emphasize the minoritarian position of the cyborg within a specific axiom and tend to 
naturalize the huMan1/2 versus the cyborg, as opposed to thinking Whiteness and 
Blackness as different cyborg configurations. 
 
Cyborgness! 
{(soul / ⧂) = (White = not-Black) = (human / machine)}. 
 
This axiomatic equation marks the split in cyborg theory, between the human and 
posthuman cyborg, between authors such as Claudia Springer, who argue that the cold 
rationality and force of the machine and cyborg are coded as male and that the cyborg in 
popular culture therefore should be understood as a mode of male and huMan1/2 
reproduction, and authors such as Donna Haraway, who argue that the in-humanity of the cyborg must be subversively adapted to narrate not ǲcountermemoryǳ but ǲcounterfutureǳ ȋcf. section )).͵.͵.Ȍ, viz. that the cyborg signals something beyond the 
understanding of gendered and huMan1/2 thought. The cyborg, here, is a totem, a figure 
for becoming, accessible only to a few, rather than a description of something that already is. Using the critique of D&Gǯs notion of ǲbecomingǳ, however, becoming cyborg 
turns into a useful problematization of the utopian potential of the cyborg trope and u.u., 
as it would mark the dynamic of a contemporary constitution of Blackness that both 
permits some privileged bodies to work the disruption of the constellation between 
constitutive, constituted and constitutional Blackness (or: C3) and tweaks these bodiesǯ 
cyborg configuration, while over-identifying and mass-incarcerating others. This 
problematic of becoming thus marks the crucial problematization of the differences 
between the anti-humanist racial glitch that can not be voluntarily produced, and the 
modalities of C3 and t/racing that are central methodological tenets of Cyborg Black 
Studies and as such subject to both Ǯhumanǯ agency and volition and the axiomatic that 
frames them. Although the MythScience that is Cyborg Black Studies can attempt to 
retro-actively diagnose/narrate a glitch, itǯs own mobilization of the abject has to be 
understood in terms of C3, with both the glitch and C3 marking different kinds of 
semiosis of the abject. Cyborg Black Studiesǯ discourse on the abject aspects of the 
hybrid cyborg is always caught in a paradox, attempting to speak and write about 
something within a language whose axiomatic foundation the abject exceeds. As in 
cinema, realism necessarily stops here and myth begins, because the appearance of the 
abject part of the hybrid cyborg is not only noise, but also irrational and unreal within 
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the axiomatic. At the same time, however, this noise risks being both validated and 
contained by the its intra-axiomatic location of appearance in science. In order to avoid 
both the pitfalls of this paradox and its potential reproduction of Black abjection, further 
elaboration on the semiosis of the abject and the relationship between the glitch and C3 
is therefore necessary. 
 Closely related to Walter Mignoloǯs concept of ǲcolonial semiosisǳ ȋHermenéutica, 
126), the semiosis of the abject emphasizes not only the potentially lethal appearance 
within the axiomatically determined socio-symbolic realm of something that is 
constitutively excluded from it, but also indicates that this appearance cannot simply 
take place or be expressed within the vocabulary or grammar of that realm and its 
axiomatic. The semiosis of the abject can never be total in the axiomatic that creates this 
abjection to constitute itself, because such a total semiosis would destroy that axiomatic. 
It can, however, be partial and it is this partiality that is emphasized in terms such as 
unBlack Blackness that still rely on the axiomatic framework of their appearance (viz. 
Blackness). As section II. has shown, thinking about the semiosis of the abject thus 
revolves around two key fields of interrogation: 
 
1. How and in how far does the abject cease to be abject through its 
semiosis within the axiom that abjects it? Does a prior transformation 
have to take place for such a semiosis to even be thinkable? Does its appearance indicate that it was not Ǯreallyǯ abject in the first place? How 
many kinds of semiosis of the abject are there (semiosis of the body-
abject in The Crying Game, semiosis of the flesh-abject in Suture …Ȍ?  
2. How would such a semiosis come about? What form would it take? 
Would it be possible to intra-axiomatically speak about such a semiosis 
in a form that is not noise? Would such a semiosis emerge in un-
colonized fields, or would it create such fields through 
deterritorialization? How does a partial semiosis of the abject relate to a 
total semiosis and the creation of one or many (Fanonian) new 
language(s)? 
 
So far, two approaches towards answering these questions have been suggested: the 
glitch and constitutional Blackness (which are not in themselves moments of the 
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semiosis of the abject, but describe structural dynamics which may cause and be caused 
by such moments).  
 
The glitch is an event within discourse and it is from here that it affects the inscription of 
discourse onto and into the body. The glitch is cybernetic, it is not between discourse 
and body – this ǲbetweenǳ being the place of cruelty – but firmly within discourse. The 
glitch emphasizes a structural effect, it is not the product of a free and oppositional 
consciousness. How, then, does it come about, if it cannot be willed? Either through 
accumulation of micro-differential ruptures that are produced within its reproduction, 
or through an autopoietic moment, an event in the desiring machine, a chaosmotic 
happening, which exceeds or disrupts existing modes of racialization and Blackness. 
Again, the argument returns to Deleuze and Guattari. Although proponents of micro-
differential ruptures (e.g. Judith Butler) theorize these in dispositivist patterns, micro-
difference and autopoiesis are not mutually exclusive. While micro-difference explains 
intra-dispositive effects, the concept as such does not exclude the possibility that events 
originating outside the dispositive affect that dispositive. The schize is not Ǯeither … orǯ 
but accumulative. Thus, although micro-difference as such terms the ruptures that might 
appear in reiterative processes of subjection and abjection, it does not exclude haunting 
(see chapters I.3.f. + II.2.). Indeed, micro-differential thought is motivated by haunting in 
as far as haunting comes from that space which is not subjectivated/abjected and which 
thus forces the reiterations of subjection in which micro-differences can appear. But 
micro-differential thought insists that haunting will remain such, contained in 
melancholia as the impossible morning of the lost part. But rather than accepting the 
idea of melancholia, one should consider haunting the first indication of a possible 
autopoietic event. As such the uncanny and frightening feeling the marionette or cyborg 
may cause carry a socially symptomatic dimension. This is where the politics of 
displeasure emerge as part of cyborg politics, but it is also the hauntology as theorized 
by Mark Fisher:  
 ǲWhat haunts the digital cul-de-sacs of the twenty-first century is not so much the past as all the lost futures that the twentieth century taught us to anticipate. […] 
More broadly, and more troublingly, the disappearance of the future meant the 
deterioration for a whole mode of social imagination: the capacity to conceive of a 
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world radically different from the one in which we currently live.ǳ ȋǲ(auntologyǳ, 
16) 
 
Musing about the records of Blues musician Robert Johnson and the hauntological character of AfroFuturism, Fisher notes that in hauntology, ǲthere is no presence except mythologicallyǳ ȋǲCrackleǳ, ͶͻȌ. But mythological, here, does not refer to imaginary or 
made up, but designates the only possible mode of presence for something which is not 
compatible with the axiomatic criteria of reality and Ǯhardǯ science, while also indicating 
that the semiosis of the abject, in disrupting the axiomatic, also inflects time beyond the 
supposed linearity of modernity and its subjects and towards the assemblaged hybridity 
of the unBlack Black cyborg and some of its temporal performances such as the 
rememorizing that Toni Morrison develops in Beloved. Haunting emanates from outside 
the axiomatic and therefore poses a threat to both that axiomatic and the political 
ontology it founds. As Colin Davis points out: 
 ǲ(auntology supplants its near-homonym ontology, replacing the priority of 
being and presence with the figure of the ghost as that which is neither present 
nor absent, neither dead nor alive. [It marks; S.W.] a wholly irrecuperable 
intrusion in our world, which is not comprehensible within our available intellectual frameworks, but whose otherness we are responsible for preserving.ǳ 
(373) 
 
UnBlack Blackness is (as Blackness) something that bears the trace of its axiomatic 
constitution, yet the para-ontological split it mobilizes and the hybridity it creates mark a haunting of that constitutive axiomatic. Reading Fisherǯs notes on Johnson, one could 
think he might well have been speaking about the presence of the Black abject in A[WS], 
with his focus on formalist play as a way in which hauntology pushes against the limits of expression and cognition and his emphasis that ǲ(auntology is the proper name for a 
history made up of gaps, erased names and abductionsǳ ȋǲCrackleǳ, ͷʹȌ. (ere we begin to 
circle around the specificities of the hybrid cyborg. Thinking not only about, but through 
the unBlack Black cyborg (as AfroFuturism does) means taking up the challenge to think of haunting as a mode of conceiving from within A[WS] a ǲworld radically differentǳ. 
Thus, haunting, again, returns us to the question of the semiosis of the abject, just as it 
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returns us to the difficulty of intra-axiomatic speech and noise and to the question (C. 
Davis, 379) and ǲposition of the unthoughtǳ ȋWilderson & (artmanȌ. 
 
Where is haunting located in the terminology developed thus far? Is it a precondition or 
already the first stage of the semiosis of the abject? An uncanny feeling, present but not 
grasped in language, felt (affective? psychological?) noise but not yet symbolic noise? 
One must dwell on autopoiesis for a short moment to grapple with this problematic. 
How does it come about, what is it? Derrida – whose ǲhauntologyǳ176 inspired that of 
Mark Fisher – approaches autopoiesis through (auto)teleipoietics, giving the following 
definition:  
 ǲTeleipoiós qualifies, in a great number of contexts and semantic orders, that 
which renders absolute, perfect, completed, accomplished, finished, that which 
brings to an end. But permit us to play with the tele […] Rendering, making, 
transforming, producing, creating – this is what counts; but given that this 
happens only in the auto-tele-affection of the said sentence, in so far as it implies 
or incorporates its reader, one would – precisely to be complete – have to speak 
of auto-teleipoetics.ǳ (Friendship, 32; emphasis in the original) 
 
The emphasis here is on a production that is more than the micro-difference created by 
disturbed re-production. ȋAutoȌteleipoiois is an act of ǲgeneration by joint and simultaneous grafting of the performative and the reportive, without a body of its ownǳ 
(idem). (Auto)teleipoietics have a retroactive character through which a cause is 
determined by its effect, viz. in which an effect creates in its event the conditions of its 
possibility and epistemic grasp-ability, which, in axiomatic terms means that an extra-
axiomatic event creates only in its happening the ruptures in the axiom that make it 
cognitively possible. Thus, (auto)teleipoios marks the relationship between the racial 
glitch and Cyborg Black Studies. What could not be thought of, what was neither legible 
nor legitimate, imposes itself in its event. It will not be erased by an axiom, because if the 
modes of erasure were able to do this, this would imply that the event had a least been 
                                                        
176 ǲRepetition and first time: this is perhaps the question of the event as questions of the ghost. What is a 
ghost? What is the effectivity or the presence of a specter, that is, of what seems to remain as ineffective, 
virtual, insubstantial as a simulacrum? Is there there, between the thing itself and its simulacrum, an opposition that holds up? […] Let us call it hauntology. This logic of haunting would not be merely larger 
and more powerful than an ontology or a thinking of Being …ǳ ȋDerrida, Spectres, 49; emphasis in the 
original). 
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implicitly anticipated and therefore never really was an event at all. But although this 
offers a first clarification of the importance of the concept of (auto)teleipoetics for 
Cyborg Black Studies, it does not explain how such an event could happen nor what its 
implications would be, but stops with the assertion that, could we understand the event 
a priori, it would not be an event. The questions asked about the character and 
possibility of the semiosis of the abject still stands, while it seems, again, that the 
argument begins to circle around itself faster and faster the more one nears the limits of 
the axiom that founds it. While MythScience may attempt to narrate an origin to 
(auto)teleipoetics, the fact that it can only be acknowledged retroactively makes of it an 
intuition more than a deduction, that is, a cognitive category fundamentally determined by oneǯs position in relation to the colonial difference and once position or situation vis-
à-vis A[WS] and its constitutional cruelty and agnotology. 
 
This has two fundamental consequences for a Cyborg Black Studies approach. First of all, 
it means that (auto)teleipoetics cannot be conceived as Freudo-Lacanian drives (such as Motenǯs liberatory driveȌ, which occupy well defined dynamics and constitute well 
analyzed relationships. Rather, it is very much like the productive desire in D&G. As Slavoj Žižek argues in his reading of Deleuze through (umberto Maturana and Francisco Varelaǯs conceptualization of ǲautopoiesisǳ ȋto which Derridaǯs notion of 
(auto)teleipoetics harks back)177, the question of this autopoietic event is nothing less 
than the question of freedom as the possibility to act in spite of not being a free monadic agent ȋŽižek, Organe 153-162), in spite of being determined by discourse deep into the 
                                                        
177 According to Félix Guattari, Varelaǯs autopoiesis refers to a homogenetic system reproducing itself 
inside itself (as would for example be the case in a living organism). Guattari himself explicitly refuses to 
limit the term to homogenetic and self-identical processes, describing Varelaǯs version of autopoiesis  ǲ… as unitary individuation, with neither input nor output …ǳ, while his own conceptualization would,ǳ … 
direct us towards a more collective machinism without delimited unity, whose autonomy accommodates diverse mediums of alterityǳ ȋChaosmosis 42). Guattari therewith performs a rapprochement to the function of the ǲteleiǳ in Derridaǯs ȋautoȌteleipoetics which emphasize both the notion of becoming and 
becoming beyond one self. Although not identical – especially in what concerns the emphasis on event in ǲpoiesisǳ and the emphasis on systematicity in ǲpoieticsǳ – Guattariǯs and Derridaǯs terms sufficiently 
overlap to be subsumed in the use of Guattariǯs concept of autopoiesis for the purpose of this chapter. For a more detailed look at Maturana & Varelaǯs concept of autopoiesis and its adaptation by D&G, see Paul 
Bains (85ff.). Rosi Braidotti also uses an adaptation of the Maturana-Varela notion of ǲauto-poieticsǳ closer 
to the original to ground her thinking of the posthuman in a nature-culture continuum that refuses both a 
transcendental notion of the human (e.g. through the soul) and a biological purism that would oppose species and technology: ǲMy point is that this [social constructivist] approach, which rests on the binary 
opposition between the given and the constructed, is currently being replaced by a non-dualistic 
understanding of nature-culture interaction. In my view the latter is associated to and supported by 
monistic philosophy, which rejects dualism, especially the opposition nature-culture and stresses instead 
the self-organizing ȋor autopoieticȌ force of living matterǳȋBraidotti, Posthuman 3). 
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realms of oneǯs desires. It is the question of agency in spite of accepting the 
afropessimist analysis, the question of agency in spite of disagreeing with large parts of 
Black Optimism (see chapter II.2.) and thus one of the central questions of Cyborg Black 
Studies. Autopoiesis marks the limits of discourse and guarantees its insufficiency in 
terms of a total reproduction of power. There will always be disturbance and rupture. 
But this must not be misunderstood as abject agency. Haunting is not simply a political 
scheme, but a socio-politco-epistemico-economico (etc.) effect. Although haunting seems 
to imply agency on the part of the abject, it should rather be understood as a deficiency 
of the axiom, haunting as long as that axiom holds, but transforming into a semiosis of 
the abject as soon as the axiom falters, e.g. in the event of a glitch, which thus marks an 
effect involving both the axiom and its outside. 
 
C3, on the other hand, describes an intra-axiomatic process, a dynamic between different 
dimensions of an axiom. The glitch points to an effect within the axiomatic that disturbs 
or disrupts its inscription into the body/flesh, viz. the glitch describes a rupture between 
constitutive and constituted Blackness that potentially disrupts its constitution and 
introduces into the axiom outside-moments that it cannot understand and not assimilate 
or colonize, such as noise. The glitch has no founding, except hauntology. C3, on the other 
hand, is founded on political ontology. It describes a dynamic that arises out of the 
relation between constitutive and constituted Blackness and works on the level of the 
constituted, remaining within the language of the axiomatic and the space for perceived 
agency it offers, trying to transform rather than abolish it. The glitch, in other words, 
pertains to aeskesis, it works towards the new language and a new political ontology 
and can only be hinted at, while C3 remains in the given language and ontology and 
marks a specific mode of contra-axiomatic expression at the intersection of politics and 
aesthetics (e.g. Free Jazz, Black Arts Movement, etc.). While the glitch describes a more 
radical position working towards u.u., C3 enables a theorization of intra-axiomatic 
changes within the continuity of pessimist permutations; the paradigmatic (but by no 
means exclusive) counter-axiomatic dynamic of C3 therefore is micro-difference, not the 
autopoiesis attributed to the glitch above.  
 
This leads to the second consequence of the intuitive character of autopoiesis for a Cyborg Black Studies methodology: itǯs schizo-analytic approach. In spite of insisting on 
the differences between different cyborg configurations, as well as its emphasis on the 
 207 
continuing fatality of pessimist permutations, Cyborg Black Studies ultimately propose a 
system of hybridity not based on difference (or différance). As Guattari points out (and 
this defines the engagement with the work of both D&G throughout the present text), 
autopoiesis is a concept that is neither structural nor post-structural, but on the 
contrary describes productive forces that are constantly undoing structure:  
 ǲStructure implies feedback loops, it puts into play a concept of totalisation that it 
itself masters. It is occupied by inputs and outputs whose purpose is to make the 
structure function according to a principle of eternal return. It is haunted by a 
desire for eternity. The machine, on the contrary, is shaped by a desire for 
abolition. Its emergence is doubled with breakdown, catastrophe – the menace of 
death. It possesses a supplement: a dimension of alterity, which it develops in 
different forms. This alterity differentiates it from structure, which is based on a 
principle of homeomorphism. The difference supplied by the machinic 
autopoiesis is based on disequilibrium, the prospection of virtual Universes far from equilibrium. And this doesnǯt simply involve a rupture of formal 
equilibrium, but a radical ontological reconversion.ǳ ȋChaosmosis 37) 
 Breakdown, death, disequilibrium, catastrophe … those were the dangers that 
threatened the Lacanian subject if it came to close to the abject that is both constitutive 
of and banned outside the dispositive and its axiom. )t is in this sense that Guattariǯs use of ǲalterityǳ has to be understood as referring to something not assimilated by the 
axiom, as that whose introduction into the dispositive creates ruptures, disorder and 
ultimately freedom. The ultimate potential of autopoiesis is thus the abolition of the axiom and the political ontology it founds; the ǲradical ontological conversionǳ points to 
a fanonian new language and the axiomatically unspeakable and afropessimist a-topia. 
But Guattari, too, must admit that, although autopoiesis guarantees agency and freedom, 
the ontological reconversion marks an extreme point that escapes an agency one can 
only theorize in that discourse which will break down in its event. The question asked of 
the impact of technological change on the constitution of Blackness here continues in a 
different form: Is autopoiesis – as that which undergirds the semiosis of the abject – 
deterritorializing or reterritorializing, does it undo racialization or create not yet 
racialized spaces? 
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The glitch would be an example of deterritorialization, but as was pointed out in the 
critique of becoming cyborg, one has to be careful not to confuse epistemological 
deracialization with deracialization Ǯin the streetsǯ: unthinking race is not undoing race. 
As anti-humanist autopoiesis, the glitch can neither be a political strategy nor an 
academic method in itself. It is an event that not only escapes, but undermines structure. 
No matter on what side of the colonial difference one is located, one cannot willingly 
produce a glitch. Nevertheless, the significance and impact of the glitch changes 
according to that location. While Blackness, through its abjection and antagonistic 
relation to constitutional cruelty, always-already Ǯlivesǯ as such Ǯinǯ an epistemological 
hybridity made up of both A[WS] and that which haunts it and breaks open in the glitch, 
the White subject can only learn to note the glitchǯs presence in its effects and through 
the affects it produces. While the Black abject, then, because of it experiences of being Black in A[WS], may Ǯknowǯ of the possibility and necessity of the glitch before it 
happens, the White subject, indeed, can only (but must) learn to be affected after the 
fact. Parts of a Cyborg Black Studies approach would therefore consist in 
teaching/learning a mode of apprehending, a mode of listening to noise, of not erasing 
the t/race, not ignoring the glitch, of being ǲin the wakeǳ ȋSharpe). This is a mode of 
askesis, where the subject needs to learn its enmeshment with abjection and its erasure. 
But as the abject and its semiosis are not contained within the discourse they constitute, this cannot simply be done through ǲcommon senseǳ and everyday language and reason. 
It is for this reason that MythScience and autopoiesis are related to affect, to sensing 
(both as perceiving through the senses and as giving sense) the uncanny, to being 
haunted by absent presences/present absences not contained in axiomatic modes of 
feeling, knowing, making sense. But one need not aim directly for ontological 
reconstitution and the radical potential of the glitch, but may approach the work of/on 
haunting (both in terms of a t/racing hauntology and in the sense of promoting the 
creation of the conditions of possibility of haunting) – as it was theorized in the 
preceding chapters under the names of a politics and cinema of displeasure or noise – 
through the conceptual framework of C3.  
 This is also the direction of Félix Guattariǯs work, who defines his engagement with 
chaosmosis (based on schizo-analysis) as an attempt to articulate an ǲethico-aesthetic paradigmǳ ȋChaosmosis 8). This step back from total ontological reconstitution to the 
aesthetic is precisely the step back from afropessimism to a partial and provisional 
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alignment with Black Optimism that I have defined as inevitable for White authors such 
as myself, or, in other words, for the White subject which, through its being a subject, 
has necessarily to begin its engagement with abjection from an intra-axiomatic position. 
But this schizo-analytic engagement and provisional alignment is also strongly 
characterized by important differences from Black Optimism, because it refuses the 
latterǯs structural approach and its reliance on Lacanian psychoanalysis. In using the term ǲmachineǳ, Guattari refers back to his development, together with Deleuze, of a 
notion of desire that is productive, not representative, a desire that is always full, never lacking. This desire is a force of autopoiesis, much like Fred Motenǯs idea of a liberatory 
drive, but it is not simply based and contained in Oedipal models, but must remain 
unknown in its ultimate nature. The machine cannot be known in itself, it can only be 
approached in the assemblages of political, psychological, technical (and so on) effects 
and the dynamics it combines to form the subject. This assemblage is an ongoing process 
with ever changing and developing parts, not simply a soul damned into the confines of 
the dispositive. In fact, as was mentioned several times already, there is no soul here at 
all: both the subject and the abject do not exist as such but are only ever constituted 
through political ontologies: they are only relational, configured by but never completely 
contained in A[WS]. 
 
Cyborg Black Studies focus on these configured relational assemblages from within 
A[WS], because this is the location of the sciences in which even MythScience still partly 
partakes. They are still Black Studies, but, working from unBlack Blackness, they push 
towards unBlack unBlackness (and thus, ultimately, self-abolition). Although Cyborg 
Black Studies give a central role to autopoiesis in the transformation of Blackness, they 
do not simply prophesize the coming of the glitch and built a cult around its epiphanies, 
but both analyze its conditions of possibility and work to create them. In doing so, they 
focus on the transformation of axioms, and on disruptions in central racializing 
mechanics such as constitutional cruelty, without simply withdrawing into esoteric 
systems of inspiration, improvisation, revelation or individual genius. The term ǲMythǳ is not to be read as indicating mysticism or gratuitousness. Rather, the ǲMythǳ in Cyborg 
Black Studies as MythScience emphasizes (as this text hopes to have demonstrated) the 
existence of alternative modes of knowing and sensing as a position of disciplined 
critique. This is precisely the point where Cyborg Black Studies as MythScience meet with Guattariǯs ethico-aesthetic paradigm. Both position themselves on the fine line 
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between analytical science and a productive mode more closely associated with art. 
MythScience, thus, is caught in several aporias: it has to use speech to express that which 
is not only beyond that speech but lethal to it; it is concerned with a position it partly 
excludes (viz. Cyborg Black Studies are still connected to White colonialist epistemology. 
Even though it strives to undo that epistemology, its enunciative position refers it back 
to the White subject side of colonial difference); it aims to undo the subject that 
determines its grammar; it emphasizes the anti-humanism of the axiomatic event while 
venturing to t/race these through the haunting of the abject. These aporias signal the 
necessity of a methodology pushing against the limits set by A[WS], and it is in order to 
even be able to think them that one needs to engage with science through the ǲMythǳ of 
MythScience. 
 
In other words: Cyborg Black Studies, as all Black Studies, is a mobile methodology 
whose specificities depend on who uses them, with what they concern themselves and 
at whom they are directed. Thus, a White author such as myself, who does not 
experience being-in-a-Black-body and its socio-political consequences and implications, 
must posit a glitch in A[WS] prior to his work in order to guarantee its conditions of 
possibility. Such a White subject can only approach Black Studies from a decentered 
perspective, having to learn to listen and having to work on its subjectivity in order to be 
able to do so. Given the foundational role of Black abjection for White subjection, Black 
Studies is always also a work on Whiteness (et vice versa). However, a shared 
cyborgness must not produce mislead universalities. As was mentioned above, cyborgs 
do differ in their configurations and these differences play an essential role for the 
design of Cyborg Black Studies methodology. While this may be read as radical socio-
epistemological determinism, the effect of autopoiesis is precisely to prevent this. It is 
precisely to break the power of any form of dispositivism and make possible instead 
what Guattari describes as ǲchaosmosisǳ, whose main point of definition is that it 
subverts static modes of subjection by a mobilization of pre- and non-discursive affects 
which qualify as chaos when set in relation to the structures they undo (Chaosmosis 79). 
This being-set-in-relation is essential: Chaosmosis is not simply the eruption of ǲbeing in generalǳ ȋͺͳȌ into discourse; it does not start from the ǲzero degree of subjectificationǳ 
(idemȌ but marks an ǲextreme degree of intensificationǳ ȋͺʹȌ. )n other words: the abject 
is not being-itself threatening to destroy the dispositive, nor is it a new magic totem 
White subjects must capture in order to free themselves of themselves and access new 
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realms of pure knowledge. It must not be forgotten that the abject stands in a relation of 
mutual constitution with the axiom that erases it. Therefore, any mobilization of the 
abject is never simply the eruption of a separate outside, but the folding back of the 
constitutive outside into the inside of the axiom, hence, an intensification of its constitutive mode that may create ruptures in the constituted; an ǲintensificationǳ that 
may reach the mode of being/becoming constitutional. As the analysis of Suture has 
shown, such an intensification may be put in scene within A[WS] in a manner pushing 
against but still firmly inside its limits. While the glitch signals a deterritorializing 
structural defect completely outside volition, constitutional Blackness and the C3 
complex mark a productive effect to which both subject and abject may connect and 
whose ultimate results can range from a mere recalibration of (post)structural 
categories such as constituted Blackness (for example giving voting rights to Black 
people while maintaining and even refining the mechanisms which produce their social, 
civic and symbolic death) to a semiosis of the abject disrupting the (post)structural 
paradigm and not only incompatible with, but unthought and unthinkable through it. 
 
Cyborg Black Studies exceeds (Post-)Structuralism. It is schizo-analytic and it is tied to 
hauntology: its chaosmosis is not ontological, but happens where political ontology, in 
its attempt to constitute and reproduce itself, partially fails to do so. Chaosmosis may 
therefore be understood as an anti-humanist principle of hope: though oneǯs own agency is limited through oneǯs axiomatic subjection/abjection, the latter not only 
describe a never total nor finished process, but are furthermore subject to sudden and 
violent disruption (at least on the theoretical level) and therefore change is thinkable 
and theoretically possible. But Cyborg Black Studies and its conceptualizations of 
chaosmosis, autopoiesis, glitch, C3 and semiosis of the abject is not merely focused on 
abstract events: for Cyborg Black Studies, a pure event is not relevant if its does not bear 
the potential to partake in the undoing of racial discrimination and privilege. It is in its 
focus on the assemblaged subject/abject, that Cyborg Black Studies permits theorizing 
how technological change impacts the constitution of Blackness and its socio-political 
situation and feeds back into the Cyber of the Cyborg. Right from the beginning of 
Chaosmosis, Guattari insists on the importance of considering technology in any 
theorization of the assemblage that is the subject: 
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ǲ…technological machines of information and communication operate at the 
heart of human subjectivity, not only within its memory and intelligence, but within its sensibility, affects and unconscious fantasms.ǳ ȋ͵Ȍ 
 Though he does not use the word Ǯcyberǯ, the argument that founds its use here is implicit in Guattariǯs elaboration on the assemblage-subject. Chaos designates a glitch in 
the Cyber; it affects the Cyborg as glitch, the ultimate threat of Chaos being psychosis. 
Drawing from both his work as a practicing psychoanalyst and his previous writing on 
schizo-analysis, Guattari refuses to qualify psychosis as negative in relation to a positive Ǯnormalǯ, but he is also aware of the difficulties of proposing psychosis as a socio-
political model, choosing to focus on art as a contained mode of psychotic moments 
instead. This amounts to acknowledging the possibility of the glitch and of the semiosis 
of the abject in general, while recognizing that one can only approach it through 
conceptual frames such as C3. Art, here, is not located in the artist178, but marks a shift of 
focus from ontological claims to truth to performative and formalist interrogations. As 
such, the term designates a chaosmotic potential inherent to every part of the subject-
assemblage and a function that may also be occupied by non-living things or places, e.g. 
a kitchen: 
 ǲThe enunciative emergence of the kitchen at La Borde [the clinic where Guattari 
worked; S.W.], to stay with this example, can lead it to take on the role of partial 
analyzer, without any guarantee in time. The autopoietic character of such an 
instance calls for a permanent renewal of the assemblage, a verification of its 
capacity to welcome a-signifying singularities – unbearable patients, insoluble 
conflicts – a constant readjustment of its transversalist opening to the outside world. […] Just as the schizo has broken moorings with subjective individuation, 
the analysis of the Unconscious should be recentered on non-human processes of 
subjection that I call machinic, but which are more than human …ǳ ȋChaosmosis 
71f.) 
 Guattariǯs theorization of chaosmosis as an ethico-aesthetic paradigm follows normative 
pragmatics that are also those of Cyborg Black Studies: it hints at a productive space 
                                                        
178 ǲThis is not about making artists the new heroes of the revolution, the new levers of History!ǲ 
(Chaosmosis 91). 
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whose alterity-to-the-axiomatic-inside functions to create and guarantee intra-axiomatic modes of change and freedom, yet cannot inhabit this productive space because itǯs goal 
is to offer modes of critique and creativity engaged with both noise and axiomatically 
legible and legitimate modes of knowing and making sense.  
 
The Cyborg is an assembled/assemblaged figure. It is a trope chosen to facilitate 
thinking beyond the linear and (post-)structuralist subjectivity and abjection so 
prevalent in current North-Western Theory. Through this trope, the subject is both 
radically decentered and destabilized and the role of technology in this decentering is 
emphasized. The cyborg, thus, is not simply a given object of study, but also a figure that 
crosses the White huMan1/2 axiom of A[WS] and, in doing so, creates the chaosmotic 
dynamics that will permit proposing a a-topian thinking from unBlack Blackness 
towards unBlack unBlackness. By theorizing chaosmosis and autopoiesis, the semiosis 
of the abject and the ontological reconstitution it would signal cease to be only a radical 
horizon and become recognized as recurrent events that permit at least the thought that 
the pessimist permutations in the constitution of Blackness may one day come to an end. 
Yet, these recurrent events are precisely the objects of the erasure that makes the 
constitutive disappear under the constituted. As the necessity to still speak of subject 
and abject indicates, not all cyborgs inhabit the same social position/situation. As in 
noise, the subject and the abject cyborg configurations find themselves on different sides 
of an epistemic divide, on different sides of the colonial difference. What may be a 
chaosmotic event in one series of cyborg assemblages therefore must not be so in 
another. Guattari acknowledges this:  
 ǲArt is not just the activity of established artists but of a whole subjective 
creativity which traverses the generations and oppressed peoples, ghettoes, minorities … ) simply want to stress that the aesthetic paradigm – the creation of 
mutant percepts and affects – has become the paradigm for every possible form 
of liberation, expropriating the old scientific paradigms, to which, for example, historical materialism or Freudianism were referred.ǳ ȋChaosmosis 91) 
 
Again, we return to MythScience (but this time we will not begin the ritornello of 
hybridity again, we will not write about the difficulty of writing of that beyond the axiom 
that structures writing one more time.) Rather, this chapter and text will perform 
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closure by considering what the shift from subject/abject to hybrid assemblage might 
mean for constitutional cruelty.  
 
The trope of the cyborg does not only indicate a move away from the huMan1/2 as a 
matrix for analysis, but also distances itself from conceptualizing subjectivity through 
desire(-as-lack) that has been a focus of critique all throughout this text. The cyborg 
trope follows the critique of dispositivistic White self-overrepresentation and answers 
to the impossibility of Black desire within A[WS] that the schizo-analytic approach has 
traced in dispositivism. The cyborg signals how the suturing of flesh and discourse is not 
an ontogenetic process, but constituted and performed by power. The cyborg has no 
drives or Butlerian imperative longing to participate in any society and occupy symbolic 
space at all costs, in it desire as the Ǯnaturalǯ link between flesh and discourse is broken 
and therewith the soul undone. The emergence of the cyborg and the development of 
the glitch fundamentally revolutionize the role of desire in the explanation of social 
identity and racialization, both redirecting the focus to the essential importance and 
constitutive role of cruelty in the formation of Blackness (and Whiteness), and 
underlining the both artificial and tragic character of both Blackness, Whiteness and 
other forms of racialization. However, as has been emphasized repeatedly in the schizo-
analytic approach pursued here, this does not mean that such totalizing desire does not 
exist, but merely indicates that this desire does not exist Ǯas suchǯ or as the only form of 
desire, but is merely one possible aspect of a series of cyborg configurations among 
others. What these other configurations and their relations to cruelty or different forms 
and modes of desire might be, cannot be known or expressed within the axiomatic of 
this writing at this point. This means that in spite of the change in the constitution of 
Blackness and in spite of the potential of the glitch theorized here in relation to 
technological change, neither cruelty nor the racialization it founds cease to exist. 
Neither C3, nor the racial glitch, so far, have kept Black bodies from magnetizing bullets, 
even if the trope of the cyborg permits thinking and points beyond (social, symbolic, 
civic) death. Thus, death itself is hybridized. The cyborg is not only within huMan1/2-
speech but makes cyborg-noise. If there should be a desire specific to the cyborg-trope 
proposed here, it would emanate from unBlack Blackness, that is: from an assemblage 
rooted in the past and present of A[WS] while also outside and haunting it. This desire 
would be the productive and chaosmotic force proposed by D&G: something whose 
presence would affect the axiom, but can not be integrated, channeled and controlled by 
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it. Thus, unBlack Black cyborg-pleasure is already a different pleasure as yet 
unspeakable. The cyborg makes a totalizing theory impossible, including the one 
expounded here. It is a trope whose mode of activation indicates the position of the author in relation to the epistemic split of colonial difference: the cyborgǯs pleasure 
would frustrate the axiom, while the cyborgǯs frustrations would drive the politics of 
displeasure. As Donna Haraway writes: 
 ǲRace, gender and capital require a cyborg theory of wholes and parts. There is 
no drive in cyborgs to produce total theory, but there is an intimate experience of 
boundaries, their construction and deconstruction. There is a myth system 
waiting to become a political language to ground one way of looking at science 
and technology and challenging the informatics of domination in order to act potently.ǳ ȋͳ81)  
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CODA: THE VOICES OF TRAYVON MARTIN, MICHAEL BROWN …. 
 
ǲ … a makeshift memorial sprang up in the middle of the street where Michael Brownǯs 
body had been sprawled in plain view for more than four hours. Flowers and candles were 
scattered over the bloodstains in the pavement […] Soon, police vehicles reappeared […] An 
officer let the dog he was controlling urinate on the memorial site. […] Brownǯs mother, 
Lesley McSpadden, and others … placed candles and sprinkled flowers on the ground where 
Brown had died […] Soon, the candles and flowers had been smashed, after police drove 
over them.ǳ  
(Follman) 
 
ǲThe radio receiver guaranteed this true lie. Every evening, from nine oǯclock 
to midnight, the Algerian would listen. At the end of the evening, not hearing 
the Voice179, the listener would sometimes leave the needle on a jammed 
wavelength or one that simply produced static, and would announce that the 
voice of the combatants was here. For an hour the room would be filled with 
the piercing, excruciating din of the jamming.ǳ  ȋFanon, ǲVoiceǳ ͵͵ʹȌ 
 
Tuning into the din, the noise, the listener of the Voice tuned into a presence erased, or 
at least partly so. She or he tuned into a disrupted signal on and through which anti-
colonial fighters in Algeria reclaimed constitutive violence and cruelty in order to 
constitute themselves and to constitute an independent state. And although these 
fighters had not yet been able to conquer all public spaces, or even the both constitutive 
and constituted space of radio waves, those who sympathized with the emancipation 
struggle were able to hear the Voice through the noise of the jammed station. These 
listeners had not only tuned their radio to static, but they themselves had tuned into a different desire, not for smooth Ǯmusicǯ and reportive or iterative communication, but 
for generative noise. Their desire had become chaosmotic, creating an imaginary 
                                                        
179 The Voice of Fighting Algeria was a pirate radio station during the Algerian war of independence, 
whose reception the French colonial state powers tried to disturb by jamming its wavelengths. The ǲtrue lieǳ refers to claiming that one had heard this station. )t was true in as far as one was tuned into the stationǯs wavelength and might be able to hear snippets through the jamming. )t was a lie in as far as, 
because of the jamming, this was a productive rather than receptive listening, an imagining rather than 
knowing of what was being transmitted. 
 217 
community and a shared public space out of the white noise of State produced jamming, 
out of sheer will and want, drawing hope from signals that prior to that had been 
illegible, the radio becoming a mediating agent of autopoiesis not unlike the LaBorde 
kitchen.  
 
As the writing on this text began, the Black teenager Trayvon Martin was shot by a 
vigilante for not much more than wearing a hoodie and being Black. Now, as this writing 
is coming to an end, a St. Louis County Grand Jury has decided not to bring criminal 
charges against the White police officer who shot Michael Brown, another Black 
teenager, and left him to bleed to death in the streets for four hours. Even before that 
Grand Jury decision, police let their dogs urinate on a memorial for Brown, made up of 
flowers by mourners on the place where he died. Whatever deracializing potential a 
theoretical consideration of the racial glitch might trace, whatever transformative force 
this consideration might find in C3, must measure up against this continued cruelty and 
the continued pessimist permutations of anti-Blackness and Black abjection. Combined 
with the ongoing continuity of technological change, this continued reproduction of anti-
Blackness makes it impossible to conclude a study on the impact of technological change 
on the constitution of Blackness. Instead, one can only sketch further problematics and 
directions for future work, work that inherently needs to continue, just as change never 
stops and cruelty persists. It is a work of listening to the din, the noise, listening to the 
voices of Trayvon Martin, Michael Brown, aunt (ester … 
 
Fanon wrote of The Voice of Fighting Algeria: 
 ǲThis voice, often absent, physically inaudible, which each one felt welling up 
within himself, founded an inner perception of the Fatherland, became 
materialized in an irrefutable way. Every Algerian, for his part, broadcast and 
transmitted the new language. The nature of this voice recalled in more than one 
way that of the Revolution: present Ǯin the airǯ in isolated pieces, but not objectively.ǳ ȋidem. Emphasis added.) 
 )n order to not only engage with Fanonǯs call for a new language, but apply its creative 
and political force to its own production, this textǯs research into postcolonial and Black 
epistemologies and their effects in such diverse fields as Political Theory, Film and 
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Sound Studies offered an often fundamental critique of the foundations of established 
disciplines in the humanities and social sciences. It combined post-Marxist and 
psychoanalytic as well anti-psychiatric and Film Theory with French Theory and Black 
and Sound Studies. Interweaving research into the Prison Industrial Complex and its 
history with theoretical questions of desire and abjection drawn from Gender Studies 
and pursued in an analysis of postmodern film and Detroit Techno music, several fields 
that are often treated apart within Black Studies were combined to offer a new approach 
to Black Studies.  The focus of this approach was often the inscription of power into and 
onto bodies and flesh and the complication technological change introduces into that 
inscription. The common thread running through all the different chapters and fields of 
the present text was a Black Studies inspired schizo-analytic critique of the mostly 
Lacanian infrastructure of the theories touched upon. This critique was articulated with 
a pronounced decolonial interest and lead to the formulation of a fundamentally new 
approach to Black Studies by closing with a critique of posthumanism, offering Ǯnoiseǯ as a new epistemological paradigm and moving the ǮCyborgǯ instead of the Ǯ(umanǯ into the 
focus of Black Studies. In doing so, however, the text has also criticized schizo-analysis 
for ignoring the effect of its situatedness as well as the impact of the racialized identity 
of its creators on its formation. It was emphasized that the epistemic divide between 
White subject and Black abject is necessarily present in a writing about Blackness that is 
also always a writing about Whiteness, a writing that at worst reiterates dispositivistic 
subjection and at best strives for a chaosmotic semiosis of the abject. 
 
But as cruelty continues, just as technological change continues, there is never really a 
conclusion, but a sustained coda that keeps repeating the elements of the main corpus, 
putting them in ever new constellations with each other. A coda of noise becoming 
voices, a desire to hear these voices, to tune into the din, to listen, to face abjection and 
enslavism and work towards its undoing, not only unthinking. As the previous pages 
have shown, these impulses and questions about the impact of technology on the 
constitution of race revolve around two central possibilities: creating as yet non-
racialized spaces or un- (and re-)doing already racialized spaces and the identities that 
they sustain. By introducing both C3 and the racial glitch, the present text has decidedly 
focused on the latter possibility, theorizing transformations in the constitution of Blackness as opposed to the idea that ǲthe historical, political, and cultural construction of ethnicity … inevitably will weaken and fade as the technological future unfolds …ǳ 
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(Lavender 190). One potential of Cyborg Black Studies lies precisely in offering a method 
and theory to ferreting out such glimmers of change in the continuing pessimist 
permutations in the constitution of Blackness, as opposed to prophesizing a total 
techno-utopia beyond Blackness and Whiteness. From this perspective, two projects 
impose themselves for the immediate future development of Cyborg Black Studies. One is 
to continue theorizing the always coming but never to arrive avenir of unBlack 
unBlackness and the creative dynamics that arise from is contra-factual force. The other 
project lies in combining the work done on Black Diasporas with more recent work on 
race in cyberspace (Nakamura) and Digital Diaspora Studies (Everett), fields of research 
that are still connected to Black Studies at large but will attain more importance and 
independence as technological change continues to impact society. Increasingly, large 
parts of the methodologies and conceptual vocabulary partly in use since colonialist 
times will prove to be incapable of explaining contemporary social and polit-theoretical 
problematics. What is Blackness, when communities not only can, but always-already do 
rely on cyberspace to constitute themselves? What is a racialized body, when 
subjectivity and social identity are no longer supported only by the physical body, but 
also by technological devices that permanently connect one to the internet (e.g. 
smartphones) and thus make cyber-presence a constitutive aspect of social existence? 
What, in other words, will Blackness become as transmediality increases? What would 
politics of displeasure gone digital look like? How does the constitution of Blackness 
change at the intersection of desire and data? How radical is the potential of the racial 
glitch and C3? These are some of the questions for future applications and developments 
of Cyborg Black Studies. These are some of the lines of flight in attempting to listen to the 
voices, some of the ways of adapting the language of Black Studies to contemporary and 
future challenges and to continue understanding and working from (and as far as 
possible against) the constitution of Blackness as abject within White civil society. 
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